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Abstract 
This thesis conducts a conceptual genealogy of love in sociological thought. lt 
traces the passage of a positive logic of love: a disappearing logic conceived 
in Goethe's art, cultivated from the social science of Comte and Marx to 
classical non/Marxist sociology, and finally extinguished by late/modern 
reflexive sociology. Recovering the lineage of Comte, Durkheim and Parsons, 
it defends an economic politics of love in the positivist tradition against the 
political culture of classical sociology and the bio-politics of current sociology. 
After the demise of Marxist political economy, it examines a new order of love 
transversal to the socialist and capitalist organizations. 
The tripartite thesis argues that the sociological tradition has been tarrying 
with a social order of love evolved from Goethe's ethic of death and 
renunciation. This order expresses a disorganizing phenomenology of fate as 
the modern world traverses from the fated causes. to fatal consequences of 
love. In the causal loop, the fated-fatal order of love encounters the act, 
freedom and risk in a multiple unfolding of reality with minimal difference. Part 
I explores how a religious-political belief of fetishism practiced by Comte and 
Marx comes across its fate in the historical act. Part 11 explicates why a 
cultural-political calling for fraternity theorized by classical non/Marxist 
sociologists runs up against its fate in sexual freedom. Part Ill reveals that a 
bio-political interest in reflexivity methodized by late/modern sociologists 
tumbles upon its fate in social risk. In conclusion, however, the thesis 
suggests that an event of posthumous life after the liberation of humanity 
continues to occur in a state of emergency because the passion for fate 
escalating from social science to sociology is driven by an unrequited love of 
Humanity. 
Keywords: order, fate, love, act, sex, risk, fetishism, fraternity, reflexivity, 
humanity 
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Introduction 
Love in Sociological Thought: A General Outline of the Thesis 
There are three principal aims of the thesis 
(i) 
This thesis proposes that love in sociological thought has ceased to be an 
abstract idea celebrated in literary odes, religious hymns and philosophical 
treatises. No longer a magical solution to original sins and monstrous evils, 
love has acquired a self-questioning thought of its own. This means a history 
of rationality progressing from social science to sociology and beyond makes 
no sense without the problematization of love. At the dawn of modernity in the 
early 19th century, social scientists thought a reconstruction of national 
societies might be grounded in love. At the dusk of modernity from the late 
20th century onwards, sociologists have reconsidered if love could deliver a 
transformation of our world s~ciety. We will present a close rereading of 
orthodoxy from Comte through Durkheim to Parsons starting from Goethe's 
ethical matrix (eh. 1, 2, 6, 8). We will find unanticipated encounters with 
Marx's theory, non/Marxist sociologies and psychoanalysis, late/modem 
sociology and post-psychoanalytic-Marxist social theory. In these encounters, 
we have separated a heterodox complex from a transdox series. The 
heterodox complex will receive mostly critical commentaries, particularly for 
Weber, Marxists, Gillian Rose and Luhmann (eh. 4, 5, 7). Standing out from 
the heterodox complex, we will highlight a "transdox" series from Badiou 
through Zizek to Baudrillard as a counterpart to the orthodox line (eh. 3, 6, 9). 
We are unfolding a conceptual genealogy of love in sociological thought, not a 
systematic history of sociology or social thought, much less of philosophy, in 
Hegel's sense. In sum, the first aim of the thesis seeks to prove that there is a 
hidden agenda of love in the sociological·tradition requiring reconsideration by 
heterodox and transdox discourses. 
The thesis is divided into three parts with each part consisting of three 
chapters. While unfolding the genealogical network, a chronological order 
from part I to part Ill is largely retained. Within each part, the genealogical 
I 
network spreads out from the chapter level down to the level of a specific 
point of argument. For example, in part 11 where classical non/Marxist 
sociology is concerned, we rather begin with an overview of post-structuralism 
and post-modernism through the eyes of Rose's history of contemporary 
philosophy (eh. 4) and end in a rereading of Durkheim through the lens of 
Zizek's history of modern philosophy (eh. 6). 
Part I introduces Goethe's art as the forerunner of social science before the 
latter takes on the forms of Comtean religion and Marxian politics. In chapter 
1, we will show that Goethe's art of love-life lies beyond the German 
philosophical journey of reason and revolution passing from Kant to Hegel. 
Moreover, his ethic of renunciation in death is irreducible to the cultural-
historical imaginations of classicism, the Enlightenment and romanticism. In 
chapter 2, we will argue that Comte's scientific religion and Marx's scientific 
politics act out Goethe's art, insofar as both attempt to square the circle of 
knowledge and love in the hope of constructing a new society. Specifically, 
they result in a convergence on the question of fetishism in the historical 
process of r/evolution. In chapter 3, we will suggest that the social scientific 
conception of love can be understood as a dream of socialism unrequited in 
the current neo-liberal democracy. To elucidate this point, we bring Goethe, 
Comte and Marx back in the counter/late-modern philosophical contexts from 
Hegel through Nietzsche to Plato. These contexts are brought to the fore by 
contemporary philosophy from Karl Low"ith's hermeneutics to Alan Badiou's 
post-Marxism. On this horizon, we conclude with a heuristic notion of love 
called the fatal act. 
Part 11 examines further how Goethe's ethic of renunciation is embodied in the 
culture of classical sociology. In chapter 4, we will provide Rose's overview of 
the contemporary post-structural subject in law and postmodern subject in 
love against the modern philosophical baseline between Kant and Hegel. 
Reading Rose's work, we recognize the fates of sociology, Marxism, 
poststructuralism and postmodernism on the one hand and the chances of 
Hellenism, Judaism and Christianity on the other. However, Rose's total 
archaeology of the subject misreads Comte and Marx, obscures Goethe, and, 
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as a result, robs classical non/Marxist sociology of the chance to present a 
case for a loving spirit of society. In chapter 5, we will reread classical 
sociologists in light of Rose against Rose. Weber, Durkheim and Simmel are 
serialized according to her philosophical logic of the end, middle, and 
beginning to help us realize that classical sociologists do presuppose but only 
suspend a subject of love in their preoccupation with the law. By a common 
misconception of Goethe's ethic of renunciation, furthermore, sociology and 
Marxism end up with a coincidence of insight on the question of fraternity. In 
chapter 6, we will reconsider Durkheim's oft-criticized organicism in an 
alternative history of modern philosophy offered by Zizek, discovering an 
organism of love between the sexes in his sociology. We insist that Durkheim 
is immune from the German ideology because of his fidelity to Comte's 
positivism. In fact, he overcomes Comte's problems in the science of altruism 
and Religion of Humanity by introducing a symbolic method of sociological-
anthropology, a genetic method inherited by later Parsons. This minimal 
difference marks the internal horizon of his sociology limited by the conceptual 
relation of life-time and free will. In this sense, Durkheim brings Comte's 
science back to Goethe's art of love. 
Part Ill traces the end of sociological thought brought about by late/modern, 
reflexive sociology. In chapter 7, we will survey several reflexive discourses of 
love developed by late/modern sociologists, including Bauman, Giddens, 
Beck and Luhmann, distinguishing their new method of social analysis from 
the critical discourses of love presented in the conventional frameworks of 
social psychology, liberal Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis. Our reading 
will lead readers to acknowledge the impasse of the reflexive approach in a 
mystic cult of cynicism, as it abuses the knowledge of the Enlightenment and 
the power of the French Revolution by a fantasy of the romantic 
Enlightenment. In chapter 8, we will situate the intellectual growth of 
late/modern sociology in a rite of passage out of Parsonian modern sociology. 
Furthermore, we will explain the social genesis of reflexive sociology in a 
historical-institutional context. This means the institutionalization of sociology 
makes it a reflexive discipline in the service of the needs of everyday life in 
late-modernity. As a result, with recourse to Foucault's study of bio-politics, we 
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learn to tell that the late/modern(ist) discourses of self-government target 
sexualized individuals, not couples in love. In chapter 9, from the demise of 
Durkheimianism, Marxism and Freudianism, we conclude there is an evental 
order of love foreign to the body politics' will to risk. 
(ii) 
With the above genealogical network, we hope to achieve the second aim of 
the thesis, which is to reconstruct a conceptual event of love. Beginning with a 
consideration of Goethe's art, the tripartite thesis argues that the sociological 
tradition of love has been pursuing an order of life in accord with the ethic of 
fate, that is, a social ethic of death and renunciation driven by the situational 
duality of love in fated and fatal events. Love's three degrees of causality are 
found in a threefold encounter of fate with the act, freedom and risk. Part I 
may be read as the initiation of a temporal causality of love. Temporally, love 
finds its fate in the historical act, a true act in the structure of a fiction, just like 
Comte's religious cult and Marx's political praxis. Part 11 may be read as the 
intervention of a material causality of love. Materialistically, love finds its fate 
in the organic freedom of the sexes behind the scene of sexual antagonism, 
as we see from classical non/Marxist sociologists' common search for 
fraternity. Part Ill may be read as the determination of a spatial causality of 
love. Spatially, love finds its fate in the risk society, where fatal consequences 
of risk are governed by the code of everyday security, as we see in the 
reflexive condition of life in late/modern sociology. 
Moreover, our conceptual genealogy of love traces the original causes to the 
very end of the evolutionary chain. That is to say, while the three causalities of 
love seem to progress from the history through reality to hyper-real politics of 
life, we think against the grain. Bluntly put, we do not believe in a 
communicative model of love in the current society/sociology, insofar as this 
model "deconstructs" the concept of love reflexively into sensational pillow talk 
across multi-cultural spaces, inter-textual discourses and transsexual bodies. 
We hold that reflexive deconstruction profits from a cultural reduction of 
language, ranging from Greek, Germanic, Italic to Balto-Siavic languages. By 
contextualizing the linguistic structure, making language an open system of 
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signs, it falls prey to the code of Western culture, rendering other cultural 
phenomena transparent but its own fundamental rules opaque. As a result, 
the multicultural respect it pays to foreign cultures is merely rhetoric. lt 
disregards the linguistic fact that the fabric of Western logos is not constituted 
by speech, but by the grammatical rules of gender and tense. Following these 
suggestions, we trace the conceptual causes of love back to sex in time. We 
suggest that love, after being subtracted from communicative space, can 
recollect its original relationships with sexuality and historical community. In 
other words, only by traversing the obscene and fantastic terrain of economic 
intercourse could one rethink a politics of love. 
(iii) 
Our final aim is implied in a discussion of the social world of love since the 
disorganized world of love constitutes the limit and horizon of the thesis. 
There are already many representations of love in the world from bestselling 
pocket books to statistic psychological models. But we find that love's logic of 
disappearance forbids us to grasp it in this manner, that love's genealogical 
network allows us to see only its quivering silhouette, and that love's 
conceptual event is available only through counterfactuals. Nonetheless, we 
pres~nt a list of contemporary studies of love (consisting of philosophical, 
historical and sociological works) in the following with a constant reminder that 
one easily loses sight of love's truth. 
Philosophical works on love can be roughly divided into humanist and anti-
humanist camps (cf. eh. 8). On the one hand, lrving Singer is doubtlessly a 
productive humanist philosopher of love. His major works include The Nature 
of Love (3 vols. 1984-1987), The Meaning of Life (3 vols, 1994-1996), and 
Explorations in Sex and Love (2001). John Armstrong's Conditions of Love: 
The Philosophy of Intimacy (2003), Alain de Bolton's Essays in Love (2006), 
and Christopher Philips' Socrates in Love: Philosophy for a Passionate Heart 
(2007) are for popular tastes, since they discuss love in practical contexts 
from daily life to current affairs. This approach sticks to secular humanism 
against the religious view by putting more trust in the power of imagination to 
revaluate reality. On the other hand, feminist philosophers write about love in 
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addition to female sexuality. Julia Kristeva's In the Beginning was Love: 
Psychoanalysis and Faith (1987) and Tales of Love (1987) are textbooks in 
this area. Most of Luce lrigaray's works ponder on the link of sexual difference 
to love in opening up a new space for democracy. Her more recent works are I 
Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History (1993[1990]), To be Two 
(2001 [1997]), and. The Way of Love (2002). Hel€me Cixous' latest writings on 
love are L'Amour du Loup et Autres Remorc/s (2003) and L'Amour Meme 
Dans la Borte aux Lettres (2005). This approach is more interested in a 
meditation on the moral-religious condition of politics based on a marriage of 
psychoanalysis, deconstruction and mysticism. 
Historical works related to love are rich in empirical material, and yet 
susceptible to ideological representations due to a lack of philosophical and/or 
social scientific logic. First, in the history of emotion, one should mention 
Theodore Zeldin's A History of French Passions (5 vols, 1973-1977) and An 
Intimate History of Humanity (1994) which is much more concise. Peter Gay's 
The Bourgeois Experience (5 vols. 1984-1998) and Schnitzler's Century 
(2002) are critically acclaimed as usual. This approach is interested in 
psychoanalysis of everyday life in Western Europe. Second, in the history of 
private life, the first choice must be Philip Aries' The Century of Childhood: A 
Social History of Family Life (1962) and History of Private Life (5 vols, co-eds. 
with Georg~s Duby, 1987-1991). Aries is a good start because of his 
theoretical reference to Foucault's history of sexuality. Third, in the literary 
history of love, one cannot miss C.S. Lewis' The Allegory of Love: The Study 
of Medieval Tradition (1936) and The Four Loves (1960). Denis de 
Rougemont's Love in the Western World (1939, rev. 1972) and Myths of Love 
(1963[1961]) among others are often compared to Lewis' works. Apart from 
the problematic identification of culture with literature, this approach reflected 
a calling of love in the religious-political contexts of Protestantism, 
Europeanism and Nationalism (especially Frenchness and/or Englishness) in 
the early 201h century. But in a late/modern condition, Simmelian Octavio Paz' 
mystic view of love in The Double Flame: Essays on Love and Eroticism 
(1996) turns out to be more well received by the current sociology (cf. eh. 5, 
7). 
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Probably the only sociologist who claims to have a theory of love available for 
empirical study is Francesco Alberoni. His fecund writings on love are built on 
his early political notion of the nascent state. Against French eroticism, 
especially Bataille, Breton and others, Alberoni has been approaching a 
general theory of love-life by extensive researches on love-related emotions in 
different social settings, such as friendship, first love, cultural celebrity and 
political charisma. lt remains to be discussed if his life trans/forming idea of 
love is a variant of neo-vitalism or nee-humanism. To say the least, one can 
find his Italian style of exposition in any of his works, such as Falling in Love 
and Loving (1979), I Love You: A Theory of Love (1996), Sex and Love 
(2005). Alberoni also founded the Falling in Love Center with his wife Rosa 
Giannetta Alberoni in the 1980s. In the U.S., by contrast, The Institute for 
Research on Unlimited Love was founded by John Templeton Foundation in 
2001. The current president Stephen G. Post directs a group of scholars from 
medicine, psychiatry, theology, religious study, social science and sociology to 
publish interdisciplinary studies on altruistic love. The center is reminiscent of 
and more ambitious than Pitrim Sorokin's sociological studies conducted in 
his Research Center of Creative Altruism founded at Harvard in 1943 (cf. eh. 
8). 
Apart from the above projects aiming to produce a general sociology of love, 
more focused studies rest content to. make sense of intimacy. In the cultural 
sociology of intimacy, Eva lllouz's Consuming Romantic Utopia: Love and The 
Cultural Contradiction of Capitalism (1997) and Cold Intimacies: The Making 
of Emotional Capitalism (2007) keep to the cultural Marxist approach. Finally, 
Viviana A. Zelizer's development from the classic The Social Meaning of 
Money: Pay Checks, Pin Money, Poor Relief and other Currencies (1994) to 
The Purchase of Intimacy (2007) makes her an exemplar in the economic 
sociology of intimacy. In our view, this line harbours great potential for the 
empirical research of love. 
The disappearance of a love-event: theoretical and methodological 
. orientations of the thesis 
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Following the outline above, we propose to conduct a conceptual genealogy 
of love in sociological thought. The thesis as a whole argues that Goethe's art-
life inaugurated a new world order grounded in true love. Goethe's order of 
love subject to the ethic of death and renunciation once helped the birth of 
social science and the growth of classical sociology, but his legacy has now 
passed into oblivion with the advent of late-modern, reflexive sociology. 
Against the current sociological opinion that reflexive modernity recurs 
through individual agency, we bring Goethe's subject of fate back in the 
sociological tradition to reform the site of a singular modernity. Above all, we 
assume that contemporary social theories are driven by the question of 
modernity and its discontents. Accordingly, a counter-modern current, a 
theoretical spectrum composed of the discourses of post-modernity (e.g. 
Lyotard and Bauman), late-modernity (e.g. Beck and Giddens), non-modernity 
(e.g. Foucault and Latour), and hyper-modernity (e.g. Deleuze and 
Baudrillard), may be largely seen as a dissatisfaction with the general view(s) 
of modernity (e.g. Habermas and Luhmann). A common presupposition 
across the spectrum considers that the contemporary world has progressed 
beyond the duality of the subject and the object not only in its content but also 
in its form. This premise is often led to a conclusion that the dual form of 
modernity could be superseded by fragmented dualism (i.e. nothing exists but 
a formless figure in the real, a preponderance of the Subject or the Object) or 
by simulated monism (i.e. nothing exists but a system of signs in the virtual, 
since there is neither the Subject nor the Object). In contrast, by recollecting 
the subject of fate, we hope to recover the dignity of the object at the same 
time. 
Simply put, we adopt an ontology of the subject in covariance with the object 
to maintain a singular form of modernity. We challenge, undermine and even 
disavow the existence of the Other and the Self as the first and last 
metaphysical reasons of the world, only to recognize a social scientific 
non/relation between the subject form and the object form in parallel 
universes. While embracing the failure of modernity in its institutional content, 
we preserve the form of duality embedded in the (true) mendacity of 
modernity. That is to say, by keeping subjective fidelity to the "sublime object" 
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of ideology, an "immaterial corporeality of the 'body within the body'", we aim 
to formalize the vacuity inside the official, hypocritical words of community, 
which span from freedom and equality to justice and true love, to the letter (cf. 
Zizek, 1989: 18). Adopting such a "fatal strategy" suggests that our ontological 
point of departure rests on an event of the dice throw, a central theme of 
Mallarm? and Nietzsche elevated but unresolved in the discourse of hyper-
modernity (Deleuze, 1983: 25-34; Badiou, 2000a: 67-78; Brassier, 2000). The 
image of the dice throw, exemplified by gambling, evokes the ethical problem 
of choice and decision under the ambivalent condition of modernity, that is, 
the ontological coincidence of chance and fate (Baudrillard, 2001: 58-66, 80-
89; Badiou, 2005a: 46-56). In this situation, the theoretical problem does not 
reside in the ontological structure of chance or fate as an ambivalent structure 
of being, but rather in how to think the world in an original way, that is, in a 
way beyond the proto-mystical meditation upon being-in-the-world heralded 
by Heidegger. Conversely, it is against the ontological confusion of being and 
the world that our research question is posed: how do we conceive a new 
world order grounded in true love? As such, we presume that a new order 
cannot be thought without an evental conception of true love. This means 
before introducing the universal truth procedure of love, the subject matter 
guiding the intention and purpose of the thesis, we should explicate our 
approach to the world with resort to Badiou's philosophy of the event. 
Although we retrace the theoretical legacy of fate to Goethe, we are 
unconvinced by the philosophical method of being and becoming in 
hypermodernism. An ontology of being-in-the-world which structures 
presentation in terms of appearing and appearing alone requires an existential 
phenomenology of metamorphosis to express it (Deleuze, 1989; 1994; 
Baudrillard, 2001: 79). A major consequence of this world view of uninterrupted 
emergence is the emancipation of human history, upholding the temporal 
heterogeneity of modernity with a multiplicity of time by means of continuity, 
duration and flow. Answering Heidegger's call for the end of philosophy, 
Deleuzian being is hence appropriated as an event, insofar as life as such is 
affirmed by "a sort of unwavering love for the world" (Badiou, 2000a: 43). In 
effect, hypermodernism imagines a certain non-mediated, sometimes even 
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immediate, becoming of being in the world at the expense of a subjective 
difference between being and the event. 
And here Baudrillard is more aware than Deleuze of the non-identity of being 
and the event (Baudrillard, 1990a: 144-46). From the outset, one should 
abstain from a systematic misreading of Baudrillard's "passion for rules" and 
"siding with the object" since Seduction (1990a[1979]: 131-53) and Fatal 
Strategies (1990b[1983]: 111-28) as a radical shift from his symbolic 
standpoint toward a compromise, if not total confounding, with the sign in the 
orders of simulacra (Kellner, 1989: 180-81; Kroker, 1992: 60-62; Levin, 1996: 
128; Butler, 1999: 98-99, 120-21; Merrin, 2005: 38-41). On the contrary, 
Baudrillard's early critique of the object system and later praise of the object 
can be read as his consistent effort to develop a fatal, literal analysis of the 
event, so that being may be discriminated from the world (Baudrillard, 2001: 
133-36; 2003; 2004; 2005: 133-36). For this analysis to function, Baudrillard 
reserves an evental site foreign to ontological embroilment, a place of art 
where the disappearance of the subject could be captured "objectively" on a 
photographic image (Baudrillard, 1993b: 1 03-05; 1997: 28-34). 
In fact, Baudrillard's unwavering view of the symbolic order originates in For a 
Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (1981 [1972]), in which he argues 
that "sign must burn" by first demystifying use value before exchange value 
and then exterminating value (of the signified-referent) through more, not less, 
exchange (of the signifier) (Baudrillard, 1981: 63-87, 130-63, 211-12). This 
counter-anthropological logic of fetishization shows that the symbolic is 
inhumanly opposed to "the social" understood as a human organism in 
gentrifying the spirit of community. This is why the primary lesson after his 
analysis of "semiological reduction" is to acknowledge that fetishism of the 
body and beauty is an integral part of the ideology of the sign produced by the 
social system (Baudrillard, 1981: 88-101). This is also why, after his logic of 
the sense-event presented in Symbolic Exchange and Death (1993a[1976]), 
Baudrillard must supplement it with a logic of the disorganizing world, 
elaborating on the arts of seduction and fate, a "semiotics" of organs and 
affects, to counter the semiology of the sexual body (cf. Kristeva, 1987: 4-9). 
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For him, symbolic "relation and distance" mediated by the gift may localize 
"this void, the locus of relationship", and so proves counterfactually the 
insistence of subjective desire in a society where "love and aggression", or 
"love and death", coincide (Baudrillard, 1981: 65, 97; 1996[1968]: 199-202). it 
is this unrepresentable social void which prompts Baudrillard to portray a 
parallel universe of an "impossible exchange" with life after the "symbolic 
exchange" with death (formed in an object of the gift exchange) (Baudrillard, 
1993a: 131; 2001: 123). Relativizing the value of life as well as death, he 
reiterates the thesis that a society is immanently traumatized by the symbolic 
order, an order existing for those who "prefer to pay and owe nothing to 
anyone" (Baudrillard, 1981: 211). Standing by the paradoxical point of society, 
on which a gift is anything but free and love is other than grace, Baudrillard 
demystifies the perverse omnipotence of God, a symbol of the Other 
persisting in the Self-identity of a secularized society (cf. Zizek, 2000: 157-58; 
2003). 
Without losing Baudrillard's focus on the art of disappearance, Badiou 
universalizes the singularity of the event into four generic truth procedures, 
science, art, politics and love. For Badiou (2003c: 87), "the void is the destiny 
of any event, since the being of an event is a disappearing." Moreover, if the 
event follows the logic of disappearance as such, then "death is not, and can 
never be, an event" (Badiou, 1999: 77; cf. Baudrillard, 1993b: 103-05). Being 
and the world never form a total circle without a break or a swerve toward the 
disappearance of truth events, on the site of which love constitutes one 
procedure. Postponing idealism indefinitely, Badiou has assumed that 
phenomenological, existentialist and structuralist approaches all fail to 
maintain the ontological difference of being from the world in the last instance 
due to the exclusion of the event in their thought, thereby inviting tyranny of 
the unthought. Conversely, the presentation of being in the world must not be 
levelled down to the appearance of the world with a post/phenomenological 
becoming of consciousness at one with things. Thus, Badiou comes around to 
reconsider an ideological subject without subjectivity in the light of Althusser's 
"subjectivity without a subject" (Badiou, 2006: 58-66; Zizek, 1999: 128). In 
other words, what is missing in Althusser is a rethinking of the subject of 
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"interpellation without identification", "an uncanny subject that precedes the 
gesture of subjectivization", in a savage world (or rather worldless situation) 
excommunicated by the cultured lifeworld of phenomenology and 
structrualism (Zizek, 1994: 60-61 ). In this respect, Badiou differs from 
Baudrillard in that the disappearance of truth-event invokes a subject to force 
nomination of the real at the risk of blowing truths into transparent evil, 
whereas the disappearance of art-event continues symbolic exchange to 
worship the object at the risk of reducing truths to obscurant simulacra (cf. 
Badiou, 2001: 58-89). The return of the truth and the good opens the question 
of the im/possibility of a subjective theory of the signifier. 
A subjective theory of the signifier is apparently possible for Badiou. An 
"undecidable event" occurs to "someone" in a real life situation as s/he 
becomes an "indiscernible subject" by keeping fidelity to a "generic truth" of 
the situation, nominating the situational void without forcing upon the 
"unnamable" multiplicity of the real (Badiou, 2003c: 61, 165-68). Naming the 
ontological void of a situation by a subjective truth-event largely sums up 
Badiou's solution to the problem of the dice throw in modernity. Effectively, he 
seeks to "discover a thinking of choice and of the decision that would go from 
the void to truth without passing through the figure of the master, that is, 
without either invoking or sacrificing the master" (Badiou, 2005a: 54). 
Suspending the master-signifer within a subjective nomination of the truth-
event, Badiou (2006: 26-57) brings Sylvain Lazarus' "anthropology of the 
name" in the real back to philosophical thought. Situated in the evental site 
like other truth procedures, "love is a thought" irreducible to the plenitude of 
being and the world, since the ontological structure of modernity has acquired 
an intelligence of its own (Badiou, 2003b: 55). Consequently, the being-
thought of love cannot be thought through with recourse to the body and 
language as they have been revived from phenomenology to structuralism 
and beyond. Thinking love beyond rational consciousness does not mean that 
one should retreat to some oceanic feelings claimed by a lived experience 
(erlebnis) of the unthought. Quite the contrary, one could break into 
consciousness itself by embarking on a perilous, near-death experience 
(erfahrung) of the unconscious, a "mechanical memory" or compelled thinking 
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of the subject shocked by a love-event (cf. Zizek, 1994: 43-47; Jay, 2006: 
312-60). 
We will not go on to survey Badiou's views of love in the context of 
sociological thought until chapter 3, since his philosophical edifice sketched 
so far is sufficient to provide the building blocks of the thesis. Granted that 
love is a thought of the truth-event, the task of sociology in the wake of 
Badiou's philosophy would then consist in how to capture the disappearance 
of this love-event which resists a total expression of being in the world. But 
how do we analyze the ontological structure of modernity from the vantage 
point of a love-event? What would a new order of the world look like under the 
subjective fidelity of an amorous event? What is this amorous logic which 
conceals as well as reveals the truth of being in the world? 
In view of Badiou's philosophical concepts of the event, subject, being and the 
world, we might tentatively reconstruct the analytic sites of philosophy and 
sociology as follows: 
Philosophy Event-subject/truth Science Art Politics Love 
Sociology Being-world/meaning Religion Culture Economy Sex/uality 
First and foremost, we agree with Badiou's fudamental claim of the "essential 
opposition" between "the classical ideal of truth and the modern polyvalence 
of meaning", insofar as truth is devoid of positive meanings after subtraction 
(Badiou, 2003c: 34). Accordingly, philosophy is predisposed to subjectivize 
the four truth procedures (from science to love) at the level of the event, whilst 
relegating corresponding objective apparatuses (from religion to sexuality) to 
the level of being in the world. The two levels are intransitive to each other, 
which means, for example, there is no relation between politics and economy, 
including a relation of antinomy requiring balance (from na"ive other-exclusion 
to critical self-delimitation) or dialectics requiring sublation (from relative 
contradiction to absolute identity) (Badiou, 2001: 1 02-06; 2006: 124-40; Zizek, 
1999: 347-59; 2004a: 73). Nevertheless, there are.exceptions to the rule .of 
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intransitivity. Badiou (2001: 140) philosophises culture subjectively as a 
"singular interconnected configuration of truth procedures." In a similar vein, 
Zizek (1999: 144) holds instead that religious ideology "gives body" to 
Badiou's generic truth. Their difference aside, exceptions of religion and 
culture have shown that there is still ambiguity concerning how to tell being 
from the world in the light of subjective truth-events. Hence, there is much 
room for sociology to reconfigure these sites, as long as sociologists do not 
rest content with making sense of love by a theodicy of being and becoming 
of the world, which we will see from Weber's cultural-economic sociology of 
world religions in chapter 5. 
A separation of love from the world: intention and purpose of the thesis 
In a sociological sense, one is bound to ask: what is love's evental relation 
with being in the world? Dignifying dance as a metaphor for thought, Badiou 
(2005a: 65) analyzes that "dance retains only a pure form from sexuation, 
desire and love: the form that organizes the triptych of the encounter, the 
entanglement, and the separation. In dance, these three terms are technically 
coded." Figuring love qua separation preserves the event from intermixing 
with Paz's post-modernist eroticism of "the double flame" and Latour's non-
modernist networkism of the "factish", because love, as a thought subtracted 
from feelings, is much more singular than an "explicitating" desire for 
attachments and imbroglios (Paz, 1996; Latour, 1999; 2007a; 2007b). If the 
singular being of an event cannot but disappear from the multiple presentation 
of being in the real, then a love-event must occur to the world in a manner of 
separation, marking its place in but not of the world. By separation, love shies 
away from the obscenity of earthly desires. 
As a reader of Badiou, Zizek (2001: 68-78, 142-51) evokes this tragic world of 
separation by love through a gesture of feminine renunciation of the beloved 
Other. In counter to the hysterical sacrifice of oneself for the Other, "someone" 
can reclaim a subjective desire by sacrificing the Other, given that "the Other's 
decision in me" is blinded, whether naively or cynically, by the desire of the 
Other. After subtracting one's subjective desire from the Other, an evental site 
of decision is then opened for a new order of love to be produced. If this is the 
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case, one errs to criticize the amorous truth procedure in positivist terms, such 
as familial chauvinism or political Fascism, since the subtractive aim of love is 
to revolutionize the libidinal economy of the subject in the real. And this aim is 
supposed to be achieved by the means of separation, the primary issue of 
which pertains to a dialectical overcoming of Women posited cultural-
politically as the master-signifer in a post-patriarchal society (Zizek, 1994: 87-
166). 
Examined closely, Zizek's critical analyses of culture and politics are 
sustained in a religious ideology of love. It appears that he defends a militant 
politics of love originated in Christianity against messianic mysticism 
celebrated in (postmodern) Judaism and New Age obscurantism supported by 
(Western) Buddhism (Zizek, 2000; 2001; 2003). But he is far from calling for a 
struggle of cultural hegemony in an age of globalization. On the contrary, 
Zizek's wage lies in preserving a counter-cultural drive of modernity by 
releasing a savage form of Western culture from its multicultural 
positvizations. To subtract the violent drive of love in modernity, Zizek 
dialecticizes its double religious paradoxes, that is, between Protestantism 
and Catholicism on one front, and between Christianity and inhumanist 
atheism on the other front (Zizek, 1994: 41-43; 2001: 127-37; 2003: 122-43; 
2008a: 1 09-18). Zizek works through his dialectic of Christianity and 
modernity by a Hegelian syllogism of Christianity. This dehistoricized 
syllogism results in his complex strategy to rebuild a· passage from faith 
(salvation and despair, act of love) to belief (ritual, work of love) in the face of 
impotent knowledge (doctrine, law of death) (Zizek, 1994: 34-41; 2001: 109-
13). 
it is this religious ideology of love which makes Zizek return from Badiou to 
Deleuze eventually. In reading Badiou's Being and Event (2005b[1988]), Zizek 
retraces the Christian root of Marxism, as he reads Badiou first as an 
Althusserian, then as a post-Marxist reader of Saint Paul, and finally as an 
implicit Kantian, only not Kantian enough. Meanwhile, Zizek reconstructs the 
trunk of German idealism in Marxism, as he reads Badiou first as an anti-
psychoanalyst, then as a pre-Kantian metaphysician, and finally as the last 
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French dogmatist who not only relies on the master's discourse against the 
discourse of university, but also sometimes regresses into the mystic's non-
discourse (Zizek, 1998; 1999: .127-70). Based on the religious root, Zizek 
·(1999: 145-58) plays Saint Paul against Badiou (and then Lacan against Saint 
Paul and Badiou), protesting that Badiou discounts the negative power of 
death in life and of betrayal in fidelity. Developing along the philosophical 
trunk, Zizek ascribes Hegel's notion of concrete university to Saint Paul's 
teaching, proposing that religion is the "arch-model of ideology", the 
"symptomal torsion" of Badiou's four truth procedures (Zizek, 1998). Reading 
Badiou against Badiou, in short, Zizek tries to embody Badiou's philosophy of 
the truth-event in a Christian religion of love. 
For Badiou, however, the question of ir/religion no longer constitutes a distinct 
line of social division in the 201h century as it was in the 191h century. Zizek is 
therefore mistaken by adding Pauline religion to his list of science, art, politics 
and love. Rather, "[t]he comparison is between philosophy and Paul; that is, 
between my conception of truth and the Pauline conception of truth" (Badiou 
in Badiou and Miller, 2005: 40-41). Taking this view, he understands Christian 
religion in the context of Hebrew culture as opposed to Greek culture. This 
suggests that a theological worldview remains at the margin of philosophy not 
because it believes in a sacred God, but because it builds a secular body of 
Christ as the symbolic support of the Church, State and Society. At bottom, 
the point of contention between Badiou and Zizek lies in a disembodied, 
philosophical notion of truth versus an embodied, psychoanalytical notion of 
truth. The problem of the body begs the Deleuzian question of how a body 
can be thought as an event, which bears an undecidable relation with 
ontology and the subject. In this regard, Badiou (2003c: 87) sums up well: 
"philosophy localizes the void as the condition of truth on the side of being 
qua being, whereas psychoanalysis localizes the void in the Subject, for the 
Subject is what disappears in the gap between two signifiers." This means 
Badiou's subject is situated between being and the event, leaving the world at 
arm's length, whereas Zizek's subject is equivalent to that very void event 
beween being and the world. 
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As a consequence, from Badiou's viewpoint, Zizek has no Christian politics of 
love despite his acute concern for political emergency. On the other hand, in a 
recent reading of Badiou's Logic of the Worlds (2008[2006]), Zizek (2008b: 
381-419) openly challenges his philosophical "master" for not being able to 
deal with being, event and the world on the same theoretical level, and also 
not being able to practically "give the dictatorship of the proletariat a chance", 
provided that Badiou has settled for a pragmatic politics to work with the state 
"at a distance". Betraying Badiou, Zizek finally takes a stand on Deleuze's 
Bartleby life politics, a "saintly" politics of resistence to pseudo-activitiy such 
as non-voting as long as it "affects the big Other" (Deleuze, 1998: 68-90; 
Zizek, 2006: 375-85; 2008a: 151-73; 2008b: 410). He ventures so far as to 
insist that, facing a "non-subtractive" class divide, even true love (exemplified 
by Romeo and Juliet) must be sacrificed (Zizek; 2008b: 411). But Zizek's 
problem is that there is only a virtual line demarcating life politics from bio-
politics in Deleuze's thought (Zizek, 2008a: 168; 2008b: 412). This means he 
stakes his philosophy on discriminating Deleuze's philosophy of science and 
art from its cultural-political consequences (Zizek, 2004a). This contentious 
venture of Zizek will be discussed at length in chapter 6 to shed some new 
light on Durkheim's work. 
By comparison, Badiou remains more sensitive to the actual situation of 
politics because of his scientific vantage point indifferent to religion. 
Accordingly, he takes a lucid view toward the knot of love and politics. "Love 
begins where politics ends" due to their contrary numerical procedures: love is 
counted from one to infinity via sexuated duality, whereas politics is counted 
from infinity to one via free distancing (Badiou, 2006: 151). Badiou's politics is 
infinitely "unbounded" by positive predicates such as the family, race and 
nation-states, since he fully admits that "everyone on the ground is essentially 
alone in the immediate solution of problems, and their meetings, or 
proceedings, have as their natural content protocols of delegation and inquest 
whose discussion is no more convivial or superegoistical than that of two 
scientists involved in debating a very complex question" (Badiou, 2006: 76). 
Implicitly privileging science to art, Badiou's "axiomatic politics" is dismissive 
of modernist-regulative and postmodernist-aporetic moralities of ought and 
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perhaps. In effect, "either the egalitarian axiom is present in political 
statements, or it is not. Cosequently, either we are in justice, or we are not" 
(Badiou, 2006: 99). Badiou's axiomatic politics of eternal presence brings a 
full circle back to our point of departure, only to rest on the other side of the 
mobius band, with Baudrillard's aesthetic politics, because Baudrillard, as a 
post-Maoist like Badiou, remarks similarly that an utopian revolt occurs at 
"radical presentness ... even in its death throes", regarding "every man and 
society as already totally there, at each moment, in its symbolic exigency" 
. (Baudrillard, 1975: 165). 
Following the multiple methodological, theoretical and practical threads 
intertwined in the works of Baudrillard, Badiou and Zizek, we run up against 
an issue recurring in every truth-event procedure and life-world apparatus. 
This is the question of the master-signifer, or sovereignty, which is about how 
one can understand and change the world anew without "passing through the 
figure of the master, that is, without either invoking or sacrificing the master" 
(Badiou, 2005a: 54). Today, it is facile to accept that the world can function 
smoothly without the need to invoke a master (say, global capitalism or virtual 
reality), but is is difficult to resist the temptation of sacrificing the master. We 
have seen how Zizek, in his Deleuzian moment, touches upon the thin red line 
between life politics and bio-politics. Playing with fire like this, we are only a 
step away from Latour's sacrifice of the master for the "love" of the factish 
provided that we are "well bounded" (Latour, 1999: 22, 29). Outbidding Zizek's 
Pauline subject of faith with a reified turn to Frankenstein's mimicry of Jesus 
on the cross, Latour invents the end retroactively by technological means, 
settling with a cosmic morality of care, a political ecology of design (Latour, 
2002; 2007b: 10-12; 2008). Latour's desire of the thing shows how easy the 
ethical dilemma of a presupposition and yet suspension of the master-signifer 
can be ignored. After all, it is extremely delicate a matter to maintain 
subjective fidelity to truth-events at a distance from being in the world. In this 
strict sense, we suggest love in the figure of separation is the arch-event in 
which one might still experience such a predicament of life by the hours. 
In light of the preceding discussions, one might better understand the 
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intention and purpose of the thesis constituting the first aim claimed at the 
start of this introduction. Simply put, our intention is to uncover a conceptual 
genealogy of true love hidden in the sociological tradition from social science 
to classical sociology, while our purpose is to discern true love from its 
simulacra in the discourses of reflexive sociology. Through our genealogical 
research, we hope to achieve the second aim of the thesis, reconfiguring a 
conceptual event of love in a form different from the rigid analytic sites of 
philosophy and sociology diagrammed earlier. But we will not present a 
diagram of the conceptual event of love until our research journey reaches an 
end in the conclusion. Instead, here we provide a sketchy theoretical model 
more in accord with the contents of the thesis. Since our genealogical point of 
departure is the conception of social science by Comte and Marx inherited 
from Goethe, our theoretical model of love follows the assumption of fate, only 
to find parallel views of the act, freedom and risk with minimal difference in 
reality. In the meantime, this theoretical model organizes the tripartite 
structure of the thesis, as we review three phases in sociological thought, that 
is, social science, classical sociology and reflexive sociology. Their objective 
difference is minimal because social reality, according to the disappearance of 
love-event, is part and parcel of subjective thought. Therefore, subjective 
differences in these amorous discourses remain mudded up unless we can 
develop an evental approach to tell one from another. From Badiou's vantage 
point of the science-event, the three phases of sociological thought on love 
largely correspond to the three philosophical orientations toward art, including 
Aristotole's encyclopedic approach to the love-object in social science, Plato's 
axiomatic approach to the love-subject in classical sociology, and Parmenides' 
mystic approach to the love-thing in reflexive sociology (cf. Badiou, 2003c: 69-
82). With these theoretical tendencies in mind, we may briefly explain our 
choice of reading. 
The thesis is developed within a modest scope. First, we restrict ourselves to 
a discontinuous history of sociological reflections on love. As if to present a 
"pure" sociological genealogy, we feature our reading of Comte and Marx in 
part I, Durkheim, Weber and Simmel in part 11, and Bauman, Giddens, Beck, 
Luhmann, Parsons and Foucault in .part Ill. However, we engage more with 
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Comte, Durkheim, and Luhmann, and less with Marx, Weber and Parsons. 
Meanwhile, we feature several thinkers beyond the sociological curriculum, for 
example, Badiou, Low"ith and Bhaskar in part I, Rose, Zizek and Goethean 
Marxists (Lukacs, Bakhtin and Benjamin) in part 11, and social 
psychologists/psychoanalysts (Riesman, Sennett and Lasch), liberal Marxists 
(Fromm, Marcuse and Arendt), and Baudrillard in part Ill. Yet, we deal more 
with Badiou, Rose and Zizek, and less with Bhaskar, Marxism, social 
psychology/psychoanalysis and Baudrillard. 
Specific reasons for our choice and arrangement are too many to be 
enumerated in detail, so we indicate only two general lines of concern. Above 
all, the list is by no means meant to be exhaustive. We suppose that few 
would deny that a tradition is invented and reinvented retroactively. Moreover, 
after canonization, contemporaneous currents of thought never form a system 
without inner contradictions. For example, no one has convinced us why 
Durkheim and Weber can be read together as sociological fathers rather than 
failed philosophers or historians. Likewise, no one has explained why 
Foucault, who never held a post of sociology in his life, should be revered in 
contemporary sociology, whilst Baudrillard, once a sociological teacher, is 
largely dismissed except in the circles of literary and art criticism. In view of 
this, the material is meant to be theoretically consistent with our context of 
discovery of the love-event. The principle of choice is designed to test the 
pulse of love in the heart of sociological reason without being dogmatic or 
eclectic about the so-called sociological tradition. We simply wish to provoke a 
novel way of thinking between orthodox, heterodox, and transdox sociologists 
as well as anti-sociologists, reminding all parties concerned that, once upon a 
time, or twice in fact, there were conceptual seizures of a new world order of 
love occurred to serious thinkers of social science and classical sociology. 
Second, we have excluded a wide range of philosophical (consisting of 
humanist and feminist) and cultural (consisting of literary and historical) and 
empirical sociological (consisting of social-political and political-economic) 
explorations of love from consideration, except to provide a supplementary 
reading list, which ranges from Singer and Kristeva, through. Aries and Lewis, 
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to Alberoni and lllouz. We find that they often reproduce stock ideologies of 
love, failing to think the subject matter creatively enough to meet the intention 
and purpose of the thesis, probably due to a common lack of an evental 
dimension in their works. We can also argue that we will examine critically 
similar methodological assumptions behind these excluded views of love in, 
say, Weber's cultural sociology. Besides, a particular meditation on love 
developed by Breton and Bataille in the interwar period will not be examined 
directly, except being critically referred to through their postmodern and 
poststructural forms of misrepresentation. Contemporaneous with heterodox 
Marxist sociology from Lukacs to Benjamin, post-Durkheimian sociology 
undoubtedly also has something original to say. about love. But we can also 
argue that we have dealt positively with similar theoretical consequences 
derived from this intensive view of love, say, in Baudrillard's sociology of 
symbolic exchange. 
In sum, we believe a restricted recollection of what has been thought about 
love by canonic sociological theories in the past will guide us to think again 
supposedly original thought of love in contemporary social theories with a 
sense of genealogical maturity. Thus, the thesis attempts to seize an event of 
true love as a long standing concept in the sociological, or rather social 
scientific, tradition, thereby discerning the love-event from ideological 
perversions of love mirrored in reflexive sociological discourses due to their 
collusion with the world. All in all, we have transposed Badiou's axiomatic 
politics of justice to our subject matter: there is true love, or there is not. 
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Part I 
From Goethe's Art of Love to 
The Social Science of Comte and Marx 
Chapter 1 Why Goethe? 
After the death of art and philosophy declared by Hegel, Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, postmodernist and poststructuralist sophists have grown 
accustomed to announce the second death of sociology and Marxism. These 
discourses attempt to mend broken ties with philosophy and theology in our 
post-communist, multicultural global village. Paradoxically, as indistinct doxas, 
common senses and tribal consciences are revalued, no discipline is dead 
since a virtual whole is created in the epistemic series from theology and 
philosophy to sociology and Marxism. What is really disappearing is a social 
science of love implied in the projects of Comte and Marx. In this chapter, we 
will examine the social scientific condition of love prior to the formation and 
transformation of sociology and Marxism. We will argue that if the thoughts of 
Comte and Marx are read within the horizons of Saint-Simonianism and 
Hegelianism, a social science of love produced by positivism and communism 
will be lost to the dialectic of reason and revolution. Moreover, this common 
import of love can be put into perspective by introducing Goethe's legacy of 
love at the turn of the 19111 century. Goethe theorized a civilization of love-life, 
in which a savage duality of the sexes underlying the Greco-Roman culture 
was re-cognized so that the ethical kernel of death and renunciation could be 
extracted out of the dialectic shell of quantity and quality, growth and transit, 
andlor evolution and revolution. As such, if anything new came out of the 
thoughts of Comte and Marx, it was a social science of love. 
1.1 Reason, revolution and love 
At the acme of his systemization of natural sciences, Auguste Comte coined 
the word "sociology" to mediate his positive philosophy (the historical law of 
three states) and positive polity (the religion of Humanity), or simply, 
positivism and altruism. Overseeing the five natural sciences (after 
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mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry and biology), sociology emerged 
to be the sixth science. Undercutting the five cultural religions (after fetishism, 
polytheism, monotheism, pantheism and deism/atheism), sociology prepared 
for the sixth religion, religion of Humanity. By systematizing not only theories 
of knowledge but also practices of love, sociology actually gave birth to the 
seventh science called morals. Coincidentally, when Comte set out to change 
his focus from a rational organization of knowledge to an emotional 
congregation of love in 1844-48, Marx turned his attention away from an 
impassioned critique of the ideology of money to a dispassionate analysis of 
the power of capitalism. Reduced to modernist stereotypes, stereotypes to be 
refuted later, it is as if the cultures of the Enlightenment and romanticism 
exchanged their representatives in the parallel "transitions" of Comte's and 
Marx's thoughts in the same period. Indeed, the wane and wax of Saint-
Simonianism and Comteanism overlapped with the decline and rise of 
Hegelianism and Marxism. The period lasted half a century from the late 
1820s to the early 1860s with the turbulent 1848 marking the time of inversion 
and vertigo. 
Marxism promoted a revolutionary progression from speculative to practical 
philosophy (theology-7 anthropology-7 Marxism) in preparation for an 
egalitarian "state" of Communism. Positivism, on the other hand, celebrated 
an evolutionary progress from negative to positive philosophy (theology-7 
metaphysics-7 positivism) in establishing an altruistic "church" of Humanity. 
Manifestly, just as Marx strove to produce a scientific politics capable of 
striking a blow to all state politics, so Comte sought to build a scientific religion 
qualified to put an end to all theocratic religions. In the two modes of thought, 
the all-embracing question, the question of method, theory and practice knot 
together, concerned the conception of a social science (if the term sociology is 
limited to Comte), in which science was expected to bring a radical 
regeneration of society by way of a religious or political economy. Writing in 
the aftermath of the French and English (industrial) revolutions, both Comte 
and Marx wondered whether a new order of love was rising in the post-
revolutionary society. Their common insight opened up a transitional ontology 
of im/possibility: can love do justice to the eternal return of revolution? Or, 
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must love occur with a Cultural Revolution of the world? 
How could one read Comte and Marx today? First, it's tempting to subsume 
Comte's and Marx's thoughts under the "Saint-Simonian matrix" (Gane, 2003). 
The utopian socialist hypothesis has been suggested by Durkheim's study of 
socialism (Durkheim, 1958: 105-08, 219-21). But Durkheim also declared 
Montesquieu and Rousseau as the forerunners of sociology (Durkheim, 
1960c). Moreover, the image of Durkheim as a positivist turned idealist was 
the invention of early Parsons' functionalism, which by no means reflects the 
whole picture of Durkheim's sociology, much less Comte's social science. We 
will come to Durkheim and Parsons later in the thesis. The point here is to see 
that reading Comte and Marx from the Saint-Simonian matrix does not lead us 
back to the source as hoped, but rather exposes our institutionalized idea of 
sociology in a series of difference and deference from Durkheim to Parsons. 
Thus, tracing a conceptual genealogy of love from the history of sociological 
thought must begin by breaking the mirroring relation between modernity and 
sociology. Specifically, one must renounce the very exceptional view of 
modernity, identifying sociology with an exclusive host country or region, such 
as American, English, German and/or French history and society. With regard 
to the matter of love, in particular, there is no host of origin, only disseminating 
hospitality of an origin. 
Marx at least found an English connection to French socialism. Deriding 
Bruno's "absolute critical criticism· in The Holy Family (1845), Marx (in Marx & 
Engels, 1975, vol. 4: 124-34) argued that the early 19th century socialism 
comes from French materialism of the 18th century in order to overturn the 
metaphysical outlook of philosophy in the 17th century (Descartes' 
metaphysics, Spinoza, Leibniz and Malebranche). Furthermore, French 
materialism originates not only in French physicalism (Descartes' physics, Le 
Roy, La Mettrie and Bayle) but also English empiricism (Duns Scotus' 
nominalism, Bacon, Hobbes and Locke). In effect, French materialism is but a 
disavowed Spinozian pantheism promoting the popular belief of thinking 
matter. In this strict sense, French Enlightenment could be understood as a 
philosophy of commonsense binding deism with pantheist materialism. As a 
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continuation to his doctoral thesis on Epicurean materialism, Marx intended to 
overcome French materialism, inventing a German materialism based on the 
history of contradictory production. But it was Engels in Anti-Duhring (1878) 
who canonized Marx's materialism into a post-Hegelian dialectical philosophy 
inspired by a Spencerian history of science. As a result, Marx's materialism is 
distinguished from French materialism not only because French utopian 
socialism has a metaphysical root in English empiricism, but also because 
Marx's socialism is based on a scientific basis, whether it agrees with En gel's 
version of "scientific socialism" or not. 
In light of Marx's analysis, Comte's positivism cannot be mistaken for French 
socialism since it seeks to transcend metaphysics as such. Indeed, it is along 
the lineage of French materialism derived from English empiricism and French 
rationalism that one would misread Comte. This accounts for the early 
excitement and later disappointment of eminent British positivists, such as 
Mill, Lewes and Spencer, about Comte's positive philosophy and polity. 
Confronted by French socialism, in fact, Comte broke off from Saint Simon's 
utopian activism in 1824 to develop his positive philosophy of sciences since 
1826 (Coser, 1977: 16). His positive polity of religion elaborated since 1846 
also differed sharply from Prosper Enfantin and Claire Bazard's sexual 
revolution for la femme fibre in the 1830s (Gane, 1993: 114-19), since the 
female messianic "rehabilitation of the flesh" rebuilt only a masculine 
projection of feminine holism to help release the sexual fantasy of men. 
Alienated from feminists (Saint-Simonians, George Sand, Charles Fourier, 
Flora Tristan), women's rights activists (Jeanne Deroin and Desiree Gay) as 
well as antifeminists (Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Jules Michelet) of his 
contemporaries, Comte "defended the family" and "celebrated the so-called 
feminine qualities of nurturing, love and empathy ... to the construction of a 
new, more compassionate and harmonious society'' (Pickering, 1996: 16, 20-
21 ). Logically, Comte's "universal order" of love adopted an impossible 
position of overcoming the sexual division of faculties as well as gendered 
division of spheres by fatally embracing them. 
A similar provocation could be heard from Marx's and Engels' ironic remarks 
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about Edgar's "tranquility of knowledge" in The Holy Family (1845). Edgar had 
argued against writers like Tristan, Beraud and Proudhon on the issues of 
production, prostitution and property. While dismantling Edgar's "faded, 
widowed Hegelian philosophy", Marx and Engels, however, did not simply 
side with Edgar's interlocutors. In the section on love written by Marx (Marx & 
Engels, 1975, vol. 4: 21-22), he introduced his notion of "uncritical" love: "Herr 
Edgar changes love into a 'goddess', a 'cruel goddess' at that, by changing 
man who loves, the love of man, into a man of love; by making 'love' a being 
apart, separate from man and as such independent.. .the beloved is a 
sensuous object, and if Critical Criticism is to condescend to recognition of an 
object, it demands at the very least a senseless object. But love is an un-
Critical, un-Christian materialist...Criticallove 'is careful above all not to forget 
the cause behind the personality, for that cause is none other than the cause 
of humanity.' Un-Critical love does not separate humanity from the personal, 
individual man.'' 
Given the above, Comte and Marx could not be assimilated into the matrix of 
Saint-Simonian socialism. Unlike Comte, moreover, Marx was a foreigner and 
outsider to Saint-Simon's circle. Hence, both imitated the act of Jesus Christ 
insofar as socialism could be regarded as a modern repetition of the early 
Christian community. That is, the subjective positions of Comte and Marx 
would become closer if we see them as loving traitors, as opposed to blind 
lovers, of Saint-Simon's utopian socialism. For the true love of socialism, they 
dared to betray their master to come up with a scientific religion and politics of 
love. Conversely, dismissing the religious and political implications of love in 
the writings of Comte and Marx would risk reducing them to either madness or 
platitude. This means identifying Comte's and Marx's thoughts with their 
historical personalities as chauvinists, misogynists and/or authoritarians would 
miss the mark. Committed to change their contemporary social order in 
practice, Comte's and Marx's theories could no longer be identified with 
idealism-realism or essentialism-constructivism. Akin to dramatic art, their 
science initiates one to an objective order of belief before the abyss of 
subjectivity. 
26 
Second, it's equally tempting to explain Comte and Marx with reference to 
Hegel (Marcuse, 1955). This represents a Western Marxist hypothesis of 
revolution. lt describes the downfall of Hegelianism (and Hegelian Marxism by 
extension) and the rise of positive social theory represented by Comte, 
Fried rich J. Stahl and Lorenz von Stein. However, Comte's work attracted only 
belated and negative attention (except Nietzsche) in Germany (Heilbron, 
1995: 260-62; Gane, 2006: 50). Hence, it looks strikingly odd to introduce 
Comte into modern German philosophy from Hegel to Marx, as if Comte 
interrupted the flow of revolutionary reason. But Marcuse (1955: 357) 
maintains that "the positivist program of social reform foreshadows liberalism's 
turn into authoritarianism". This judgment is produced less by the 
modernization of the West towards liberal capitalism than by the 
nationalization of Germany from the Weimar Republic to National Socialism. 
For an outspoken liberal democrat, in fact, the identification of Comte as an 
authoritarian in the spectrum of French politics from 1848 to 1851 is 
correlated to the development of fascism in Germany from 1920 to 1933 
(Aron, 1968: 303-04). Accordingly, it is more reasonable to regard the crisis 
analysis of Hegelian Marxism as a reflection of the downfall of Comteanism 
and the rise of German sociology shaped by Weberians and the Frankfurt 
school. lt is this political-intellectual context which allows Marcuse (1955: 343, 
360) to assert that Comte theorizes from "the fundamental conviction of 
idealism" and only comes up with "the idea of humanity to make amends for 
the oppressive atmosphere". In short, Marcuse's Western Marxist hypothesis 
is motivated by his historicist conviction to democratic politics in the guise of 
historical objectivity. 
A closer look at the intellectual contexts between 1830 and 1850 shows a 
parallel but zigzag development of positive philosophy in France and 
Germany. About one year after the death of his mentor Saint-Simon and his 
marriage with Caroline Massin, Comte's began his personal lectures on the 
philosophy of positive sciences in March 1826, but they came to an abrupt 
close due to his mental breakdown. Since the resumption of his work in 1829, 
Comte completed his entire lectures across the 1830s and meanwhile 
published Cours de Philosophie Positive in six volumes between 1830 and 
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1842. This decade saw the crisis of the Saint-Simonians, so it's not hard to 
see that Comte's scientific socialism competed against Saint-Simon's religious 
socialist disciples. 
In Germany, on the other hand, the 1830s marked the rise of young Hegelians 
after the death of Hegel (in 1831). Later on, as Friedrich William IV came in 
power in 1840, his Minister of Culture invited Schelling over to Berlin from 
Munich to "destroy the dragon seed" of Hegelianism. Along with Kierkegaard 
and Bakunin in the packed audience, Engels (in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 2: 
181) reported in 1841 Schelling's "dominion over German public opinion in 
politics and religion" from the latter's lecture hall. In the development of 
German idealism, Schelling's Naturphilosophie (up to his Jena years between 
1803 and 1806) has been logically understood as objective idealism, marking 
the transitional phase between · Fichte's subjective idealism and Hegel's 
absolute idealism. Historically, however, Schelling's objective idealism of 
nature returned with a new face of "positive" philosophy of existence to 
dethrone Hegel's "negative" philosophy of reason. lt remains a controversy as 
to whether Schelling has a systematic philosophy to integrate his romanticism, 
mysticism and positivism, but these gaps capture exactly Schelling's anti-
Hegelian stance. 
Indeed, Schelling had to revolt like a romantic against Hegel's theological 
rationalism; meanwhile, Comte had to argue like a rationalist against Saint-
Simon's new religious romanticism. In this regard, the historical terms of 
rationalism and romanticism have reached their limitation in understanding the 
import of positive philosophy, much less any political judgment in terms of 
authoritarianism and liberalism. 1 Hence the difference between the two 
1 Marcuse (1955: 324) does notice from the outset the contributions to positive philosophy by 
Schelling as well as Comte on the ground that both sought "to counter the sway of apriorism 
and to restore the authority of experience". Nonetheless, he fails to draw further implications 
from this, but rather turns to introduce Stahl's theory of the state as the political version of 
Schelling's positive philosophy. The reason is that Marcuse is confused by the disagreement 
between Comte's focus on factual law and Schelling's interest in experiential freedom. He 
doesn't even entertain the possibility of a coincidence of opposites from a Hegelian view. 
However, he has no qualm to subsume Comte's rationalism and Stahl's anti-rationalism under 
the same banner of positive social theory. Marcuse's self-contradiction is a result of his social 
democratic bias, as if any positive social theory could be demonized as the authoritarian 
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versions of positive philosophy is the result of a particular social-historical 
situation. 
Besides Schelling, the arch young Hegelian Feuerbach came up with a self-
contradictory view of philosophy. Two years after The Essence of Christianity 
in which the first anthropological interpretation of religion was risked, 
Feuerbach published Principle of the Philosophy of the Future in 1843 to 
depart from the criticism of Hegelian theology in arriving at a quasi-positive 
statement of the new philosophy. "The new philosophy rests on the truth of 
love and feeling. In love and in feeling generally, every man confesses the 
truth of the new philosophy. The new philosophy itself is basically nothing 
other than the essence of feeling elevated to consciousness; it only affirms in 
reason and with reason what every man - the real man - professes in his 
heart. lt is the heart made into mind. The heart does not want abstract, 
metaphysical, or theological objects; it wants real and sensuous objects and 
beings" (Feuerbach, 1966: 53-54, sec. 34). 
Feuerbach's new philosophy is formulated through the application of art to 
religion: first "art 'depicts the truth in sensation'", and then "just as in art, so it 
is in religion. Sensuous perception, and not the imagination, is the essence of 
the Christian religion; it is the form and organ of the highest and divine being" 
(Feuerbach, 1966: 56-57, sec. 39-40). In a reflexive move, the object of 
philosophy turns into th'e sensuous subject, Man: "not only 'external' things 
are objects of the senses. Man is given to himself only through the senses; he 
is an object of himself only as an object of the senses. The identity of subject 
and object, which in self-consciousness is only an abstract idea, is truth and 
reality only in man's sensuous perception of man" (Feuerbach, 1966: 58, sec. 
41). Hence the division of nature and man, anthropology and physiology in the 
new philosophy: "[t]he new philosophy makes man - with the inclusion of 
nature as the foundation of man - the unique, universal and highest object of 
philosophy. lt thus makes anthropology, with the inclusion of physiology, the 
universal science" (Feuerbach, 1966: 70, sec. 54). 
precedent of fascism. 
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Feuerbach's new philosophy can only be pseudo-positive since the essence 
of his sensuous Christian philosophy is retained in the love of Man, stopping 
short before Comtean Humanity. Stated otherwise, Feuerbach performs an 
imaginary leap from the theological to the positive state, conflates essence 
with existence, and eventually gets himself trapped in the metaphysical 
replacement of God by Man. In light of this, a fine distinction should be kept 
between Feuerbach's metaphysical humanism and the scientific humanism of 
Comte and Marx. 
lt was after their Paris meeting in 1844 that Marx and Engels launched their 
polemic against Saint-Simonians and young Hegelians in writings like The 
Holy Family (1845) and The Germany Ideology (1845). Their life-long 
collaboration often makes readers overlook some underlying differences in 
relation to positive and negative philosophies. In his "business to follow the 
course of his [Schelling's] thinking and to shield the great man's [Hegel's] 
grave from abuse", Engels considered Schelling "the new enemy" early on in 
1841 (Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 2: 187). He expressed his hostility in 1\vo 
pamphlets Schelling and Revelation and Schelling, Philosopher in Christ first 
published anonymously in early 1842 (Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 2: 607-08). 
Marx had no involvement in this debate. 
A strong opinion against positive philosophy, furthermore, leaned toward 
young Hegelianism (Strauss, Bauer, Stirner, Ruge, etc) which culminated in 
Feuerbach's inconsistent philosophy. With no open critique of positive 
philosophy, Marx (in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 5: 3-5) held a radical view of 
Feuerbach in Theses on Feuerbach (1845). His idea of praxis is based on a 
vision of social humanity: the 11th thesis ("The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change if') is the logical 
result of the 1Oth thesis ("The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; 
the standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity.") Further, this 
is derived from Marx's difference from Feuerbach in the 61h thesis: "Feuerbach 
resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of 
man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the 
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ensemble of the social relations." 
Consistent with his early polemic against positive philosophy, on the other 
hand, Engels became entangled with Feuerbach's philosophy after Marx's 
death. This can be seen in the two independent pieces of work, The Origin of 
the Family, Private Property and the State (1884) and Ludwig Feuerbach and 
the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886). In Ludwig Feuerbach (1886), 
En gels suggested that it was Feuerbach rather than Marx who brought an end 
to German idealism, ironically due to the philosophy of sensuous love. "But 
love! - yes, in Feuerbach love is everywhere and at all times the miracle-
working god called on to help surmount all difficulties of practical life ... Love 
one another- fall into each other's arms regardless of distinction as to sex or 
estate - a universal orgy of reconciliation!" (Engels in Marx & Engels, 1975, 
vol. 26: 381) However, in The Origin of the Family (1884), Engels himself 
introduced an egalitarian sexual politics called "individual sex love" to the 
communist movement. Modern socialist feminism hasn't been able to fully 
appreciate this work since it is read as a historical anthropological study to 
abolish the family, private property and the state. As such, Engels advanced 
very little from what had been noted by (Marx's study of) Morgan's Ancient 
Society. Rather, his original point was to propose "individual sex love", thereby 
superseding the structural contradiction of monogamous family which 
determines class contradiction in the bourgeois society in the last instance 
(Engels in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 26: 170-90). His concept of sex love 
"differs essentially from the simple sexual desire, the eras, of the ancients" in 
three aspects: first, "the woman stands on a par with the man"; second, "to 
possess each other, they confront great hazards, even risking life itself with 
"a degree of intensity and permanency"; third, "whether it arose from mutual 
love or not" (Engels in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 26: 184). As a neo-tribal sign 
for the arrival of communism, the idea of individual sex love was reconfirmed 
to Engels in "a recently discovered case of group marriage" in 1892 (Engels, 
1985: 195-222; Engels in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 27: 348-51 ). All in all, he 
intended to align the revolutionary practice of individual sex love to the 
working class. 
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lt has been argued that Engel's ennoblement of individual sex love represents 
a radicalization, if not direct reversal, of his early position on gender relations 
in The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845) as a result of his 
relationship with Mary Burns. Meanwhile, it represents an implicit indictment 
of the gap between Marx's theory and practice due to his marriage with Jenny 
von Westphalen (Gane, 1993: 83-104, 141-55). Unlike Marx's duplicity, 
Engels generalized his personal relationship with Mary Burns into a 
theoretical statement, expecting that a transgression of class difference via 
reciprocal intimacy would be conducive to the withering away of the family, 
private property and the state. He had every right on a personal level to 
protest against the Marx couple for mistreating Burns; on the theoretical level, 
however, he went too far and too soon in putting egalitarian politics before 
revolutionary politics. Acting out his authorial sincerity, Engels committed a 
romantic fallacy in the same way as Feuerbach did. 
In the final analysis, the issue comes back to where Marx and Engels stood 
with regard to Hegel's negative philosophy. This could be clarified from 
Engels' other two independent pieces of work written a few years before 
Marx's death, Anti-Dilhring (1878) and Dialectic of Nature (1883). Clearly, the 
metaphysical question of nature which had preoccupied early Schelling 
returned to haunt Engels as he sought to identify social with natural change in 
his dialectical materialism. Engels' new methodology was laid out earlier in 
Herr Dilhring's Revolution in Science (1878). An extended version of its 
general statement was later published in French in 1880 and then translated 
into English in 1892 as a separate pamphlet authorized by Engels himself. In 
the pamphlet, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels argued a distinction of 
utopian and scientific socialism according to his naturalistic dialectic. But 
Mane's short introduction to the French edition complicates the authorship of 
dialectical materialism, as if Marx endorsed Engels' naturalized Hegelianism 
through Spencer. In light of the above, there is room for doubt. At least with 
regard to positive philosophy, Marx is brought closer to Comte's love of 
Humanity than to Engels' individual sex love. 
All in all, reading the works of Comte and Marx within the intellectual contexts 
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of Saint-Simonianism and Hegelianism generally prioritizes reason (science 
and industry) and revolution (politics and culture) at the expense of love. For 
both Durkheimians and Western Marxists, the observation of modernity 
presupposes a dependent relationship of Britain, France and Germany in the 
following scenario. After changing into a relatively liberal bourgeois state since 
1640 (the Royal revolution), Britain led a scientific revolution in the late 17th 
century and the industrial revolution in the early 19th century with the 
mediation of the British (English and Scottish) Enlightenment (from empiricist 
philosophy to political economy) in the 18th century. As an absolutist state, 
France politicized the British experience to create the French Enlightenment 
(the philosophes) in the 18th century by overturning its 17th century 
metaphysics, which culminated in the French revolution. Playing a leading 
role of Reformation in the 16th century made the progress of Germanic states 
religiously and culturally forward on the one hand and yet scientifically, 
economically and politically backward on the other. Hence, as the British and 
the French revolutionized economic and political realities, the German 
conducted a revolution of the mind from Kant to Hegel. In this world-historic 
grand narrative, the production, reproduction and consumption of knowledge 
always circle around the social use and abuse of reason and revolution. 
Rejecting the Eurocentric grand narrative won't release the thoughts of Comte 
and Marx from the grip of grandeur. In fact, Marx and Comte are themselves 
the first grand narrators or architects to dare dreaming the future of society. 
Following the grand narrative, instead, we might consider Comte and Marx as 
singular minds with respect to their national characters by way of excess 
rather than exception. Simply put, Marx is more German than Hegel whilst 
Comte is more French than Saint-Simon. First, Comte subjects Saint-
Simonian religion to a philosophical scrutiny whilst Marx subjects Hegelian 
philosophy to a political critique. Then, both apply their new found approach to 
a cognitive remapping of industrial capitalism, responding to the economic 
malaise of modern society with a scientific reconstruction of religion or politics 
beyond theology and philosophy, Encountering at the gap between theory and 
practice, they both grow larger than their national characters, speaking for the 
love of humanity as citizens of the world. With this tacit alliance, they meet 
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Goethe. 
1.2 Goethe's love-life, death and renunciation 
To appreciate the cogenesis of sociology and Marxism in a social scientific 
condition of love, one must return to the poet Goethe and his age. lt is our 
hypothesis that Goethe wrote for the future, prefiguring Comtean positivist 
religion and Marxian communist politics to come. Simply put, Goethe created 
a legacy of love based on a futuristic vision of modernity. We can argue the 
case as follows. First, we challenge the cultural conception of modernity as it 
draws on opposing historical hypotheses of the Enlightenment and 
romanticism to explain the revolutionary event around 1789. The cultural-
historical causation of modernity is liable to overlook Goethe's legacy of love, 
and so undervalue the roles of sociology and Marxism in reconfiguring 
modernity. Second, we examine the reductive interpretations of Goethe as a 
romantic, a classicist and a Kantian. Third, we conduct a selective analysis of 
Goethe's literary work to recognize the ethic of death and renunciation as his 
legacy of love. 
lt is a common practice to dichotomize the Enlightenment and romanticism, 
regarding them as cultural-historical antecedents of modernity. Gay's (1967; 
1969) interpretation gives a sweeping formula of the Enlightenment. He 
argues that the Enlightenment begins with an ideological weakening of the 
Catholic belief by pagan philosophy, natural science and art, and results in an 
institutional emulation of the European absolutist states with the Roman 
Church. Gay's portrayal of the Enlightenment, spanning across the latter half 
of the 17th century and the entire 18th century, goes beyond the Augustan or 
classical humanist tradition of Erasmus and Bacon to identify a neo-pagan 
origin of modernity. This is represented by the social criticism and philosophy 
of Diderot, Voltaire, Hume and Kant on the one hand, and the science and 
literature of Newton, Lessing and Rousseau on the other. "The Enlightenment 
was a volatile mixture of classicism, impiety, and science; the philosophes, in 
a phrase, were modern pagans" (Gay, 1967: 8). Resisting the autocracy of 
kings, aristocrats and priests, these savants, especially the French 
philosophes, claimed their own authority by unleashing the social force of 
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knowledge drawn from natural reason. In this sense, Gay's interpretation is 
tendentiously idealistic since the agents of social change are primarily the 
philosophes, empirical scientists, and neoclassic artists, leaving out the 
believing mass population. Accordingly, the pagan nature of knowledge is 
overstated insofar as the deistic rationale of the philosophes themselves is 
dismissed in an overly intellectualist account. In result, the historical impact of 
the Reformation upon the Enlightenment is turned into a break of the modern 
pagan mode of thought from the ancient humanist-neo-Stoicism (Gay, 1967: 
269-79, 295-304). 
But even when one takes structural explanans into account, such as the end 
of the War of Religion (1562-1598), the rise of imperial wars between state 
powers since the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the steady increase of 
population, the emergence of towns and cities, the expansion of plantation 
economy (particularly tobacco) and so on, the Enlightenment still looks like a 
civilizing process of the European social system insulated from the rest of the 
world. it's hence worth noting that the 18th century began with thirty golden 
years of piracy (1700-1730) which led to a legalized government of the 
overseas trade (of goods and slaves) by the European states, particularly 
after the Netherlands, France and England took over the Portuguese and 
Spanish monopoly of the world market. 
Placing the Enlightenment in the wider context of colonization, Clarke (1997) 
provides us with an alternative view of the Oriental Enlightenment progressing 
from the age of the Enlightenment to that of romanticism. Indeed, apart from 
the philosophes, scientists and artists, the social carriers of the Enlightenment 
should also include other lesser-known cultural messengers, such as civil 
servants, entrepreneurs and adventurers, at the frontier of the West: The 
apparent outcome is the introduction and assimilation of Chinese and Indian 
thoughts and artifacts (if not yet practices adopted until the 1960s) in the 
West, and vice versa. Focusing on ideas, Clarke (1997: 60) argues that "U]ust 
as philosophes projected onto Confucian China their concept of polity 
governed by wise and philosophically educated rulers, so the Romantics 
projected onto India their idea of a more realized human existence and a 
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more holistic and spiritually driven culture." In other words, "just as 
Confucianism had offered the philosophes a model for a rationalist, deist 
philosophy, so the Hinduism of the Upanishads offered an exalted 
metaphysical system which resonated with their own idealistic assumptions, 
and which provided a counterblast to the materialistic and mechanistic 
. philosophy that had come to dominate the Enlightenment period" (Ciarke, 
1997: 61). 
Nonetheless, Clarke's thesis of the Oriental Enlightenment, inspired by Said's 
problematic theory of Orientalism, has assumed the projection of the Western 
gaze onto the East as "romanticization" (Ciarke, 1999: 19). Whilst gaining a 
critical perspective to anatomize the colonial power/knowledge, this approach 
not only undermines the truth value of the Enlightenment, but also threatens 
the validity of the Oriental Enlightenment itself, for nothing could be learnt 
from the East and everything recoils to a cultural-psychological projection of 
power. As one's historical standpoint is turned from the truthful Enlightenment 
to fantastic romanticization, the question returns to the change of 
consciousness from rationality to madness within the European social 
systems. 
In this regard, Berlin's (1999[1965]: 1) lectures on the roots of romanticism 
presents a provocative argument to account for "the greatest single shift in the 
consciousness of the Wesf' between 1760 and 1830. Berlin (1999: 14-20) 
guards against all analytical definitions of romanticism due to their tendency 
toward incoherence (such as Lovejoy's difficulty in accounting for the 
coexistence of primitivism and dandyism), and yet he calls for a historical 
conception of romanticism as a revolution "against everything" instead of 
revolution with a cause. Firstly, romanticism induces a change in the 
fundamental rules of judgment from a belief of truth to a faith in character, or 
from a compromise with errors to a display of martyrdom for incompatible 
worldviews (Berlin, 1999: 9-13). Secondly, romanticism emerges from "the first 
attack on Enlightenment" by rationalism and empiricism (Montesquieu and 
Hume) themselves before it is challenged by Johann Georg Hamann's 
German Pietism (Berlin, 1999: eh. 2). Thirdly, Berlin (1999: eh. 3-4) identifies 
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several "true fathers of romanticism" (Hamann, Herder, Kant and Rousseau 
as a borderline case) and recognizes some "restrained romantics" (Kant, 
Schiller and Fichte). Fourthly, an "unbridled" romantic movement heralded by 
August Wilhelm Schlegel explores the inexhaustible depth of the self merging 
with a mystified world of nostalgia, paranoia and irony (Berlin, 1999: eh. 5). 
Fifthly, Berlin (1999: eh. 6) reflects on "the lasting effects" of romanticism, 
stressing the shift of ethical judgment from consequence to motive (i.e. 
sincerity) as a cause of the swing between Fascist violence and liberal 
tolerance in contemporary politics. In the final analysis, Berlin (1999: 119) 
renders his historical view of romanticism: the romantic individual's 
"indomitable will" self/creates an infinite "flow of the universe" out of nothing 
since "no structure of things" is presumed in the first place. 
Berlin's view might be regarded as a romantic definition of romanticism due to 
its holistic and self-referential character. Discarding analytical understanding 
altogether, Berlin is unable to recognize romanticism without generalizing the 
other side of romanticism. If romanticism is understood as the construction of 
abyssal mystery, the other side is relegated to a pre-romantic "jigsaw puzzle" 
of the truth of things soluble by "virtuous knowledge," thereby rendered 
historically indistinguishable by itself. The underlying presumption of a dualism 
of order and chaos undermines Berlin's claim about the radical impact of 
romanticism upon modernity because all post-romantic attempts at a 
reconstruction of social order, from positivism to Marxism and beyond, would 
be dismissed as either pre-romantic authoritarianism or trans-romantic Fascist 
liberalism. Given the case, Berlin reduces the reality of irony to a 
psychological projection, undervaluing its social effects in our technological 
modernity. As social systems are increasingly ruled by digital and genetic 
engineering, an irony may no longer be subject to relativist and/or nihilist 
perspectives, but is embodied in the order of things themselves. Not exclusive 
to romanticism, in short, an irony can be "objective" as much as it is 
subjective. Thus understood, the problem boils down to his failure to admit 
that romanticism maintains an umbilical cord with the negative reason of the 
Enlightenment: romanticism is a revolt against the Enlightenment. Without 
accepting this objective irony, no modern love can be approached social 
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scientifically untainted by romantic mystification. 
The accidental tradition of love was initially shaped by the Greek public eros, 
the Christian universal agape and the French's provincial courtly amour. By 
contrast, a modern conception of love is subordinate to cultural-historical 
mentalities of the Enlightenment and romanticism. From the modem 
standpoint, love, in its European identity, originates in romanticism, preferring 
passion to reason. However, this opinion risks reducing modern love to what 
· we call the romantic fallacy, the assumption that passion, for its spontaneity 
and sincerity, could reclaim truth from the dominion of rational calculation. But 
passion is no less affected than reason; essentially, they might not even 
oppose to each other, for mysterious passion merely deepens the 
profoundness of the truthful reason. In this sense, romanticism could be better 
seen as the historical embodiment of irony by its "natural" revolt against the 
Enlightenment's negative reason. In a word, romanticism exemplifies Hegel's 
negation of negation. The French Enlightenment is "idealistically" believed to 
be the consequence of scientific revolution and the cause of political 
revolution. Developed largely in England and Germany, however, romanticism 
bore "historical" proximity to the political and economic revolutions which 
rocked European modernity out of the imaginary into a real order. This real 
order is reflected in the convoluted form of romanticism caught by a love-hate 
complex towards aspects of tradition and modernity, such as belief and 
reason, or religion and art. In terms of idea, if love's heart were romantic by 
default, it would invoke an "innocent reason" in excess of the knowledge of 
reason, as we learn from Pascal's revision of Cartesian ism. In historical terms, 
however, the French Enlightenment did not exist until the overthrow of the 
ancien regime in 1789, for if France had been an enlightened state (that is to 
say, if France had not had an absolutist king to resist the economic 
independence of the bourgeoisie in a populated city of Paris), the Revolution 
would not have happened. Therefore, it was romanticism which released the 
critical force of the Enlightenment reason to the point of perversion after the 
event. 
As a literary movement, the golden age of romanticism spans the years from 
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1770 to 1830 across Europe, especially in England. For, it was English 
romanticism which got collectivized into a bourgeois experience in the late 
romantic, Victorian society since 1837 (or the reform Act of 1832). In light of 
this, one could distinguish four analytic dimensions of romanticism. The first 
dimension stresses on folklore or popular art in general, the antecedent of 
nationalism. This proto-historical character is derived from fairy tales collected 
by the Grimm brothers, von Herder's study of folk songs, and the study of old 
ballads by Joseph Addison and Richard Steele. Prominent examples are the 
timeless Shakespeare and von Goethe. The second dimension revolves 
around emotion, nature and exotic cultures. This proto-social character comes 
from romantic poems by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth, Percy 
Bysshe Shelley and John Keats. Representative figures include the 
transnational Rousseau, Lord Byron and von Goethe. The third dimension 
extends to the neo-Gothic representation of medievalism. lt is rooted in the 
folk tales of Robin Hood and King Arthur, as well as Horace Walpole's Castle 
of Otranto. This historically regressive feature may be seen in the novels of 
Waiter Scott, Mary Shelly and the Bronte sisters. The fourth dimension turns 
toward the Victorian cult of social individuals. They are inspired by individual 
geniuses, such as Napoleon Bonaparte's saga, Lord Byron's poetry and 
Beethoven's music. This socially progressive feature may be further seen 
from everyday heroes in Heine's poems and even Dickens' novels. In these 
four dimensions, specific meanings and examples may contradict to each 
other, but self-contradiction is exactly what characterizes romanticism. 
Nonetheless, they reveal a logical development of romanticism from eternal 
nature to historical society in a paradox of continuous rupture. In other words, 
why did the "Great Chain of Being" (Lovejoy) break up? How did willful 
passion arise from lawful nature? When did human society emerge out of 
natural reason in a historical turn? These are puzzling questions not just 
about evolution but about the genesis of evolution. The evolutionary meaning 
of genesis has changed from theological creationism through historical 
genealogy to the biological genetics of individuals in society. 
If romanticism was the prodigal son of the Enlightenment, and romanticism, 
especially in the English case, had a social existence more in the wake of its 
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literary imagination, then the actual revolutionary sentiment and act between 
1770 and 1830 couldn't be represented contemporaneously by the French 
Enlightenment (before 1770) or English romanticism (after 1830), and hence 
should be captured, we suggest, by the transfiguration of German cultural 
revolution in itself. Moreover, even such a cultural revolution is often unduly 
referred to as German romanticism, since Goethe, however representative he 
might be to his age, presents a highly questionable case to romanticism. 
Here, the word "revolution" should be recovered to its original sense of 
over/turning, which is manifested in the very passage of incompatible systems 
of thought, such as classicism, enlightenment and romanticism, 
providentialism, scientism and mysticism, and/or transcendence, 
transcendentalism and idealism, finally making up a structural reference to the 
dynamic of the modern world in its aspects of modernism, formalism and 
hyperrealism. lt is in this sense that Goethe in Weimar of Prussia produced 
his drama of love. 
To "understand" Goethe, it is crucial to acknowledge an irony of truth in the 
gap between life and art: while the last whole man Goethe left every single 
detail of his life in diaries, correspondences and autobiographies, a definitive 
account of his life to do justice on both literary and biographical levels 
becomes unattainable. This irony is largely responsible for the inconsistent 
images of Goethe as a Kantian poet, a romantic biologist and a neo-classic 
humanist (Boyle, 2000; Richards, 2002; Armstrong, 2007), and the confusion 
could be clarified by looking for a legacy of love Goethe has bequeathed to 
the world behind the curtains of German philosophy, politics, science and art. 
Forsaking the practice of law, he grew into a poet, a scientist, and a lover. 
Goethe the poet, the novelist and the dramatist composed sophisticated 
masterpieces, including The Sorrows of Young Werther, Wilhelm Meister, 
Elective Affinity and Faust, amongst others. Goethe the scientist was involved 
with many pioneering projects, ranging from the study of minerals and animal 
anatomy to the study of plants, animal electricity and colours. Goethe the 
lover matched his science and art with numerous covert and overt erotic 
relationships with family and friends, regardless of class, sex and age, to 
synthesize the Enlightenment concept of nature with the Romantic concept of 
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life.2 Goethe's legacy of love, in short, exemplifies a way of natural life. But his 
natural life has to be distinguished from Rousseau's Emile (innocent 
savagery) as well as Voltaire's Candida (skeptical civilization) in that life, for 
Goethe, follows a rule of love in learning an act of renunciation from the 
experience of death. The resulting new order of love, we will argue, does not 
revolve around the dialectic of reason and revolution, but an experience of 
death and renunciation. 
At the center of Weimar's courtly politics, Goethe was intellectually and/or 
personally familiar with all great minds emerging from the odd coupling of 
Kantian philosophy and French revolution, including Schiller, Fichte, 
Schleiermacher, Holderlin, Hegel, Schelling, the Schlegel brothers, 
Schopenhauer, and so on. Heavily influenced by philosophical ideas and yet 
without becoming a philosopher, Goethe conducted a search for truth through 
his work of art. Meanwhile, because of a quasi-autobiographical lining to his 
work, Goethe's art and life were entwined in a web of love adventures, a love-
life as we call it. So, how should one approach his love-life? Goethe is well 
known for ·his love to his family (his wife Christiane, son August, and the 
Frauenplan house) as well as romantic attachments, infatuations, and affairs. 
To the contemporary eyes, such ambivalence is symptomatic of an ennobled 
middle-class patriarch. Far from it, this shows his love did not fall prey to an 
imaginary romanticization of extramarital relationships as opposed to the 
family and society. Contrary to ambivalence, Goethe's love was larger than 
romantic passion since he had poeticized all of his personal relationships in 
an erotic ambiance. By Goethe's impossible demand to love all, everyone and 
everything, love turns into an unrequited, foreclosed tragedy. This is why his 
life and art are entwined together in love stories, transfiguring fractured love 
within the conflicted social structures into a hope of love-life. To elucidate 
2 A round portrayal of love must defy social classification, and this is also true in Goethe's 
case. His loyalty with male friends such as Karl August and Schiller amongst others and his 
interest in homosexuality during his Italian trip can always provoke curious lines of analysis, if 
beyond the boundary of academic chastity. His love for children, exemplified in Werther's 
personality, appears beyond doubt, especially for his son August. His romantic liaisons with 
females go beyond class, social-marital and age divides to include Gretchen (his professed 
first love), Friederike Brion, Charlotte Buff, lili ScMnemann, Charlotte von Stein, Christiane 
Vulpius, Minna Herzlieb, Ulrike Levetzow, and many more flirtatious or casual relationships 
with actresses, widows, ladies and models. 
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Goethe's love-life, therefore, one should drop the distinction between literary 
fiction and biographical reality to examine his literary artwork directly as an 
esthetic of appearance. On the basis of appearance, moreover, Goethe's 
love-life needs to find an objective nature to complete, not impair, his art of 
truth. His interest in natural science, that is to say, helped to redefine a close 
encounter between nature and life. 
By taking romantic biology "as a species of the wider genus of German nature 
philosophy", Goethe is understood as an archetypical romantic biologist to 
prefigure Darwin's romantic concept of life which highlights the "aesthetic and 
the moral dimensions of the science of biology" (Richards, 2002: 8, 512). The 
philosophical premise is that "Spinoza would set him [i.e. Goethe] on the path 
that would lead to Kant and then to the Romantics" (Richards, 2002: 396). 
Such a genealogy of romanticism levels out Kant's three Critiques to marry 
post-Kantian idealism with Spinozist pantheism because from the moral-
aesthetic judgment (a preference for the third Critique shared by idealists from 
Schiller to Hegel), the Self can be reunited with God through the mediation of 
Nature. Hence, highlighting Goethe's trip to Italy (1786-88) as the romantic 
breakpoint, Richards (2002: eh. 10-11) presents the poet's early art around 
"the eroticization of nature" in the female form, and his late science around "a 
morphological science of life" which is the forerunner of evolutionary biology 
beyond his early interest in animal anatomy (Goethe's alleged discovery of 
the intermaxilary bone in humans in 1784). This dramatic narrative, however, 
reduces Goethe's art to post-Kantian morality, idealizing the progression from 
nature to art on essential and historical grounds (i.e. from essential nature/ 
historical art to historical nature/ essential art) (Richards, 2002: 392-94). In 
effect, there is no real life concern for nature and art in Goethe's work. This 
inattention to real life is reflected paradoxically in Richards' (2002: 382-83) 
valorization of revolution as a romantic self-discovery or rebirth. Ironically, 
Goethe's legacy of love regarding death and renunciation is buried since the 
romantic concept of love has been subjected to an infinite concept of life. 
Armstrong's recent thematic storytelling applies Goethe's life and work to a 
neoclassic ethic of being "happy in an imperfect world". Armstrong reads 
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Goethe from a humanist view of life to imagine the renunciation of death and 
immature love. His method of reading is straightforward: "[i]t is how you 
respond to the problem itself (being confronted by the impossible choice 
between two loves) rather than how you get into it that is interesting" 
(Armstrong, 2007: 90). Hence, suicidal love in Werther and triangular love in 
Stella are negative points of refl;lrence: "Werther is on the road to ruin, not 
because of the faults of the world, but because of some flaw in his inner 
condition." "Within the worlds of these works, there is no adequate response 
to such problems - there is only a fantasy solution (let's all love one another) 
or death" (Armstrong, 2007: 62, 90-91). Given as such, Armstrong (2007: 65) 
reads Goethe subsequent work like Wilhelm Meister and Faust as "epics of 
personal growth" in response to the early problem of sentimentality. Above all, 
Wilhelm Meister is read alongside Goethe's friendship with Schiller on the 
agreement of an classical art of politics "to ennoble us, to make us whole and 
balanced ... to promote a kind of lucid inner stillness and equilibrium ... centred 
and calm, vital but poised like an ideal Greek athlete ... to spread energetic 
sanity" (Armstrong, 2007: 255-56). In this context, Wilhelm Meister tells us 
"we have to learn by experience", and a key "political creed" behind this 
humanist idea of education is about "human contentment. We are envious of 
more than we can use ... And hence we don't rest content with the good things 
we have" (Armstrong, 2007: 276). Furthermore, the self-reproductive meaning 
of life can be read into Goethe's scientific study of plants and colours. His 
science constitutes the knowledge of holistic experience in accordance with 
Spinoza's ethic of renunciation to lead a life of "light-minded" thinking 
(Armstrong, 2007: 310-12). Thus, Goethe's science of life is opposed to both 
romantics and philistines, but· it remains contestable to affirm "Goethe's 
acknowledgement of the conservative, material basis of happiness" as the 
wisdom of contemporary life (Armstrong, 2007: 330-31). Nonetheless, Faust 
is read as a drama of conflicting human values: worldly happiness is attained 
only by rejecting Mephistopheles' darkness to be led by God's light. The 
Manichean view of humanity exemplifies the hatred and love of earthly life by 
the metaphors of Mephistopheles and God, while Faustian humanity is 
understood as striving for the good work of creation (Armstrong, 2007: 392, 
411,417, 421). 
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From the humanist view of a happy life, Armstrong prioritizes the ethic of 
renunciation of death and immature love. Albeit therapeutic, this neo-classic 
world order is more individualistic than communitarian, let alone universalistic. 
In this sense, it amounts to a New Age rendition of Goethe's classicism: 
Armstrong's neoclassic Goethe would be most appreciated by a postmodern 
consumer/reader in search of inner peace, most probably with middle-class 
affluence and intellectual restlessness. However, he "misunderstands" Goethe 
as soon as Werlher is excluded from Goethe's work of "mature love". In short, 
Armstrong fails to reincorporate Werther's sorrowful, death-seeking love into a 
building block of Goethe's irony in art and life. Biased toward hedonistic 
humanism, Armstrong condemns the death wish to a sentimental emotion 
without objective reality. But suicide, once completed, might induce real 
consequences to social life. In light of this, the ethic of renunciation as 
Armstrong describes it amounts to a denial of death. This is why he cannot 
fully account for the idea of fate in a tragic sense of renunciation, a theme 
which predominates in Wilhelm Meister and Elective Affinity, except to assert 
the value of individual choice against Goethe's text (Armstrong, 2007: 264-65, 
362-65). 
Boyle probably comes closest to Goethe's poetic legacy of love irreducible to 
both social morality and individual ethic. In a close reading of the poem 
Euphrosyne (1798), especially in the passage where the poet fails to speak, 
Boyle (2000: 673-74) argues that Goethe's "poetry is rather a form of love 
which values even the most intangible moments and the shortest lives, in 
spite of Fate". This poetic form of love may be specified as the poetry, or 
rather anti-poetry, of renunciation in response to the death of high art (Boyle, 
2000: 781-784). Since Schiller, post-Kantian idealists had great expectation 
for Art to reconstruct the society, against which Goethe held a complex view of 
romanticism, swinging from reprehension, sympathy to qualified reconciliation 
(Richards, 2002: 458-59; Armstrong, 2007: 330). However, Goethe's 
renunciation embraced the historical fate of French Revolution without 
succumbing to it, which means he renounced its romantic-idealist 
consequences represented by "the secret German Revolution" in 
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reestablishing "the Kingdom of God" and "the invisible Church" (Boyle, 2000: 
73). "The ideal, at once Greek, Kantian, and - after purification and 
reinterpretation - Christian, was a, perhaps the, characteristic of German 
response to the great political challenge of the time" (Boy le, 2000: 69). As a 
result, Boyle suggests that Goethe's "post-Christian" poetry of renunciation 
conveyed a subtle but sharp message by the end of the 1790s. The poet 
accepted neither Greek Classicism (cosmic harmony) nor Christian 
Romanticism (Protestant love), and nor atheist Enlightenment (French 
progress), but rather grasped Kant's limited reason (or the limit of reason as 
post-Christian love-poetry) to affirm the critical gap between idealism and 
realism, "acknowledging the existence of a power beyond poetry" (Boyle, 
2000: 55, 793). Goethean renunciation, Boyle (2000: 794) sums up, "is the act 
of those who believe that their happiness is dependent on a power beyond 
their control. .. [and] the silence that acknowledges the absence from reality of 
the ldeai...Conversely, poems, being all of them occasioned poems, and 
expressing delight in a glimpse of beauty recovered, thanks to favourable 
circumstances, are emblem or 'talisman', of a 'counter-magic' which works 
against the hostility of fate." 
We have argued that neither romanticism nor classicism can describe Goethe 
accurately. Nonetheless, for Goethe to become a Kantian poet without lapsing 
to both pre-Kantian Greek classicism and post-Kantian Christian romanticism 
is an impossible task. The reason is Kant himself is not up to the task if he is 
known (or perhaps confused) as the philosopher of the Enlightenment 
celebrating freedom and knowledge, not a poet of love and fate. In this sense, 
Goethe's anti/poetry is in conflict with Kant's "necessity of thought" modeled 
on Newton's mathematics. Although capturing Goethe's poetic renunciation as 
the spirit of his age, Boyle's critical Kantian interpretation still sometimes falls 
short of the mark. 
At bottom, the problem of understanding Goethe is rooted in the problem of 
interpreting Kant because Kant himself is an elusive thinker who could belong 
to the tradition of French Enlightenment, German romanticism, and Prussian 
Enlightenment. First, Boyle's judgment of Goethe as a Kantian poet is 
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premised on Kant as a progenitor of the Prussian Enlightenment, which is a. 
cultural-historically specific view that we will adopt. Second, neo-Kantian 
Cassirer (1970[1945]: 20-21) links Rousseau's penchant for primitive nature 
to Kant's practical reason, making Kant an heir of the French Enlightenment. 
Moreover, he interprets Goethe in the light of Kantian philosophy, emphasizing 
their common rejection of Wolffian philistine theology and common defense of 
a critical philosophy of nature through the case of Goethe's theory of 
morphology (Cassirer, 1970: 65-67, 77-78, 91-92). Gay (in Cassirer 
1970[1963]: xiv-xv) goes on further to suggest the affinity between Goethe 
and Rousseau along the Enlightenment's rational construction of nature. 
Third, from a parallel view (of romantic liberalism), Berlin (1999[1965]: 69-78) 
sees Kant as a restrained romantic (which is not unlike Richards' genealogy of 
romanticism), but (contrary to Richards' thesis) sees Goethe as a decided 
anti-romantic. However, Berlin (1999: 111-13) fails to identify Goethe between 
classicism (as in Armstrong) and the Enlightenment (as in Boyle, Cassirer and 
Gay), except to say "there is a solution" for Goethe, thereby relegating him to 
the pre-romantic world of "order, self-restraint, discipline." This self-referential 
exclusion of Goethe from romanticism altogether is a logical result of Berlin's 
romantic definition of romanticism. In sum, from pro-Enlightenment to anti-
romanticism, a surprisingly consistent view of Goethe emerges on the basis of 
inconsistent, even contradictory, views of Kant. As a whole, it is Kant's thorny 
ties with the cultural-historical mentality of the Enlightenment and romanticism 
which prevent Goethe from being understood in his own right. For this reason, 
Goethe the poet cannot be read along with Kant the philosopher too closely. 
The above reflections mean to show that if Goethe is neither a classicist nor a 
romantic, then he is equally neither pro-Enlightenment nor anti-romanticism. 
In other words, conventional cultural-historical classification only obscures 
Goethe's legacy of love. Instead, we argue that Goethe exceeded his times to 
foresee a post-idealistic fate of modernity since his legacy of love qua poetic 
renunciation couldn't be learnt without coming up against the sexual power of 
death. That is to say, Woman, in place of God, turned into the "fate" of Man in 
the double sense of destined-condemned death and predestined-redeemed 
life. In the process, femininity became separated from nature while nature was 
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internally differentiated into a divided whole of matter and life at the turn of the 
19th century. In response, Goethe fictionalized the Kantian Thing-in-itself and 
then idolized (in no na'ive way) a post-Christian beauty called Humanity. The 
feminine body of Humanity conceived "society" miraculously in the 
subsequent ideas of Comte and Marx. 
The development of Goethe's poeticization can be seen from his contributions 
to science and literature under the Prussian political condition. Independent 
from the old Empire, Prussia sought for a solution to similar problems (of 
social reproduction, mainly) comparable to France at the end of the 18th 
century, but a bloody revolution did not occur in Prussia as in France for 
necessary sociological reasons. In terms of social structure, Prussia lacked a 
mature bourgeois agent in an industrialized urban environment (Boyle, 2000: 
23-25). In terms of historical culture, Prussia had "its own traditions of 
Lutheranism, rather than Catholicism, and Enlightened, rather than arbitrary 
rule" (Boyle, 2000: 51). In fact, a group of Prussian officials had begun a 
proper political "revolution" for at least a couple of decades before the French 
terrorist "accident", which resulted in a compromised course led by Kant's 
revolution of the mind in 1780 (Critique of Pure Reason) and Wilhelm von 
Humboldt's law reform in 1792 (Ideas towards Essaying a Determination of 
the limits of State Action) (Boyle, 2000: 26f, 36f). Therefore, the resulting 
Prussian norm was a "compromise" of the Prussian officials (like Kant and van 
Humboldt) with the monarchical social system and its Leibnizian metaphysics: 
"[b]y a Copernican revolution, the role of the Leibnizian 'as if' in establishing 
harmony between substances and appearances, is reversed. lt is no longer 
the phenomenal world that functions 'as if' it. possessed causality, but the 
monadic world behind it. But the connection remains obscure between visible, 
material, life and the noumenal realm to which the higher causality of 
politically independent beings who determine their own fate and legislate for 
themselves is confined" (Boyle, 2000: 52-53}. The compromise of critical 
epistemology with dogmatic ontology marked the impossible transition from 
the individual monad to the universal subject. In other words, the Prussian 
Enlightenment was qualified with a sense of humility in which a break with the 
past would never be clean. As a Kantian poet, especially, Goethe knew better 
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that his critical idealism (or, rational empiricism) built a transitional wonderland 
between the past <;~nd the future, for the fate of the Enlightenment was to be 
an unfinished project between magic and science. 
In the first decade in Weimer (1775-85), Goethe focused his scientific studies 
on mineralogy (the mineral "goethite" is named after him) and animal anatomy 
(he claimed the discovery of the intermaxillary bone in humans). From the 
Italian trip (1786-88) onwards, his interests expanded to botany, animal 
chemistry and zoology, commencing with the famous essay The 
Metamorphosis of Plants published in 1790. All these scientific explorations 
culminated in Goethe's creation of morphology, which has been widely 
conceived as the forerunner of modern evolutionary thinking. In this context, it 
is understandable that Goethe's morphology is regarded as the first romantic 
biology. As implied above, this is Richards' (2002: eh. 11) over-interpretation 
when he stresses the impact of post-Kantian idealists from Schiller to 
Schelling on Goethe's morphological notions of Urpflanze (primal plant) and 
Urtypus (archetype), as if the romantic doctrines of idealism have been 
accepted unreservedly. In fact, Richards' (2002: eh. 10) autobiographical 
reading of Goethe's literary art under the heading of "erotic authority of 
nature" has disclosed a fundamental principle behind the romantic concept of 
life, the principle that matter and mind belong to a positive force at One with 
Nature-God. In the Whole, the distinction between death and life becomes 
irrelevant since they have entered into a continuous natural process which is 
potentially, if not consciously, alive. In this sense, the romantic science of life 
is based on a furtive belief in the magical power of love which we might call 
the Snow White complex: romantic love can bring death to life in an instant of 
a kiss. This romantic magic of love in corollary to the romantic science of life 
may be found in romantic literature, such as Frankenstein (1818) written by 
Mary Shelley, Mary Wollstonecraft's daughter. Understood as such, Goethe 
did not go as far as subscribing to romantic occultism apart from an open-
minded sympathy which did not breach the consensus of Prussian 
Enlightenment, for his idea of natural science did not presume an essence of 
things-in-itself as in romantic life-love, but was rather confined in studying the 
manifest phenomena of nature by empirical observation. 
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Before musing on its anatomical implication, a morphological reading of 
Goethe's The Metamorphosis of Plants should not focus on the idea of plants, 
but its apparent metamorphosis qua Bui/dung. lt is not difficult to see that 
Goethe's essay bridged the scientific and cultural-political meanings of 
Bui/dung, that is, Buildung as "formation" originated in 1789 by J. F. 
Blumenbach, and Buildung as "education" (or cultivated growth) applied in 
1792 by Wilhelm von Humboldt. However, the ambiguity of choosing between 
a Leibnizian monad and the Kantian subject, especially in von Humboldt's 
applied sense, remained unresolved since a biological conception of the 
whole as an organism apart from the inorganic was yet to be developed 
(Boyle, 2000: 30-31). To be sure, Goethe did not coin the term "morphology" 
until September 1796 in his diary, roughly two years after his conversation 
with Schiller about Urpf/anze, a talk which indeed led to their romantic 
friendship until Schiller's death in 1805, but a talk which by no means reached 
any consensus about Urpflanze being an essential idea of beauty beyond 
experience. Conversely, Goethe's original theory of morphology was "the first 
outlines of a new science of appearances, a universal phenomenology" 
(Boyle, 2000: 460). In his own words, "everything that is must also manifest 
and show itself ... to our outer and inner sense. Form is something mobile, that 
comes into being and passes away. The science of form is the science of 
transformation. The doctrine of metamorphosis is the key to all Nature's signs" 
(Goethe cited in Boyle, 2000: 459). lt is true that Goethe at the first stage 
believed in Nature as a romantic Whole which included organic and inorganic 
realms, but he also meant it in Kant's critical sense that morphology presents 
Nature "as a subjective whole ... the world of the eye, exhaustiyely comprised 
by form and colour" (Goethe cited in Boyle, 2000: 460) .. 
From March 1797, Goethe got into close contact with the promising 
physiologist Alexander von Humboldt, Wilhelm's brother. The younger von 
Humboldt introduced Goethe to the science of animal electro-chemistry 
dominated by the debate between Galvin and Voila over the existence of "the 
galvanic fluid" in animals. This refers to a controversial experiment about the 
vivification of a frog's leg when brought into contact with metal plates arranged 
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like a modern battery (Boyle, 2000: 483; Richards, 2002: 317-20). The 
controversy induced a possible distinction between the inorganic and organic. 
Inspired by Kant's metaphysical division of matter and life at the time, Goethe 
came up with a modified theory of morphology more in common with 
Alexander von Humboldt than with Schelling's romantic force of life since the 
result was "a pragmatic science, with an Idealist basis but aware of its limits 
and collectively undertaken" (Boyle, 2000: 486).3 For von Humboldt (cited in 
Richards, 2002: 316), elements of matter "are combined according to the laws 
of chemical affinity", whereas an organism's body has the tenacity to "dissolve 
the bonds of chemical affinity and prevent elements of bodies from freely 
uniting." Hence, matter is "inactive, brute and inanimate" not because it 
remains in hypostasis but because it displays malleable deformation (such as 
water). On the other hand, life is "vital, animated and organic" not because it 
strives for infinite transformation but because it expresses the strength to 
sustain the appearance of a form in the course of metamorphosis. In short, life 
can be distinguished from matter by observing its irritability or excitability to 
stimulation: the ability to go "mad" is a sure sign of life. Given as such, 
Goethe's modified morphology allowed a certain degree of differentiation in 
Nature, severing ties from "the inorganic sciences, particularly mineralogy and 
parts of optics" due to their reversible course of change (Boyle, 2000: 483-84). 
Furthermore, he reworked drafts of comparative anatomy in the same period 
to put forward "a science of general metamorphosis" in which the Kantian 
distinction of the organic and the inorganic was maintained but only in a 
limited sense in order to reserve for the inorganic elements some "faint share 
... in Nature's universal breath of life" (Goethe cited in Boyle, 2000: 484). lt is 
· hence true that Goethe at the second stage clung to the belief in Nature, but 
its partial organic differentiation was no longer a romantic Whole. Eventually, 
he settled for an awkward concept of "simultaneous metamorphosis" devoid of 
"the secession of time", "the kind of metamorphosis preeminently found in the 
higher animals ... to explain both the interrelation of the differentiated but 
3 On the contrary. Richards (2002: 321) argues that Alexander von Humboldt's science of life 
"appealed to" early Schelling's nature philosophy. However, Richards' (2002: 518-21) 
romantic introduction of von Humboldt misses the fact that he was amongst the first audience 
in Auguste Comte's courses of positive philosophy opened in April 1826. The adoption of 
Comte's tenninology "celestial physics" in his work attests to von Humboldt's non-romantic, if 
not positivist, orientation to science. 
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identical parts of a whole animal (by transformation of the basic bone) and the 
relation to the common type of the differently modified species (by 
transformation of the entire skeleton)" (Boyle, 2000: 485). In the final analysis, 
Goethe's modified morphology of nature departed from both Spinozist Nature-
God and post-Kantian Ideal-Whole; he arrived at a comparative anatomy of 
the partially organic whole in order to keep a harmonious, material hierarchy 
of life and yet to reject the monadic notion of the individual. In this latter 
sense, Goethe's reflective natural whole exceeded both Leibnizian and 
Kantian systems to create a middle ground. Taking advantage of the loss of 
the end, he gave a poetic origin to the modern evolutionary conception of the 
natural whole (cf. Boyle, 2000: 485-86 for a critical Kantian view; Cassirer, 
1970: 61-98 for an neo-Kantian view). 
By August 1798, Goethe put forward a revised theory of morphology based on 
the principle of reproduction as opposed to individuation. Initially, he 
synthesized the empirical and the scientific methods of "looking" into an 
"active vision" of "the 'appearance' of the object" called Urphenomenon (pure 
phenomenon) in order to distance himself from the dogmatic residue of 
Naturphilosophie, for early Schelling's "ways of seeing things" granted 
monadic perspectives of nature and nature remained mystified in a lively 
thing-in-itself (Boyle, 2000: 597-99). Subsequently, "the subject-matter of the 
sciences is repeatedly described not as things but as 'phenomena', the 
appearance of things to an observer; and of so fundamental a phenomenon 
as the capacity for reproduction, which distinguishes the organic from the 
inorganic world, it is said not to be possible to give any further analysis. lt is 
an ultimate among phenomena, which others exemplify, but which itself 
exemplifies nothing" (Boyle, 2000: 599). Standing by reproduction, Goethe 
has taken a decisive step back from the romantic concept of life as unbridled 
productivity. More in line with Alexander von Humboldt, reproductive life 
should be understood as the maintenance of a form against the tendency to 
regress into formless matter. Goethe's morphological world of appearance is 
then a paradoxical world of simulation: an artful way to attain life is to simulate 
the stillness of death, whilst matter simulates the activity of life. In short, to live 
is to learn the art of death. lt is based on this scientific understanding of life 
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that Goethe's love qua poetic renunciation could be seen as the experience of 
death. 
To elucidate the poetic relations between love, death and renunciation, it is 
probably best to return to Goethe's literary art. Hence, we choose The 
Sorrows of Young Werther (1774), Elective Affinity (1809) and Faust (1772-
1832) to exemplify his early, late and definitive works of love. Albeit covering a 
wide range of literary genres from epistolary confession and formalist novella 
(long-story) to poetical drama, this sample of work belongs to fiction instead of 
reflexive writings like Italian Journey or Poetry and Truth. lt is assumed that a 
work of fiction has a poetic dimension foreign to what can be found from a 
contextual method of reading, including psychoanalysis, biography, history 
and sociology. To appreciate Goethe's literature, one should never deviate, 
but on the contrary follow rigorously his rule of fictionalizing love-life: "[a]nd so 
began that path, from which I have not been able to stray away during my 
whole life, namely, that inclination to turn whatever delighted, tortured, or 
otherwise occupied me into an image, a poem, and thereby to come to terms 
with myself so that I might as much justify my conception of external things as 
well as calm my inner self about them" (Goethe cited in Richards, 2002: 338). 
In light of this, it is not enough to read the suicidal love in The Sorrows of 
Young Werther as a symptomatic malaise of his individual existence and/or 
social condition. Notwithstanding internal contradictions, both readings have-
commonly assumed that Werther's unrequited love bears a sentimental 
relation to nature and/or society, eventually leading up to his suicide. These 
interpretations argue how Werther's sentimentality is represented by his 
imaginary projection onto nature and/or by his critical distance from society. 
Hence the emphases are laid upon his na"ive closeness to children and 
common folk, inconsistent images of nature from vitality to inactivity, and 
rejection by the social circle. Furthermore, Werther's constant call for 
understanding may be regarded as a narcissistic outcry, and his object of 
love, Charlotte, deemed as an instrument of his egoistic character. In result, 
the story tells us that if Werther had developed a mature kind of love, he 
would not have committed suicide; he could have either settled for a happy 
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life or fought for a just society. Given as such, these views do not grant 
Werther being read as a story of true love. 
By contrast, if one takes Goethe's rule of fiction into account, then Werther 
must commit suicide, not only for the sake of saving Goethe's love-life (i.e. his 
relations with Charlotte Buff and Christian Kestner) but also to reveal the 
poetic truth that only an act of suicide can prove Werther's love for Lotte is 
real in this situation. Why must it be love or death? From Werther's standpoint 
in a type of unrequited love (i.e. A loves B who loves C), he must commit 
suicide in this subjectively totalitarian condition where every possible 
ex/change is closed. Suppo_se Werther throws himself a life line, from 
adaptation to struggle, his love would be either self-deluded in the first place 
or compromised at the end of the day. Thus, only by committing suicide can 
he demonstrate that his love for Lotte has objectivity. From Charlotte's 
standpoint, she could prevent the tragedy by practicing hetaerism, were she a 
man. But she is a woman, so Werther must die. 
If Charlotte becomes a man, we then have a type of triangular love (i.e. B 
loves A and C who both love 8).4 Even so, the problem is not resolved by · 
gender equality (i.e. the evolution from monogamy and hetaerism to polygamy 
and promiscuous partnership) since gender strategies play a feeble role in 
Goethe's work of love. This is why we see from Elective Affinity when the type 
of triangular love presents us a deadlock of fate beyond strategy. In Werther, 
"the fate of Man" both "ordained" and "forsaken" by God has preoccupied 
Werther's mind from the start to the end (before the narrative passes on to the 
third person's viewpoint introducing an "analysis" of Werther's suicide) 
4 Sexuality is not an issue here, so it does not matter whether Werther and Albert change their 
sex or not In addition, Goethe is as disinterested in the melodramatic type of triangular love 
(i.e. A loves B who loves C who loves A) as he is bothered about the fairy tale type of 
reciprocal love (i.e. A and B love each other and live happily ever after). Moreover, the circular 
form in the melodramatic type of triangular love may be romanticized or rather mystified to 
infinity. This orgiastic love is represented by Schnitzler's ceremonial dramas in the making of 
Victorian middle-class, sexual culture (cf. Gay, 2002). For example, one of his best-known 
plays Der Reigen (1900, Hands Around, which was not performed on stage until 1920 and 
made into a film called La Ronde by Max Ophuls in 1950) constructs ten dialogues between 
characters before and after coitus. Beginning with the seduction of a Soldier by a Proslitule, 
each subsequent dialogue is related to its predecessors to form a cycle, until the tenth 
character, the Count, makes love to the Prostitute, and closes the cycle. 
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(Goethe, 1989: 25, 99-105). In parallel, Charlotte has cast Werther's fate in a 
double sense of death and salvation. For Charlotte, she is the direct cause of 
his suicide since she hands her husband's gun over to Werther's servant. For 
Werther, "I shall live for you· since "the darkness and madness of my soul are 
dispelled, and I breathe more freely again" only by your "divine breath" and 
"sacred music" (Goethe, 1989: 49, 53). 
Moreover, in Elective Affinity, an unexpected event of fate could interrupt the 
strategic trade of elective affinity, reclaiming the identity of death and love in 
the type of triangular love. "Elective affinity" was a new concept borrowed 
from chemistry in Goethe's time ("de attractionibus electivis" named by the 
Swedish chemist Torbern Olof Bergmann in 1775, and then translated into 
German "wahlverwandtschaft" by Heinrich Tabor in 1785), which caused a 
moral controversy over his novella. But one should heed any simple 
opposition of elective affinity to fate in a metaphysical-political sense of 
freedom and necessity. As Hollingdale notes (in Goethe, 1971: 12-13), any 
naturalistic reading of a novella is a mistake since this genre features "the 
absence of names, the strict economy of means, the unnaturalistic action, 
and ... elements not susceptible to rational explanation [but] proceeds in a 
more orderly and symmetrical way•. In short, the novella allows Goethe to 
create an objective form of irony, "[making] possible mystery and ambiguity 
underlying the action ... without committing the author himself to an ironic view 
of that action." In light of this, it seems better to regard elective affinity as a 
scientific solution to the problem of triangular love. This view is in fact 
summed up by the Captain himself in the story: "imagine an A intimately 
united with a 8, so that no force is able to sunder them; imagine a C likewise 
related to a D; now bring the two couples into contact: A will throw itself at D; 
C at B, without our being able to say which first deserted its partner, which first 
embraced the other's partner" (Goethe, 1971: 56). This formula follows after 
another central character Eduard's argument that elective affinity introduces a 
fourth term to the triad "so that no one will go empty away" (Goethe, 1971: 
55). 
Therefore, elective affinity is an explanation of the tragedy of triangular love 
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ending in divorce. In fact, this notion is introduced through the conversation 
between Eduard, Charlotte and the Captain about the duality of love and 
divorce. In the beginning, dealing with substantial compounds instead of 
elements, chemical affinity does not produce a spontaneous combustion like 
the making of water (2H + 0 -7 H20), but depends on a third compound to 
aid unification, such as the combination of oil and water with the mediation of 
alkaline salt. Eduard reasons a compound "will not relinquish this unified state 
except through the action or force of some other agent. If this is removed, 
they [i.e. the elements] immediately come together again" (Goethe, 1971: 51). 
Eduard goes on to compare this third agent to "laws and customs", and 
Charlotte ventures further to apply affinity to "affinity of mind and soul" 
(Goethe, 1971: 52-53). If chemical affinity romanticizes the social cohesion of 
love, then elective affinity introduces a real complexity about love and divorce, 
"for the most complicated cases are in fact the most interesting ... the affinities 
become interesting only when they bring about divorces" (Goethe, 1971: 53). 
Simply put, once there is a free unity with the new, there is a forced 
separation from the old, and the abandoned party in this duality cannot be 
saved without a fourth party is thrown in to create a swap. In the frame of 
scientific discussion, the erotic game of elective affinity begins when 
Charlotte's young niece Ottilie is brought into the trio. 
However, this ideal condition does not end in a happy ending but a fatal 
outcome. Before long after the two couples allow elective affinity to take its 
course, Charlotte's child Otto, suspiciously resembling the Major and 
described by Eduard as being "begotten in tWofold adultery", dies of drowning 
in the nearby lake under Ottilie's guardian (Goethe, 1971: 259-62). This fatal 
incident, first of all, forestalls the win-win scheme developed "so firmly 
complete in Eduard's mind" by inviting the Major back to the swap to prevent 
his divorced wife Charlotte from "going empty away" (Goethe, 1971: 258). 
Second, Charlotte and the Major resign to fate in the same way as they 
adapted to elective affinity. They make no objection to whatever may come 
and offer no answers to life's misfortunes (Goethe, 1971: 266-67). Ottilie 
initially counted on Charlotte to "decide our fate" upon the proposal of Eduard, 
but later she says "I have decided ... ! shall never be Eduard's!" since "God has 
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opened my eyes in a terrible way to the crime I am committing ... [and] the 
moment I learn you have agreed to a divorce I shall atone for my crime and 
transgression in that same lake" (Goethe, 1971: 260, 269). Because of 
Ottilie's act of renunciation, everyone is forced in the end to restore to a 
period of self-deceptive "pure togetherness" until Ottilie dies of resolution and 
Eduard dies of accident after her (Goethe, 1971: 286-87, 292-93, 299). No 
matter how much Eduard believes that "man is capable of willing and 
choosing", he half-realizes before his unpredictable death that "how fortunate I 
am that all my endeavours have ever been no more than imitation, a 
counterfeit!" (Goethe, 1971: 285, 299) Now it is plausible to argue, as 
commentators do, that the death of a child is a reflection of Goethe's worry 
about his only survived son August, and then symbolizes his conservative 
defense of social reproduction by marriage against free love. 5 But this 
argument is based on a liberal ideology to affirm elective affinity and reject 
fate in the name of personal choice. 
In fact, the logic behind Goethe's defense of social reproduction lies in 
something more binding than marriage. According to Alexander's von 
Humboldt's concept of life, elective affinity may stand for a lack of strength to 
maintain a form. In contemporary terms, elective affinity may be applied to 
plastic sexuality, signifying the triumph of the pleasure principle in society. For 
the party who does the choosing, in fact, a unity with the new is forced, 
whereas separation is free: saying yes to seduction takes no human effort 
whereas it requires the courage of love to say no. Given as such, the fatal 
incident provides a test of death to the existence of love in elective affinity. 
However unnatural it seems to human nature, renunciation by the rejection of 
social intercourse becomes the most natural human response available when 
a cruel event of fate happens to us. In parallel to Werther's suicide, Ottilie's 
renunciation is a logical result and the proof of true love behind the eroticism 
of elective affinity. 
'From 1786 to 1788, he made a tour to Italy by himself, and upon returning he started to live 
with Christiane Vulpius whom he did not marry until after Napoleon's siege of Weimer in 1806. 
Three years later, Elective Affinity (1809) was published, reflecting Goethe's inner conflict with 
an extramarital desire for Minna Herzlieb. 
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At bottom, this counterfactual but objective irony of love within elective affinity 
echoes the foreshadowing clue of the trio's erotic conversation in the manner 
of scientific discussion. Their discussion is provoked by the situation in which 
Eduard complains about Charlotte's reading over his shoulder when he tries 
to read aloud to Charlotte and the Captain. As Eduard explains, "if I read 
aloud to someone, is it not as if I were speaking to him and telling him 
something? What has been written down and printed takes the place of my 
own mind and my own heart; and would I ever take the trouble to speak at all 
if a window were constructed in my forehead or in my chest, so that he to 
whom I want to expound my thoughts one by one, or convey my feelings one 
by one, could always know long in advance what I was getting at? Whenever 
anyone reads over my shoulder if is as if I were being torn in two" (Goethe, 
1971: 49). Apparently, Eduard is expressing a serious concern about the 
changing nature of humanity by technology in which love is put at risk. What 
can this love possibly mean? 
During the conversation, Charlotte repeatedly confirms to Eduard that she is 
learning not only the science of elective affinity but also the art of listening 
with patience. In view of this foreshadowing, the art of listening is the art of 
love, and the art of love is the art of responding to the fate of death with 
renunciation. Eventually, Eduard's complaint ironically blows back to his face 
as he becomes "driven by uncontrollable impatience" to hasten the swap 
(Goethe, 1971: 259); in fact, because he thinks without reflection, prompted 
only by "longing" and "desire", Eduard chases Ottilie to the inn where she 
stays overnight in order to flee, and asks her to come back. Cornered as 
such, Ottilie returns to live with the trio, but maintains her fidelity to the 
promise of renunciation by keeping her silence and starvation onto death. Her 
uncompromising demand to others exclaims "leave my soul to me!" (Goethe, 
1971: 278-93) In this sense, Ottilie's silent sui.cide appears more unnatural 
than Werther's pronounced suicide, for Ottilie dies of the renunciation of a 
false fate (Eduard), whilst Werther dies of a true one (Charlotte). 
All in all, from unrequited love to triangular love, Goethe shows us that there is 
something binding in love beyond the law and its transgression (i.e. marriage 
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and extramarital affairs). Encountering a love event could challenge a 
potential lover's character, a challenge so strong that his/her personal life is 
put at stake. In Faust, the ethic of renunciation in love is also achieved 
through an experience of death. From the start, it is equally tempting to read 
Faust as a classical "drama of reconciliation", a romantic tale of female 
beauty, and a modern/enlightened fable of "incommensurable worlds" (Berlin, 
1999: 112; Richards, 2002: 398; Boyle, 2000: 768). However, these historical 
readings are bounded too much by contextual concerns (such as analyzing 
versions composed in different stages of Goethe's life) to account for the 
drama as an organic whole. As Goethe's definitive work of love, Faust is 
unfolded in a real or virtual reality, a poetic fiction par excellence. Composed 
in 60 years of Goethe's life, it includes a prelude, a prologue and two parts.6 
Moreover, the first part has a single act and the second part five acts. First of 
all, the prelude "on the stage" juxtaposes the conflicted concerns of the 
director, the author and the actor in the production of a dramatic work. The 
director stresses on action to win the crowd, the author cares about language 
to express artistic imagination, and the actor is interested in experience to 
convey meaning to the audience (Goethe, 2002: 31-33). Then, the prologue 
"in heaven" introduces the ambiguous "pact" between God and 
Mephistopheles, modeling on the Book of Job. Strictly speaking, there is no 
pact being made not only because the two deities are in no direct 
disagreement with each other but also because God has predestined Faust's 
soul to be saved. This is why after Mephistopheles laments "[t]he torments of 
Mankind move even me/ to pity, not to plague Humanity", God comments "[h]e 
serves me now uncomprehendingly./ But I shall lead him soon toward the 
light." At bottom, Mephistopheles is but a tool since God aims to show that 
"[m]en make mistakes, till they learn not to strive" (Goethe, 2002: 35-36). 
Thus, Mephistopheles is surprised at being "fooled" in the end (Goethe, 2002: 
216). In effect, the foreshadowing in heaven orients this drama toward a love 
story of grace, not law: there is no question of fairness in love, since it is 
measured by neither classical action nor romantic imagination, and yet nor 
6 Spanning across 60 years, he finally finished the dramatic poem Faust in 1831, but was 
reluctant to publish the second part before his death in 1832. Goethe started to compose 
Faust as early as 1772, after which parts and versions were published in 1790 (a fragment), 
1808 (the first part), 1827(an interlude), 1832 (the second part) and 1887 (Urfaust). 
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enlightened experience, but by their renunciation. 
The first part is opened with the pact between Faust and Mephistopheles, and 
then turns to focus on the love tragedy between Faust and Gretchen. 
Although a knowledgeable academic, Faust's character bears much 
resemblance to Werther's suicidal passion for nature, life and poetry. In this 
sense, one might consider Faust a poet-scientist. In fact, the Devil intervenes 
to make a pact with him just when Faust prepares to end his life. This pact is 
to keep Faust unquenched and hence craves for more life experiences until 
he marvels, "this moment is so beautiful- let it stay!", where upon his soul 
should be snatched away by the Devil (Goethe, 2002: 61 ). Ironically, the pact 
is a statement of the identity of love and death since "let it stay" means to "be 
content to die" (Goethe, 2002: 60). To preempt the plot, this is why Faust must 
be saved instantly after ~ondemnation in the second part, for the angels who 
carry off Faust's soul explain "(a]ll things at variance/ must be rejected:/ 
inward discordance,/ do not accept it./ If it prove violent,/ we must prove 
valiant;/ only the loving/ are raised up by Love" (Goethe, 2002: 214). By 
contrast, one would expect Faust's soul being taken away in the first part 
when Faust falls in love with Gretchen. But this is not the case since Faust 
merely falls for lust in the crucial scene of "forest and cavern": "I stumble from 
desire to consummation,/ in consummation pining for desire" (Goethe, 2002: 
89). Instead, what happens is Gretchen being seduced and betrayed, as well 
as sinning (having sex with Faust) before killing her son and mother. In the 
famous "prison" scene, she renounces being rescued by Faust and chooses 
to pay for her own sin through real death. As such, she is immediately atoned 
upon judgment, leaving Faust to keep on striving (Goethe, 2002: 113). 
Homologous to the situation in Ottilie and Eduard, Gretchen is the true lover 
here who goes through subjective destitution and renunciation in the 
relationship, whereas Faust stays a desiring subject who cannot die (a living 
dead) and would not be saved (were he to die then). 
The second part of Faust generates a world-historic vision of love in a 
mythological sense of universality. Although this part is often read as centring 
on Faust's quest for Helen of Tray, this affair is subordinated to the grand 
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vision. Accordingly, it is erroneous to forge a parallel link between Gretchen 
and Helen as a passage of female beauty from romantic particularity to 
classical generality, or the other way around. On the other hand, Faust's 
immortal soul redeemed in the "burial" scene is the central issue to provoke 
the holy eulogies of love in the final scene "mountain gorges, forest, cliffs, 
wildness"; therefore, it would be untruthful to argue that Faust, as a man of 
the Enlightenment, cares about his life rather than his soul, living in an 
incommensurable world from that of God and Mephistopheles. Even if Faust 
is a play of modernity, there is no sufficient reason to rule theology and 
religion out of modernity. At all events, we argue the five acts in this part can 
be read as Goethe's proto-sociological theory of love. From a thematic point 
of view, act one reflects on the futility of empire and illusory economy (gold 
and magic; 'nature and reason); act two of science and uncontrollable eros 
(homunculus and god of metamorphosis Proteus; philosophies of water and 
fire); act three of art and transient beauty (Helen and her son Euphorion; 
female and youth); act four of war and corrupt powers (emperor and 
archbishop; politics and religion) (Goethe, 2002: 117-98). Taking part in all 
four stages, the insatiable Faust has reached old age in act five where the 
impossible hope of love finally reemerges. By this time, Faust has become 
rich. He seeks to claim more land from the sea, creating "new living space for 
Man• to build a second nature. To enforce the "master-plan", he turns cruel to 
the traditional common folks who refuse to be relocated (which costs their life 
during the protest), remains impervious to the persuasion of Care, and so is 
blinded by her curse (Goethe, 2002: 199-208). At the height of complacency, 
Goethe utters the fatal words regarding the new man: "I see a race grow, 
fearless, self-reliant,/ living their lives out here, proud and defiant./ Such a 
race of men I long to see,/ standing upon free soil, a people also free./ Then to 
the fleeting moment I could say:/ 'You are so beautiful -can you not stay?'/ 
Through all of Time, the achievement of my day upon this earth will never 
pass away./ I sense foreknowledge of such happiness,/ and now enjoy my 
highest moment- this" (Goethe, 2002: 211). He is then snatched away by 
zombies and soon redeemed by angels, or rather by the grace of love. 
Furthermore, from a narrative point of view, the entire second part shows that 
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modernity is not only retrospective of all past historical cultures but also 
prospective of a future vision of love. This is why the Christian mentality 
dominating in the first part is traversed by the succession of modern, classical, 
medieval and back to modern scenes in the second part (frorn act one to 
four); meanwhile, the famous fifth act concludes Faust's fall and redemption in 
a feminine future of love: "[a]ll that shall pass away/ is but reflection./ All 
insufficiency/ here finds perfection./ All that's mysterious/ here finds the day./ 
Woman in all of us/ shows us our way" (Goethe, 2002: 223). lt is worth noting 
that the image of woman is already separated from the Devil as 
Mephistopheles curses with disgust the female sex as "thrift" (Goethe, 2002: 
128-29). One could also stress that the final scene with the multifarious 
eulogy of love is performed by "holy authorities" made of deities, angels, 
chorus of women and boys, and particularly Gretchen "the penitent" (Goethe, 
2002: 222). The definitive historical beauty Helen of Troy is not a part of it. 
Given as such, one could summarize the meaning of love for Faust. If there 
are two colliding worlds symbolized by Mephistopheles and Faust, they are 
the worlds of production and consumption. After. serial conquests, Faust gets 
tempted by Mephistopheles to change his masculine nature from suicidal 
consumption (indulging and forsaking by drive) to murderous production 
(striving and possessing by desire). However, the future fate of modernity is 
consumption in the feminine mode, and Faust's original character shares an 
elective affinity with this "Woman in all of us." Thus we have the paradoxical 
fate of Faust's love: he must reach something more radical than self-critically 
changing his masculine nature from consumption to production. Prone to 
produce nothing, by contrast, he could have pushed his suicidal character to 
the fatal extreme, and so reverse the very sexual premise of renunciation from 
the masculine to the feminine mode in the new world. 
From a selective analysis of Goethe's literature, we have seen that modern 
love is realized through an experience of death. For Goethe, the life of love 
has nothing to do with adaptive happiness, reasonable knowledge or 
sacrificial mystery, but requires a suicidal simulation of death, humbly 
admitting the futility of knowledge arid receiving redemption by feminine 
grace. In view of this, Goethe's love-life is not a project carried out by 
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knowledgeable, risk-assessing choices of reason, but a destiny recognized 
retroactively by adventurous, fate-guided acts of renunciation. This presumes 
·that an act of love could be manifested in authentic as well as inauthentic 
modes. That is to say, to love is to die before living in the future mode of time, 
experiencing poetically the fiction of the present without realism and 
embracing soberly the arrival of the future without utopianism. The mode of 
time one experiences in Goethean love is neither classical eternity, nor 
enlightened immortality, and nor romantic infinity, but an unbearably positive 
piece of the future sticking out from the present, that inevitable future flying in 
my face ceaselessly. Renouncing the nostalgic past and the compromised 
present, only a true lover dares to enjoy the fictional, make-believing future 
abiding in the present; only a true lover has the courage to dream, demanding 
the illusion (of the future) to "stay!" Dreaming in the future, only a true lover 
can achieve renunciation in death. In love, indeed, who frets about the lapse 
of time, the end of history? In this strict sense, Comte and Marx are fatal 
lovers after Goethe. 
62 
Chapter 2 The Dual Relation of Comte and Marx 
We have argued that Goethe bequeathed a legacy of love to modernity, a 
legacy obscured in the modernist philosophy of reason and revolution. The 
Goethean tradition of love makes a universal exception to the Kantian system 
of freedom and knowledge by situating the latter in the practical order of love-
life. Exceeding the Enlightenment, this singular order is likewise irreducible to 
classicism and romanticism. In concrete terms, there are three points worth 
noting in Goethe's order of love-life. First, it is expressed in an act of 
renunciation or radical self-questioning as love-life relies on the suicidal 
restoration of the subject. Second, it is driven by an experience of death, a 
limit experience beyond human bodies and discourses. Third, it is oriented 
toward a fatal vision of the future at once in counter to the Art of idealism and 
the Life of utilitarianism. Precisely, Goethe's art of love called for a science 
fictional order of life in a time characterized by the failure of Art and the 
triumph of Life as the organizing principle of society. This fatal order of love 
adumbrated the conception of social science. 
In the following, we will argue that Comte and Marx acted out Goethe's 
science fictional order of love-life via the objective forms of religion and 
politics. We suppose that an uncanny twinship of religion and politics 
underlies the dual relation of positivism and Marxism in the making of a post-
idealistic social science since the very antagonism reveals their kindred spirit. 
Given as such, we oppose resolutely to the theses of two Comtes and two 
Marxs. In fact, such a symptomatic reading dictated by the rationalistic need 
for identity is responsible for most partial praises as well as criticisms, 
depending on where one comes from, of Marxism and positivism by 
undeserved notions such as classicism, enlightenment and romanticism, or 
traditionalism, rationalism and idealism. Particularly, interpreting a body of 
thought by means of epistemological breaks functions as an easy cop out, 
often resulting in a superficial rivalry between Marxism and positivism on the 
levels of method, theory and social reality. 
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On the level of method, one errs to contrast the positivist method with 
dialectics in terms of the object-subject divide. Besides, there is a further 
danger of vulgarizing positivism as well as Marxism by fusing the subject-
object dualism into a mystic whole. Simply put, both modernist and 
postmodernist/medievalist readings have distorted the two modes of thought 
from the outset. As a matter of fact, dialectic and positive methods preserved 
the subject-object divide in every instantaneous state of the hierarchal series 
which makes up a social evolutionary process toward the objectification of 
subjectivity, or rather a totalization of the subject-object duality. Anticipating 
Heidegger's ontological difference, both modes of thought sought to maintain 
a dualistic tie with the sciences of existence on the one hand and the 
philosophy of Being on the other. But contra Heidegger, especially his 
mystical turn from Dasein to Sein, religious and political sciences of love 
envisaged by Comte and Marx respectively could overcome their antic status 
to reconstitute a social ontology. In this self-positing move, the scientific 
reference to reality would be ontologized post facto and hence fictionalized. 
As such, positivism and Marxism together coined the idea of social science 
based on a religious-political ontology of love. 
On the level of theory, one errs to contrast positivism with Marxism in terms of 
the order-revolution divide. Moreover, it amounts to a categorical mistake to 
regard positivism as a theory of science and Marxism a political practice. In 
short, dualisms like order versus revolution or theory versus practice are 
empty metaphysical constructs. For, the religion of Humanity presented in 
itself a revolutionary order while the politics of communism required an order 
of revolution for itself (i.e. dictatorship of the proletariat). To be exact, they 
both demanded a post-revolutionary order, an order of love-life. Along similar 
lines; the Comtean religion was the direct outcome of his theoretical science 
while the Marxian science was the necessary condition of his practical politics. 
In light of this, we are dealing in both cases with an original style of social 
analysis as a forerunner to the genre of science fiction since Comte and Marx 
wrote for the future reconstruction of society with a posthumous structure of 
feeling. In this sense, they were more like apostles, priests and media from 
the future rather than messiahs, prophets and utopians of the present since 
64 
they conveyed a non-representational order of love which emerged from but 
was not yet recognized by their contemporary age. 
However, the social reconstructive function of social science has been carried 
out by reflexive sociology since the late 201h century as the capital of 
knowledge/power is theorized with no consequences in "changing the world". 
From natural sciences to humanities, it is no longer the contents of the subject 
matter (i.e. facts, values and situations), but rather the social construction of 
knowledge in layered contexts (i.e. individual, cultural, economic, political, 
etc.) which constitutes the focus of study. This reflexive plague is stripping the 
practical idea of social science from itself. Betraying the reflexive social 
politics which conjoins us to "act otherwise," one fails to "think otherwise" in 
the first place as s/he is convinced to take the stand of a second-degree 
observer to "participate" the nominal society. The rampant liberation of 
reflexivity produces in result the reification of society in which everyone is 
complacent with self-preserving critique without self-endangering change. 
Indeed, current sociology has reached to a point of saturation where reflexive 
deconstruction is practically not enough: what we need is fictional 
reconstitution. Relocated in the universal social ontology of love, we may 
reverse the methodological order governing the constructionist sociology and 
social psychology of knowledge. Since we have assessed Goethe's legacy of 
love in a cultural-historical light, we will go on to examine Comte and Marx in 
the light of Goethe. This secondary order of exposition runs counter to 
reflexive readings, from literary criticism to sociological analysis, in the sense 
that Comte's and Marx's social theories will be fictionalized by Goethe's 
absent presence. Although contextual factors will still be considered, we will 
begin from the genealogical hypothesis that Goethe's legacy of love shaped 
by a science fictional view of art can account for the theories and societies of 
Comte and Marx. 
On the level of social reality, accordingly, one can never fully explain a social 
theory by its empirical contexts in social-individual and/or cultural-historical 
modes because there is no simple causal relation between theory and society 
apart from covariance. In particular, the theories of Comte and Marx met not 
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only scientific validity but also social effectivity as their theories "mirrored" 
reality in a non-representational way. In other words, their theories were an 
integral part of the social dynamic they invoked, which was in but not of social 
reality since they captured the outliers of reality instead of the average mean. 
Simply put, their theories helped to produce the future strains of social reality 
in the sense that theorization was practiced without a historicist bias to justify 
the status quo. This radical theorization of society added an event of thought 
to social reality as if words could become literally flesh by notation, statement 
or declaration as ways of objectifying subjective existences. In the following 
two sub-sections, we will focus instead on depicting the science fictional order 
of love proposed by Comte's positivist religion and Marx's communist politics. 
One will see in what sense they lived on Goethe's fatal vision of love-life, 
especially with regard to an interest in the fetishization of humanity as the 
primordial form of love. 
2.1 Comte's love offate 
As a social program, Comte's positivist order of love is built on the virtual 
totalization of subject-object duality and ontic-ontological difference by 
idolizing human altruistic feelings into the Great Being. In the context of his 
work, this order evolved from the ties sociology established with the positive 
sciences up until1838, with art since 1844 and with religion since 1848. As if 
to reframe his law of the three ·states in a reversed order, the triune 
configuration of science-art-religion reflects the three forms of sociology and 
its condition, love, could take. In a prospective sense, this might signify either 
a logical evolution or an illogical devolution of his thought, depending on one's 
position of enunciation in the three states. However, such ambivalence would 
eventually lead to metaphysical uncertainty, ending in a division of Comte's 
positivist thought into two halves. Hence, we adopt a retrospective reading, 
arguing that Comte's positivist order could be read as a mathematical solution 
to a set of practical-theoretical problems of love in a bid to consummate a 
science fictional ontologization of love after the facts. 
First and foremost, although Comte followed the lead of his mentor Saint-
Simon to relocate "spiritual power" in industrial society as early as 1820 in the 
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essay "Summary Appraisal of the General Character of Modern History," it 
was not until A General View of Positivism published in 1848 that he proposed 
his own "introduction to sociology a religious mode" (Gane, 2006: 31, 117, 
Comte, 1998: 5-46). The Comtean religion represents anything but a 
providential kind because identifying his positivist religion with providentialism 
is equivalent to accusing him of political authoritarianism, which only betrays 
one's own preference for liberal democracy (Aron, 1968: 94-95). Furthermore, 
Comte's religious movement, while different from the political movement of 
communism, should be properly understood as one of many historical 
responses to the revolution of 1848 (Pickering, 1999; Gane, 2006: 87-89). 
From 1848, Comte's religious form of sociology was conditioned by a complex 
of love based on physiological, ideological and biographical foundations. 
Physiologically, the complex of love refers to a positive theory of the soul 
demonstrated by phrenology, a quasi-scientific branch of biology in his time. lt 
originated in his conception of· human nature composed of three parts, 
intellect (thought or head), affect (feeling, heart or love) and action (activity, 
practice or character). The parts of intellect and affect had been introduced in 
the section on the individual aspect of social statics in the Courses of Positive 
Philosophy before the part of action functioned to modify the fatalistic order as 
one of the progressive aims of positivism in A General View of Positivism 
(Comte, 1968[1851-54], Vol. 1: 6-45; 1974a[1830-42]: 498-502). The positive 
relation between these three parts may be summarized in the maxim, "act 
from affection, think to act," in Comte's "systematic view of the soul" or 
"positive classification of the eighteen internal functions of the brain." As a 
logical order, social individuals are encouraged "to love, to think, to act" in an 
Aristotelian, that is, categorical manner that love is considered the principle, 
thought the means, and action the result (Comte, 1968, Vol. 1: 594f; 
1891 a[1852]: 294f, table 3). In the classification of eighteen cerebral 
functions, specifically, these three parts are further divided into multiple series 
of "affective motors" which coordinate "intellectual functions" to generate 
"practical qualities". In the field of action, courage, prudence and 
perseverance compose three qualities of execution. In the field of intellect, 
synthesis, analysis, generalization, systemization and communication 
67 
compose five functions of counsel. In the field of affection, there are ten 
motors of impulsion within a personal-social duality. On the personal side, 
which occupies seven out of ten motors, there are five interests (i.e. nutritive, 
sexual, material, military and industrial instincts) and two ambitions (i.e. pride 
and vanity). On the social side, they consist of the remaining three motors, 
including attachment, veneration and benevolence, with benevolence strictly 
known as sympathy or universal love. The cerebral mapping of this affective 
field illustrates the "decrease of energy, increase of dignity, from the back of 
the head to the front, from the lower part to the higher, from the sides to the 
middle." In sum, Comte valued the submissive character of action insofar as it 
is subordinated to intellect whilst the head has been harmonized by love 
evolving from the egoistic to altruistic area of the brain. 
Ideologically, Comtean love was legitimated by the institution of monogamous, 
conjugal family as the analytic unit of sociology. Indeed, primary relations 
within the family provide the empirical context for Comte's phrenology of the 
soul (cf. Wernick, 2001: 116-52). From Course of Positive Philosophy, the 
family was analyzed along the relations of "subordination" of age and sex 
(Comte, 1974a: 502-06). Yet it's far from an arbitrary, absolute subordination 
of women to men, but rather a reversible, relative one based on "natural 
distinction" (Comte, 1968, Vol. 1: 170). To be exact, women were first given a 
religious political role in A General View of Positivism. Bridging the social and 
the moral, Comte introduced a practical theory of class to build a religious 
polity of positivism. In accord with the submissive notion of practice guided by 
intellect and affect, women become the moral companions for positive 
scientists in order to convert the working classes from the communist camp 
into the religious constitution of a positive polity. In this practical phase, a 
certain post-revolutionary ·dictatorship of the popular origin, resembling 
Jacobins' government of the Convention, is a "provisional necessity" prior to 
the autonomy of the spiritual power (Comte, 1968, Vol. 1: 92-95, 160-63). Until 
the System of Positive Polity, a "positive theory of the family" was elaborated 
with moral and political aspects. In the moral aspect, filial, sibling and conjugal 
relations provide the natural habitats for the cultivation of the three social 
affections, veneration, attachment and sympathetic love (Comte, 1968, Vol. 11: 
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155-59). The political aspect of the family is illustrated by the division of the 
spiritual power of women from the temporal power of men (Comte, 1968, Vol. 
11: 163). In the positive polity, as a result, love overcomes masculine Eros-God 
and sexless Reason-Life to be complemented with a feminine sex at the 
hearth. With the spiritual influences of motherhood, wifehood and ·sisterhood, 
women enjoy the social power to promote sympathetic morality beyond a 
private economy. 
Biographically, an idealized image of Clotilde de Vaux played no doubt a 
crucial role in Comte's complex of love. But this is a chauvinist view which 
cannot be taken seriously without acknowledging de Vaux's female gender 
strategy in reality. As Pickering (2000) has shown, the actual relationship 
between the two proceeded more like a struggle over gender power, at least 
on de Vaux's part, as social morality imposed an impossible demand of 
antinomy on women in the mid 19th century France, expecting them to satisfy 
both private and public virtues by achieving a contradictory self-identity of the 
passive mother-lover and the active partner-thinker. Avoiding this dilemma, 
Comte assigned a passive identity to women in his positive polity as he 
endowed the religious images of angels versus demons to the emotionally 
virtuous and intellectually overbearing types of women, according to his 
impressions of Caroline Massin and Clotilde de Vaux, respectively (Pickering, 
1996). If we followed this critical view, then Comte's resort to the ideal of 
motherly love would represent nothing but the disappearing reality of the 
conjugal family. In fact, this view itself presupposes that there is a social 
paradox of women's independence to be solved in reality: if all women look for 
public recognition in intellectual professions, then marriage becomes highly 
dissoluble for various practical reasons (from child rearing to loving company), 
and an altruistic society of families will be replaced by a society of 
individuals. 7 Nonetheless, this feminist case cannot be overstated either 
because if de Vaux was not na"ively passive, then nor was Comte simply 
7 Ironically, we now have a twist to the critical feminist view of Comte's perfect society since, 
in our over-productive consumer society, more and more well-educated women might wish to 
stay or return home being docile and glamorous housewives so much as the crazy female 
scientist who mastenninds her robot husband to rebuild a harmonious, male-dominating · 
society in the film The stepford Wives (2004 ). We argue, however, Comte's positivist order 
relies on a fatal potential of women, which is much more radical than feminism and its irony. 
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idealistic. As a result, one might argue a case of the third gender's view, which 
better captures the ironic sting in Comte's solution to the post-revolutionary 
dilemma of sexual politics. In this case, one has to drop the idea of historical 
individuals, which presents de Vaux and Comte as an alpha female and an 
alpha male vying for power and self-identity in place of love and care of the 
other. If one insists that Comte's biographical situations must be accounted 
for, then it's worth noting that the power struggle in fact lay elsewhere insofar 
as Comte was always involved in a triadic rather than a dyadic psycho-social 
relation: first to love the alleged prostitute turned wife Massin, he had to rival 
her patron Antoine Cerclet; then to love the widow turned writer de Vaux, he 
needed to compete with her editor Armand Marrast (Gane, 1993: 122; 
Pickering, 1993: 315-26, 373-74, 491; 2000: 144, 149). At bottom, the sexual-
social logics of power and love are not mutually reducible. Hence, in the third 
gender's view, we come to understand the literal sense of Comte's proposal: 
his religious polity aimed at moral feminization of men by socially subjecting 
women to men. In this realm of public-private or social-moral duality, the 
preoccupation of seizing public, social power which dominates the designs of 
both chauvinist dualism and feminist monism could always be overwritten by 
the moral power of love as feminine grace in the hearth. This sexual-social 
logic in Comte's religious positive polity antedated the psychoanalytic 
conception of castration more than half a century. Politically, he proposed a 
sociological form of Catholicism, which overcame not only religious 
Catholicism but also Hobbes' anti-Catholic, political model of society since the 
ground of submission was brought from the political state's authority back to a 
spiritual power. 
Secondly, after crowning sociology as the apex of his philosophy of positive 
sciences, Comte tried to synthesize the scientific form of sociology with the 
form of art in A Discourse on the Positive Spirit in 1844. He insisted that 
science as law discovery and art as work making share "a close spontaneous 
connection" in sociology (Comte, 1903(1844]: 47). As an introduction to his 
lectures on Popular Astronomy, this text summarizes positivism in its 
intellectual and social aspects. Nonetheless, "the universal preponderance of 
Morals" is noted in passing to stress the consolidation and stimulation of "the 
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sentiment of Duty" by "the positive spirit of Generality" (Comte, 1903: 112). In 
short, only by bridging the theoretical science to an art of practice can the 
heart become the objective of the intellect. Subsequently, a positive theory of 
art was elaborated in A General View of Positivism (1848). In this text, 
Goethe's poetry, along with Bryon's, is considered as the work of "destruction" 
for its "idealization of Doubr on the Protestant soil (Comte, 1968, Vol. 1: 239, 
274). Comte then goes on to argue the identification of aesthetic and scientific 
geniuses, in respect of which Goethe is adduced again as a negative · 
example, for he is better conceived as a metaphysical philosopher than a 
. positivist poet (Comte, 1968, Vol. 1: 249). Nonetheless, selected works of 
Goethe and Byron are included in Comte's positivist library, except Byron's 
Don Juan, to acknowledge a borderline positive spirit of the poet (Comte, 
1968, Vol. IV: 484). In fact, already in 1829 while being informed of Hegel's 
lecture to prove the existence of God, Goethe commented "(!]he period of 
doubt...is past; men now doubt as little the existence of a God as their 
own ... A French philosopher of the most recent times begins his chapter 
confidently thus: 'it is acknowledged that man consists of two parts, body and 
soul; so we will begin with the body, and then speak of the soul'" (Eckermann, 
1998: 331). Radicalizing the Cartesian tradition, Comte's positive theory of the 
soul developed exactly this new French philosophy. 
In short, Comte's positivist order of love, before it took a feminine religious 
form in 1848, had been prepared in 1844 by his intimation of sociology as a 
synthetic form of art and science. Apart from the argument of compatibility, 
however, there are no corresponding ideological and physiological complexes 
of love to condition the artistic form of sociology in the same way as in the 
religious form. Accordingly, Comte has no physiological and ideological 
theories of art (to deal with issues pressing to us, such as the institutions of 
art functioning in galleries, museums and academies, the industries of art 
constituted by art collectors, art dealers, art critics, art viewers, and mass 
media, and the behavioural and brain sciences of artists in comparison to 
geniuses, criminals, clairvoyants, mental diseases, brain damage, etc.). 
Biographically, furthermore, one errs to overgeneralize the impact of his affair 
with de Vaux on shaping a complex of love prior to the religious form of 
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positivism because the 1844 text was published a couple of months before he 
met de Vaux. 6 Therefore, it seems more reasonable that the on-and-off 
relation with Massin, which ended in divorce in 1842, prompted Comte's 
conversion from the intellect to the heart and science to art. Massin was by no 
means less important than de Vaux in Comte's emotional life. In fact, as early 
as 1828 when Comte reviewed Broussais' physiology, he raised the issue of 
the "extreme negligence" of moral care in psychotherapy against the pretext 
of his wife's "love care" after his release from Esquirol's clinic in 1826 
(Heilbron, 1995: 233; Comte, 1998: 240). Here to look for a historical 
individual Mass in is as unhelpful as in the case of de Vaux since it would imply 
more or less that Comte's record of mental illness can discredit his late 
thought to personal delusion, let alone its social-historical impact. On the other 
hand, explaining Comte's artistic reform of positivism in terms of his historical-
individual imagination about women is equally self-defeating since this 
feminist view could not escape from the grip of patriarchal ideology. What 
matters here is the actual Massin and de Vaux who contributed to the making 
of Comte's artistic and religious forms of positivism, respectively. This 
dimension pertains to his actual disappointment and expectation as a result of 
his intimate interactions with the two women throughout his adult life. In short, 
as Comte's disappointment toward Massin shaped his expectation of de Vaux, 
so the artistic formation of love was led to a religious transformation. 
Thirdly, the fact that Comte initiated the seventh science of moral altruism to 
condition or supplement the queen of positive sciences, sociology, implies that 
there was a logical problem in the scientific form of positivism itself. Sociology 
needed to be extended to a new science .of morality because, apart from the 
semi-scientific phrenology, there was no theory of love accountable even by 
the most advanced branches of positive sciences, such as biology and 
sociology (when narrowly defined without morals). Given as such, the 
question arises as to whether this seventh "science" implies a passage to a 
"philosophy" redefined? If so, what is this new philosophy's converse relation 
8 There is a biographical error here as Comte did not meet de Vaux first in October 1844 
(Aron, 1968: 126; Gane, 1993: 123). Rather, he first met her in Apri11844 and did not write 
her until April 1845, whereas A Discourse of the Positive Spirit had been published in 
February 1844 (Gane, 2006: 89; Pickering, 2000: 140). 
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to the positive sciences? logically, the answer pertains to the mediating status 
of sociology insofar as it connects the positive sciences to philosophy. 
Therefore, one might examine the scientific character of sociology by 
comparison to the other positive sciences in order to find its implication for a 
philosophical notion of love before the artistic and religious forms of positivism 
took shape. 
The question of a new science or new philosophy emerged as early as 1838 
during Comte's second mental crisis and third marriage separation, leading 
him to an "aesthetic revolution" in a thirst for poetry and music. Meanwhile, 
this crisis caused him to stop reading practically all contemporary publications 
for the sake of his "cerebral hygiene" (Pickering, 1993: 477-86). In view of the 
six volumes of Courses of Positive Philosophy published between 1830 and 
1842, 1838 was the year of the publication of volume Ill on chemistry and 
biology (lectures 35 to 45), and the year of his writings on social 
physics/sociology, which would be published later in three volumes in 1839, 
1841 and 1842. Given these contexts, one might ask a fundamental question: 
what is sociology as a science and philosophy of love in Comte's positivist 
order? First, it is a myth that Comte's positivist sociology is analogous to 
organic biology. The organicism of sociology and its "bio-politics" are usually 
identified with positivism, but this was not the case until Spencer's social 
Darwinism altered Comtean sociology (cf. Fuller, 2006: 61). 
Second, the place of chemistry has a strategic significance in Comte's order 
of positive sciences, for chemistry, derived from a break with the ancient 
alchemic order, could have upset the hierarchy as it appeared between 
astronomy and physics historically, but between cosmology and biology 
theoretically (Comte, 1891a: 149-50). Comte inserted chemistry between 
physics and biology against the historical sequence to create a theoretical 
distinction between the inorganic and organic sciences based on the degree 
of phenomenal complexity (Comte, 1974a: 256-57). Although chemistry 
brought the first method of observation to a new height by adding the senses 
of taste and smell to sight (in astronomy) and touch (in physics), it fell short of 
the methods of experiment, comparison and history (Comte, 1974a: 253-54; 
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1974b: 105-07). Logically, chemistry should have had surpassed physics with 
an advanced method of experimentation, but it didn't. Actually, its close 
relation with "the greater complexity of the phenomena in physiology" 
impeded the pure experimental environment (Comte, 1974b: 106). This 
physiological or bodily complication in chemistry also made its method of 
comparison imperfect and that of history wanting. This means chemistry in 
Comte's time couldn't deal with the question of life properly and that of 
memory at all. In effect, as an imperfect analytical science of composition and 
decomposition, chemistry had to improve its synthetic skill of recomposing the 
organic body (Comte, 197 4a: 255-56; 197 4b: 1 08-09). But this is far from 
saying that Comte envisaged a romantic biology, for his consideration of a 
positive state of chemistry was closer to modern physical chemistry 
characterized by its mathematical exactitude than to biochemistry. Conversely, 
Goethe's approach to discover the scientific laws of nature might be 
misunderstood by Comte as a romantic-metaphysical conception of life 
resurrected from death. That's why his expressed radical doubts over the 
metaphysical rule of affinity behind electro-chemistry, a reservation which 
settled down to a blanket rejection of "organic chemistry" (Comte, 197 4a: 285-
300). At the end of the day, he left no remarks about Goethe's "morphology." 
We have seen how morphology constituted the scientific basis of Goethe's 
legacy of love. Recall that Goethe coined the term of morphology as a result 
of his initial study of the metamorphosis of plants in accordance with Wilhelm 
van Humboldt's theory of the state, and his subsequent interest in animal 
electro-chemistry in the company of Alexander von Humboldt. Morphology 
later developed into a general and then comparative metamorphosis. By 
contrast, Comte granted "the theory of plants [to become] the normal basis of 
biology," but "this is the only part of biology which could be absolutely 
separated from sociology." Eventually, he excluded ·a sounder knowledge of 
man" from the hierarchy of all species based on parallel laws of animality and 
vegetality (Comte, 1891 a: 154-57). At the outset of Courses of Positive 
Philosophy, in fact, he had professed to treat only physiology, but not botany 
and zoology, and chemistry, but not mineralogy. His reason was that in the 
two classes of natural sciences, which means fundamental and derived ones, 
he only dealt with "the abstract or general,'' not "the concrete, particular or 
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descriptive" (Comte, 197 4a: 41 ). At all events, Comte's concern was not that 
biology was a higher and more favoured science than chemistry, but that the 
distinction of organic biology and inorganic chemistry had to be held as a 
positivist order of sciences. 
Henceforth, third, it becomes meaningful for his sociology to be modeled on 
the only hard science of his time, physics. Accordingly, sociology named 
originally as social physics was a matter of convenience. Nonetheless, his 
positive philosophy in pursuit of "invariable natural Laws" did look up 
constantly to Newtonian physics "in the case of the doctrine of Gravitation" 
(Comte, 1974a: 28). Hence, sociology construed as social physics implies that 
Comte biased toward the inanimate notion of love before the rise of Darwinian 
biology as a respectable science. Finally belonging to Goethe's legacy of love 
as we understood it, Comte's philosophy of love posited the renunciation of 
biological vitality by the simulation of physical death. Moreover, this scientific 
form of love was manifestly applied all the way to the religious form, preferring 
the sympathetic affect, the synthetic intellect and the submissive action. 
All in all, Comte implemented his science-art of sociology by instituting a 
positivist religion after 1848. The religious form of positivism was elaborated in 
the four volumes of System of Positive Polity published between 1851 and 
1854. In the meantime, he began to write in a circumspective manner, that is, 
not only in the form of a catechism to educate revolutionaries, women and 
workers, in 1852, but also in the form of an appeal to advise conservatives, 
kings and patricians, in 1855. To the mass audience, he offered questions and 
answers about the positivist worship, doctrine and regime, instructing the 
members of positive religion a way to "live openly", that is to "become more 
apt to think, to act and even to love." To the elite readers, he provided a 
philosophy of conservative politics to defend the rise of a "progressive 
dictatorship" in "the necessary connection between republican monocracy and 
sociocratic heredity" (Comte, 1889[1855]: 232, 254; 1891a: 189-90). In view of 
this, Comte's religious positivism replaced the realistic-idealistic dualism with 
a real-virtual duality. Goethe had commented at the end of 1826 that "French 
have good brains; but with them everything must be positive, and if it is not so 
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they make it so" (Eckermann, 1998: 139). Read in context, he managed to 
concur with a French science of nature (on the subject of colour) to have 
moved beyond "the load of mathematics" (Eckermann, 1998: 140). 
Nonetheless, the positive spirit of the French method "stick[s) too much to the 
real, and cannot get ideal into their heads," for "[u)nderstanding will be in the 
way of the French; they will not consider that imagination has its own laws, to 
which the understanding cannot and should not penetrate" (Eckermann, 1998: 
212, 215). However in Comte's case, Goethe's largely accurate view of the 
French mind is somehow rendered ironic: although the positive state in 
Comte's law of the three states is acclaimed as the realistic one, his religious 
practice is often derided as idealistic. This irony reveals the inapplicability of 
realistic-idealistic dualism in Comte's thought taken as a whole. Rather akin to 
Marx's revolutionary praxis, Comte sought to advance his real, positive state 
by instituting "a universal order" of love (cf. Wernick, 2001: 165-66). Beyond 
pre-idealistic imagination and idealistic symbolization, Comte's rational idea 
must converge with the real affectively, or affectively post-idealistic. His ethical 
perfectionism to carry out religious positivism short-circuited the metaphysical 
desires of anthropologization, humanization and individualization in the 
Western civilization since the Greco-Roman times. This explains why his 
worship of the Great Being was "formed much more by the dead in the first 
place, then by those to be born, than by the living" (Comte, 1891 a: 63). 
Hence, Comte's altruistic love of Humanity defined as "the whole of human 
beings, past, present and future ... , but those only who are really assimilable, 
in virtue of a real cooperation toward the common existence" was post-
humanistic and anti-humanitarian by anticipation (Comte, 1891a: 53). Within 
Western history, such "inhuman" love of the Great Being might be traced to 
the Egyptian worship of the dead. In practice, it points to astrology in Egypt or 
Chaldaea as it could be understood as the condition of im/possibility to the 
birth of positive sciences by Greek philosophers, from whom previsional 
observation broke out of oracular imagination to establish an astronomic view · 
of the future for the first time (cf. Comte, 1974a: 135; 1974b: 81). Growing to 
maturity in the hands of Corpernicus, Kepler and Galileo, astronomy became 
the "chief motor" of history (Comte, 1903: 171-72). Beyond history, 
furthermore, the cult of astrology in Comte's positive religion refers to Chinese 
76 
culture on a logical ground, which will be discussed below (cf. Gane, 2006: 
126-27; Comte, 1891b[1856): 19). The point of comparison between Comte's 
religious positivism and the Egyptian-Chinese cultures of fetishism lies in what 
might be called "the sex appeal of the inorganic" in modernity due to the 
objectification of human subjectivity and the reification of organic bodies (cf. 
Perniola, 2004[2000]). Given Comte's difficult material and emotional life, it 
was not hard for him to savour a cruel taste of love in disjointedness and 
separation. The point here is that his positivist order of love callous to 
individual subjectivities and their rights (of whatever kind) demonstrates its 
"experimental" blood of science rather than the "dogmatic" spirits of religion 
and philosophy. Overall, Comte's positivist sociology erected a religion 
redefined scientifically in a reversed hierarchy of positive sciences from 
biology back to astronomy. 
Finally, we could appreciate the significance of the recent interest in Comte's 
positive inclusion of "systematic fetishism" in his religion of Humanity by 
putting it back to the scientific form of positivism (Preus, 1987: 107-130; 
Gane, 1993: 124, 199; 2006: 99, 110, 122; Wernick, 2001: 177-86). In the 
end, Comte's positivist sociology supplemented by moral altruism and then 
generalized to a religious love of the Great Being had to be synthesized by a 
mathematical logic of the subjective. To be exact, Comte's final writing project, 
Subjective Synthesis, intended to create a Positive System to synthesize his 
Positive Philosophy and Positive Polity. In accord with the superiority of moral 
unity over intellectual and practical ones, and religion over philosophy and 
politics, he planned to write four volumes, including one entitled System of 
Positive Logic on theoretical synthesis, two entitled System of Positive Morals 
on moral synthesis, and one entitled System of Positive Industry on practical 
synthesis (Comte, 1891b: v, 1-2). Unfortunately, this third writing career was 
cut short by his death in 1857, leaving us only the treatise on positive logic. 
Here one can no longer argue that Comte regressed to pre-positivist 
imagination due to the "regeneration of mathematics," although an aberration 
of scholastic neologism was led by his disciple Emile Littre in the 1870s 
(Comte, .1891b: viii; Gane, 2003: 37-43). Far from scholastic mysticism, 
Comte realized that "theoreticians are as much the object of suspicion when 
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they proclaim the necessity of a new spiritual power as are the rich when they 
insist on the value of material property." Accordingly, "it is for practicians alone 
to proclaim the value of priesthood ... lts foundation could not but be the work 
of a philosopher; but it rests with patricians, proletariats, and women 
exclusively to secure its due ascendancy" (Comte, 1891 b: xvii). Being 
consistently progressive, he sought to give a mathematical account for the 
religious form of positivism, particularly regarding the reintroduction of 
fetishism to the systemic closure of science and philosophy. Specifically, he 
aimed at clarifying the logic behind theologism and positivism in terms of the 
two pre-positive forms of mathematics, geometry and calculus (evolved from 
algebra, the theory of numbers).9 Restoring all seven positive sciences in the 
series between mathematics (qua mechanics) and morals to the fetishist form 
of mathematics, Comte pushed his positivism to the limit of geometrical 
imagination (Comte, 1891 b: xiv-xvi). In theory, he argued for "an adequate 
incorporation of fetishism with positivism, so completing the reign of law by 
that of Will" (Comte, 1891b: 6). Methodologically, moreover, he claimed a 
posthumous position of enunciation (of 1927) to relate "the fundamental 
science and the final science" or connect "mathematical speculations" with 
"moral meditations" (Comte, 1891b: vii, 3-4). As Comte's young disciple rightly 
admitted, Comte "did not invent the positive philosophy" which is "nothing else 
but the systematization of the sum of the forces which have concurred in the 
evolution of man ... [but] not the work of a single man" (Charles Jundzill in 
Comte, 1891b: xxv). 10 In the same sense, his logical explication of the positive 
religion should be seen as an integral part of a collective work of truth and 
love without an historical-individual author. In the context of Comte's oeuvre, 
the positivist order of love (constituted in the scientific-artistic-religious forms 
of sociology) was eventually provided with an ontology of a science fictional 
9 See Gane (2006: 123) for a fatal reading of Comte's dualistic form of theologism and 
positivism behind his law of three states. 
1
° Comte included in the appendix to the preface not only a letter of dedication to his first 
mathematical teacher but also the letters of his admirer and sponsor (Comte, 1891 b: xxiii-. 
xxxix). His acknowledgement to nobodies, which appeared repeatedly in many other 
publications, legitimizes his cult of heroes and savants in the positive calendar. In other 
words, Comte realized that the truth and power of his positive religion are intrinsic to what he 
called "spiritual sonship" by devoting to and so ennobling the lowest social carriers like a 
circle of love. In light of this, the sanctification of de Vaux and Comte himself should be 
understood in his two-tiered (el~ist and mass) theory of religion. 
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and hence ultra-positivist status. Through the subjective synthesis of 
mathematical fetishism, the religion of Humanity was "sutured" (A. Badiou) to 
a science fictional ontologization of love after the fact. 
If the science fictional character of positivism is revealed in the problematic of 
fetishism and positivism as two forms of subjective synthesis distinguished 
from the objective synthesis of theologism, then the resulting order of love 
must exceed the social worship of Humanity based on the moral law of 
altruism (Comte, 1891 b: 5). The logical question of synthesizing positivism 
and fetishism concerns the paradox between laws and wills in various derived 
terms, including theory and practice, intellectual generality and bodily 
complexity, or social relativity and personal absoluteness (Comte, 1891 b: 5-
6). As a solution, the cultic object of love, the Great Being (Humanity: the 
over-Man) has to be re-embedded in the non-objectified, universal realms of 
the Great Fetish (World: the Earth) and the Great Medium (Space: the 
Chinese idea of Heaven plus the Western idea of Ether) to form a positivist 
trinity (Comte, 1891 b: 18-20). Manifestly, this model is inclusive of but 
irreducible to the geometric schema. In Comte's definition, logic means "the 
normal concert of feelings, images and signs to inspire us with the 
conceptions which meet our moral, intellectual, and physical wants" (Comte, 
1891 b: 23). In the general positive logic, the Great Medium, the Great Fetish 
and the Great Being are connected to sign, image and feeling (by harmonious 
logic), deduction, induction and construction (by intellectual instruments), and 
Logic, Physics and Morals (by scientific knowledge) (Comte, 1891b: 46). In 
the universal positive logic, the positivist trinity is constituted by the 
correspondence of "Calculus with Space, Geometry with the Earth and 
Mechanics with Humanity" (Comte, 1891b: 69). In sum, the final Comte's 
subjective synthesis bridges the logic of positive sciences to the mathematical 
logic through the maxim, 'to complete laws we need wills' (Comte, 1891b: 21). 
But how do these logics work out as such? 
In practice, the fetishist-positivist synthesis boils down to the question of 
"voluntary obedience," which means how to "consolidate synergy by 
developing sympathy" without falling back on the Protestant (spiritualist) God 
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and the materialist Nature (Comte, 1891b: ix, xi, 10, 14). With this concern, 
Comte introduces the key elements of fiction and fate to the love of Humanity. 
He holds that in "the subjective conception of the external order," "the 
positivist differs from fetishist spirit only in refusing matter an intelligence 
which at first too much confounded with feeling" (Comte, 1891 b: 6, 8). As 
objects of worship, in other words, the Great Being is differentiated from the 
Great Fetish in having an autonomous intelligence (defined as "modifying its 
conduct to adapt it to its situations"), while it is assisted by positivists ("Her 
true servants and their free auxiliaries", intellect, feeling and action) to 
"gradually modify fate" (Comte, 1891 b: 7). In this disjointed condition, the 
problem of sympathy arises during the positivist worship. Comte solves this 
emotional detachment from any constructed . object by narrating a 
cosmological fiction of the stars' evolution (similar to the Big Bang) in order to 
argue in utter frankness that "we neither need, nor have we the power, to 
conceive an absolute creation ... On the other hand, it is desirable to imagine 
such changes anterior to the existing order, if such hypotheses can perfect 
our unity, whether by enabling poetical fictions to complete our philosophical 
conceptions, or better still, by developing our sympathies" (Comte, 1891 b: 8-
9). With the fictionalization of the external order, one is then initiated to the 
dominion of destiny. The "dominion of the unchangeable destinies," which 
comprises the World, the Great Being and Man, eludes the abstract, 
metaphysical system. Passing to the real, positive system, "supreme destiny" 
resides in the two groups of laws about natural sciences and morals (Comte, 
1891 b: 11 ). Nonetheless, these fictionalized laws of positivism are not binding 
enough without the love of "supreme fate" which "has no peculiar sphere," an 
"adoration [that] seems fated to remain for ever without an object. When aided 
by the supreme fate, universal love can secure as a habitual result that 
personality submit to sociability'' (Comte, 1891b: 12-13)." Conversely, if we 
"remove the yoke" of destiny and fate, "the human problem would remain 
insoluble, because altruism could never ·sufficiently overcome egoism" 
(Comte, 1891b: 13). In this context, the Great Milieu or Medium "with a 
fictitious nature of an unequivocal kind" is introduced in a historical fiction 
(about the replacement of Western God by Feminine Humanity originated in 
the Chinese Heaven and Earth) to account for this non-objectified fate 
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(Comte, 1891 b: 14-20). Only as a result of positivism, Comte concludes, the 
value of willful submission can be redeemed, substituting "the social for the 
personal point of view" to transform involuntary obedience into a happily 
voluntary one (Comte, 1891 b: 13-14, 21-22). In short, the subjective synthesis 
of wills and laws cannot succeed without recourse to fiction and fate as the 
preconditions of science and morality. If this is the case, to whom are these 
practical logics suggested, and for what? 
Building on the problematic of The Catechism of Positivism and Appeal to 
Conservatives, Comte's unfinished project Subjective Synthesis marks a ripe 
deliberation on a universal positivism in the wake of the general view. It is to 
be read by "synthetic teachers" and "medical men" (Comte, 1891 b: vi; ix). In 
Comte's positive polity, this intellectual class is supposed to have harmonized 
scientific and moral Jaws, provided that they are supported by women, the 
affective class. Since the central problem of subjective synthesis concerns the 
willful obedience to laws, it cannot be achieved without the recognition of 
fiction and fate. The will is a "peculiar feature" in the collective human life, and 
its social carrier refers to patricians as the fourth class (Comte, 1968, Vol. IV: 
68-69). It can also be seen as a minor part of the practical class largely 
composed of workers. This minor class of practice refers to the social strata of 
administration, mainly consisting of agriculturalists, industrialists and 
especially bankers (Comte, 1891a: 236-40; 1968, Vol. IV: 57, 71). In light of 
this, Comte's subjective synthesis provides a spiritual (as opposed to 
spiritualist) guide to the arbitrary government by the practical class, advising 
the patricians to submit their fetishist, capricious wills to Heavenly Fate 
beyond the positivist laws of Destiny (World-Humanity-Man). As a result, 
Comte's positive polity is grounded in its two sources, moral science and 
religion, to suggest a religious politics of love, insofar as the virtualized God in 
his spiritual philosophy escapes the two traps of spiritualism, monotheism and 
mysticism. Historically, this religious politics looks down on power politics 
evolved from Machiavelli through Hobbes to Rousseau in order to reclaim 
Aristotle's moral politics. Bounded by categorical thinking, however, even the 
Aristotlean science has lost the spiritual truth in Plato. Henceforth, as a 
cultural response reversal to Hegel's philosophy of history, this religious 
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politics looks up to the Chinese feudal courts, in which the patricians, following 
their common emperor's lead, were constantly exhorted by their literati to 
govern the Destined World-Humanity-Man by the Heaven's Way. 11 Politically, 
in result, Comtean love is far from conservative since the governing class is 
doubly governed by moral-scientific laws and spiritual powers. Writing from 
the future's point of view, Comte believed the governmental mentality could be 
revolutionized from within by the universal love of fate. 
Comte would be surprised had he lived to hear that we read him under 
Goethe's legacy of love, even though he did have indirect reports from 
Gustave d' Eichthal about the German philosophies of Herder, Kant and Hegel 
as early as 1824, and later came to familiarize himself with Goethe's poetry in 
particular during his 1838 aesthetic turn (Pickering, 1993: 275-303, 483). lt 
might have brought more astonishment to Goethe had he lived to see how 
Comte's philosophy of the positive sciences began with an evolutionary series 
from mathematics or astronomy to biology and ended in a sociological polity, 
a moral polity further founded on a religious ontology of love synthesized with 
a mathematical logic of the subjective. However, given the key elements of 
death, woman, fiction and fate in the formation of positivist thought, we 
maintain that Comte acted out Goethe's legacy of love in a genealogical 
rather than cultural-historical or social-individual sense. In short, Comte 
reincorporated the sympathizing function of fetishism in the positive logic 
through the emerging mediator of fatalism. Representing the three states 
inside the positive state, the (imaginary) real objects of laws (World-Humanity-
Man) and the (symbolic) real matheme of wills (the subject) are synthesized in 
an encounter with the (really) real thing called Fate. 
11 The Chinese literati practiced morality as well as astrology, defying Weber's ideal typical 
analysis in The Religion of China, which will be discussed in chapter 4. Practicing the 
Human's Way by the Heaven's Way is not just an ideal of Chinese religious politics, but rather 
constitutes the real of Chinese social organization, contradicting thereby Weber's judgment of 
Asia as traditionalism due to the lack of a Protestant spirit of modernity. The same can be said 
about Marx's "Asiatic mode of production" in a world dialectical series of liberation from China 
to Europe, which is an application of Hegel's philosophy of history. This Way or Tao implies 
the notion of Nature composed of an outer Nature and an inner nature, from which Taoist and 
Confucian cultures are deduced. In the Chinese figurative language, Nature/nature (Tzu-ran) 
means the affirmation of the self by restraint since it conveys an image of one saying yes, 
alright or enough (ran) by pointing a finger at oneself (tzu). 
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Without grasping the inner differentiation/systemization of the positive logic, in 
contradistinction to its phenomenology, one would normally criticize Comte's 
history of science and religion as a failure to think "at the end" of techno-
science in modernity, and follow instead the nee-romantic doctrine of late 
Heidegger to redeem the saving grace of poetry from the grave danger of 
technology (Scharff, 2003). But the post-historical reading itself fails to 
appreciate that in the final analysis, Comte's narrative of the real is a narrative 
logic of historical laws as such, meditating on the im/possibility of time before 
the beginning of history. In this strict sense, one could refute the rationale of 
his English admirers and later detractors, such as Mill and Spencer, by 
arguing that Comte's contribution to sociology would not be practically positive 
without taking his second career (including the incomplete third) into account. 
Reflexively, the social belief in scientific knowledge in Comte's France 
guaranteed the efficacy of his thought, so much so that scientists like him 
could take the unique chance to design and launch his social engineering. 
Counter-reflexively, however, the logical synthesis of Comte's positivism 
makes one realize why his sociological science-art-religion was a "real" thing 
in a society of love which disregarded the distinction between science fiction 
and cultural history, fatal thought and convicted action. To say the least, if we 
think he was "mad" to bother himself instituting a positivist order of love, then 
the society we live in has probably been trapped in a loop of mental sanity. 
2.2 Marx's question of fetishism 
If Comte's theory of society is built on his religious economy, then Marx's is 
based on his political economy. If any 'Marx's philosophy' is worth saving from 
post/Marxist philosophies, then the evolution of his writing style from critique 
to analysis must be totally respected in order to break through the 
'epistemological break' of Marx's anti-humanism. For Althusser, Marx broke 
away from his early humanist philosophy of praxis since 1845 by introducing 
the contradictory realities of social production, state-market ideology and 
dialectical history into the self-identical thinking of philosophy (Balibar, 
1995[1993): 6, 40-41, 78-79, 96). In view of this, the object of Marx's 
philosophy is neither political economy nor political economy (cf. Zizek, 1999: 
347-59), but political economy. More than traditional political economy, his 
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philosophy becomes a model of social science as soon as it recognizes, from 
the horizon of economic politics, real contradictions in a politico-economic 
form of society. Economizing political forces, Marx's thought is thus not 
trapped in 'the mirror of production' which only reflects the identity of socialist 
revolution and capitalist rationality (cf. Baudrillard, 1975[1973]: 141-59), but 
rather opens a window to see through the contradiction of capitalist and 
socialist instances in one and the same social formation. 
Marx's early writings are widely conceived as falling prey to the romantic 
ideology, given that Goethe's art was a distinctive allusion in his love poems to 
Jenny and remarks on literature (cf. Gane, 1993: 85-92; Marx and Engels, 
2006). But he does have a humanist concept of love from very early on. As we 
have seen, he called for "uncritical love" with the vision of "social humanity" in 
1845, assuming a theory of society based on the needs of human dignity as 
well as individual survival. 
Already in 1844, Marx concluded his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
with the universal power of money. After discussing human feelings as 
'ontological affirmations of being (of nature)' and private property as 'objects 
of enjoyment and objects of activity', he concluded with a sublime meditation 
on the dialectical consequences of money as human society is turned into a 
topsy-turvy, inhuman society. Firstly, expounding Goethe's Faust, money is 
"the procurer between man's need and the object", and so "[f]or me it is the 
other person," "the supreme good" that makes its possessor (that is me) all 
good. Secondly, expounding Shakespeare's nmon of Athens, money is "the 
bond of all bonds" and "universal agent of separation", "the visible divinity" 
and "the common whore", and so "the alienated ability of mankind." Thirdly, 
money is "the truly creative power", "the external, universal medium and 
faculty [sic] for turning an image into a reality and reality into a mere image", 
and so the general distorting of individualities." Fourthly, money is "the general 
confounding and confusing of all things" (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 3: 
322-26). Then, with a neo-classical turn, he came down to earth, revaluing 
human relationships as a "specific expression, corresponding to the object of 
your will, of your real individual life," as if "you exchange love only for love, 
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trust for trust, etc." Finally, he hoped for a reciprocal idea of love to counter 
the inalienable and alienating power of money: "(i]f you love without evoking 
love in return - that is, if your loving as loving does not produce reciprocal 
love; if through a living expression of yourself as a loving person you do not 
make yourself a beloved one, then your love is impotent- a misfortune" (Marx 
in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 3: 326). 
At first sight, this is a sound humanist argument. Once we think again, 
however, he is begging the question of the beloved power of money or the 
fetishist power of love: are the four universal qualities of money not the 
universal characters of love? Did Marx not soon discover that the 
unreciprocated irony of love, love as a universal exception to all the other 
individual values in life, demanded him to complete the Hegelian synthesis? In 
other words, does the first volume of The Capital (1867) not stand for Marx's 
forced reply to love's inhuman demand as his opening analysis of commodity 
fetishism attests to the passive seduction of love swerving from the active 
production of love? Is this not why the 'incessant struggle' of capital and 
labour aims beyond relative gains of the surplus value between profits and 
wages to seize the· valueless power of the beloved, when the wage system is 
abolished in the absolute antagonism between capital and labour (Marx in 
Marx and Engels, 1975, Vol. 20: 149)? Does The Communist Manifesto 
(1848) not represent Marx and Engel's inhuman cry for the international 
organization of workers into a political cult of fraternity as beloved as money? 
Nevertheless, Comte and Marx failed to appreciate the strengths and 
weaknesses of each other's projects. This missed encounter might be 
explained historically and logically. Historically speaking, while Comte tried to 
convert communists to his positivism in 1848, Marx rejected "shitty positivism" 
in 1866 (Gane, 2006: 50).12 The changing socio-historical climate propitious 
12 From his July 1866 letter to Engels in London, one sees that Marx in Manchester read 
Comte's positivism through the English lens. In that letter, Comte was mentioned in the prior 
context that Marx intended to solve the problem of "organization of labour" in his revolutionary 
theory, a problem to which Comte had offered a solution, albeit unsatisfying to Man<. So the 
contextual implication is Marx encouraged Engels to pursue the problem so that Comte's 
"shitty positivism" could be surpassed (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 42: 291-92). This 
implication becomes manifest in another letter dated October 1867. There Marx tried to get 
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for the advancement of the new religious and/or workers' movements must 
have affected the divergent theoretical-practical strategies Comte and Marx 
took. After all, neither of them was an armchair theoretician, enclosing social 
reality in an abstract scientific analysis. Furthermore, with respect to the 
theoretical logic itself, for Marx, intellectuals criticize the governing class in 
which they form a part for the economic progress of the governed as an 
exceptional organ in the society. For Comte, intellectuals exhort the governing 
class to speak for the moral progress of society as a virtual body composed of 
class divisions. Different roles the intellectual class adopt in relation to the 
state result in different ways of changing the society by way of religious 
economy or political economy. Nevertheless, in both cases the intellectuals 
take a self-alienating stance within the system, hence reflecting an immanent 
condition of contradiction to catalyze the transformation of industrial capitalism 
into scientific socialism. From this standpoint, socialism and capitalism are no 
longer alternative rational projects to be chosen, but two life situations 
appearing and disappearing in the formal duality of society. And yet, due to 
historical and logical discrepancies, Comte's and Marx's mutual exclusion 
sealed their common fate of disappearance as positivism and communism 
were displaced. 
Comte died in 1857, two years before Darwin's On The Origin of Species 
(1859} was published. Within the Comtean circle, both orthodoxy (Pierre 
lafitte) and heterodoxy (Emile littr? lost their intellectual momentum. Around 
the Comtean circle, Mill and Spencer lost their interest in Comte's religious 
turn within the real, positive poUty. After The Principle of Psychology in 1860, 
Spencer gave his Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte 
(1864). One year on, Mill also voiced his disappointment with Comte in 
Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865). In fact, as early as 1832 in the famous 
London & Westminster review, Mill had expressed his view that Bentham's 
utilitarianism and Coleridge's conservatism were the spirits of the age. This 
Engels infiltrating English positivism by writing a critique for The Fortnightly Review, of which 
G H. lewes "the Goethe man, and unfortunately semi-Comteist, too" was the eo-proprietor 
(Marx in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 42: 455). In a sense, Engels did succeed in converting 
English positivism to Marxism by replacing Comte's system for Spencer's as·the reference of 
his positive Marxism in Dialectic of Nature, thereby paving the road to Russian Marxism. 
Marx's question of organization was ironically solved. 
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generalization implies that Comte's universalistic concept of society based on 
a discriminative and sympathetic religion of love was discredited by Mill's 
particularistic idea of society in an egalitarian and liberal morality of love. Mill's 
frankness hence betrays his psychologist utilitarianism, or his subjectivization 
of social-moral reality, instead of an objective account of historical relativism. 
In this self-referential sense, Coleridge only turns conservative after the 
emergence of Mill's liberal psychology, just as traditionalism acquires its 
traditional character only from the subjectivist standpoint of modernism. 
Marx died in 1883, one year before Engels' Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State (1884). We have seen how Engels, at the center of the 
Marxian circle, fell into romantic fallacy by confusing public with private 
relations. If class and gender difference are equated and equalized in 
individual sex love, socialist feminism will differ very little from liberal feminism 
represented by Mill (cf. Gane, 1993: 128-40). A communist politics of 
emancipation foreclosed by social-cultural equalitarianism foreshadows the 
contemporary perversion of politics towards the convergence of post-socialist 
and late-capitalist economy, totalitarian and nee-liberal politics. Around the 
Marxian circle, neo-Kantian ethics from the Baden school (Rickert and 
Windelband) to the Marburg school (Cohen, Cassirer and Scheler), Dilthey's 
historical hermeneutics, Heidegger's existential ontology, as well as Friedrich 
von Wieser's economics of marginal utility all contributed in/directly to a 
certain domestication and dispersion of the collective force of praxis in 
transcendental, psychological individuals. 
From the social science of Comte and Marx to its romantic biological-
psychological displacements by Spencer, Mill and Engels among others, the 
organizing logic of society shifts from objective love to subjective sexuality. In 
other words, a post-Comtean-Marxian paradigm of subjective love remains 
unclear, which, as we will present in the remaining parts of the thesis, appears 
to be the common bid of classical and late/modern sociology, Marxism and 
psychoanalysis. Indeed, the peaceful cult of women receded as liberal-
socialist feminism advanced, leaving the feminine salvation of love to be 
subjectively appropriated by the becoming-woman of men. In a materialist 
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move, the perfectionist-revolutionary science of love turned literally 
homosexual as if Eve's ethos regresses into Adam's rib. As class struggle 
confused itself with gender struggle, the war of sexuality soon arose to 
stipulate a new social rule of hysteria expressed via aggression, homicide and 
suicide. Morally, the case seems ambivalent since it is unclear whether the 
rise of sexualized subjectivity signifies social progress: is it civilization or 
barbarism? These notions simply fail to describe a real society of subjects 
since this world of perpetual misunderstanding and self-misunderstanding 
belongs to Werther's manic-depressive impersonators. They are in capable of 
recognizing Goethe's poetic-scientific love in the kindred spirits of the young 
Werther and the old Faust. In sum, Goethe's life by death and renunciation 
recoils to a Gothic society of individuals surviving in solitude as long as they 
agree to the utilitarian morals of surveillance. Politically, however, the situation 
seems more straightforward since the struggle of subjective sexuality in the 
late 19th century adumbrated the warring state of the future. We are Jiving in 
the future, a story embroiled in the self-fulfilling prophesy. 
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Chapter 3 Social Science after Badiou 
In the previous chapter, we arranged a re-encounter of Comte and Marx in 
light of Goethe's art of love to find a dual relation, a coincidence of insight on 
fetishism, between them. Conversely, Comte and Marx missed their initial 
encounter because a "religious politics" of love, the blind spot, the eye which 
made possible the scientific visions of religious economy and political 
economy, was lacking. After all, positivist and dialectical modes of thought do 
stand on the same ground with regards to love, science, and religious politics, 
regardless of crucial derivative differences. For the theory of love, both 
champion a universal order of society based on a superhuman love extending 
from or. breaking with the family kinship. For the method of science, both 
develop a science of history, ending up with a religious or political approach to 
social-moral economy. For the practice of religious politics, both defend a 
merciless style of government or rule. In result, both push the idealist 
philosophy to a certain materialistic opening, bringing being back to thinking. 
And yet, it is in this historical philosophy of being that a primary distinction 
emerges: Comte transforms (the medieval) tradition, whilst Marx transcends 
it. In general terms, they seem to disagree on the social ontology of time, that 
is, whether or not there is a continuous process toward the future. For 
positivist philosophy, a representation of the medieval order is possible in the 
future, but for dialectical philosophy, it is impossible. 
However, the distinction is already a modernist one because it presupposes a 
historicized ontology confined to the im/possibility of retraditionalization. There 
is no reason why it couldn't be understood futuristically. In fact, from a 
rigorous post-traditional standpoint, contrary ontological procedures become 
the case since dialectical philosophy now draws on the possibility of 
preserving (the modern) traditions, composed of the enlightenment and 
romanticism, to achieve the overcoming, whereas positivist philosophy is able 
to surpass them (the law of three states). In result, the social dynamics of the 
future evolved from the positivist possibility and dialectical impossibility of the 
(absent) past may reverse their ontological premises when they are referred 
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to the positivist impossibility and dialectical possibility of the (historical) 
present. With the social-historical ontology of possibility and impossibility 
trading hands, the modernist distinction (between past and future, with 
reference to one, inherited tradition) can effortlessly turn into late-modem and 
de-constructive difference or even post-modern and post-structural 
ambivalence (between present and future, with reference to modernity qua 
multiple, invented traditions). In result, the distinction of a social ontology of 
the future between Comte and Marx is a spurious one since, continuous or 
not, both witness a predestined course of history, a fated history from a 
science fictional view of the future, rather than from the past or the present, 
and therefore distinguish themselves from objectivism and voluntarism, or 
scientisin and historicism. Conversely, only from this untimely alienation from 
the world can one properly read Comte's and Marx's analyses of the past and 
present worlds as a futuristic and worldless work of love. 
In this chapter, we will explicate the unrequited love of a social science in the 
context of contemporary philosophy. In a logical as well as historical sense, 
contemporary philosophy is expected to "represent", however impossible, the 
post-modern and/or anti-modern condition which is unbounded by the system 
of modern philosophy. Stated otherwise, the question of modernity is reposed 
in a new mode of thinking. Accordingly, by dreaming on Comte-Marx's social 
science of love after exemplary philosophers from Karl Lowith to Ala in Badiou 
and beyond, we might ask to what extent love is a modern event subtracted 
from cultural-historical meanings. In pre-modern philosophy (from Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle to Plotinus, Augustine and Aquina), an onto-theology of 
being referred to the love of Wisdom and God via dialogue, monologue, 
mystic light, confession, knowledge, etc. In modern philosophy (from 
Descartes and Hume to Kant and Hegel), the love-being became reason and 
history to express Man and the Spirit via intuition, questioning, critique, 
reflection, etc. In consequence, what Comte and Marx have discovered is a 
Great Being. Other than divine and human beings, the Great Being 
demonstrates an objective intelligence, exercising its unconditional freedom to 
the brink of self-contradictory caprice. In the exceptional state of being, that is 
to say, the Great Being may contradict without reconciliation the identity of the 
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subject in the conventional religious-political sense. Hence we visited Goethe, 
not Hegel, to bring out the artistic-natural intelligence in Comte's and Marx's 
ideas, saving them from evolutionist and historicist progressivisms. 
In Low"ith's account, modern German philosophy from Hegel to Nietzsche 
ends in a strange return to Goethe's eternal love of nature distinct from 
Hegel's processive idea of history, whilst its manifest dis/course progresses 
toward a "bourgeois-Christian world" shown in the writings of young Hegelians 
(Low"ith, 1991[1941]: 3-29, 175-231). As a result, men in Nietzschean 
modernity forge an "inconsistent compound", becoming "neither ancient 
ancients nor ancient Christians". Sharing the visions of Marx and Kierkegaard 
albeit having no acquaintance with them, Nietzsche witnesses the dying 
moment of the bourgeois culture and the inception of its posthumous 
simulation (Low"ith, 1949: 19; 1991: 176). Low"ith's interpretation of this 
"inconsistent compound" of fatality, providence and free will in modernity 
focuses on how the modern meaning of history represented in the antithetic 
figures of Hegel (deism/statism) and Proudhon (atheism/anarchism) is laden 
with the Christian telos of the future on top of the Gre~k logos of the cosmos. 
Henceforth, this eschatological future predominates over all modernist writers, 
from Comte and Tocqueville, through Marx and Burckhardt, to Spengler and 
Toynbee, beneath their historical science of facts (Low"ith, 1949: 3-91 ). Given 
the case, however, modernity itself becomes unexplainable in Low"ith's 
account since his theological interpretation of history has biased toward the 
Christian worldview, making the return to a Goethean modernity in the name 
of Nietzsche look implausible, if not impossible. The problem is Low"ith bases 
his history of philosophy on a historicized philosophy of religion, overstressing 
the antinomy between antiquity and Christianity (in its Protestant type 
retroactively ascribed to the New Testament idea of the Church theorized by 
St. Paul and practiced by St. Augustine) at the price of obscuring the 
irreducible types of Judaism and Catholicism in configuring modernity, and 
further undervaluing the current of Eastern mysticism underlying all Western 
civilizations in disfiguring modernity. 
Since civilizations are regarded as meaning-seeking cultures· in history, 
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LowTth's interpretation inevitably "predicates" upon a regressive dualism of 
Christianity and paganism, falling short of his fine discrimination of Goethe's 
innocent paganism from Nietzsche's anti-Christian paganism (1991: 179). 
This shows that his philosophical method of "Schopenhauer's determined 
distancing" is unable to step into the affirmative love arising in either Goethe's 
or Nietzsche's modernity (Gadamer in Lowith, 1991: xi). Qualifying his thesis, 
LowTth does doubt the very notion of a Christian philosophy of history, calling 
it an "artificial compound" derived from the "Hebrew-Christian tradition". This 
tradition is unwilling to "'work out' a working God" since there is a contradiction 
between Jewish particularity and Christian universality, that is, between a 
. nationalistic "religious politics" per se and an inter-nationalistic profane politics 
as such (LowTth, 1949: 194-97). Nevertheless, Judaism and Catholicism 
never amount to overarching explanans of modernity except in the 
represented ideologies of progress in Marx's "transparent messianism" and 
Comte's "shallow theology" (Low"ith, 1949: 44, 90). That's why "the 
impossibility of elaborating a progressive system of secular history on the 
religious basis of faith has its counterpart in the impossibility of establishing a 
meaningful plan of history by reason" (LowTth, 1949: 198). The two 
impossibilities deconstruct his backward-looking interpretation of history which 
"explains" nothing about modernity, but merely reflects an anti-historical 
common-sense: "this (Le. the two impossibilities] is corroborated by common-
sense; for who would dare to pronounce a definite statement on the purpose 
and meaning of contemporary events? ... What we cannot see and foresee are 
the potentialities of ... the apparent contingency of historical events ... [which] 
are not solid facts but realized potentialities, and as such they are liable to 
become undone again" (LowTth, 1949: 198). 
Overwhelmed by chaotic contingencies, Low"ith (1949: 199) wonders if 
"history, instead of being governed by reason and providence, seems to be 
governed by chance and by fate." Yet again, Low"ith (1949: 199), by following 
Augustine, reintegrates the religious views of pagan fate (based on astrology 
and a supreme power) with Christian providence (based on the supreme 
power only) to check against the irreligiously modern view of progress. 
Eventually, the mystery of history qua chance and fate is suppressed by a 
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Weberian interpretation of modernity as a progressive secularization: 
"Christian by derivation and anti-Christian by consequence," a "radical 
atheism ... within a Christian tradition," and "the fruit [of evils] of too much good 
will and of a mistaken Christianity" (Low"ith, 1949: 200-03). What remains is 
nothing but the problem of the futuristic horizon of modernity turned into a 
cage from the religious perspective of hope, regretting the nightmare of 
progress and disillusionment insofar as it is dreamt by a rebellious child of 
reason and faith who is lost in confusion (Low"ith, 1949: 204-07). As such, 
Low"ith "interprets" nothing positive from the meaning of history but a 
pessimistic critique of nihilism in modernity. 
At bottom, Low"ith, the Jewish liberal pupil of Heidegger, suffers from the 
problem of his historical method because the hermeneutical approach can 
hardly "understand" the post-historical necessity of Goethe's art. If Goethe's 
universe guards the eternal present against biases towards the past and the 
future, then Nietzsche is no doubt Goethe's philosophical heir, as Low"ith 
implies in From Hegel to Nietzsche. 13 Yet again, Goethe is primarily a poet. So 
if Goethe's world can be reread as fictionalizing a piece of illusion of the future 
abiding in the eternal present, then the materialist analyses of history 
conducted by Comte and Marx may be regarded as live narrations of the 
Great Being, partaking Goethe's artistic love of nature on the "six thousand 
feet beyond man and time" (Zarathustra), leaving utopianism (Saint-
Simonians) and futurism (young Hegelians) way behind. 
The discovery of the Great Being guides the trajectory of contemporary 
philosophy drawn by Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Althusser, 
Derrida, Deleuze, Badiou and others. Losing the privilege to ponder on a 
happy life as Epicurean and Stoic philosophers did, life for contemporary 
philosophers becomes a self-undermining art, literally a tragic life. For, the. 
Great Being compels one to think through the outsid.e, the frontiers of good 
" This doesn't exclude Nietzsche from striking a science fictional cord after his literary 
masterpiece Zarathustra in the same manner as Comte's posthumous self-regard. Nietzsche 
wrote in a letter in 1884: "my work has time, I do not want to be misjudged as though I were 
concerned with the particular task of the present time. Fifty years hence a few men will 
probably realize what I have done" (cited in Lownh, 1949: 214). 
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living like misery (the poor), madness (the monstro.us) and death (the remains 
if not spectres), as the exceptional state of existence. In short, the 
fundamental question of the Great Being revolves around the endogenous 
otherness of its intelligence. There are at least three phases of probing the 
intelligent Great Being. Phase one reflects on its (post-Hegelian) historicity: 
does it intimate an indomitable will to recur eternally, which amounts to 
nothing (Nietzsche)? Or, does it refer to a technological en-framing or destiny 
of the subject qua being-there (Heidegger)? Phase two deliberates about its 
(post-Kantian) transcendence: can it be dialecticized by a total political subject 
qua nothingness (Sartre)? Or, can it be supplemented by an infinite ethical 
subject qua the face (Levinas)? (Derrida then applies Levinas to undermine 
Althusser's theory of totality.) Phase three thinks over its (post-Comtean-
Marxian) immanence: since ontologizaton (phase one) and deontologization 
(phase two) both suffer from idealist vestiges (i.e. failures to cross the 
endpoint of philosophy, giving [up] enough thinking to [begin] being), intelligent 
otherness might be reconsidered as sheer happening in the name of an 
event, thereby resituating the subject qua the constituted void between being 
and the event. Given the case, do being and the event count as a univocal 
One, or the antagonistic Two? Simply, does the multiplicity of being itself 
deserve the name of the event? And, exactly, what situations (of disjunction) 
do both figurations create to shape and mobilize the subjects (of the void)? 
(Deleuze and Badiou radicalize Althusser's Spinozism.) At bottom, the 
question of the Great Being provoked by its objective intelligence concerns 
the duality of a Thinking-Being while growing out of the classical problematic 
about the dis/unity of thinking and being. 
This is not the place to discuss ramifying philosophical questions from the 
above typology. Our brief contextualization is to show that any presentation of 
the Thinking-Being must renounce both an orderly law of thinking and a 
promiscuous love of being, and confront instead the knots of thinking and 
being, law and love, on a Comtean-Marxian basis indifferent to Kantian 
antinomy and Hegelian dialectics. This is why the final Comte's problematic of 
the "subjective synthesis" of law and will remains acutely pertinent to the 
developmental problem of humanity, especially in light of Badiou's account of 
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the 201h century through a documentary analysis of poems, plays, manifestoes 
and treatises. Refuting the dubious name of totalitarianism-liberalism, Badiou 
renames the century (strictly from 1917 to 1976 for him) as the Russian 
century of revolutions complicated by wars, and then argues that it displays 
an irruption of "passion for the real" from the volcanic encounter of a "non-
dialectical two" without synthesis, or a "disjunctive synthesis" between destiny 
and will, destruction and foundation, the end and the beginning of a new world 
in "a figure of inhuman beginning" (Badiou, 2007,: 31-39, 171-78).14 Therefore, 
double images, such as history and life, wandering and command, submission 
and transgression, fraternity and we, resignation and rebellion, reappear in 
these documents (Badiou, 2007[2005]: 14, 91, 125, 129, 142-43).15 
Whilst reminiscent of Comte's question to which he answered with a 
mathematical love of fate, another spectre called Marx lurks behind Badiou's 
account. More than a spectre, in fact, Badiou unearths Marx's remains in the 
Russian century. Hence he argues carefully that since "the reverse of 
cowardice is not will, but abandonment to what happens," this courage to 
abandon oneself runs a greater risk of fusing with the bourgeois tolerance of 
differences, accepting the human condition in ecstasy, before being able to 
confront the abyssal act (Badiou, 2007: 125-27). lt turns out that from the fatal 
to the act is a non-dialectical descent into a deep, deep valley. On this journey 
marks a sudden encounter of two strangers who become an "item". The 
formation of a fatal act is an event of love, disregarding consequences, 
staying with its conversion and making its own future in the eternal present. 
This means no dialectics, positive and negative, can now bridge the two 
states of existence since real life can no longer be processed by a master-
slave relation of power originated in mechanics. In fact, dialectics worked out 
by the rational mind is susceptible to a denial of real life, papering over its 
14 Badiou shares with Deleuze the non-dialectical method, but then he disputes with Deleuze 
about its formal procedure, defending a symbolist deduction (Mallarm? against the vitalist 
production (Bergson) (Badou, 2000a[1997]: 31-40, 75-77; 2007: 31-32). The politicization of 
Mallarme's aesthetics allows Badiou to distinguish the uses and misuses of both Nietzsche 
and Marx according to specific situations, such as the relation between theatre and politics in 
the case of Brecht (Badiou, 2007: 39-47), without lumping them together as critical thinkers in 
general to pervert the revolutionary subject. 
" Badiou's documents include Mandelstram's The Age, Saint-John Perse's Anabasis, 
Fernando Pessoa's Maritime Ode, Brecht's The Decision, and Breton's Arcanum 17. 
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disjointed situation. Further, it might even be abused by nihilists who trans-
value truths and simulacra infinitely as a gaming strategy, until "a dialectic 
disease would find a wholesome remedy in the study of nature" (Goethe in 
Eckermann: 1998: 244). Facing such an impossibility, Badiou turns around to 
embrace the non-presentable gap between the two by means of 
"formalization," which is a mathematical procedure of subtraction combined 
with literary symbolism (i.e. a poetic image composed of few words to include 
the excluded margins of the paper as a part of the poem) in order to discern "a 
minimal difference between place and taking-place" (Badiou, 2007: 56). 
Renouncing what Gillian Rose (1984) calls the "dialectic of nihilism" (between 
the Kantian law and its discontents), Badiou's non-dialectical formalism 
reserves a non-geometric place so that evental truths can be seduced by acts 
of fate unvalued in the semiotic space. I would call this recovered commitment 
which is at once forced and forcing "the fatal act of love" because, apart from 
resurrecting Marx, Badiou rehearses, however unwittingly, Comte's positivist 
method' as he overcomes military strategies to become militant.16 Following or 
shadowing Badiou's. method if not his polemic call for a "fusion of Germany 
and France", I propose to rethink the philosophy of social sciences in the site 
of its truth procedures by formalizing the possibility of art and love immanent 
to Comte's scientific religion and Marx's scientific politics. I suggest this 
"desuturation" within the Comtean-Marxian "historic network of sutures" is a 
prerequisite to contest the Heideggerian-Levinasian cult of the Poets and 
Woman in the global culture of "syrupy love" (Badiou, 1999[1992]: 56, 61-67). 
Here lies the methodology of our science fictional genealogy of the 
sociological reason. Badiou (1999: 70-71) sees the "rivalry of the poet and the 
philosopher'' as a result of Nietzsche's overturning of Plato because 
16 Except for Macherey who wrote a monograph on Comte after his dissertation on Spinoza, 
other Althusser-inspired Marxists from Balibar to Badiou dismiss Comte as a transitional 
figure who looks back to either the Enlightened Progress (Condorcet before Marx) or the 
Romantic God-Man (Hegel before Nietzsche)(Balibar, 1995: 84; Badiou, 2007: 168). Both fail 
to clear the unpaid debt of Althusser's structuralism to Comte's positivism (Gane, 2003: 179-
80). This denial is unfortunate when one reads Althusser crediting Comte as "the only mind 
worthy of interest" in "the pitiful history of French philosophy in the 130 years following the 
Revolution of 1789." (Aithusser, 1969[1965]: 25) 
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"Descartes, Leibniz, Kant or Hegel might have been mathematicians, 
historians, or physicists; if there is one thing they were not, it was poets. But 
since Nietzsche, all philosophers claim to be poets, they all envy poets." What 
is meant by "the Age of Poets" was "completed" by Holderlin, Mallarme, 
Rimbaud, Trakl, Pessoa, Mandelstam and Celan, but is revived misleadingly 
by post-Heideggerian philosophy (Badiou, 1999: 71, 86). Nonetheless, Badiou 
(1999: 93) rereads these poets to defend "a locus of thinking which would 
maintain the category of the subject, but would grant the poets the destitution 
of the object." Accordingly, he raises three questions regarding "the unbeing of 
contemporary philosophy" to reform Platonism: the two, the objectless 
subject, and the indiscernible or generic multiple (Badiou, 1999: 89-96). 
Ironically, Badiou's subject reinvokes Comte's "supreme fate [sic] without an 
object" in his subjective synthesis. They share a mathematical fetishism 
(evolved from numbers to sets) which introduces an empty sign in the 
omnipotence of language and the body by exterminating language and 
dismembering the body. Notwithstanding this absent ontology, it is ontically 
inconceivable to situate a subjective "encounter" (which defines the two) with 
truth events "without a vis-a-vis", unless Badiou's definition of philosophy as 
an ethical history of "a desubstancializaton of Truth" can be applied in 
contemporary settings to an economic politics of digital and/or genetic 
fetishism (Badiou, 1999: 93, 144). Hence, the problem is that, preoccupied 
with the primary contradiction between Hegel's philosophy and Nietzsche's 
poetry, Badiou neglects our philosopher-poet Goethe, whose art of love 
anticipates Comte's and Marx's social sciences. But Badiou has dismissed 
them as suturing only to science and politics. Consequently, one must 
reconsider Badiou's "fiction of art" in a double sense since the age of Holderlin 
and Goethe, a twofold fictionalization of art composed not only of fictional 
poetry through "dis-objectivation" but also of a fictional theater through re-
objectivation. This means "the metaphorical movement of a destitution of the 
subject-object couple" must be complemented by a metamorphic movement 
of a constitution of the subject-object couple (Badiou, 1999: 76). That is, the 
mathematical ascent to the truth of the subject requires a sociological descent 
to the knowledge of the world at the same time since subjective fidelity to the 
truth of an undecidable event subtracted from being has presupposed the 
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being of the event subtracted from situational knowledge. Only in this double 
movement circling around the object, which splits into singularly presented 
being and universally represented knowledge, can Badiou's truth be 
conceived in the generic production of a situation from "any part whatsoever 
of it, that it says nothing in particular about the situation, except precisely its 
multiple-being as such, its fundamental inconsistency" (Badiou, 1999: 107}. 
Stated otherwise, only when the split object qua symbolic being and imaginary 
world is doubly subtracted by the split subject qua nothing, objectless and 
real, can a situation be named as a generic truth event. Thus, we argue that a 
religious politics of love qua the fatal act, once redelivered from the missed 
encounter of Comte and Marx, becomes a reflection of the subjective 
disjunction in the Great Being as much as it is a response to it. 
Apart from methodological reorientation, the theoretical position developed in 
this thesis could also be expounded with reference to Badiou's philosophy of 
being and event. Badiou's work can be read as formalizing a void between 
system and anti-system. In the main, he conducts a fourfold philosophical 
suture, suturing to science via Canto and Cohen, to art via Holderlin and 
Mallarme, to politics via Marx and Mao, and to love via St. Paul and Lacan (cf. 
Barker, 2002; Hallward, 2003; Badiou, 2003a[1997]; 2005b[1988]}. Ultimately, 
he seeks to redeem Platonic philosophy by embracing its fiercest enemies, 
avant-gardes to seize the conceptual power of the prose within poetry 
(Mallarme to Pessoa} and theatre (Brecht to Beckett} (Badiou, 2005a[1998]: 
36-56, 89-121; 2007: 39-47}. Leaving philosophical issues aside, this thesis 
revisits Badiou's four generic truth procedures or conditions of philosophy, 
which are science, art, politics and love, by means of the sociological method 
stated above. And yet, we take Badiou's caveat seriously, minding not to 
confound these procedures whilst supplementing his method of subjective 
reality with our method of objective fiction. This amounts to an organization of 
Badiou's philosophical conditions, a genealogy of sociological history, an 
effective historical sociology of sociology. That is to say, objective fictions of 
religion and culture will be woven into subjective realities of science, art arid 
politics to constitute a site of true love in a subject-object duality. This site may 
then provide the conceptual coordinates to review social science, classical 
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sociology and Marxism, offering further a yardstick to revalue current 
sociology and social theory. 
Given this organization, the site of true love includes Badiou's subjective 
reality. As a truth procedure, love is "the treatment of a paradox", a paradox 
between the two and the one, that is, between sexuated knowledge and truth 
of humanity (Badiou, 2000b[1996): 269ff). Being sexuated, the truth of 
humanity can only be "seized" by inhumanity, that is, by the supremacy of 
feminine love over four generic procedures, thereby coinciding topologically 
with humanity (Badiou, 2000b: 280). In other words, love of humanity cannot 
attain concrete universality until it is punctured by feminine inhumanity, insofar 
as women are what Hegel says "the eternal irony of community". In poetic 
terms, true love follows the path of a labyrinth leading to the heart of a 
woman. In the labyrinth, love manifests a scene of Two, a scene of "an 
immanent construction of an indeterminate disjunction" "on the order of hard 
labour" (Badiou, 2003b[2000]: 52, 55). This labour is characterized by "the 
limping march of the double function of an indeterminacy," which involves "the 
included indeterminacy which is the object, and the exterior indeterminacy 
which is such-and-such unpredictable fragment of the scene of Two" (Badiou, 
2003b: 52, 54). In sum, it is not enough to choose from objects of love (the 
order of being), for a loving subject, in the full sense of that term, must already 
be led to love by an unexpected scene (the order of event). 
Moreover, the site of true love is not confined to love's subjective reality, but 
must reach out to work on the objective fictions of religion and culture. In 
Badiou's own terms, we posit that love is the most subordinate of all objective 
situations and the predominant subjective truths. This unique duality explains 
why love is theorized in the least among his four truth conditions of 
philosophy, whilst having been formalized to the fullest out of the feminine 
substance of humanity (Hallward, 2003: 185; Badiou, 2000b: 280; Badiou in 
Badiou and Miller, 2005: 40). As the social scientific conception of religion has 
been reviewed, this thesis is unfolding the whole process of organization. But 
prior to cultural objectification, one must see how love connects to other 
subjective generic procedures. For Badiou, while philosophy is sutured to 
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these conditions, philosophy itself produces nothing. On the contrary, these 
conditions produce truths, the "intra-philosophical effects" of which are 
"seized" by philosophy. That is to say, these conditions cannot be posited as 
objects by philosophical reflection in a conventional division of study, such as 
epistemology, aesthetics, political and moral philosophies. In Badiou's 
neologism, therefore, science produces an intra-philosophical effect in 
transitional ontology, art in inaesthetics, politics in meta-politics, and love in an 
ethic of fidelity (cf. Badiou, 2001[1993]; 2003c; 2005a; 2006[1998]). In these 
intermediary zones, love is first of all mediated to science via transitional 
ontology in an impersonal way, as Badiou himself deduces mathematically the 
indeterminate object wandering in the scene of love, which we summarized 
above. Second, love is mediated to art via inaesthetics in a poetic, productive 
way, as Breton issues "the patently 'surrealist' Manifesto of an uncertain act" 
which says "I love you forever", the act of love fated to disappear "as 
encounter and thought, as an asymmetrical and egalitarian becoming, as the 
invention of oneself (Badiou, 2007: 139, 145). For, inaesthetics renews itself 
from the schemata of didacticism, romanticism and classicism to introduce 
"the only education [which] is education by truths", insofar as poetry could 
resist the triple temptations of ecstasy (of identifying with the place), of 
plenitude (of choosing a simulacrum), and of the sacred (naming that cancels 
the singularity of the event), falling once again "under the registers of amorous 
desire and poetic production" (Badiou, 2005a: 5, 14, 140-41). Third, love is 
mediated to politics via metapolitics in a militant way, like Engels' new man 
"against the family, property and the nation-state", or "Gide's cry 'Families, I 
hate you"' (Badiou, 2007: 66). For, metapolitics offers "the least bound place 
of all" in a true egalitarian politics which "undermines [sic] the illusion of the 
bond, whether it be trade unionist, parliamentary, professional or carnival", 
provided that democracy could be deregulated from all nominations by 
"communitarian predicates, or predicates of subsets" (Badiou, 2006: 76-77, 
94). Fourth, love is mediated to itself via a spiritual ethic of fidelity in a non-
religious way, like Saint Paul's universal declaration that "circumcision is 
nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing", or Lacan's subjective analysis that 
"there is no sexual relation" (Badiou, 2003a: 86-106; 2007: 68-80, 139). For, 
"the ethic of a truth is absolutely opposed to opinion, and to ethics in general", 
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as long as one could "love what you will never believe twice" by keeping 
faithful to one's encounter with a truth event as "something that happens to 
you" (Badiou, 2001: 51-52). In sum, these intermediations of love form a 
proto-objective, or subjective network of the infinite. 
But there is a key provisio. Badiou (2007: 148-64) reckons the "romantic 
infinite" and "contemporary infinite" must be carefully distinguished in order to 
capture the real passion driving the progression of poetic politics from 
surrealists through situationists to the Tel Que/ group. He sees those alliances 
of art and politics as reflecting a conflicted image of the century which "strives 
to have done with the romanticism of the Ideal: to abide in the abruptness of 
the effectively-real, but to do so with subjective means [sic] that remain 
irreparably romantic" (Badiou, 2007: 153). That's why they swing between "the 
perpetuation of a romantic subjectivity" and "the integral sacrifice of the 
infinite", or "a programmatic forcing" and "a nihilistic iconoclasm" (Badiou, 
2007: 155). On a positive note, they do help to open the question of "the 
trace" between romanticism of the work and anti-romanticism of the act 
(Badiou, 2007: 158-59). The lesson is "to extricate itself from romanticism. lt is 
the ideal of materialist formalization. According to this ideal, the infinite 
proceeds directly from the finite" (Badiou, 2007: 156). Badiou hence 
concludes that "it is because of a post-romantic conception of the infinite -
qualitative as well as vanishing - that the art of the century inscribed itself 
paradigmatically between dance and cinema." He asks himself "what a non-
religious art could be ... an art in which the infinite is drawn from nothing 
besides the effects of the act ... an art of formalization rather than work" 
(Badiou, 2007: 160; cf. 2005a: 57-71, 78-88). 
Now as a concept, we have argued that unrequited love of a social science 
renders significant a religious politics of love qua the fatal act. At the level of 
history, this means there has never been a real order of love founded on the 
fatal act in any state socialism, market capitalism or world capitalism. 
Rendered positively, we argue that the real order of love delivered from the 
reencounter of Comte and Marx opens up a really non-existing socialism, 
which is to be conceived against the ongoing struggle between Marxist and 
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non-Marxist sociologies, our subject matter in part 11. In a sense, the struggle 
is imaginary since it continues decades after the breakdown of the wall 
between socialism and capitalism. In fact, we argue that the actual struggle 
never takes place between socialism and capitalism, or between Marxism and 
non-Marxism, but within Marxism. lt is a familial quarrel over the crisis of 
Marxism. What we have is a "cold war" mentality of two Marxisms. The 
watershed of this familial strife lies in the entry of "culture" as the concept has 
been revalued by Western Marxists to substitute the notion of superstructure 
with far-reaching consequences. Returning to the fountain of the 
Enlightenment, the autonomy of culture was expected to redress Marx's 
economic determinism of the working class motorizing the law of history, as 
well as Eastern Marxists' political dictatorship of the party mobilizing the will of 
the naton-state. Ironically, the narrative of neo-Marxist cultural study derived 
from the inner split of political and economic aspects of society is now 
supporting the mythical reality of a recursive cultural economy (e.g. 
economies of tourism, higher education and mass media) on the one hand, 
and a reflexive cultural politics (e.g. politics of race, gender, age and sexuality) 
on the other. These parallel worlds render the ghost of two Marxisms 
inexorable, but this internal ideological breakup, we further argue, hides the 
real war between socialism and neo/liberalism. 
Indeed, there is a growing enthusiasm of postmodern Marxism (Jameson), 
poststructural Marxism (Laclau and Mouffe) and critical realist Marxism 
(Archer) as they claim to apply postmodernist, poststructuralist and critical 
realist philosophies (Lyotard, Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault and Bhaskar) to 
social analysis (Sim, 1998; Munch, 2000: 138-52; Joseph, 2006: 128-41). 
Along this eclectic line, eco-socialist Uiwy (1993; 2001: 11f, 58ff) goes 
furthermost to promote "critical irrealism" as he argues to save some anti-
modern, anti-capitalist passion from a typology of about ten romantic 
orientations, so that the revolutionary and/or utopian project of Marxism could 
be rejuvenated. Turning into a high priest of romantic Marxism, Lowy (2001: 
eh. 3-5) even invents its theoretical traditions (young Marx, Lukacs and 
Luxemburg) and historical traditions (from young Coleridge and Ruskin in the 
191h century to Charles Peguy, Ernest Bloch and Christa Wolf in the 20th 
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century). His generalization extends further to contemporary times as 
romantic variants of Marxism can be found in surrealism, May '68, new social 
movements and new religious movements (Uiwy, 2001: eh. 6). Due to Uiwy's 
sweeping account, one must find some of his contemporary examples 
overlapping with Badiou's models of love in his generic truth procedure, 
namely surrealism and May '68. Yet this is exactly where Badiou's hair-
splitting distinction of romantic infinity and contemporary infinity becomes 
essential. As a sober post-Marxist in our post-romantic times, Badiou rightly 
preempts romantic Marxism as the primary simulacrum of Marxism, 
demanding it to be curbed from within. As an insider to Marxism, his caution 
agrees with the master hypothesis we have been arguing. That is, Comte and 
Marx were pioneering social scientists thinking from outside of the cultural-
historical boxes of the Enlightenment and romanticism. 
From this integral view, critical realism sticks out to be our final negative 
reference. To be exact, critical realism doesn't belong to post-Marxism if, as I 
argued just now, post-Marxism is plagued by the same romantic passion as 
non-Marxism is. Rather, critical realist philosophy is better understood as a 
reflexive open system which has assimilated post-positivism and post-
Marxism by surmounting their nihilistic aberrations, especially their antirealist 
theory of knowledge and relativist theory of truth (Brown et al, 2002: 1-22; 
Groff, 2004: 1-24). Accordingly, Bhaskar's critical realism appears to come 
around to developing a unified spirit of Comte and Marx from an alpha point, 
supporting, along with Archer's sociology of "analytical dualism", a "social 
realism" of continuity and change, structure and agency, reality and critique in 
an endless elaboration of emergences (Cruickshank, 2002: 95-121 ). But 
dualism silences rather than answer the question about the historical relation 
of nature and society by introducing an analytical distinction of 
epistemological relativism on the transitive side and ontological realism on the 
intransitive side. Developing this paradox positively, critical realism grows from 
an abstractive objectivism since The Possibility of Naturalism (1979), 
develops into a dialectical realism by Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (1993), 
and reaches at a transcendental hyperrealism in From East to West: Odyssey 
of A Soul (2000). From the first volume of his multivolume project M eta-Reality 
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(2002} onwards, a multicultural doctrine of spirituality, which combines Zen, 
Tao, Yoga and Gnosis, is coined to humanize as well as sanctify some critical 
realist wisdom to creative truth and emancipating freedom. The "Tao of love" 
plays a key role in initiating one into an affective and intuitive ambiance 
beyond the duality of subject and object, or knowledge and being (Bhaskar, 
2002: 167-232}. In sum, Bhaskar's philosophical journey has a naturalistic 
beginning, a dialectic turn, a transcendental end, and finally an anti-
philosophical exit to saintly spirituality. Contrary to appearance, however, his 
multicultural Enlightenment remains on the horizon of Kantianism, only to 
probe the mystic potential of Kant's personal God e/merging at the alpha point 
of Comte's and Marx's theoretical logics. In other words, critical realism 
accomplishes a triumphant metaphysic of the post-scientific age, blinking 
totally the duality of nature and society, real duality as such. Only by doing so 
is it able to systemize everything in an "open" world by reflexive wisdom, 
everything but a reencounter of Comte and Marx from a futuristic, omega 
point. For, a religious politics of love qua the fatal act must be situated in an 
awkward encounter, and encountering always eventuates in a site of duality. 
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Part 11 
Goethe's Culture of Sociology Embodied 
Chapter 4 Rose's Archaeology of the Subject in 
Law and Love 
Based on the conclusion of the previous chapter, we are tempted to claim that 
since Spencer's and Engels' social evolutionist displacement of Comte's and 
Marx's ideas, a formal subject ruled by law and love has become the calling of 
sociology and Marxism. But discontinuing the history of sociological thought, 
in this chapter, we will introduce instead an overview of cotemporary social 
thought. The message is similar but more general. We will argue the cultural-
archaeological importance of law and love in the subjects of post-structuralism 
and postmodernism. We will examine the discord of subjects by drawing on 
Gillian Rose's problematization of law and love in the history of social thought. 
Since the baseline of her analysis is drawn between Kant and Hegel, Rose 
can rise above the divide between Marxist and non-Marxist sociologies. 
Gillian Rose's profound critique of the subjects of law and love in the history of 
social thought undermines their transcendental and transcendent grounds, 
including the consequences of organic morality and social science on the one 
hand, and holy ethics and state politics on the other. First, Kant's question of 
law is reposed by the neo-Kantian philosophies of validity and value in 
Marburg and Heidelberg schools, insofar as they continue Rudolf H. Lotze's 
metaphysical reading of Kant's transcendentalism (schamatized in triadic 
terms, subjectivity, objectivity, and thing-in-itself) through Plato's "logic of 
validity" (Geltungslogik). Furthermore, neo-Kantianism dominates the 
recurrent problem with the laws of necessity and freedom, or nature and 
humanity, in the two sociologies (Durkheim and Weber), two Marxisms 
(Lukacs and Althusser) and two social theories, structuralism (Saussure and 
· Levi-Strauss) and post-structuralism (Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault) (Rose, 
1984; 1995[1981]). Second, Kant's question of law is replaced by the question 
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of love in the post-Hegelian philosophies of anxiety and violence, including 
existentialism (Kierkegaard and Kafka), psychoanalysis (Freud and Lacan), 
and_ postmodern ethics (Girard, Arendt, Levinas, etc.) (Rose, 1992). Radical 
existentialism and psychoanalysis still recognize Hegel's ethic of the middle in 
the actualization of social life from the subject-object relation. Ironically, the 
consequential religious-political ethic of postmodernism stretches the middle 
ground unconditionally, so the transcendental law is transfigured with 
transcendent love in a mystical union with God beyond essence, unknowable 
Otherness. Third, at the heart of neo-Kantianism and post-Hegelianism, it was 
Hegel (and Nietzsche's Zarathustra) who first thought through the problem 
with the Kantian subject of law without invoking a dialecticized subject of love, 
insofar as 'absolute' idealism could be read, beyond partisan ideologies of the 
left and the right, as reflecting the 'real' contradiction of private property in a 
bourgeois society. But the strength coincides with the weakness of Hegel's 
'speculative' thought. Since the absolutely real tarries with any constitutive-
regulative prejudgment of ethical life which turns actuality into reality, it 
supposes an ethic of renunciation, consigning post-Hegelian ideas to a 
perpetual theoretical-practical reflection in the Kantian-Fichtean manner. 
Anticipated but unresolved by Hegel (and Nietzsche), the fate of non-Marxist 
and Marxist social thought, including Marx himself, is determined by the 
arrested transition from Kant to Hegel (Rose, 1984: 87-90, 109-110; 1995: 
201-11). After. clearing the ground of transcendental laws and transcendent 
love, Rose calls for preserving Hegel's ethic of the broken middle. Specifically, 
she looks into the fractured abyss to uncover a fated subject of love who has 
and loses nothing, thereby embracing the wisdom of the Russian orthodox 
monk Staretz Silouan: "keep your mind in hell and despair not." In result, Rose 
believes "love's work" is neither conditional nor unconditional, but lies "around 
the bounds", that is, "bound to continue to get love wrong, all the time, but not 
to cease wooing" (Rose, 1997[1995]: 97-99). 
lt is plausible to trace Rose's approach back to her early study of Adorno, in 
which she examines the melancholia of his negative dialectic in light of 
Hegel's speculative philosophy (Rose, 1993: 53-63). However, we would 
rather describe her work as a total archaeology of the subject, because she 
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challenges the cultural foundations of the West in modernity, including 
Hellenism, J udaism and Christianity, relentlessly. Confronting her own past, 
Rose refuses to indulge in the post-Holocaust romanticization of Judaism as 
the messianic Other of modernity or its saving Grace; instead, she 
understands the contradiction between philosophy and anti-philosophy, or 
Greco-Roman politics and Hebrew ethics, in the Self-reflection of modernity. 
Renouncing the "divergences and convergences" of philosophy and Judaism, 
law and ethics, rights and power, Rose (1993: 23-24) introduces "a new 
discomfort" to the post/modern culture: "[i]s there a Jewish philosophy? I hope 
that by now you no longer know the answer to this question." Distinguished 
from current intellectuals who are skilled in indoctrinating personal religious, 
political or scientific faith with the rhetoric of critique, paradox or irony, Rose 
. shows rare courage in carrying out the cultural cleansing, discriminating the 
surface value of modernity from its underlying traditions. By digging a hole in 
the dialectic of disappearance (modernity) and loss (traditions), she works 
through the dialectic of nihilism. In this sense, Rose's "method", had she 
cared to claim one, comes close to Badiou's subtraction of generic truths from 
singular being (one, formal modernity) and universal knowledge (many, 
particular traditions). Conversely, if a method must be subscribed to her 
writings, then she adopts Hegel's phenomenology which makes "the 
methodological statement that there can be no method" by applying "the 
equally self-canceling phrases" of Hegel's "absolute method" and Nietzsche's 
"conscience of method", "for an 'immoralist' could have no conscience, while 
no 'method' could be absolute." (Rose, 1993: 56; 1995: 149) But before 
pondering on Rose's fated subject of love, it's worth rehearsing her critiques 
of the post/modern subjects of law and love. 
In the case of Marxist and non-Marxist sociologies, Kant's question of law is 
radicalized by the intermediary factor of neo-Kantianism. As the fourth 
generation of critics of Kant (1870-1914), the neo-Kantians of Marburg and 
Heidelberg schools (e.g. Cohen and Rickert) were inspired by critics of the 
third generation (1830-1870), especially by Lotze's ontologization of Kant's 
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epistemology into a Platonic "logic of validity".17 This logic gave primacy to the 
{Platonic) proposition of objectification prior to empirical phenomena which 
are objective experiences apperceived by the (Kantian) subjective synthesis 
of concept and intuition. "Lotze's notions of 'validity' and 'value' became the 
foundation of the Marburg and Heidelberg schools of neo-Kantianism and of 
their sociological offspring" (Rose, 1995: 6). With direct associations with neo-
Kantians, moreover, non-Marxist sociology brings Kant back into account, 
transcendentalizing again neo-Kantian ontology into a socially or culturally a 
priori: "Durkheim and Weber turn a Kantian argument against neo-Kantianism. 
For when it is argued that it is society or culture which confers objective 
validity on social facts or values, then the argument acquires a metacritical or 
'quasi-transcendental' structure" (Rose, 1995: 14). Because of this double 
take, the neo-Kantian division of validity and value is redoubled in Durkheim 
and Weber at the levels of method and theory: "[a] paradoxical result of 
Durkheim's granting priority to validity over values, and of Weber's granting 
priority to values over validity, is that Durkheim produced an 'empirical' 
sociology of values (moral facts) and Weber produced an 'empirical' sociology 
of validities (legitimate orders)" (Rose, 1995: 21). Nonetheless, "it is the logic 
which grants priority to values, which is known, strictly speaking, as 
'sociology'. This tradition draws on Simmel's 'forms of sociation', Weber's 
ideal types, von Wiese's theory of interrelations, and Parsons' general theory 
of action" (Rose, 1995: 21-22). By contrast, metacritical "new ontologies" 
which span from Dilthey, Mannheim, Husserl, Heidegger to Gadamer all 
"turn[s] the neo-Kantian critique of the philosophy of consciousness against 
neo-Kantianism itself: it exposes the formation and deformation of both 
transcendental and methodological reason." In other words, the metacritical 
analysis stands closer to the Marburgian stress on validity like Durkheim, 
insofar as "the analysis revolves within a hermeneutic or transcendental 
circle" (Rose, 1995: 23). On the other hand, Marxist sociologists ranging from 
Lukacs, Adorno, Habermas and even Althusser all reproduce, consciously or 
17 The first generation of critics (1780-1790) "concentrated on the status of the thing-in-itself" 
while the second generation (1790-1830) "'tried to resolve these Kantian aporias by giving 
primacy to Kant's practical philosophy or to the Critique of Judgment." Highlighting Hegel's 
actual ethical life elusive to and yet determinant of theory and practice, Rose seeks to 
distinguish a radically absolute Hegel from this second generation, including "Fichte, 
Schelling, Holderlin, the early Romantics and Hegel" (Rose, 1995: 6). 
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not, the neo-Kantian paradigm as a result of the attempt to square Simmel's 
Philosophy of Money with the Hegelian-Marxist philosophy of reification and 
personalization (Rose, 1995: 25-39). Therefore, "Marxist sociology meets non-
Marxist sociology at the Fichtean station between Kant and Hegel,." (Rose, 
1995: 36) In effect, both types of sociology thrive on the ambiguous distinction 
between "theory" and "method", wavering in the mutual conditioning of 
morality and legality (Rose, 1995: 39-41 ). The problematization of legal-moral 
"judgment" shows the limit of sociological reason within Kant's critical 
philosophy, failing to understand correctly Hegel's philosophy of the absolute 
designed to integrate theoretical and practical reasons. At bottom, the 
question concerns an actual theory of subjectivity which Rose believes only 
Hegel could deliver, whereas the fates of sociology, Marxism, and even Marx 
are all sealed in the Kant-Fichtean "victory of reflection" forewarned by Hegel 
(Rose, 1995: 201-03, 209-18). As the intellectual distinction between Marxist 
and non-Marxist sociologies is seen as spurious, eventually, the 
corresponding "political economies" of "capitalism" and "Marxism" are re-
cognized as two "cultures" of law (Rose, 1995: 219-20). On the same course 
of fate, class struggle is indefinitely differed from within as well as without. 
In the case of post-structuralism, the neo-Kantian problem with law is far from 
resolved as one might expect, but turns obvious and transparent devoid of 
any "conscience of method" as it once had for Hegel, Nietzsche and neo-
Kantian sociologies (Rose, 1984: 210-11). Post-structuralism is derived from 
Heidegger's philosophy of the historical event, "the Ereignis of the histor, the 
judgment in which all judge and all are judged", which provides the solution to 
a problem originated in neo-Kantians' (Lask and Cohen) dispute over time and 
history before the judgmental court of the social (Rose, 1984: 48-63, 67). 
Moreover, post-structuralism is over-determined by the vitalism of Comte and 
Bergson, the phenomenology of Hegel and Husserl, and the structuralism of 
Saussure and Levi-Strauss. This results in the dominance of poststructuralist 
philosophy represented by Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault. First, inventing a 
new vitalism evolved from Comte to Bergson, Deleuze revives Duns Scotus' 
God of "divine and arbitrary will", alluring us to his cult of "univocal being" 
which is "'at the same time nomadic distribution and crowned anarchy"' since 
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"everything is equally subjected to this inequality." (Rose, 1984: 1 05-07) 
Second, Derrida "legislates" forcibly "a new law table" of the grapheme 
distinguished from the logos to make the medium of ''writing on the coin 
become coin as writing" insofar as "'[f]etishism' is made by Derrida into the 
unaddressable absolute in Marx and Nietzsche when it is the point of address 
in their work" (Rose, 1984: 166-70). 
Unlike Deleuze's iconoclasm, Derrida de-constructs by re-constructing his 
intellectual distinctions from Hegel's and Husserl's phenomenology as well as 
Saussure's and Levi-Strauss' structuralism, literally stealing the logics of 
"history" revealed by phenomenology and "law" erected by structuralism to 
"prescribe" his doctrine of differance. In other words, the terms and conditions 
stipulated in "the old law table" are far from terminated but rather reactivated 
by Derrida's signature in absentee. On the one hand, the terms of linguistic 
and anthropological structuralism involve a romantic rewriting (after Hamman, 
Herder and W. van Humboldt) of Kant's transcendentalism in a hyper-arbitrary 
legal-rational "stipulation" of "a system of pure values" and "reciprocal 
communication" to precondition as a "form of exchange" the arbitrary 
exchange of signification and circulation. As such, language and kinship are 
linked to legal economy to formalize the paradox of time in the theory of social 
contract, assimilating the living force of "imagination", the social force of "free 
consent" and the universal historical law of "spurious intelligibility" in the 
"memory" of "social fact" and "mathematical and mythical metaphysics of 
history" (Rose, 1984: 112-30). On the other hand, the conditions of idealistic 
and intentional phenomenology historicize the sovereignty of social contract to 
search further for the genesis of "historical self-consciousness" and "historical 
factuality" in the differentiation of geometrical culture and absolute economy. 
With his "exorbitant choice of text", however, Derrida "changes the signs" of all 
writings under examination, making, for example, Rousseau a utopian 
ignorant of the antinomy of law, Levi-Strauss an anarchist unaware of the 
liberating power of writing, and Hegel a conservative complacent in historical 
eschatology. By his distracting play, the productive values already existing in 
these writings can then be usurped by Derrida's terminology, such as 
differance, trace and the middle voice. Perhaps, he recognizes only Husserl's 
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genetic historicity, Nietzsche's idea of force, and Bataille's general economy. 
Nonetheless, due to the unjust reversal of all textual signs, Derrida's 
prejudgment disguised as a deconstructive play invites counter-judgment, as 
Rose finds that Derrida's borrowed notions, such as Nietzsche's and 
Bataille's, defy their contexts of use, whereas, amongst his purloined letters, 
Hegel's speculative logic of the middle is particularly abused to the effect of 
encouraging a bad infinity seen in Levina's Otherness beyond history, a 
prescriptive value which Derrida claims to have avoided. At bottom, Derrida 
enforces a law of differance which glorifies non-knowledge by sacrificing 
historical self-consciousness (Rose, 1984: 131-65). 
Finally, vacillating around the terms of vitalism, phenomenology and 
structuralism, post-structuralism is most destined by Heidegger's "self-
perficient nihilism" to the concerns of "fate" (Moira), "justice" (Dike) and "light" 
(die Lichtung) of Being as "historical time, the historical present, the 
Event...the 'Thing"' (Rose, 1984: 72-76). Ironically, the fate of Being only ends 
up with Deleuze's inventive life under the "ontological injustice" of Being and 
Foucault's discursive power via "theological and military" strategies and tactics 
at the "original night of the body" (Rose, 1984: 108, 174, 206). The 
Heideggerian Event turns into a pendulum ad infinitum between "post-
metaphysical" science and metaphysics, reducing Kant's transcendental 
science of law to a fusion of a "legalism without law" and a natural "law 
without legalism" (Rose, 1984: 7, 83, 99, 193). All in all, Rose lays bare a 
series of civilization and naturalization of the Roman law (of private property) 
from Kant through Cohen/Heidegger to post-structuralists as long as Kant's 
"critical court [sic] founded and undermined by the usurpatory concept of 
freedom" is first unfounded by Heidegger's Event of appropriation and then 
undermined "by the post-structuralist revelation of the usurpation of Being'' 
(Rose, 1984: 109). Simply put, this Fichtean perversion of freedom is 
construed as poststructuralists' over-identification of its thought with the 
fetishization of the subject at the epochal coincidence of civilization and 
barbarism. In consequence, Kant's critical court of consciousness, as a 
method of replacing metaphysics of the divine will with jurisprudence of 
scientific laws to settle the dispute over private ownership along the 
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transcendental poles of subject and object, person and thing, dignity and 
price, ends in a savage kingdom without ends, a no-man's kingdom in which 
"[t]he thing or owning becomes the object, the thing owned, and disowned in 
the inclusive sense", a senseless kingdom of fetishes qua "the medium which 
encompasses all discrete entities", erasing objects and things (Rose, 1984: 
11-19, 64-65). 
While unimpressed by the sociological, Marxist and post-structuralist 
reformation and deformation of Kant's transcendental law into civil, formal and 
natural laws, Rose is also disappointed by the danger of supernatural 
transcendence of love in the post-Hegelian philosophies of irrationalism. On a 
positive note, far from dialectical nihilism, for Rose, it is this non-dialectical 
irrationalism which rightly captures Hegel's radical system, opening up the 
middle between subject-object relations. As a negative note, however, 
irrational thinking is susceptible · to unconditionalize the science of 
transcendental law into an ethical politics of transcendent love, ideally taking 
the responsibility of, but actually abetting personal, face-to-face responses to 
the infinite demand of postmodernity. The trade-off is created by the paradox 
of advancing Hegel's logic between the end and the beginning towards the 
post-Hegelian logic "between" the middle and the beginning. The derivative 
"between" here has become a simulated sign, an abstraction of abstraction 
since the middle is hypostatized. In other words, by usurping the 
consciousness of the end with that of the middle, Hegel's determination and 
act of actuality in the (real) middle loses out again to the Kant-Fichean 
possibility and impossibility of thought in the (ideal) beginning. Henceforth, 
existentialism and psychoanalysis which write "from the middle in the 
beginning" give in fatefully to the religious-political ethics from Girard, Arendt 
to Levinas who speak "from the beginning in the middle". 
For Rose (1992: xi-xv), all social and political thoughts of modernity must work 
through the "diremption of spirit" since Kant's antinomy of law. Therefore, if the 
diremption of law and science (of logic) is re-cognized by Hegel contra 
sociology and Marxism, and if the diremption of law and will (of power) is an-
nihilated by Nietzsche contra post-structuralism, then the diremption of law 
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and ethics (of love) is repeated by Kierkegaard contra post-modernism. As the 
true heir of Hegel and Nietzsche, it comes to Kierkegaard who rallies 
existentialism and psychoanalysis to preserve "the equivocation of the middle" 
while admitting "the anxiety of beginning". First, against textual interpretations 
derived from hermeneutics, dialectics and Judaic philosophy (Gadamer, 
Adorno and Fackenheim), Rose (1992: 3-17) argues that Kierkegaard's 
fragment is not contrary to Hegel's system, for neither does one begin from a 
philosophy of existence, and nor does the other end in a philosophy of 
essence. Following Blanchot's literary reading to heed the confusion of 
authorship with authority, Rose (1992: 24-50) suggests that both play with an 
"illusion of thought" as long as one notices how Kierkegaard repeats what 
Hegel has recognized with "unscientific" pseudonyms called Johannes 
Climacus and anti-Ciimacus. "Every beginning so far encountered, whether 
contra or pro the System, appears as a mask ... Just as this play of personae 
is the key to Hegel's authorship without authority, so systematic illusion is the 
key to Kierkegaard's pseudonymity." In specific terms, just as Hegel tells "the 
story of how natural consciousness acquired 'personality' - legal, aesthetic, 
moral", so Kierkegaard enacts the drama of how "eternal consciousness" 
received impersonality - aesthetic, ethical and religious (Rose, 1992: 1 0). 
Disguised in the ironic and anxious voice of a self-negating woman, or rather 
"actress", "[!]he aim of both 'authorships' - that of Kierkegaard and that of 
Hegel - what makes 'authorship' as such problematic to them and to their 
work, is how, contra Kant, to bring Revelation into philosophy" (Rose, 1992: 
10, 18-23). 
Second, Rose (1992: 51-54) argues against contextual explanations 
susceptible to biography, theology and psychology (Bred, Buber and 
Blanche!) because they concede Kafka's debt to Kierkegaard regarding the 
anxiety of beginning, but consider Kafka to be more equivocal than 
Kierkegaard about the ethical law. For Rose (1992: 148), however, 
Kierkegaard's "suspension of the ethical" guarantees no success in religious 
faith, for "[t]o posit that the ethical is 'suspended' is to acknowledge that it is 
always already presupposed." Insofar as "both address the relation between 
not marrying, authorship, authority, actor/actress and truth," "this is to remain 
113 
both with the anxiety of beginning and with the equivocation of the middle, 
manifested in the manifold failing towards form" (Rose, 1992: 55-56). Looking 
backward, this failing is caused by the "unhappy recollection" of love qua sins: 
"[f]rom the confessional face, the ambivalent erotic countenance 
predominates: 'I cannot marry Regina/Felice because limy father am too 
sinful'; from this paradox: 'Regina/Felice and I do not marry because of the 
forgiveness of sins"' (Rose, 1992: 59). Looking forward, the failing might lead 
to a "happy repetition" of love qua humour if a man could impersonate a 
woman's pathos: "woman provides the expression at every stage - coming 
into sight as the initial or aesthetic pathos of 'myth', coming into judgment as 
the ethical pathos of 'conscience', and leading off stage at the decisive border 
with the pathos of humour; momentary, eternal and transtemporal, 
respectively" (Rose, 1992: 83). In effect, the ethical ends "[w]ith this humorous 
revocation which returns us to the equivocation of the middle" (Rose, 1992: 
84). 
Third, Rose (1992: 85-86) argues that Freud psychoanalyzes Kierkegaard's 
"look into beginning - anxiety of beginning and beginning of anxiety" via 
Pauline preaching, ''without law, no sin: without sin, no grace." Above all, "[t]he 
Kierkegaard authorship is ethical because of its premise that law is always 
already given. Anxiety, therefore, has an origin, a beginning: 'being given'; and 
it is always already there or posited: 'law"' (Rose, 1992: 87). This law of 
anxiety does not refer to the commandment in a confusion of pre-biblical 
paganism and post-biblical Rabbinic Judaism, but to the biblical Hebrew-
Christian covenant (Rose, 1992: 99-101). Yet if the law begins with a pact of 
words, then the beginning must presume a speculative spirit. Accordingly, "[i]n 
the thinking of Kierkegaard and of Freud, 'anxiety' is a Janus-faced concept 
which looks back to the aetiology of guilt and forwards to freedom. 
Pseudonymously, anxiety creates sin: sin does not create anxiety; 
psychoanalytically, anxiety creates repression: repression does not create 
anxiety. Anxiety is the pivot of movement backwards and movement forwards, 
of recollection and repetition, of loss and possibility, because it holds the 
middle - the 'third' or spirit of commandment to body and soul" (Rose, 1992: 
1 01-02). Unfortunately, early Lacan's "small circuit of the symbolic order'' 
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"anthropologizes" the concept of anxiety by delimiting ethical eternity between 
life and death to the death instinct, and assimilating (hence, misrepresenting) 
Kierkegaard's "repetition" and Freud's "compulsion to repeat" in backwards 
only (Rose, 1992: 102-10). Therefore, the formation from the "natural body" to 
the "spiritual body" is thwarted as "the cycle - anxiety to sin, sin to despair; 
despair to grace -" is broken. As a result, the ethical "tone of facetiousness" 
preserved by Kierkegaard and Freud is muted since "ethical life has been 
ruined" by the disjunction "between the 'deepest misery' of the individual and 
the ethical 'everyday' of the age" as a symptomatic disjunction of Greek, 
Judaic and Christian cultures in modernity (Rose, 1992: 110-12). 
More than singing another refrain to Hegel's logic and Nietzsche's power, 
Kierkegaard's diremption of law and love strikes deeply to the heart of 
modernity. This heart is made up of the aporia of "love and the state" with the 
aporetic "and" implying "violence-in-love" (Rose, 1992: 240). However, in the 
making of postmodern ethics, the violence which characterizes the broken 
middle is first "sequestered", then "culturalized", and finally "sacralized" in "the 
holy middle". The first stage, of sequestration, is achieved by Mann and 
Girard. Aiming to get around severe Fascism, they rethink the place of myth 
by reading Goethe and The Genesis (i.e. the stories of Abraham, lssac, Jacob 
and Joseph) to suggest a facetious style of politics (Rose, 1992: eh. 4). 
Ironically, they overplay mythical facetiousness, ending up authorizing a 
Gnostic politics of love. In other words, "the feast is spoiled: Mann's repetition 
in the feast of a new, difficult humanism; Girard's re-affirmation of agape, the 
original love-feast, love without violence ... This comparison of Mann's masked 
Gnostic authorship with Girard's unmasked Gnostic authorship brings out the 
politics of anxiety and the anxiety of politics in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous 
and signed Christian authorship" (Rose, 1992: 147). 
The second stage, of culturalization, is advocated by Varnhagen, Luxemburg 
and Arendt. Seeking to deepen the critique of Enlightenment, they rethink "the 
right of women" by engaging with reformative (Goethe for Varnhagen), 
revolutionary (Bernstein, Lenin and Lukacs for Luxemburg) and socialist 
(Augustine, Kant, Lessing, Varnhagen, and Luxemburg for Arendt) ideas 
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cumulatively, and expecting a gendered civil society governed by the state 
(Rose, 1992: eh. 5). Ironically, they undermine feminine sexuality, resulting in 
legitimizing an Agnostic society of love. In concrete terms, "[t]he impotence of 
'the beautiful soul', the 'hypocrisy of judgment', and the 'omnipotence' of 'pure 
culture', represent three temptations whose precondition is the triple 
diremption - not 'twin contradiction' - which, unresolved, recurs in the three 
crises of bureaucratic reform, social democratic defeat, rise and fall of 
Fascism, and whose structural prevalence is especially exposed in the wake 
of 1989" (Rose, 1992: 236). Furthermore, "[a]ll three were less equivocal later 
in life and authorship - Rachel Varnhagen more 'beautiful' in her Second 
Salon; Rosa Luxemburg more judgmental in ways she herself anticipated in 
her last writings on the Russian Revolution; Hannah Arendt, who first knew 
the equivocalities of emancipation and twin contradictions, who knew truth in 
its equivocation, cultures judgment, and then, in a subsequent retreat, turns 
the culture of judgment back into a mental capacity in the lecture sketches for 
the final volume of the Life of the Mind: 'Judging"' (Rose, 1992: 238). A similar 
irony may be found in sociology as there is a surreptitious return of 
functionalism represented in Habermas' operational society of communication 
and Giddens' administrative society of surveillance (Rose, 1992: 245-46). 
Secularizing the state in the service of the needs of civil society, all is tied to 
one system of maintenance, and yet none seems content with 'the social' 
devoid of sacred bonds. 
The third stage, of transcendence, is completed by Levin as and Rosenzweig. 
Trying to move beyond the holocaust and liberation politics, they retrace the 
origin of ethics to the Judaic law, halacha, by reading the Talmud against 
Hegel's philosophy and so intimating a Messianic ethic beyond knowledge 
and being, history and ontology (Rose, 1992: eh. 6). Ironically, the reduction of 
the Roman law and Christian ethics to the Hebrew law (sustained by the 
Rabbinic institution) leads up to an eschatological ethic of love. This means 
'within halachic Judaism, as within philosophical presentation of Judaism from 
Rosenzweig to Levinas, there is no comprehension to complement 
commandment: no recognition of freedom and unfreedom' (Rose, 1992: 277). 
This full-fledged 'new political a/theology' is adopted by postmodern theology 
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and sociology alike to celebrate an ethic of 'the holy middle' between the 
'misrepresented' Judaism and 'the end of' the end of philosophy. Rose's 
examples are 'Theology and Sociology of the Disaster' authorized by Metz, 
Fackenheim and Bauman as they sacralize the dead and moralize the person 
to remake humanity in a 'New Jerusalem' (Rose, 1992: 277-96). In 
conclusion, the diremption of law and ethics is lost by way of redoubling, or 
'dirempting it yet again', in all three stages. As such, the equivocation of the 
middle is mended and the anxiety of beginning resolved, while violence-in-
love is forced to reconcile with the law, proposing a politics, a society and a/n 
a/theological ethic of love without violence. In the name of postmodern agape, 
which is pacifist, humanitarian and cosmopolitan, any territorial violence is 
subject to public censure in a claustrophobic, ironically not absolutely open, 
manner. 
Unconvinced by any antinomy or dialectic of the law, Rose rejects both finite 
dualism and infinite holism to embrace the mundane work of love through and 
through. Albeit appreciating Hegel's radicalism and its offspring in 
existentialism and psychoanalysis, she refrains herself from offering any 
theory or method of love, except for an impractical, useless but cathartic 
autobiographical fiction at the end of her short life. She records her personal 
observations, experiences and understandings about illness, old age and 
death, gender and the body, friendship and love with minimal reference to 
religious and philosophical ideas. Questioning the genre of autobiography, 
moreover, the heroine here is not Rose's ego and her reflection, but rather her 
significant others of nebulous identity, such as her disloyal boyfriend, unhappy 
mother, unknown artist friend, her cancerous body and so on. As such, she 
shows how anonymous intimate relations could have determined her 
sociological writings in a form of fiction (Rose, 1997). However, the odd 
allusion to Silouen about not abandoning oneself to despair in hell might be 
read as taking refuge in Byzantine mysticism. Still, Rose insists "[t]his is the 
source of my excessive spirituality, my screwtape obsession with disembodied 
truth" (Rose, 1997: 42). Masking herself in the demonic character of 
Screwtape from C. S. Lewis' fiction, Rose's "spirituality" is far from mystic. Her 
speculative flight 'out of ancient society' (founded on the three cultural pillars 
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of Europe, Hellenism, Judaism and Christianity) never flees from modernity to 
Eastern mysticism. On the contrary, her flight lands firmly on the mundane 
world of the multiple which is as generic as it is universal, that is, on Hegel's 
'concrete universal'. For Rose, a true lover is no longer a post-Protestant who 
is destined to labour on earth while secretly believing in predestined salvation 
and damnation: the dubious a/theist is trapped in the ego and its ideal. A true 
lover is 'modern' in an ethereal sense, dwelling in an earthly hell without 
heaven, with a hope against hope in the world of means. Conversely, the 
'worldly' kernel extracted from the triune traditional shell of modernity may 
also be understood as an earthly heaven without hell. In either case, Rose's 
generic subject of love inhabits in a world of transfinite contiguity, embracing 
the fate of human frailty. 
Fundamentally, Rose might be read as an "absolute" Hegelian beyond left and 
right. In her reading, Hegel's absolute idealism is differentiated into a tripartite 
whole to organize the structure of Hegel contra Sociology. These three parts 
include the identity and non-identity of politics and religion, of art and life, and 
of reason and science. On this plane, Rose recapitulates Hegel's philosophy 
evolving from the pre-phenomenological writings of politics, religion and 
history through his phenomenology and aesthetics to the post-
phenomenological logic. As such, Hegel's system is unfolded in a 
methodological more than a chronological order, as he goes from the absolute 
through the objective to the subjective logic to criticize the Kantian-Fichtean 
thought of morality from the speculative thought of actuality. 18 This 
differentiated totality allows Rose to argue a "return to Hegel" by way of 
feminine seduction, which is to explain how Hegel's logic itself has blocked a 
18 A retroactive understanding of the system ~ould be seen from Hegel's speculative reading 
of Kant in the Science of Logic (1812). For the logical Hegel, Kant's formal distinction of 
"boundary" and "limit" assumes a moral judgment, the ought (Sol/en). Antinomies such as 
finitude versus infinity, quality versus quantity, space versus numbers, physics versus 
mathematics, and knowledge of the other versus self are derived from it (Rose 1995: 185-92). 
Hegel's actual determination and contingency of thought could then overcome, which some 
would say "deconstruct", Kant's moral possibility and impossibility of thought. Thus, Kant's 
injunction that "you must because you can" (morality as a boundary possibility) is susceptible 
to its reversed form: "you can because you must" (morality as a delimiting impossibility). 
Beyond Kant's formalist morality, Hegel's speculative idea proposes "you can because it can 
be" (actuality as a determining fate), which is tantamount to saying "you can because you 
can" (actuality as a contingent act). 
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proper return after him (and has also anticipated this blockage), or how Kant's 
question of law is fated to recur in the post/neo-Kantian twists and turns of 
sociology, Marxism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism. The repetition is 
mainly due to a misunderstanding of Hegel from Kant's critical project, 
"hypostatizing" Hegel's absolute reason reckoning the "speculative" unity and 
contradiction between the subjective and the objective into Kantian-Fichtean 
reasons of theory and practice conditioned by the "propositions" of subjectivity 
and objectivity. Henceforth, just as sociology and Marxism conscientiously 
employ the last Hegelian couple of reason and science by progressing to the 
post-Kantian problem of validity and value, so post-structuralism and 
postmodernism impertinently exploit the first Hegelian couple of religion and 
politics by regressing to the pre-Kantian problem of metaphysics and law/love. 
In other words, whilst sociological and Marxist laws fall prey to transcendental 
methodologism and moralism by hypostatizing absolute reason to rigorous 
science, poststructuralist law and postmodernist, love fall victim to 
transcendent occultism and messianism by hypostatizing ethical politics to 
mystic religion. In light of this, Rose herself could be said to rely on the middle 
couple of art and life, by which she gains the leverage to show the "pre-
judgments" of Hegel from both left and right in their objectivist and subjectivist 
"justifications" of reason with science, politics with religio"n. 
For Rose, Hegel's speculative thought moves between the ideas of the end 
and the beginning, bestowing the end with a double meaning of finis and 
telos. The first and last telos of Hegel's philosophical system refers to "ethical 
life" in the middle of or elusive to the ideal subject and the real object. Its 
"actuality" hence takes on a relative, indeterminate abstraction, and yet an 
absolute substance of determination. The "apparent inconsistency", however, 
is methodologically consistent insofar as "the Hegelian system" follows a 
phenomenology which acknowledges that "(!]he abstract rejection of 
abstraction is the only way to induce abstract consciousness to begin to think 
non-abstractly" (Rose, 1995: 151). As a philosophy of life, Hegel's 
phenomenology adopts the non/method of "self-perficient, self-completing 
skepticism" which is. a "path of despair" more radical than "the path of self-
enlightening doubt". I! is "not a teleological development toward the 
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reconciliation of all oppositions between consciousness and its objects, to the 
abolition of 'natural' consciousness as such, but a speculative presentation of 
the perpetual deformation of natural consciousness", "the experience not of 
alienation, but of the inversions of substance into the various forms of 
misrepresentation." (Rose, 1995: 150-53) "The Phenomenology is not a 
success, it is a gamble. For the perpetual occurrence of inversion and 
misrepresentation can only be undermined, or 'brought to fluidity', by allusion 
to the law of their determination, to the causality of fate" (Rose, 1995: 159).19 
As a philosophy of art, on the other hand, Hegel's aesthetics adopts the (non-
)method of the severe style "to give a true representation of its object and 
makes little concession to the spectator. lt is designed solely to do justice to 
the integrity of the object" (Rose, 1995: 51). The two procedures are 
reversible because although life suspects the object whereas art respects it, 
both seek to uncover some substance from the object, which is the substance 
of a free subject. Accordingly, subjective freedom is truly "free" out of 
necessity, only if produced by the necessity of ethical life to "substantiate" the 
reflective ego or will from the outside. 
Based on the two-tailed approach to life and art, the three speculative couples 
are interlinked by the end and beginning of an ethical life with absolute 
actuality. In the last couple of reason and science, science has finished in the 
"infinite task" of intellectual-cultural "re-formation", but reason might begin 
from the absolute logic, albeit threatened by an end in the egocentric 
reflection (Rose, 1995: eh. 6-7). In the first couple of politics and religion, 
religion has finished in the "ideological formation and deformation of modern 
culture", but politics might begin from the ethical life, albeit threatened by an 
end in "the severe style" of an unjust state (Rose, 1995: eh. 2-3). In the middle 
19 The causality of fate refers to a multi-causality of Greek life, Roman law and Christian love · 
manifested in the manifold conceptual contradiction between the individual and the subject, 
freedom and necessity, deed and word, lack of life and denial of life (Rose, 1995: 112-17, 
155-57). "This fate means first, destiny, what happened historically to fate as ethical life; 
secondly, determination, how the first fate, ethical life, changed into the second fate which 
denied life and hence changed itself as life; thirdly, representation, how the denied concrete 
existence is misrepresented as ideal, non-worldly love" (Rose, 1995: 157). In short, fate begs 
the thought of the absolute to traverse its multi-causality, insofar as one recognizes fate as 
the determination of the ethical substance of modem life as a result of the contradiction 
between life, law and love. 
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couple of art and life, art has finished in "severe, ideal and pleasing styles" 
(and yet in a symbolic form), but life might begin from "the grave" of unhappy 
consciousness, albeit threatened by an end in cultural barbarism and moral 
conscience (Rose, 1995: eh. 4-5). On the balance sheet, Rose's Hegel 
combines life with art to speculate on the beginning of an ethical political 
reason at a time when religion and science have come to an end beyond 
rescue. The hidden and "weakest" link hinges on the condition of symbolic 
culture to play out its severe style, transforming the dual form of politics and 
art (dual because one with and the other without regard to spectators) (Rose, 
1995: 142). Hence, "Hegel was not wrong to distinguish the end of art from 
the end of religion", but "Hegel underestimated the power of art in bourgeois 
society to renew itself at least as a culture, to re-form itself as different modes 
of re-presenting the contradiction between meaning and configuration" (Rose, 
1995: 219-20). Hence also, if we recall, Rose can de-classify antithetical 
sociologies into egocentric cultures complicit to each other, and yet avoid 
invoking a "totalitarian" Hegel. After all, she has radicalized Hegel's "thought of 
the absolute" by way of an artful life, that is, by giving life's ethical actuality a 
"social import", a speculative art of letting contradictory experiences comes to 
pass without prejudgment (Rose, 1995: 92, 204). With a double vision of 
actual life and fictional art, Rose strives to re-cognize love as a work of 
renunciation of both conditionality and unconditionality, so that a generic gap 
between the real content and the symbolic form could be kept. This broken 
middle anticipates Rose's generic site of love. 
Given her excavation of the generic site of love from Hegel's philosophy of life 
and art, one wonders why Rose couldn't appreciate Goethe's art of love-life in 
shaping Comte's and Marx's sciences in general and their views on fetishism 
in particular (as presented in Part I of this thesis). Rose is largely critical of 
Comte and Marx. First of all, after recognizing Comte's radicalism in 
resituating "the argument for natural law" in the positive age to counter natural 
right, she criticizes Comte's weak conception of metaphysics whilst explaining 
away Bergson's "attack" on Comte's positive philosophy as metaphysics by 
the mediation of Kant: "Comte is using metaphysics in the pre-critical sense, 
while Bergson is using metaphysics in the post-critical sense." The conclusion 
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is that "Comte and Bergson both share the same ultimate ambition: to 
demonstrate that moral experience is continuous with natural experience" 
(Rose, 1984: 93-94). This is a misleading analysis because Rose first reads 
Bergson through his admiration of Spencer as if the latter were a Comtean, 
and then reads "Comtean" Bergson through Mill: "Bergson produced a 
sentimental physics for his generation as Mill said Comte did for his" (Rose, 
1984: 94, 98). As a result, Comte is seen as the forerunner of Deleuze's 
poststructural philosophy and Jenck's postmodern architecture, presiding over 
a "triumphant eccesiology" of "forced reconciliation" (Rose, 1992: xii-xiii; 1993: 
233). The consequence of Rose's misreading is unfortunate, considering that 
Hegel's philosophical journey, which starts from the absolute through the 
objective to the subjective and back again, bears a striking homology to 
Comte's, insofar as one could manage not to read two (objective and 
subjective) Comtes abstractly out of Kant's morality of thought, but rather 
heeds his absolute concern for the actual "reconstruction of society" from the 
beginning to the end of his career. 
In this regard, Rose shows an explicit inconsistency in Marx's case. She 
remarks that "the theory of commodity fetishism is the most speculative 
moment in Marx's exposition of capital" since his theory of fetishism conveys 
the categorical imperative of "how necessary illusion arises out of productive 
activity'' (Rose, 1995: 217). What is unsettling here regards how Marx's "most 
speculative moment", which is supposedly a Hegelian one for Rose, ends up 
regressing to the "necessary illusion" of Kant's morality rather than Hegel's 
truth. Nonetheless, Rose's comment is based on the premise that "Marx's 
failure to understand Hegel's actuality meant that he did not develop any 
theory of subjectivity" (Rose, 1995: 216). However this premise overstates her 
own general point, arguing that Marx, when he seeks to distinguish himself 
from Feuerbach's "'passive' materialism" and Hegel's actuality of the absolute 
at the same time, falls prey to "Kantian or Fichtean opposition of theory and 
practice" and heralds the fate of non-Marxist and Marxist sociologies by 
indulging in the "victory of reflection" (Rose, 1995: 203, 215-16). In fact, Marx 
did have a theory of subjectivity, even if it seems to agree with a fetishized 
subject, and even if it seems to be opposed to Hegelian subjectivity 
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enveloped in actual life and symbolic art. Moreover, Marx's non-fetishist (i.e. 
neither pro- nor anti-) theory of subjectivity has defused the regression to a 
Kantian or Fichtean subject, as Rose reads it, if it could be read radically as 
witnessing a fictional subject of love~ Ironically, it is this backward reading 
which feeds those false questions to reappear in the history of Marxism, 
wondering whether Marx is guilty of determinism or voluntarism, evolutionism 
or historicism, legalism or moralism, enlightenment or romanticism. 
In the final analysis, Rose's reluctance to apply her radical reading of Hegel to 
Comte and Marx might be ascribed to her exceptional identification with 
Hegel's speculative thought of actuality at the expense of Goethe's art of love-
life. Her understanding of Goethe is mediated by the Goethe studies of Mann 
and Varnhagen, which draw excluded "knowledge" of modernity from the 
"erotic irony" and salon hostess' friendly "listening" to overcome the problems 
of "sexual beauty" and "beautiful soul" of a woman as the problem of "modern 
subjectivity- sovereign and subordinated" (Rose, 1992: 122-25, 185-98). The 
literary-political stake involves taking on an extra position of the "witness" by 
the artful device of a pseudonym to remain vigilant to the aporia of authorship 
and authority, and so renouncing the twin temptations of becoming the 
perpetrator and the victim with the help of "this always already knowing yet 
being willing to stake oneself again" (Rose, 1992: 147-52). Given as such, 
Rose does acknowledge Goethe's playful art of love between eros and philia 
to a certain degree, albeit her authorship/authority comes from Hegel to 
Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, Rose's final analysis turns critical when Mann is 
connected to Girard, and Varnhagen to Luxemburg and Arendt. To reiterate, 
Rose criticizes this sociality of authorships for eventually abolishing the 
anxiety of beginning and the equivocation of the middle by isolating violence 
from "violence-in-love", by assimilating the "diremption of civil society and the 
state", and by taming the "facetious love and the state" into a "severe" style of 
politics or society of love without violence (Rose, 1992: 151-52, 238-46). 
Preoccupied with the consequences of Goethe's cult in politics and society, 
however, Rose obscures Goethe's main legacy of bequeathing an art of love-
life, which could relativize Rose's Hegel from an exception to a case since 
Hegel's speculative thought of actuality cannot be absolutely identified without 
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itself being read speculatively. Given the case, although the poststructuralist 
injustice of law and the postmodern violence of love succumb to Kantian 
transcendentalism and pre-Kantian transcendence, sociology and Marxism 
still hold the chance to retrieve a mundane subject of love if one could 
question harder the very conscience of method they share with Hegel, 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, and dig deeper into the neo-Kantian ground of 
Platonism to subtract the generic multiple which is more actual than any 
lifeless theory or artless method (of validity and values). For classical 
sociologists, this means the writings of Weber, Durkheim and Simmer could be 
reread to trace an amorous subject within the legal one. 
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Chapter 5 The Spirit of Society in a Loving Subject of Law 
Bearing in mind Rose's archaeology of the subject, we will examine the 
scientific formation of a loving subject in classical sociology in this chapter. 
From Weber, Durkheim to Simmel, the loving subject is unified behind a legal 
one. But classical sociology by no means represents a self-identical canon of 
neo/Kantianism, as Rose argues. Rather, the three forms of sociology 
approach idealism serially from Kant to Hegel and beyond, depending on their 
various degrees of openness to the sexual difference in Goethe's ethic of 
renunciation. Specifically, not only does the methodological difference 
between Weber and Durkheim require a reemphasis, but also Simmel takes a 
special note of Goethe's art of love in a cultural form, thereby linking sociology 
to the Marxist aesthetic. In result, Goethe's culture of love is embodied in a 
collective Subject of law. Manifested in historical entities, the collective 
Subject of law is the symbolic Other, be that a moral Society or a forceful 
State, to which individuals renounce their masculine egos in a fraternal 
celebration of the duties of charity and justice. 
5.1 Weber 
Indeed, love is not buried, but grows as a forbidden fruit in the garden of 
classical sociology, a garden guarded by the two incommensurable laws of 
culture and society, along with respective "scientific" conceptions of religion, 
morality, economy, politics, etc. In the Intermediate Reflection on the 
Economic Ethics of the World Religions, Weber enumerates the "directions of 
religious rejection of the world" diversified into five life orders governed by 
economic, political, erotic, aesthetic and intellectual values. Not only are these 
modern values at war with one another, but they all emerge in a tension with 
the core value of brotherhood. In particular, "the religious ethic of brotherliness 
in salvation religions has stood in a relation of high tension with the greatest 
irrational power of life, sexual love" (Weber, 2004[1915]: 232). As such, 
Weber's sociological "pluralism" is subject to a particular universal theodicy. 
Specifically, the economic, erotic and aesthetic orders are supposed to be 
subordinated to the political and intellectual orders which stand for the secular 
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derivatives of religious rationality. 
This implicit hierarchy of values may explain why, firstly, Weber, a drafter of 
the Weimer constitution, championed formally the legal-rational rule of law in 
a Rechtsstaat turned Gesetzestaat (rule by law), and substantially the 
charismatic rule of a hero in a Gerechen Staat Gust state). His complex 
position is to be distinguished from both autocratic and bureaucratic modes of 
government in liberal democratic as well as totalitarian states. For Weber 
(2004[1921]: 144-45), such an ideal combination is possible because, 
ultimately, "the same process" goes with "the principle of charismatic 
legitimacy that in its primary sense is authoritarian can be changed into an 
anti-authoritarian principle", and with "the charismatic legal principle" as long 
as "the free acknowledgment from the side of the ruled is the premise and 
foundation of legitimacy." From the side of the ruler, however, "the distinction 
. between an elected leader and an elected official" arises since one is 
responsible to his individual will ("his own discretion"), whereas the other is 
responsible to the collective will of law ("will of the voters"). Nevertheless, 
Weber's position holds logically since "political responsibility" is implied in this 
ideal state, guaranteeing words to become the letter by codifying two wills in 
the same law, as if the ruler and the ruled have become one thing. 
Secondly, his public lectures on science and politics do not advocate two 
vocations of fact and value, as one is led to believe, by taking up the criterion 
of "side-taking" out of context, a criterion which is highly questionable in itself, 
as if science had been taking no sides. Rather, the spirits of fact and value 
represent two professional ethics of one vocation (beruf) exclusive to 
Protestantism. Indeed, a political "hero" who is able to combine "passion, a 
sense of responsibility, and a sense of proportion" bears a resemblance to an 
intellectual. First, an intellectual cannot be without "this particular frenzy, which 
is ridiculed by every outsider ... this passion, this conviction" and 
"calculation ... intellectualization as such" in order to master infinite ideas of 
·:inspiration" that "come at its own time, not when we want". Moreover, adding 
up to the same character as a political leader, a responsible intellectual also 
"give[s] us 'no' answer", unlike a prophet or a saviour; nevertheless, he 
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"presupposes that the world must have a meaning" and proceeds "to interpret 
that meaning" by "work and enthusiasm", so that he "act[s] differently ... finds 
and obeys the demon which holds the threads of his life" (Weber, 2004[1919]: 
257-87). 
Thirdly, Weber's claim to value freedom in the construction of ideal types by a 
relevant selection of values may then be seen as a practice of intellectual-
political asceticism vis-? vis moral anarchy. Specifically, when the light of 
Goethe's Faust is lit at the end of his analysis, Weber argues to square the 
"ultimate evaluative values" with "the value of the individual facts" lost in 
"unreflective" and "uncertain" viewpoints through "the 'objectivity' of 
knowledge" (Weber, 2004[1904]: 403-04). Biographically, Weber's unwavering 
asceticism at least from 1904 until1920 is corroborated by experience since 
he witnessed Otto Gross' erotic lifestyle on the Mountain of Truth in Ascona 
over the Easters of 1913 and 1914 via his personal relations with the von 
Richthoften sisters (Gane, 1993: 156-72; Whimster, 1998; Whimster and 
Heuer, 1998). 
However, one errs to think that Weber upholds rationality against irrationality 
absolutely, and na'/i,~ly relegates passion to an irrational behaviour. In fact, he 
is well aware of the element of relativity built into his typology of social action, 
thereby emphasizing the non-reciprocal subjective meaning in a given social 
relationship: '"friendship', 'love', 'loyalty', 'fidelity to contracts', 'patriotism', on 
one side, may well be faced with an entirely different attitude on the other." 
Analytically, although affectual as well as traditional behaviours lie "on the 
borderline of meaningfully oriented action," the value-rational type shares with 
the affectual type "a common element" in that both actions are carried out "for 
its own sake" rather than for achieving "a result ulterior to it". Moreover, the 
instrumental rational type is rational not just because, essentially, "the end, the 
means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and 
weighed", but also because, relation ally, "value-rationality is always irrational" 
from the "point of view" of an instrumentally rational action (Weber, 
1978[1921]: 25-27). 
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In this sense, a modern ascetic is ideally one who is able to maintain a 
productive psychological tension with erotic passion in society. Conversely, an 
"irrational" society, in addition to one of excessive love, includes the other 
frozen in a "passionless" bureaucracy. Moreover, this bureaucracy is an ironic 
outcome of ascetic rationality. Thus, Weber's sociology of economy interprets 
modern capitalism as an ambivalent product of Protestant asceticism, casing, 
rather than caging, rational individuals in an ultra-rationalistic society of 
"specialists without spirit and sensualists without heart." For Weber, the 
ascetic work ethic evolving from German Calvinists through English Puritans 
to the American entrepreneur Benjamin Franklin attests to the fateful 
bureaucratization of Goethe-Faust's ethic of renunciation. Historically, the 
cunning of reason rules that "[!]he Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are 
forced to do so" (Weber, 2003[1904-05]: 180-82). Socially, the unintended 
consequence of ascetic action tends to embody the liberal democratic spirit of 
capitalism in a structure of professional specialization. If this is the case, then 
Weber restricts Goethe's ethic of renunciation to a virile renunciation of 
contemplative thought in favour of a constant human striving, modernizing 
Nietzsche's heroic "will to power" into a Kantian ascetic "will to act" (Kent, 
1983; Sahni, 2001 ). Interpreting Goethe's ethic within a neo-classicist agon of 
damon and deed, or conviction and responsibility, Weber's reading of 
Goethe's fiction fails to appreciate characters of feminine renunciation. These 
feminine, not necessarily female, characters from Werther and Faust to Ottilie 
and Gretchen express the movement of thought, thinking or intelligence, with 
a much more "restricted action". As such, Weber has sacrificed the subjective 
cause of conviction and responsibility to the social objective maintenance of a 
civic life. 
By an image of the casing, or literally rendered as housing (gehause), 
rationality is seen as an existential tragedy of self-legitimation with a poetic 
kind of justice manifested in the fate of a self-accountable subject. Moreover, 
playing out the tension between Nietzsche's Hellenic fate and Kant's 
Protestant subject, the course of modernity is generalized into a cross-cultural 
narrative, which accounts for the birth of historical individuals only in the West. 
Simply put, modernity is set exceptionally in the European history of 
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disenchantment, in which Asiatic types of traditionalism are superseded by 
ascetic modernism, however fleetingly (Schroeder, 1992). These Asiatic types 
are considered traditional not because they have no rationality, but because 
they have no passion (for God and His body) to be rationalized in a certain 
spirit. 
For example, in the Chinese feudal society administered by the prebendal 
state bureaucracy and mercantilist guild and coin economy, its religious 
beliefs present a system of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, including Confucianism 
and Taoism-Buddhism. Firstly in heterodoxy, Taoism appeals to the elite 
religiosity, aspiring for "apathetic ecstasy" through anchoretic mysticism. 
Popular Buddhism, having "relatively little bearing" on Chinese economic 
mentality, converges with popular Taoism to cater for folk religiosity, pursuing 
"orgiastic" or "emotional ecstasy" through astrological magic (Weber, 1964 
[1915]: 177, 181, 206-07). As a whole, folk practices in Taoism and Buddhism 
are derivations of the Taoist hierocratic practice and macrobiotic theory 
(Weber, 1964: 177, 191-95). But this sub-typology lacks the fourth possibility 
of an elitist Chinese Buddhism "since Buddhism in its imported form was no 
longer the redemptory religion of early Indian Buddhism." (Weber, 1964: 225) 
Besides, "European scientists usually agree that nowadays no correct 
Chinese could understand with complete empathy Lao-tzu's (or his 
interpreter's) views in their original, inwardly experienced context" (Weber, 
1964: 186). The upshot is Taoist-Buddhist heterodoxy tends to create an 
"organization of magicians" or a "monastic organization" with the same 
"ritualistic" traditionalism (Weber, 1964: 173-78, 224-25). Weber (1964: 225) 
takes heed of "the occasional communities" formed by "the Buddhist 
festivities" and "the enduring communities" built in "the heterodox sects, often 
pursuing political ends and hence politically persecuted", but they still lack 
"our cure of souls". 
Secondly in orthodoxy, both apathetic and orgiastic ecstasies are eliminated, 
which makes Confucians, "like the Roman nobility of office", come close to 
Puritans (Weber, 1964: 181). "Both [sic] were 'sober men'. But the rational 
sobriety of the Puritan was founded in a mighty enthusiasm which the 
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Confucian lacked completely" (Weber, 1964: 248). 'The absence of hysteria-
producing asceticist religious practices and the rather thorough elimination of 
toxic cults" are demonstrated by the Chinese rejection of alcohol "except for 
rudimentary use at sacrifice." Even the "effects" of opium consumption, 
"imported only in· modern times" by Western powers, "lie in the direction of 
apathetic ecstasy, a straight continuation of the line of 'wu wei"', which has 
more in common with "the rationalist Roman office" than with "heroic frenzy or 
the unchaining of active passion" originated in the Hellenic-Piatonic 
sophrosyne (Weber, 1964: 232-33). In sum, only in light of a dispassionate 
rationalism could one rightly understand the "doctrinal" traditionalism of 
Confucianism characterized by its scientific absence of formal logics to 
develop natural law and natural sciences, its economic rejection of the 
professional expert, and its cultural loyalty to the ideals of propriety, piety, 
gentility and classics. 
On the other hand, in the Indian caste society where independent politics and 
economy barely exist, the religious system is composed of Hinduism and 
Jainism-Buddhism. Firstly, on a scale more extreme than Taoism and Chinese 
Buddhism, the Indian heterodoxy parallels to its Chinese counterpart as 
Jainism is more royal than ancient Buddhism. But "with the support of the city 
nobles and, above all, the bourgeois patricians", Jainism and Buddhism have 
both accommodated to "the interest of the laity" via formation and 
transformation (Weber, 1958[1916]: 234 ). Internally, the Jains renounce the 
world of the gift cycle, sanctifying homelessness and nothingness via absolute 
fasting and poverty. A monk "yearns neither for life nor for death. Both desires 
would be lust capable of awakening karma." With "correct knowledge", 
"correct insight" and "right practice", "love must be eliminated for it awakens a 
desire and the processes of karma." In short, "the heart of Jainism is empty" 
(Weber, 1958: 195-96, 198-201). However, this radically "active asceticism" 
must be qualified with an external formation of "the strong organization and 
ties between the lay parish and the monks" so that the monk's "duty to 
wander" could be reversed by "the rule for the laity against travel" (Weber, 
1958: 197, 201-02). Originally, ancient Buddhism does not seek salvation in 
ascetic knowledge, thereby making it contrary to Jainism and "the polar 
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opposite of Confucianism as well as Islam" (Weber, 1958: 206). But ancient 
Buddhism parallels to early Christianity as both seek salvation in an act of 
love, only along different lines of death and life. For Buddhist salvation, "man's 
ultimate fate depends entirely on one's own free behaviour ... the meaning and 
value of the single act." Paradoxically, it refers to an act of "illumination" which 
seeks the "tranquility" of, or "satiety" with death. Accordingly, .it implies an 
acosmic love free from "passion", a passion of the early Christian love of God 
and life. Without the passion of Christ, acosmic love is unknown to the 
doctrine of brotherhood taught by the ideas of (cosmic) love and hatred, 
neighbours and enemies. Without the passion of the "struggle for existence" 
or "fight without prospects of success", acosmic love has no personality 
(constitutive of an active man of knowledge and Goethe's "contemplative" 
man of conscience), no individuality (composed of the will and soul/ego), and 
no feminine sexuality (in favour of "edifying self-humiliation of emotional love 
of man") (Weber, 1958: 206-13). Due to the parallel notions of the love-act, 
the early Christian ethic of passion can be rationalized for its modern 
development, whereas "there is no true reconciliation between the worldly and 
monastic ethic" in popular Buddhism, which determines its asocial character. 
"The later soteriology, fashioned for the laity, therefore, could not follow the 
course of an inner-worldly puritanical asceticism, but only that of a 
sacramental, hagiolatrous, idolatrous, or logolatrous, ritualistic religion" 
(Weber, 1958: 218). Externally, Hinduism and lslamism pressurize Buddhist 
monks to launch missionary works in East Asia, developing northern 
Mahayana and southern Hinayana types and transforming Buddhism into a 
world religion {Weber, 1958: part Ill). 
Secondly, Indian orthodoxy parallels to its Chinese counterpart as "both 
Brahaman and Mandarin rejected all types of orgiasticism", but "in neither 
case (Chinese or Indian) could the implied program be consummated" within 
similar but different social structures {Weber, 1958: 139). Hence, unlike 
Confucianism (but like Taoism), Hinduism is more ritualistic and less doctrinal 
due to the status of the priest over the king, the church-sect over the state. 
This unique caste structure allows Brahmanical religiosity to develop a 
"magical asceticism" by pursuing mystic knowledge in a religious theocracy 
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instead of philistine technology in a political bureaucracy (Weber, 1958: 141-
50). Sharing the same form of fate as Confucian rationalism, Hindu rationality 
is also not consummated, but rather consumed by the holy technique of Yoga, 
which is a "rationally systemized form of methodical emotional 
asceticism ... superior to that of meditation", seeking "feeling, not knowledge" 
(Weber, 1958: 165). "In the end, classical Brahmanical teaching could never 
completely reject as heterodox the virtuoso-like self-mortification of world-
fleeing anchorites, because they too upheld the magical character of the 
gnosis" (Weber, 1958: 166). Based on the salvation doctrines of karma 
(ethical compensation) and sansara (migration of souls), the Hindu rejects the 
"transitory nature" of the body and its rebirth in order to merge with the 
"cosmic order''. They all strive for a state of "Nirvana or similar states of bliss" 
via "complete dematerialization" or "unconditional physical detachment" 
(Weber, 1958: 167-80). In result, everything is woven into "unreal and passing 
beauty ... against the sole reality of divine being" when "reality and magic, 
action, reasoning and mood, dreamy gnosis and sharp conscious feelings are 
found with and within one another'' (Weber, 1958: 191 ). In short, only in the 
context of an ultra-passionate supra-rationalism could one rightly understand 
the ritualistic traditionalism of Hinduism characterized by its invention of 
rational sciences (especially mathematics and grammar) and its absence of 
the concept of natural law. 
Weber's ideal typical analysis of the Chinese and Indian religions elaborates a 
holistic social order based on a cultural dichotomy of orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy and a social stratification of the rulers and the ruled. That is, Asian 
societies are stratified into the nobility (Chinese emperors and vassals; Indian 
kings and princes), intellectual priests (Chinese Confucians; Indian 
Brahmans), practical strategists (Chinese knights and eunuchs; Indian 
Kshatriyas) and the masses (Chinese peasants, artisans, merchants, pedlars 
and serfs in villages and cities; Indian Vaishyas and Shudras). Correlatively, 
the cultural tendency shows orthodox religions are practiced by the upper part 
of the social ladder, and heterodox religions, after being transformed, are 
worshiped by the lower part. The differential political powers of these tribal-
occupational groups rely on multiple sources of authority, such as heredity, 
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status, class and so on. Internally viewed, neither Indian nor Chinese 
societies gain a relative advantage over the other since Weber portrays an 
India with more religious and scientific openness, and yet a China with more 
cultural and technological suppleness. Externally viewed, however, he insists 
that Asiatic economy results in a stable and closed system due to the 
traditional type of rule by the vying power elites. If so, he neglects a variety of 
relations the intellectuals could establish with their noble superiors, ranging 
from flattering support· and strained advice to open criticism and utter 
seclusion, and the subsequent moral impacts on the masses via whispers and 
legends. Above all, his description assumes too much from the standpoint of 
government. A corresponding difference could then be seen from the 
perspective of the governed. Reading Weber as a conservative Durkheim, 
one is tempted to follow Lockwood (1992) who argues that there is an "ethical 
fatalism" believed by the Asian masses in view of their voluntary servitude to 
the social-cultural order. However, Lockwood's theory of two integrations 
contradicts Weber's critical depiction of the masses. In fact, the mass 
religiosity in Asia is considered by Weber as an unethical fatalism, like a 
mirror-image to the ethical fatalism of Asian intellectuals. In this sense, 
magical economy is a projection of utilitarian morality, rendering those 
infrastructural elements in the analysis, such as money and the city, to be 
"imaginary institutions". Idealizing human relations, Weber still lacks a 
materialist theory of society to extract Asian modernity within the traditionalist 
order. Thus, there is no reason why his negative interpretation of the masses 
couldn't be reversed into a positive hypothesis: the intelligent indifference of 
the mass. One could argue more plausibly that Asian masses disclose an 
aesthetic fatalism, binding counterfactually with their ethicalliterati at the heart 
of utilitarian, magical economy. This suggests a crude economic intelligence 
of the Asian laity could amount to an indifferent form of the mass to pre-
de/form, however passively, the social-cultural space. To support this 
suggestion, we move to a higher logical step, arguing that Weber's view of 
Asian holism agrees with neither cultural history nor social history, at least in 
the case of China. 
Weber presents the cultural-social divide in China by first explaining the 
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Confucian culture of the literati in the context of a religious economy (part I 
and 11), and then interpreting the Taoist-Buddhist society of the a-literate and 
anti-literate believers in the context of a religious morality (part 11 and Ill). In 
this way, a highly supple contextual effect is produced: when the intellectual's 
standpoint of knowledge is examined, orthodoxy stands out without excluding 
the elitist appropriation of heterodoxy, and when the mass' standpoint of 
ecstasy is examined, heterodoxy stands out without excluding the popular 
reception of orthodoxy. But upon concluding the Confucian life orientation, 
Weber reveals his historical view of Confucianism by reading Ssu-ma Ch'ien 
after asserting that "the victory of Confucianism was decided only about the 
eighth century of the Christian era" (Weber, 1964: 165). Ssu-ma Chien is 
portrayed as a "non-classical" Confucian tinged with Taoism (Weber, 1964: 
167). These final sections lay a transitional basis to compare and contrast 
Confucian orthodoxy and Taoist heterodoxy elaborated in part Ill of The 
Religion of China. So, "the pacifist character of Confucianism" is summarized 
ambivalently as a "rationalism of order'' due to the "fear of the spirits", lest the 
"vengeance of the spirits" for the "victim of oppression" would lead to "mass 
hysteria with its danger of suicide" (Weber, 1964: 169-70). 
Presented as such, Weber commits a grave error of historiography. In fact, 
Confucianism was ordained the state religion in 134 B.C. by Emperor Wudi of 
the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 AD.). Later, Taoism and Buddhism together 
or separately were also supported by many Emperors. Particularly notable 
cases occurred in the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD.) when Taoism became 
official in 632/8 AD. under Emperor Taizong, and Buddhism in 690 A. D. under 
Empress Wu Zetian. In practice, there was a certain confluence of Taoism and 
Buddhism whether under Taizong's liberal rule or Wu Zetian's ruthless rule. 
Generally, Chinese Buddhism prospered in the Sui Dynasty (581-618 AD.), 
the Tang Dynasty and the Song Dynasty (960-1279 AD.). Apart from four 
major persecutions of which one occurred in the above golden ages, 
Buddhism was largely tolerated, if not supported, until the final stage of 
Imperial China, the Quing Dynasty (1644-1911 AD.). Emperor Kan Hi's 
prohibition of Buddhist teaching was at most a "secret" one, and the ban was 
not "certainly so since Kan Hi's Holy Edict" (Weber, 1958: 268). For, being a 
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Confucian-Taoist, Kan Hi still left many inscriptions on the renovated Buddhist 
temples under his rule. In particular, the missing fourth possibility of an elitist 
Chinese Buddhism equivalent to Indian Buddhism did prosper in the Tang 
Dynasty. Indeed, Zen Buddhism was inspired by the Indian patriarch 
Bodhidharma when he resettled to the Chinese soil in the early 61h century. 
Then, it culminated in seven major cults in China, mainly following the fifth and 
sixth patriarchs, Shen-xiu and Hui-neng, in the th-9th centuries before 
disappearing in the 101h-131h centuries. In turn, it was exported to Korea (by 
Chinul) and Japan (by Myoan Eisai) as late as the 1ih century. 
But the Chinese root is erased in Weber's account of Zen Buddhism since he 
jumps from the Indian seed to the Japanese flower, overlooking the gulf of 
language and culture (Weber, 1958: 277-80). Weber does acknowledge the 
Chinese missionary activities in shaping Korean and Japanese cultures, but 
he prioritizes the influence of original Confucianism to that of transformed 
Buddhism (Weber, 1958: 270-71 ). Focusing on Japan where Zen Buddhism 
reaches to its finest, Weber does also capture the religious feeling of "the 
middle class under feudal control" rightly as a feeling "more conducive to 
'moods' than to 'sentiment' or 'emotionality' as we understand it" since "it did 
not accept the orgiastic-ecstatic and magical turn of the old Hindu and popular 
piety, nor did it accept the strong emotional ardour of later Hindu piety or of 
European pietism" (Weber, 1958: 279). Back in China, Zen Buddhism is 
excluded from the five out of eight Chinese Mahayana Buddhist sects that 
Weber mentions.20 Instead, "the oldest school, the Tschan sung" (phonetically 
rendered as "Zen sect") is said to "have a strong Hinayanistic character" 
(Weber, 1958: 267). This is a serious misplacement. At bottom, Weber has to 
argue "Buddhism never won a controlling influence over conduct" in China, so 
that Buddhism can be fitted into the ideal types of Confucianism and Taoism. 
20 The five sects Weber enumerates are "Hsien-schon-tsung". ''Tsi-jen-tsung", "Tien-tai-tsung", 
''Lutsung-sect" and "Tsching-tu-tsang". The three missing ones are Wha-yen-tsung, Mi-tsung 
and finally Tschan-tsung, the one he misplaces. But he takes note of "the acosmic love of the 
bodhisattva" in the second sect, which is "the champion of the specific Buddhist charity in 
China", and yet fails to follow through its practical consequences, as he does in the Protestant 
sects. From the sect origin, this charity is now a universal cause of the Chinese Buddhist 
voluntary sectors. 
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· No wonder that Chinese Buddhism is deemed as a "book religion" 
"established through its increasingly plebian nature" "in part of irrational 
asceticism, in part of irrational meditation" since it is always already "deviated" 
by the "Chinese folk-ethic" of magic bound to its customs of ritual, ceremony 
and Fung Shui (Weber, 1958: 265-69). 
Weber's ideal typical analysis results in a spurious abstraction of China in all 
aspects. First, the Chinese social stratification interpreted from its religious 
morality shows at best a passive performance of the self by the Chinese mass 
public contrary to the Chinese social practice. Since the Period of the Warring 
Kingdoms (475-221 B.C.) before the very first Qin Emperor united China, the 
Chinese intellectuals have never ceased to be an organ of the masses. Ssu-
ma Ch'ien's case is fairly typical here because, serving Han Wudi when 
Confucianism turned official, the Prefect of the Grand Scribes (Taisht) wrote 
Annals ( Shijt) not only with "the absolute equanimity of tone" but also with 
moral and astrological sentiments backed by practice. Moreover, the eunuch 
Ssu-ma Ch'ien who treated his friend in a "cold didactic manner" is even 
archetypical, not just because "this cool temperature of inter-human 
relationships is truly Confucian". but rather because this reflects Ssu-ma 
Ch'ien's holistic attitude towards Confucianism and Taoism, a position of 
religious indifference which has been, not "was not acceptable without 
reservation" (Weber, 1964: 168). 
Second, the Chinese cultural dichotomy explained by its religious economy 
proves at bottom an active expression of the person by the Western individual 
public foreign to the Chinese cultural history. Rather, the transcendental 
nature of this divide is revealed in certain "superstitious elements as is the 
case with all enlightenment" as the "eternal problem of theodicy": fortune and 
misfortune, justice and providence, destiny and fate (Weber, 1964: 206). 
Weber (1964: 207) discloses here a "specific concept of predestination, for 
example, in the sense of the Hellenic moira, an irrational, impersonal, and 
fateful power determining the great peripeteia of individual life. This 
conception is specific to all purely human heroism which has always proudly 
refused to believe in a benevolent providence." Writing this passage, Weber 
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has in mind the Protestant particularization of Hellenic predestination, so that 
"both elements", the fatalist individual and the heroic subject, could be 
synthesized to create a third, universal element - the historical individual 
subject- rather than merely "existed side by side". In short, it is according to 
the ideal type of the historical individual subject that the division of 
Confucianism and Taoism is established and evaluated. Generally speaking, 
each exemplifies one element without the other, and so cannot but expresses 
the worst of that element for want of the third. Specifically, the Taoist-Buddhist 
"folk belief' in astrology makes "the stars to rule[d] over the individual's fate" 
without a subject, resulting in "the harmony and the eventual destiny of the 
social collectivity per se." On the other hand, from Confucius' "providentially 
ordered" mission is ''found the belief in irrational moira, with a characteristic 
twist. Only the 'superior man', it is said, knows offate ... Common man, without 
fate or the fearsome of fate, pursues happiness and goods; or he faces the 
change of fortune with resignation as fatum - not as kismet." In other words, 
the Confucian represents a subject of "Stoic heroism" without an individual, 
"which alone is accessible to the intellectual literati, namely, a 'preparedness' 
approximating to Montaigne's attitude" (Weber, 1964: 207). Yet finally, this 
division is erasable since Confucianism and Taoism are both empirical 
. equivalents to Catholicism, which betrays the transcendental judgment of the 
Protestant spirit (Weber, 1964: 181, 233). 
Given the case, one might resort to the Chinese religious-political history 
summarized above. Indeed, it is more reasonable to argue a simple 
separation of religious and political powers between Buddhist TaoismiTaoist 
Buddhism and Confucianism around the 8th century China. That is, at the 
pride of the Tang Dynasty, "the victory of Confucianism" was gained at the 
price of ceding its religious crown to Taoism and Buddhism practiced in 
society, not by a tolerant state assuming its triumphant "role of a 'religious 
police"' (Weber, 1958: 264). However, the Chinese "magical garden" filled with 
wicked spirits has been denied access to any separation of the sacred and 
profane powers (in Durkheim's sense) as a precondition to the social-
individual production. To be precise, for Weber, "the opposition of the sacred 
and the secular" did appear in Asia at large, but in a way between the 
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orgiastic ecstasy of the masses and apathetic ecstasy of the intellectuals, not 
in the way "between an ethical God and the power of 'sin', the radical evil 
which can be overcome through active life conduct", "describable in the usual 
manner as 'ethical personality"' (Weber, 1958: 336-37). 
As a result, Weber's overall account (of the absence of disenchantment in 
China) starts from an irrelevant misunderstanding and ends in creating 
plausible cross-cultural interpretations and explanations. The blind spot lies in 
his religious morality rather than religious economy, since he confuses religion 
with morality, prejudging enchantment by disenchantment in the forever 
unfinished project of "secularization". Weber's secular individual is anyone but 
Nietzsche's madman, for his metaphysical confusion is like a double-edged 
blade, pitting European against non-European economic histories with the 
universality of a personal God that never dies. Conversely, what Nietzsche's 
madman declares is the death of God, not the death of the sacred force and 
soul, gods and spirits. Thus, for the madman, 'everything is possible' not 
because of the coming of the secular Man, but rather because of his going, 
the disappearance of God-Man. After all, Weber's metaphysics of history 
produces a mise-en-scene of the world history seen from the particular 
universal eyes of a European subject, a hero of fate devolved to ordinary 
individuals by deifying their personalities. 
· Fundamentally, Weber maintains that Asian religions produce the silent 
masses and their rulers in contradistinction to reflective individual persons. 
The equalitarian nature of the latter qualifies them as the spiritual agents or 
carriers (trager) of capitalism. This is supplemented by his thesis of Asian 
traditionalism, which does not argue the lack of a rational mind, but the lack of 
a rational heart. Inside Asia, China and India, the two ideal types of Oriental 
rationality, are comparable to "France in the modern Occident" on one side, 
and antique Hellenism plus Christianity on the other. Herein implies the 
referential frame of French Catholicism and German Protestantism, the two 
ideal types of Occidental rationality. Across Asia, "the free competition of 
religions" resembles cultural '"tolerance' somewhat in the sense of late 
antiquity" (Weber, 1958: 329). Henceforth, "the general character of Asiatic 
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religions" is founded on "a philosophical knowledge of the 'significance' of the 
world and life" in the form of "a flight from the world" or "world-indifferent 
behaviour". Correlatively, Asiatic charismatic economy expresses a fractured 
soul of "mysticism" and "magical spell" without being mediated by the spiritual 
"miracle" of science (Weber, 1958: 330-35). In other words, "Asia's partly 
purely mystical, partly inner-worldly aesthetic goal of self-discipline could take 
no other form than an emptying of experience of the real forces of experience. 
As a consequence of the fact that this lay remote from the interests and 
practical behaviour of the "masses", they were left in undisturbed magical 
bondage" (Weber, 1958: 342). 
All is in accord with the critical idealism of the Protestant thesis, which does 
not "exclude" the possibility of Asiatic modernization in developing a rational 
form of capitalism, Quite the contrary, the possibility is included as Weber 
(1964: 248) concludes his study of China by stressing that his question is 
anything but "deeming Chinese 'naturally ungifted' for the demands of 
capitalism" because "[t]he Chinese in all probability would be quite capable, 
probably more capable than the Japanese, of assimilating capitalism ... " 
Accordingly, bulky Asian studies have missed Weber's point when they look 
for the fairly developed money economy in the city and technological 
inventions of printing and measurement by the Chinese civilization very early 
on in history. Weber's critical point intends to "preclude" an Asian modernity 
with a spirit to match the ascetic ethic of passion. Therefore, Asiatic 
modernization would be evaluated as either empty stability or blind progress, 
had Weber foreseen the "progress" of contemporary Asia. Given the case, 
one might question if he misses some political intelligence of the masses at 
the cold heart of "traditional" economy, secondly if he misconstrues "modern" 
bureaucratic economy as an ascetic engine of "possessive individuals" 
running out of its hot fuel of passion, and thirdly if he misapprehends, in a 
direct contradiction to the second if, "postmodern" libidinal economy as an 
eroticized melting pot of "possessed individuals" reaching to a boiling point. 
Nevertheless, for Weber, what makes asceticism modern at the critical 
threshold is that, at the risk of bureaucratization, the Protestant ethic has a 
unique charismatic authority to hold a rationality of passion without slipping 
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into dispassionate and impassioned authorities that eventually amount to an 
unreflective coincidence of opposites in autocratic and bureaucratic rules 
contingent on traditional and postmodern conditions. Eventually, the 
Occidental charisma is authorized by the "metaphysically indeterminable" 
logos, or discursive reason, since "significance" is added onto "beauty" by an 
androgyny's loquacity: "before the cosmos of nature we think: it must still- be 
it to the analyzing thinker, be it to the observer contemplating its total picture 
and beauty-: have some sort of 'last word' as to its 'significance' .... the belief 
that whoever, because of taste, remains silent has, indeed, much to be silent 
about" (Weber, 1958: 340). As a result, love is prone to be interpreted by 
Weber's ever-refining "forms of brotherly love", covering up not only its sense 
of male passion but also its nonsense of sexual difference (cf. Symonds and 
Pudsy, 2006). In conclusion, Weber's law of culture posits a definitive moral 
economy demanded by a secular politics of love which presupposes the 
sovereignty of an individual subject. 
5.2 Durkheim 
To deliver law from Kant's moral end, Durkheim suggests a morality of science 
around the limit of a science of morality alone by observing legal codes and 
practices and religious beliefs and rites. Rejecting the notions of purpose/aim 
and effect/result, Durkheim (1984[1893]: 11-16) confines himself to explaining 
the function/role of division of labour in society as "a source of organic 
solidarity", insofar as it may be scientifically indexed in the evolution of legal 
function from punishment to restitution (i.e. from punitive laws to civil laws of 
property, domestic affairs, commerce and administration). His elaborate 
accounts of the causes (i.e. increases of physical volume, moral density and 
species-existential struggle), conditions (i.e. decreases of common 
consciousness and physiological heredity) and consequences (i.e. 
emergences of individual freedom, social change and spiritual human life for 
itself) in Book 11 of The Division of Labour in Society demonstrate the "need" 
of society, "in an entirely speculative fashion", that is, without any superfluous 
desire to surmise a first cause "beforehand of the effects that the division of 
labour produces", or "improvise" a last judgment "in the silence of the study" 
(Durkheim, 1984: 6, 179, 340). The point is to show that "civilization [which] 
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has no intrinsic and absolute value" nevertheless needs society since "the role 
. of society cannot be reduced to a passive one of seeing that contracts are 
carried out...There are rules of justice that social justice must prevent being 
violated, even if a clause has been agreed by the parties concerned" 
(Durkheim, 1984: 15, 162-63). Simply put, there is something excessive in the 
division of labour than mere biological differentiation, just as there is 
something in-exchangeable in contractual relations than mere economic 
exchange (Durkheim, 1984: 162, 291, 308 n. 1 ). This something excessive or 
rather vacuous at the margins of nature refers to solidarity in a specialized 
society solidified by altruism "at the very dawn of humanity", thereby making a 
moral society embedded "in a network of obligations" (Durkheim, 1984: 145, 
173). 
At the natural boundary of morality, Durkheim hence takes pains to distinguish 
the normal division of labour from three abnormal forms, anomic (regulation 
but lacking integration), forced (integration but lacking spontaneity), and 
uncoordinated (spontaneity but lacking social "constraint"). In this complex 
Book Ill, which is often accepted or rejected on absolute im/moral grounds, 
Durkheim is dealing carefully with a substantial set of biological-economic 
problematic without moralism. To be exact, he tries to work out the fair rules of 
social competition in "a finely articulated organization" on the prior 
understanding that "specialization is not the sole possible solution of struggle 
for existence: there are also integration, colonization, resignation to a 
precarious and more contested existence and, finally, the complete 
elimination of the weakest through suicide or other means" (Durkheim, 1984: 
228, 313). At bottom, these unnatural forms implicating one with another 
originates in the anomic form which begs the "positive control" of a just 
government in society: "the diversity of functions is both useful and necessary. 
But as unity, which is no less indispensable, does not arise from it 
spontaneously, the task of realizing and maintaining it will have to constitute a 
special function of the social organism, represented by an independent organ. 
That organ is the state or the government" (Durkheim, 1984: 154, 295). 
Although the function of specialization demonstrates the moral in/significance 
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of society, it still doesn't justify a mastering organ of government without 
having brought about a subsisting organism of social life representing organic 
solidarity sui generis (Durkheim, 1984: 297). Hence the organization of 
professional groups suggested at the conclusion of Suicide is introduced to 
put The Division of Labour in perspective, adding "something extra" to the 
regulation and the institution (i.e. integration) of law by "creating the body 
needed for the creation of the new law" without stipulating legal codes 
beforehand (Durkheim, 1984[1902]: lvii). Supplementing the functions of the 
kinship and the state, professional groups are entrusted to bind social 
individuals together with new ethics and morals. Lecturing on professional 
ethics and civic morals in detail, Durkheim (1957[1898-1900]: 218-19) ends 
up serializing "two very different varieties of duty", justice and charity, after 
justice is divided by "distributive" and "commutative" laws of dealing with 
material and symbolic inequality in society. Charity is further defined as "the 
feeling of human sympathy that we see becoming clear even of these last 
remaining traces of inequality ... [by setting] moral equality over physical 
inequality which in fact is inherent in things" (Durkheim, 1957: 220). 
From the vantage point of charitable solidarity as "the very acme of justice" 
(Durkheim, 1957: 220), legal sentiment and religious representation manifest 
the dual aspects of the collective consciousness. For Durkheim (1984: 120), 
religion symbolizes "the representative element in the common 
consciousness" in addition to "the affective element" codified in law. 
Accordingly, a private religion is as much of a contradiction-in-terms as a 
private law. Conversely, customary vendetta without justice is equivalent to 
magical exchange without a church, characterizing a band of utilitarian 
individuals, not a moral society. In line with his original position, Durkheim 
eventually establishes the homologous forms of religious and social life by 
theorizing religion via the clan totemism of Australian, Melanesian and 
Northern American tribes against the theories of animism and naturism. lt is 
worth bearing in mind that whether or not totemism in Book I of The 
Elementary Forms of Reiigious Life is a plausible theory based on sufficient 
ethnographic data is a question of natural scientific validity, which Durkheim 
never endorses naTvely. In fact, he refutes theories of animism and naturism 
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on the very ground that both presume "the great [religious] divide between the 
sacred and the profane must be sought in nature - in the nature of man or 
nature of universe," thereby de-naturalizing religious phenomena into "the 
product of delirious interpretation" (Durkheim, 2001[1912]: 76). "Since neither 
man nor nature is inherently sacred, this quality of sacredness must come 
from another source", which is a source of that "reality in which the kind of 
delirium that characterize all religions, in a sense, takes on meaning and 
objective value." (Durkheim, 2001: 76) Fully admitting the reality of fantasy, 
Durkheim (2001: 77) could turn around to include animism and naturism as 
"derivative forms or particular aspects" of totemism. 
Given this is the case, Durkheim's theoretical problem lies in a distinction of 
totemism and fetishism since both are now supposed to be real. The reality of 
fetishism is internal to his definition of religion, the demarcation of the sacred 
from the profane things. This radically relative definition refutes the thesis of 
"the hierarchy of beings", leading Durkheim (2001: 37 -38) to argue the 
"mutual dependence" of god(s) and man by adducing a positive case of 
fetishism when man uses and abuses his gods for protection. Nonetheless, he 
insists that the relation of fetishism and totemism is equivalent to that of 
species and genus, making fetishism an "individual religion", "a simple aspect 
of that public religion", just as "the individual totem represents one part or one 
particular aspect of the collective totem", namely a "subtotem" (Durkheim, 
2001: 134). After the tradition of biological philosophy from Aristotle to 
Spencer, the classification of the individual and society is based on 
Durkheim's double propositions that "individualism and free thinking are of no 
recent date", and that individual totemism is not "all the more developed and 
all the more evident in more primitive societies" (Durkheim, 1984: 121; 2001: 
133). In short, the neither-modern-nor-primitive origin of the individual 
constitutes the vanishing endpoint of society insofar as egoism and altruism 
emerge together "at the dawn of humanity". In view of the speculative nature 
of the social individual, Durkheim's position cannot be validated simply by a 
general distinction of totemism and fetishism, but needs a specific account of 
the social re/production and representation of the individual. 
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Hence from Book 11 of The Elementary Forms of Religious Life onwards, 
Durkheim specifies totemism according to various objects of belief, conducts 
of ritual and schemas of knowledge. First, objects of belief evolve from totems 
of name, emblem, animal, man and genus to totems of the individual and sex, 
which are further personalized into post-totemic notions of the soul, spirits and 
gods. Second, practices of ritual are classified by negatively ascetic cults and 
positively sacrificial cults which are further distinguished from mimetic, 
representative and commemorative rites, functioning as the religious 
preconditions of the scientific principles of causality, representation and 
reproduction. Finally, schemas of knowledge determine the socially relative 
experiences of time, space and so on against transcen.dental reason. Given 
as such, it would be fruitless to debate over the determining factor in the 
constitution of these elementary forms, considering different Durkheimian 
schools often bias towards different aspects of his theory into a specious 
thesis prioritizing the symbolic belief of religion, imaginary knowledge of 
nature or practical ritual of society. In justifying his order of presentation, 
Durkheim (2001: 36) argues that just as "the rite can be defined only after 
defining the belief', since "ways of acting" can only be addressed after "the 
special nature of their object". Likewise, ways of knowing can be defined only 
after acting. This order appears to endorse the predominance of belief, 
lending credence to Durkheim's idealism. However, this is far from the case, 
and nor is the opposite case true to prior'itize ritual practices. In fact, his pre-
animist view of religion has upset any linear evolution from theological 
ontology through metaphysical epistemology to pragmatic science (Durkheim, 
2001: 150). Rather, the whole effort is to show that particular re/production of 
social-individual life amounts to nothing if the three apparatuses do not 
function together in concentrating a spiritual mana to mediate the triune 
realms of the real, the natural and the social, and consolidating a continuous 
force in the coevolution of religion, nature and society. 
The idea of force and the totemic principle of mana are introduced as "the 
origins" of totemic beliefs, symbolizing the ultimate reality in the determination 
of mental representations. The two terms are used interchangeably in 
Durkheim's discussion, virtually describing the same reality, and yet could be 
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distinguished by its two sources, religion and society, or in slightly different 
terms, nature and morality. Firstly, the idea of force is objectlessly natural and 
impersonally real. Force is impersonally real because it fulfills cosmic-physical 
and moral functions, not only effecting "a shock that can be compared to an 
·electric charge" and "sickness and death" that can be "conceived as fluids" 
leaving or entering a body, but also causing obedience "like a kind of 
imperative, that he is doing his duty'' and confidence "to face the world". Also, 
force is objectlessly natural because this "impersonal god" found in every 
totemic object of belief "though identical with none" is "without a name, without 
a history, immanent in the world, diffused throughout a multitude of things." 
Thus, the natural-real idea of force is the totemic, religious origin of later 
metaphysical and scientific formulations of force (Durkheim, 2001: 140-142, 
151-52). Moreover, the principle of mana is relatively social and positively 
moral. Mana is a socially relative principle because it "is located in an 
extended but none the less limited circle of beings and things of different 
kinds". The multiple names of mana (e.g. American Sioux's waken, lroquois' 
orenda and Melanesians' mana) are "imposed" by "the nature of the social 
setting" as particular totemic clans "stand side by side but do not intermingle" 
to compose one "tribal Church" of independent denominations. Also, mana is 
a morally positive principle because it is "incapable of complete 
individualization" as it creates individualized deities without being "entirely 
resolved in a specific number of discrete and self-enclosed beings", but 
negatively it could "glide above the social organization, its division and 
subdivisions", "absorbing clan cults" into "a harmful mana" in "a tribal and 
even intertribal institution" of magic. Hence, the principle of man a is the social-
moral origin of the post-totemic religious belief of deities (Durkheim, 2001: 
143-50). 
But the speculative non/identity of natural religion and moral society remains 
to be accounted for: "if the totem is both the symbol of god and of society, are 
these not one and the same?" To be exact, this is not a rhetorical question as 
many tend to believe. For, instead of giving a straightforward yes, Durkheim 
turns to ask "how was this apotheosis possible and how did it come about in 
this way?" (Durkheim, 2001: 154) Here the phenomenon of collective 
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effervescence is introduced, by which the "genesis" of the totemic principle of 
mana is explained systematically from the pole of belief to that of ritual within 
the comparative contexts of primitive tribes and modern societies. In 
particular, the National Assembly in the French revolution is adduced as the 
typical case to show the extraordinary power of effervescence (Durkheim, 
2001: 157-82, 280-88). However, one should note that effervescence is 
primarily described as the real genesis of a binding force "present, living and 
unchanged" applied "to any society and so to any religion" before it is 
concentrated on totemic belief objects and positive ritual rites (Durkheim, 
2001: 140, 161). Specifically, effervescence displays a threefold character: 
first, it is a "social action" effecting upon an "involuntary duty" outside us and 
"genuine respect" inside us. This action "excludes any idea of deliberation and 
calculation" since it originates from "echoes in the others", namely "prevailing 
opinion". Second, it is a "moral authority" measured by the "intensity" of 
"mental energy" with "psychic properties". This authority is not only aroused in 
. "exceptional circumstances" of ceremonies, festivals and assemblies when 
things, crowds and heroes are endowed with that special mana, but also in 
"various demonstrations of sympathy, esteem and affection" and "various 
benefits of civilization", such as "fixed" language, tools, rights and "a treasure 
trove of knowledge". Third, it is a religious reality overflowing the physical 
reality of things as "the sacred character ... is added to them ... superimposed" 
by social action working "in circuitous and obscure ways", leading man "to 
imagine them in alien forms and transfigure them through thought." The 
perspective of social action is gained only after a "scientific analysis comes to 
enlighten him", but the authority of scientific objectivism still depends on the 
"daughter of opinion" (Durkheim, 2001: 154-61, 17 4). In sum, the social action 
of effervescence remains a cognitive view limited to a natural scientific 
subjectivity before effervescence is objectified into a religious reality sui 
generis for social action to be re-presented and re-cognized in a roundabout 
way. As a positive implication, the duality of action and reality (or structure, if 
structuralism can be applied in advance) can only be virtually admitted in case 
they enter into an interminable exchange, leading up to a total confusion of 
religion and society. On the contrary, it is not until the suspension of reflexive 
duality that sociology can claim a social scientific consciousness for-itself. As 
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a negative result, transforming mundane things into sacred things by 
"religious imagination" cannot but actually admit the contradictory 
objectification-subjectification of society in "society's 'capacity to set itself up 
as a god or to create gods" (Durkheim, 2001: 160-61). 
With this admission, Durkheim surmounts the trap of a vulgar sociology of 
knowledge, linking the knowledge of society to its being by subjecting the 
imaginary view (of the actual contradiction of religion and society, nature and 
morality) to the symbolic view (of their speculative non/identity). In other 
words, Durkheim synthesizes the parallax view with the "hypostatization" of 
society, ambiguously, as he concludes his study with "the ambiguity of the 
notion of the sacred". lt is firstly a "scientific" ambiguity since hypostatization is 
conceived neutrally as a substantial and fictitious thing beyond reification and 
fetishization (cf. Pickering, 1984: 231-35). Furthermore, it is a "symbolic" 
ambiguity insofar as Comte's "second theory of religion", a "functional" review 
of religion as "intellectually obsolete and socially necessary", is elaborated by 
Durkheim (Preus, 1987: 109, 128). Along this line of thought, he resolves the 
contradiction of letter and theory, that is, of believers' theological approach 
and enlighteners' metaphysical approach (since Hume's anthropomorphism) 
to religion, with the methodological rigor of a symbolic literalism (cf. Preus, 
1987: 157-77). 
As long as one is immersed in the collective effervescence, one experiences 
the binding force of mana. But, there is a price to be paid for the symbolic 
grounding of the imaginary contradiction of social existence. The true "abyss 
of freedom" beneath the speculative non/identity of religion and society might 
have been sealed by an emerging, real ground of fate. Insofar as the "spirit" of 
"human brotherhood" guides his sociology (cf. Durkheim, 1984: 337), social 
reality is foreclosed by a real ground of fate too "fair" to touch the kernel of 
love with neither charitable beauty nor justified goodness, truly devoid of all 
senses. Durkheim's notion of love, as a duty of charity, is the gift of organic 
solidarity beyond biological struggle and economic utility. Love, as spiritual 
food, symbolizes a functional substitution of something for nothing, or 
precisely nothing but an empty signifier, the nothing-ness of love. 
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Finally, if Durkheim's science of morality renews the method of the symbolic 
form, this is because his morality of science inherits from the old doctrine of 
Trinity within Christian philosophy. After demonstrating the being of society 
akin to the "moral proof of the existence of God" (cf. Durkheim, 2004: 303ff), 
he is bound to be embroiled with some existential questions of society, such 
as relations of life and death, body and spirit, perception and consciousness, 
rationality and affect, which are inexplicable by the biological discourses of his 
time. We have seen that a moral society is coextensive with religion, law and 
love, just as the collective, the social and the individual are multiple types of 
species evolution "with no breaks in continuity" (Durkheim, 1984: xxix, 83, 
172-74; 2001: 154, 337). In fact, society moves towards a spiritualized body of 
"average happiness" due to the paradoxical "abstraction", not realization, of 
"Quetelet's average man". This means the spiritual body rests on a 
specialized organism which rejects heredity, optimizing social life instead of 
maximizing the pleasures and pains of utilitarian individuals in an all-too-
human historical process (Durkheim, 1984: 193, 266). Thus understood, the 
domains of social morphology, physiology and pathology can be 
circumscribed within a set of rules, studying social facts "as social things" 
characterized by an "immateriality sui generis" (Durkheim, 1982[1895]: 162). 
Durkheim's sociological rules are a methodological formulation of his 
discovery of a social "organism that takes on 'spiritual' shape" which "cannot 
take root in the organism", or "a new life sui generis ... added on to that of the 
body", due to the progressive "effect of increasing detaching the function from 
the organ - without separating it entirely, however - and life from matter, 
consequently 'spiritualizing' if' (Durkheim, 1984: 275, 284). As secular 
morality, this social spirit which Durkheim (1984: 338) characterizes as 
"charitable and jusf' is diversified from but irreplaceable by the old spirits of 
religion and law. As sacred morality, Durkheim's law of society speculates a 
definite moral economy contingent on a religion of love which proposes the 
sovereignty of a human subject. 
5.3Simmel 
For Simmel, love neither ends in a moral culture nor functions in the middle of 
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a legal society, but rather seduces at the beginning of sexual division devoid 
of the sovereignty of individual and human subjects. After the publication of 
The Philosophy of Money in 1900, he stopped asking the ethical question of 
time in a frame of social differentiation and philosophy of history. Instead, he 
focused on a concrete analysis of culture in the monetary system by 
developing a life philosophy and a formal sociology. His writings on the 
cultural representation of female psychology prepared for and continued to 
build upon his philosophy of money "which also included a discussion of the 
monetary valuation of women, marriage and prostitution" (Oakes in Simmel, 
1984: vii-viii). Female culture concerns a sociological representation of the 
feminine form. Simmel (1984[1911-23]: 65-101) argues that the objective form 
of culture represents the principle of "significance" in the male psyche, 
whereas "beauty" in the female psyche is unable to express this form. Hence, 
female culture comes close to a contradiction-in-terms if culture is defined as 
an objective form disengaged from its subjective contents. In effect, one 
should separate the absolute from the relative problems of the sexes since 
they are asymmetrical to each other. This is to say, since the male sex is 
prone to create an objective culture of differentiation discharged from a 
significant centre, the female sex is consigned to a relative problem of 
representation when the male culture predominates. By contrast, since the 
female sex tends to create a subjective culture of unity conserved in the 
beautiful whole with no centre, the female sex is elevated to an absolute crisis 
of representation when female culture starts to emerge (Simmel, 1984[1911-
23]: 1 02-32). 
Simmel's analysis of sexual division in modern cultural history can be found in 
his writings on The Adventurer and Flirtation. For the male sex, a man's 
conquest in a love affair is a case of an adventure, as everyday life is 
uprooted by indeterminable fate (Simmel, 1977[1911-23]: 195-96). This 
"super-life" experience requires a heroic attitude of fatalism to believe in the 
impossible, a triumphant confidence in the "unknown and unknowable 
element" of life. The adventurous lifestyles of Casanova, the gambler and the 
philosopher are thus intertwined by the love of fate itself (Simmel, 1977: 190-
94). For the female sex, the formal sociality of flirtation is exemplified by the 
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charming "reserve" of "this semi-concealment of woman" embodied in their 
clothing or bodily ornament (Simmel, 1984[1911-23]: 136, 148). Expressing 
"an intermediate state between having and not-having", "interplay between 
consent and refusal" or "surrender and withdrawal of the self, this "precarious 
dualism" implies a formal unity in the "undifferentiated being of woman". In this 
sense, flirtation discloses "the more profound sense of the interpretation of 
love" than the Platonic "desire for possession" (Simmel, 1984: 133-36, 147-
49, 151). Summed up in a word called "perhaps", flirtatious indecision shows 
an inner strength exactly when she abandons herself to the instrumental 
service of her lover, which is qualitatively different from anxious uncertainty 
which is a character of weakness to "gain time for the decision". Such 
"tentative turning" formalizes the "allusive charm" when a woman lures a man 
to risk an adventurous encounter with fate inaccessible to his decision 
(Simmel, 1984: 136, 141-44, 151). Accordingly, flirtation is a "play" with reality 
more than a disinterested form of "art". The immanent transcendence of "life" 
occurs as the tragedy of human separation and loneliness is metamorphosed 
into a play form of sociality unbounded by morality and beauty (Simmel, 1984: 
144-47, 149-52). 
Simmel's life philosophy may be largely read as an endorsement of Goethe's 
love and Nietzsche's fate against Kant's intellect and Schopenhauer's will. 
Without detailing his monographs on these four thinkers, one might 
recapitulate this philosophy of fatal love-life by reviewing two of his 
posthumous essays, Eros: Plato and Modern and On Love (a fragment). 
Summed up in a cultural thesis, the philosophical history of Eras (from Plato 
to Nietzsche) shows that the Apollonian rational thought has been unsettled 
by the Dionysian joyous life (Simmel, 1977[1921-22]: 235-48). Ancient and 
modern meanings of Eras can be revealed ·in a series of contrasts, such as 
unified cosmos/substance of being versus creative flux/movement of the soul, 
male body versus female face, inclusive supra-individuality versus exclusive 
individuality, self-sufficient possession versus unattainable relationship, and 
so on. A crucial transition occurred between Petrarch's and Michelangelo's 
Renaissance and Goethe's Romanticism or Weimer classicism when the idea 
of beauty was integrated to individuality. In effect, "the ultimate mystery of love 
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resides in the fact that there is no single attribute which is responsible for it-
as Meister Eckhart said with respect to God, we should not love him because 
he possesses these and those attributes, but simply because he just 
is ... Individuality-this unanalyzable unity, which is not to be derived from 
anything else, not subsumable under any higher concept, set within a world 
otherwise infinitely analyzable, calculable, and governed by general laws-
this individuality stands for us the actual focal point of love" (Simmel, 1977: 
244). Eventually, the trans-vitallife of love breaks through moral and religious 
forms when a subject's psyche acquires "a formative quality" to individuate 
love's objects (Simmel, 1984[1921-22]: 153-92). Accordingly, love is neither 
impulsive behaviour, nor religious charity and sacrifice, nor sexual sentiment, 
nor emotional experience, nor subjective enjoyment, nor objective value 
judgment, nor desire or esteem for the object, and nor magical mode of being. 
In positive terms, love is "an ungrounded and primary category ... As one who 
loves, I am a different person than I was before ... the beloved as such is also 
a different being ... There is an absolute connection, not a mere 
association ... thoroughly integral and not compounded from different and 
otherwise existing elements" (Simmel, 1984: 161 ). As a cultural transfiguration 
from the ideas of God, soul and salvation, modern love is related to but not 
exhausted by Christian love, philanthropy and Kantian ethics. From the 
"genuine love" for the "Eternal Feminine" in Faust to the "absolute love" for an 
"irreplaceable personality" in Elective Affinities, Goethe's work exemplifies 
modern love in its full complexity. Following Goethe's lead, in sum, Simmelian 
love turns life into a work of art, a heroic tragedy of "a More-than-Life" 
predestined by the fate of "incomparable individuality" (Simmel, 1984: 167, 
173-77, 180-90).21 
5.4 The Marxist question of fraternity 
As a triune canon, classical sociology does agree with Marxism on the 
suppression of sexual-erotic love with a legal-rational form in modernity, as far 
21 A self-professed Simmelian, Octavio Paz misreads the super-human individuality of love 
into a humanist personality of love. Conflating Simmel's analysis of bourgeois culture with his 
authorship, Paz over-identifies the bourgeois ideal of the person to develop an embodied 
notion of human souls via a comparative but incoherent analysis of world religions. The result 
is a mystic doctrine of the double flame, sexualization and eroticization, of love (Paz, 1996: 
156-60, 186-87, 189-206; Capetillo-Ponze, 2005). 
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as Weber's ideal type, Durkheim's elementary form, and Simmel's form of 
sociation are concerned. This is where Rose gains the leverage to warn 
against Marxist and non-Marxist sociologies trapped in the Kant-Fichtean 
reflection of methodologism and theoreticism. 
Yet exceptionally, Simmel's sociologization of Goethe's art of love to a sexual-
cultural analysis of modernity is also appropriated by Marxism politically. We 
are referring to a nee-enlightenment scholarship of Goethe developed by 
Gyogy Lukacs, Mikhail Bakhtin, Waiter Benjamin, etc. insofar as they move 
away from the nee-romanticist scholarship of Goethe by the influential works 
of Dilthey, Gundolf and Simmel (Tihanov, 2000: 216-17, 228-29; Ferris, 2002). 
On the first approach, these theories of novels struggle with the transition of 
fiction genres from Goethe's historical realism to Dostoevsky's psychological 
realism, pursuing a Marxist aesthetic in response to the rise of aesthetic 
modernism. On the second approach, the "apolitical" writings of these 
Marxists preempt, on a "meta-political" level, modernists' "anti-political" total 
aesthetic with regards to the non/dialectical relations of politics and art on the 
one hand and history and time-space on the other. On the third approach, 
Marxists under the regimes of Stalinism and Nazism often had to disavow 
their past or face exile and even death (cf. Sim, 1994; Arendt, 1999[1955]). 
Accordingly, it is unwise to engage in an ideological analysis of the shifting 
positions of these Marxist aestheticians, let alone a comparative study of 
different religious politics between them, since the truth lies in their literary 
critiques. As a rule, from Lukacs through Bakhtin to Benjamin, the more one is 
sympathetic to aesthetic modernism, the more one is prepared to admit the 
failure of Goethe's realist literature in capturing and/or seizing the historical 
force of revolution (Tihanov, 2000: 216-45; Weigel, 2002). Hence, the 
fundamental issue concerns the question: does Goethe's ethic of renunciation 
. still "survive" in our historical culture to inspire a Marxist politics of fraternity? 
Given the common wager put on Goethe by Simmel and Marxists, one should 
think twice about the destiny of the two sociological cultures sealed by Rose. 
We suggest a distinction of the logic from the thought of the world. In this 
regard, Rose is right to subdivide classical sociologists, since it is not just law 
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but its moral imperative claimed by Weber and Parsons which restricts 
sociology to a limited sense after Durkheim and Simmel. Meanwhile, she 
reminds us that Marx's question of commodity fetishism is changed to a 
problem of reification from Hegelian Marxism onwards only after further 
thoughts on Simmel's philosophy of money. In effect, the future of this fate is 
not totally foreseen, but fraught with a primary discord of Platonism and 
Kantianism inside neo-Kantians prior to the secondary division of Marburg 
and Heidelberg schools. Under the imaginary split between is and ought of 
thought, which Rose (1995: 1) dismisses hastily, one discerns a real split 
within the triune canon, which opposes the logic to the thought of the world in 
the schism of Durkheim, Simmel and neo-Marxists on the one hand, and 
Weber, Parsons and neo-Parsonians on the other. 
Theoretically, the split tells us Durkheim and Simmel are more open-minded 
towards the object of study than Weber is, for they sociologize the letter 
before judging the spirit of the law. If Weberian love is derived ambivalently 
from the antinomy of morality and legality to necessitate the thought of the 
world, then Durkheimian and/or Simmelian love is deduced speculatively from 
the non/identity of morality and legality to symbolize the logic of the world. In 
this strict sense, Rose stands on a ground too high to make a sociological 
distinction between the post/Hegelian form of society and the pre/Kantian 
form of culture based on their vanishing reference point, nature. For, Weber's 
sociology anticipates a postmodern moral culture· which dominates and 
replaces nature, whereas Durkheim's sociology anticipates a poststructural 
amoral society which simulates and displaces nature. Given the case, a 
further proximity between Simmel and Durkheim might be found in an early 
disagreement regarding Durkheim's critique of Simmel for sacrificing the 
contents of social life to its forms (Durkheim, 1960a). In view of Simmel's later 
writings of life philosophy, however, the disagreement turns out to reflect a 
prior agreement on capturing actual social life instead of stipulating an 
abstract morality. 
Approaching the world via its logic or its thought signifies two 
incommensurable social dynamics based on love or freedom. lt is apparent 
!53 
that progressive social thinkers since Comte and Marx have searched and 
researched for a "scientific" way to "help" human societies achieve the 
equality of beings in a state of universality. However, Durkheim and Simmel 
think in terms of a two-tailed double bind with freedom and equality tied to a 
real life of counter-Protestant fraternity, whereas Weber thinks in terms of a 
two-tailed double bind with equality and fraternity tied to an ideal form of 
Protestant freedom. For the former, it needs an amorous society to be moral, 
really moral; for the latter, it desires a free society to be moral, ideally moral. 
Hence, for Durkheim (1984: 321), "what constitutes liberty is the subordination 
of external to social forces, for it is only on this condition that the latter can 
develop freely." "But where human sympathy is concerned, even these 
inequalities [of merits] cannot be justified. For it is man as a human being that 
we love or should love and regard, not man as a scholar of genius or as an 
able man of business, and so on ... " (Durkheim, 1957: 219). For Simmel, "it 
was only through the voluntary act of renunciation as expressed in this 
concept [i.e. fraternite] that it would be possible to prevent liberte from being 
accompanied by the total opposite of egalite" (Simmel, 1971: 222). Due to the 
same priority of fraternity, one can see why Simmel's approach to the world's 
amoral logic antecedent to its moral thought in the frame of Goethe's ethic of 
renunciation poses a political challenge for Marxists. 
Historically, the "loving" patience of these three classical sociologists could be 
seen as formalizing the failed work of love by Comte and Marx in legal terms 
and spirit insofar as they cultivate the fruit of love in the garden of law. While 
allowing varying degrees of excess to inform their theory of society, they 
expect, at bottom, fraternal love bounded by the paternal law to substantiate a 
cultured or civilized government in modernity. Reduced to a formula, sociology 
professionalized from social science might be seen as a canonic shift from 
love to law to guide the reformation of modern social life. In terms of practical 
social carriers, the vicissitudes of social science and sociology represent a 
changing mentality of the governing class, since they enlist different 
professionals from medical doctors to lawyers as social engineers. Yet, as 
long as both professional groups intend to rein the plebian pursuit of a better 
life in a moral track on the basis of an adamant doubt about excessive 
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economic rationality, both risk throwing the baby away with the bathwater. 
Conversely speaking, self/bounded moralities of love and law are fearful of 
traversing the materialistic feeling naturally arising from the marketplace, 
eventually missing the chance of founding a new and rigorous inhuman order 
of the social. Upon closer reflection, the pre-1880 social science of love and 
the post-1880 sociology of law had written the consequences of modernity 
·since the Industrial and French revolutions, swinging from aestheticism to 
asceticism as two ways of conceiving the post-revolutionary social order. 
Given the trajectory from 1848 to 1870, this swing of historical feelings 
demonstrates how social science lived through a post-revolutionary symbolic 
enchantment, whereas sociology suffered from its disenchantment 
However, the thesis of enchantment and disenchantment is liable to over-
interpretation if one "infers" that sociology represents a "realistic" awakening 
from the "utopian" dream of social science. For, this inference is a 
prejudgment issued retroactively from the "realism· of sociology to "irrealize" 
social science. As an act of patricide, the prejudgment is self-contradictory in 
that the "realness" of the symbolic is simultaneously admitted and denied. By 
contrast, a fair, if never full, significance of the canonic transition might come 
into view if one adopts a standpoint in the wake of the historical determination 
of sociology. Seen from a post-1920 standpoint, therefore, the same transition 
shows that the social scientific enchantment had "fictionalized" the symbolic 
before the sociological disenchantment "imagined" the symbolic: symbolic 
tradition in both instances is recognized as a lost object By the thesis of 
fictionalization and imagination, we have adopted a real view of the symbolic, 
which brings us again to "the passion for the real", as Badiou (2007) claims, in 
the 201h century. Previously, we argued Badiou's analysis can be read across 
the theoretical divide of Marxism and non-Marxism. Now following Badiou's 
meta-politics, we argue the real view can hold true in both Marxist and anti-
Marxist periodizations to present a historically consistent standpoint In 
concrete terms, the real intimates a dissatisfaction of symbolic fictionalization 
if referring to the political real from 1917 through 1945 to 1976; meanwhile, it 
implies a dissatisfaction of symbolic imagination if referring to the cultural real 
from 1917 through 1968 to 1989. From the real standpoint of the symbolic, 
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these post-1920 political-cultural events manifest a double dissatisfaction with 
the post-revolutionary social orders put forward by social science and 
sociology. Thus, the canonic transition may be reconsidered to signify that the 
symbolic fiction of love must be. realized in the actual history of the real to 
complete rather than abolish the symbolic image of law. 
Nonetheless, political and cultural symbolizations of the real history do stand 
in irreconcilable positions. This antagonism cannot be dismissed lightly, for it 
does contribute to a disarray of historical interpretation of the 20th century, not 
to mention a hermeneutic meltdown over the meaning of terrorism in the 21st 
century. Specifically, the opposition of political versus cultural histories refers 
to the sorry conflation of really existing socialism (after 1917) and fascism 
(before 1945) on a first approach, and the false distinction of totalitarian 
dictatorship (before 1989) and libertarian or nee-liberal democracy (after 
1989) on the second. At bottom, the watershed lies in the event of 1968: does 
it herald a legitimate conquest of anti-Marxist culture from 1989 onwards or a 
willful implementation of Marxist politics since 1917? But these views are 
trapped in a one-sided suture to a real beginning and a real end of history, 
respectively. Given Rose's ethical equivocation of the middle, it's more exact 
to argue that the revolt of 1968 emerged at the point of reversal from politics 
to culture because one could trace the social force of youth in the event '68 to 
the decade of Cultural Revolution in Mao's China from 1965 to 1976.22 In light 
of this, one might further contextualize the de-politicized, particular culture of 
22 In fact, one could trace the source of modern student movements against imperialism to the 
4 May Movement of 1919. it was not only a patriotic movement launched by students to 
oppose the unfair treaty put forward in the Paris Peace Conference, but also a continuation of 
the new cultural movement initiated by intellectuals in 1915 to abolish the residual feudalism 
in modern China. According to Mao's epistemology of dialectic materialism in On Practice 
(2007[1937]: 58), the 4 May Movement exemplifies a practice of "rational knowledge" on a 
higher dialectic stage than the practice of "perceptual knowledge" such as The Movement of 
the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (The Taiping Rebellion, 1850-64) and The Yi Ho Tuan 
Movement (The Boxer Rebellion, 1899-1901). But Mao suggested in a private letter of 1951 
that the example of The Taiping Rebellion should be deleted from later publications because 
he suspected that it already went beyond a simple pre-rational, xenophobic movement (cf. 
http://www.marxists.org/chinese/17/marxist.org-chinese-mao-193707.htm, note 5). In line with 
this historical view, it is only natural to find Weber (1964[1915]: 219-24) had already argued a 
similar distinction, since, according to his sociology of modernity, The Taiping Rebellion 
revolutionized the Christian-Confucian mixture in China to create a chiliastic-ascetic ethic, 
whereas the Boxer Rebellion merely evolved toward a military-martial ethic from the 
contemplative-ecstatic norm in the Taoist-Buddhist soteriology. 
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1968 as the obverse consequence of the de-culturalized, universal politics 
when interwar intellectuals sought to "socialize" by force Goethe's art of love-
life in Lenin's and Stalin's Russia. The real view I expound here builds upon 
Badiou's analysis of the Cultural Revolution at the heart of his theory of the 
subject before and after he coins his philosophy of being and event. In his 
Maoist period, Badiou (2005c[1975]; 2005d[1975; 1977]; 2005e[1979]; 2005f 
[1980]) argued that the history of French Revolution and post-revolutionary 
Restoration repeats itself in Mao's Cultural Revolution and Deng's economic 
revisionism, and thus reaffirmed the "right to revolt". Recently, Badiou 
(2005g[2002]) ponders if Cultural Revolution stands for the Last Revolution. 
This is so because the organization of the revolutionary subject came to a 
point of "saturation", whereby the Russian state-party form excreted a 
Chinese mass form. In light of this, any reflexive sociology of an autopetic 
"world" culture and politics would be bereft of its historical yardstick if Lenin, 
Stalin, and Mao have been precluded as the triune nemesis of "Western" 
freedom, equality and fraternal love. 
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Chapter 6 Durkheim Reconsidered 
The entire case made in the previous chapter rests on a common interest 
between Simmel and Marxists in collectivizing Goethe's art of love into 
political culture and/or cultural politics. They read Goethe's ethic of 
renunciation from neo-romantic and neo-enlightenment views, unaware that 
opposing perspectives might have presumed the same sexual formulation of 
the ethic. In this regard, Weber lags behind them since his neo-classicist view 
of Goethe allows him to exploit different cultural representations of passion 
within the bounds of a putatively neuter reason. On the other hand, through 
Simmel, the door separating Durkheim from Marxists is further opened. Both · 
Marxist and non-Marxist sociologies promote symbolic love behind legal forms 
of the state and society by initiating them into a spiritual ring of fraternity 
circling from justice to charity and back. But this is only half of the story. Here ! 
argue there is an added complexity of love to be found in Durkheim's oft-
criticized organicism. lt is important not to dismiss Durkheim's organicism as a 
na'ive positivistic analogy since his sociological logic can detach itself from the 
philosophical thought of humanity originated in German idealism because of 
his critical readings of Comte and Spencer. 
In the section on Durkheim of the previous chapter, we applied our reading of 
Rose against Rose to suggest how Durkheim formalizes a speculative 
morality of science closer to Hegel's logic rather than neo/Kantian thought by 
means of a science of morality in the middle of social being and knowledge 
(or, ontology and epistemology). As a twist to German idealism, we concluded 
that Durkheim, in fact elaborating on later Comte's logic, coins a symbolic 
literalism to solve the imaginary contradiction of religion and society. During 
the process, his heuristic concept of organic solidarity, as an intellectual need 
' 
to mediate his sociology of law, morality and religion, posits the double ethics 
of duty, justice and charity, in a serial spirit. Such an ontogenetic logic, a post-
Kantian formal logic accounting for the twin births of society and individuals by 
the birth of a transcendental subject, works as if he gambles on justice as the 
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reason of duty, then he must at the same time raise the stake to call in charity 
as the love of duty in modern society. In consequence, we questioned if, 
having spiritualized the speculative non/identity of natural religion and moral 
society, Durkheim seals the abyss of freedom, the true kernel of love with 
neither charity nor justice, to the ground of fate. 
In fact, the question we posed to Durkheim concerns how can the charitable 
spirit of love be upheld as an indeconstructable exception in the beginning? 
Or, why not deconstruct the indeconstructable ground of de/construction (of 
subjectivity), which is fraternal love? Furthermore, what is this real ground of 
fate that actualizes the existence of love, and what lies beneath the very act of 
actualization in its dual sense of truth and fiction? To answer these 
phylogenetic questions, questions of truth/fiction regarding a literal conception 
of the real before the birth of the symbolic subject, one needs to reconsider 
the organism of love qua respect in Durkheim's work. We will stress in this 
chapter that he does provide a full explanation in this regard, and one would 
be surprised to see the complexity of his account. Afterwards, we will know 
why Goethe's ethic of renunciation, the Ariadne's thread of our genealogy of 
love from social sciences to classical (non/Marxist) sociologies, could have 
been read otherwise. If one concedes that we are living in a post-symbolic 
world of normativity, a world which has transgressed Durkheim's society of 
normality and pathology, then a new order of love beyond laws has to work 
through differential ethical formulations of Goethe's love-life between 
masculine renunciation and feminine renunciation. 
In the first instance, charity seems a remedy of social maladies, given the 
examples of caring for others, giving of alms, and even risking one's life. 
Durkheim the philosopher holds onto this post/Kantian ideal of treating human 
personality as an end from his Sens lectures onwards (Durkheim, 1957: 218-
220; 1984: 77, 338; 2004: 270-71). But it has no absolute value in his 
sociology. On the contrary, charity as a moral practice turns out to be a 
symptom. In his lectures on moral education, he admits, "[c]harity, in the 
popular sense of the word, the charity of person to person has no moral 
values in itself." Moreover, it is "a symptom of a moral state" at worst, and 
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"symptomatic medicine" at best. For, "social evils require social treatment. The 
lone individual can do nothing against them. The only effective remedy lies in 
the collective organization of welfare." (Durkheim, 1961: 82-84) Accordingly, 
once the precept of duty is actualized in the percept of respect, we will find 
that Durkheim's feeling of social reality is too rich and complex to be 
measured by idealism, or spiritualism in the sense Bougie imputes to his 
teacher (Durkheim, 1974: xli). 
6.1 Zizek's philosophy for Durkheimians 
Before rediscovering Durkheim's phylogenetic arrangement of ideas, we must 
first caution against two excessive methods of reading existing in divergent 
interpretations. We consider most contemporary studies of Durkheim too 
"sociological" and too "philosophical" at the same time. As such, they tend to 
violate Durkheim's brand of sociology and philosophy by overstretching them. 
To over/understand Durkheim, specifically, they draw on too many con-texts 
(of comparative societies, from L' Annee Sociologique to Le College de 
Sociologie, from La Sorbonne to Le College de France, from Action Franqaise 
to la troisieme Republique) induced from a "Durkheimian sociology" of 
knowledge, and too many inter-texts (of comparative individuals, from 
Descartes to Kant, Kant to Comte, Kant to Hegel, Comte to Schopenhauer, 
Hegel to Marx, Bergson to Bataille, etc.) deduced from a "Durkheimian 
philosophy" of ideas. On the surface, contextual and intertextual excesses 
stand for mutually opposed methods of reading. One watershed lies in the so-
called Parsons-Comte complex, from which a "sociological" method (of 
contextualizing, applying or projecting Durkheim to a sociological theory of 
society) and a "philosophical" method (of intertextualizing, dis-applying or 
reflecting Durkheim in a philosophical history of modernity) declare to part 
ways. At bottom, however, commentaries amount to multiple representations 
of Durkheim, converging on the charting of a "sociological-philosophical" map 
of his identity in place of the landscapes of his sociology and philosophy. The 
merging identity of contextuality and intertextuality shows that, after multiple 
interpretations, there has been only one method of reading Durkheim. We 
might call it the method of forensic science, eager to catch a "truer'' Durkheim 
by seeking trace evidences, that is, more mediated societies and individuals, 
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schools and ideas, up close and personal to the historical Durkheim (such as 
Hamelin, Renouvier, Janet, etc.). When the mediated dis/appear along with 
the immediate, excrescent "philosophical-sociological" multiplicities no longer 
respect Durkheim's scientific methods of sociology and philosophy, since their 
distinct objects of study are lost in mutual approximation. 
We are not saying that everything understood about Durkheim so far is wrong. 
On the contrary, we are saying every idiosyncratic trace of Durkheim's 
sociology being discovered is too right to "represent" the truth of his thought. 
The problem is that a labyrinthine search of contextual and/or intertextual 
evidences is inclined to ignore simple textual evidences in Durkheim's oeuvre. 
This is also the typical blindness of lovers, which is not revealed to them until 
they break up: intimate understandings turn into misunderstandings, their very 
causes. Heedless of the blind spot, one would fall into a symbolic trap, loving 
Durkheim too much in the forensic tracing of his law, his crime, in founding 
sociology. This blindness betrays one's relative and limited knowledge of 
Durkheim's sociology dependent on his love of societies and individuals in an 
ontogenesis of love of duty at the expense of his love of humanity and 
organism in a phylogenesis of love of respect. To reverse the imbalance, we 
argue a textual sacrifice of intertextuality, ripping and reshuffling contexts to 
maintain a structural distinction and relation between sociology and 
philosophy. For this purpose, we turn to Zifek. 
There are two main reasons for the choice of Zizek. First, his history of 
modern philosophy, especially German idealism, is led by a dynamic view of 
truth, and so superior to "philosophical" Durkheimians who tend to compel 
Durkheim to endorse the knowledge system(s) of a certain (group of) 
individual(s). Second, his theory of post-psychoanalytic Marxism is followed 
by a radical view of ideology, and so elusive to "sociological" Durkheimians 
who like to force Durkheim to adopt the ideological position(s) of a certain 
political, religious and/or intellectual society. As a whole, we read Zizek, in the 
same way as we read Durkheim, textually, against over-contextualizing or 
stereotyping him with a philosophical person (e.g. Zizek the Lacanian-
Leninist-Hegelian) and/or a sociological thing (e.g. Zizek the political dissident 
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from Slovenia, the theoretical psychoanalyst from the University of Paris VIII). 
Appreciating the friendship of enemies, Zizek would know best how (not) to 
love Durkheim (too much). We suggest that one can find everything 
Durkheimians might want to know about Zizek, and thus recognize the 
immoral challenge of Durkheim's sociology poses to us today, in the 
controversial book Organs without Bodies (Zizek, 2004a). In conjunction with 
Badiou's (2000a) logical critique of Deleuze, this book is firstly a philosophical 
reading of Deleuze, and secondly a sociological reading of the practical 
consequences of Deleuzianism in the domains of cognitive science, cinematic 
art and counter-cultural politics. 23 Deleuzians simply do not love this book, 
criticizing Zizek, in the stereotypical way he is always criticized, for 
downloading the systems of Hegel and Lacan to Deleuze. According to his 
central argument, they are right. But this intellectual indignation discloses their 
emotional puzzlement about Zizek's view of love, from which Zizek presents 
the book as a justified reading of Deleuze. Deleuzians might reasonably 
wonder why, apart from an introductory section on Deleuze's aversion to 
debate and a philosophical section on Spinoza's affirmation of Being, in which 
a certain conception of love is implied, a sustained discussion of love is 
missing in the sociological part, a part clearly designed to apply Badiou's four 
conditions of philosophy (recall that we noted the same under-theorized site 
by Badiou in chapter 3). 
If we could forget about all the personalities from Hegel and Lacan to Deleuze 
and even Zizek in our mind, a simple answer would strike to us that the whole 
treatise is produced by a drive to write a philosophy and a proto-sociology (in 
science, art and politics) of love in the guise of Deleuze's philosophy and its 
sociological consequences. Leaving sociological consequences aside, we 
focus on introducing his history of philosophy. Since philosophical 
personalities are a secondary concern, we do not distinguish other conceptual 
23 Badiou discusses how Deleuze, in the wake of Heidegger's phenomenology and ontology 
(from Dasein to MiVSein), turns to Bergson's method of intuition in developing a virtual 
ontology, in which univocal Being (One-All) predetermines nominal existence (anarchistic 
multiplicity) via the concept of the virtual as the organizing ground, of time as absolute 
memory, of the eternal return as chance, and of the subject as the fold. 
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authorships from Zizek's, but rather relate them historically in a conceptual 
network. Without exception, even when we credit most conceptual 
authorships to Zizek, this name· should be read as a sign and put into 
brackets. 
As a result, the only way to begin must be Truth. Truth "only occurs in the very 
passage from one to another perspective", and as such lies in neither 
transcendence nor immanence, and nor the gap between transcendence and 
immanence, but in "a fetishized misperception-effect of the gap within 
immanence" (Zizek, 2004a: 62). Without being opposed to Illusion, Truth is a 
"play[ing] with appearances" in "the structure of a fiction" (Zizek, 2004a: 167). 
In discovering Truth, therefore, one adopts "the strategy of tracking down, not 
the specific difference, but the minimal difference ... that differentiates an 
element. . .from itself, from its own place of inscription ... ", namely "the 'pure 
difference' between enunciated and enunciation" (Zizek, 2004a: 64, 69). Zizek 
knows he is no producer of the truth, but the truth's mouthpiece, a psycho-
philosophical analytic who contains himself in the subjective position of an 
object. As Zizek effaces his self-identity, Deleuze's contemporary philosophy 
might then be correlated with modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel 
through a retrospective view of post-philosophy from Hegel to Lacan. 
First, contemporary philosophy since Deleuze claims to invent a style of 
thinking in a movement of difference and repetition. Yet by a violent act of 
discrimination against Anti-Oedipus, Zizek (2004a: 32) sides with the . 
"apolitical" Deleuze of Logic of Sense who asks the philosophical-scientific 
question of causality, a question repetitive with but different from the question 
of origin puzzled by theology and positive sciences alike. So Deleuze turns 
the concept of the cause into a "quasi-cause" embedded in the immanent 
plane of consequences, meditating on how ''the excess of the effect over its 
(corporeal} causes" posits a "sense-event" of affecting and affected bodies to 
generate its own causes retroactively (Zizek, 2004a: 27). However, the bodily 
and affective nature of the sense-event discloses Deleuze's ambiguity of 
materialism and idealism, supplementing a "formal genesis" with a "real 
genesis". Deleuze is indecisive about the ontological priority of Being or 
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Becoming expressed in the flow of virtualization/ spiritualization (the passage 
from Being to Becoming) or actualization/ embodiment (the passage from 
Becoming to Being). Zizek rejects the very pseudo-choice of materialism and 
idealism due to its presumed dualistic· essentialism, including their 
contemporary coincidence of opposites in "vulgar materialism" and "gnostic 
spiritualist obscurantism" (Zizek, 2004a: 21-26). Rather, he "problematize[s] 
the very basic duality of Deleuze's thought, that of Becoming versus Being", 
arguing that this problem points to the limit of Life on Deleuze's vitalist 
conception of Event (Zizek, 2004a:. 28). 24 As a result, Zizek (2004a: 30) 
differentiates two sites of the virtual in Deleuze's work, biasing the repressed 
"site of the sterile Sense-Event" where "organs without body'' is discovered 
against the liberated "site of productive Becoming" where the "body without 
organs" is found.25 
Here, Zizek is taking a further step toward the deconstruction of the affective 
body, given that its sense-event gives Deleuze a ground of non-sense to 
make the mental structure of subjectivity an im/possibility. He corresponds the 
concept of the fold with that of autopoiesis in evolutionary cognitivism (as if 
Deleuze meets Maturana and Varela), arguing that it is not radical enough to 
rest on a self-enclosing loop of virtual organism, since it would take the duality 
of idealism and materialism to the worst (morals of ambiguity) (Zizek, 2004a: 
111-17). Moreover, Zizek (2004a: 118-23) takes care to understand rightly the 
24 On the first approach, Zizek follows Badiou's philosophy of Being and Event beyond 
Deleuze's philosophy of Being and Becoming. In the second approach, however, Zizek 
(2004a: 103-07) criticizes Badiou for relapsing to the Kantian taboo of the Thing. In his 
discussion here, Zizek does rightly understand the problematic concerning a proper 
formalization of the "passion for the real" at the interface of posUMarxist theory and practice. 
Nonetheless, it is Zizek himself who commits a Kantian misreading of Badiou's The Century. 
We have shown in chapter 3, contrary to Zizek's claim, Badiou (2007: 56, 148-64) does fully 
acknowledge the ethic of substraction (via the real object) in contradistinction to the ethic of 
gurification (via the real Thing) in his discussion of the relations between art and politics. 
5 The repressed site of organs without body can be found in Deleuze and Guattari's A 
Thousand Plateaux, where he anticipates the conservatism of the psychoanalytic approach, 
and underestimates its progressive potential: "it is not at all a question of a fragmented, 
splintered body, of organs without the body (OwB). The BwO is exactly the opposite ... The 
error of psychoanalysis was to understand BwO phenomena as regressions, projections, 
phantasies, in terms of an image of the body. As a result, it only grasps the ftipside of the BwO 
and immediately substitutes family photos, childhood memories, and part-objects for a 
worldwide intensity map. lt understands nothing about the egg nor about indefinite articles nor 
about the contemporaneousness of a continually self-constructing milieu" (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988: 164 ). 
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problematic as a complex passage from "Life to (Self)Consciousness", not a 
simple passage from matter to life. He shares with them the question of 
emergence, but does not explain it with the real-formal genesis alone; rather, 
he seeks to explain it with the passage from the real-formal genesis to the 
real-evental genesis. This passage leads him to ask "the properly materialist 
problem" of "how does subjectivity emerge in this reproductive cycle of 
genes." His position of genetic, mimetic fetishism, as we might call it, is 
guided by an effort to work through two philosophical traditions of the body, as 
one wishes to "become the body" whilst the other "possess the body". But this 
means Zizek has presupposed a unique history of modern philosophy, which 
could have anticipated Deleuze's contemporary philosophy irrespective of its 
ac/claimed novelty. 
Second, since Descartes created the absent and "ticklish subject", modern 
philosophy is destined to work through the duality of materialism and idealism 
into Zizek's "dialectic materialism" which assumes "there is only void" (Zizek, 
1999: 1-5; 2004a: 25, 88-89, 117). Premised on duality instead of dualism, the 
standard unified history of philosophy is then reread as a schizophrenic one, 
insofar as "the conceptual deployment/presentation {logos) fails, touches its 
limit, a narrative (mythos) has to intervene" (Zizek, 2004a: 74). Along the 
logocentric line, "the triad of paganism-Judaism-Christianity repreats itself 
twice, first as Spinoza-Kant-Hegel, then as Deleuze-Derrida-Lacan" (Zizek, 
2004a: 33). In the mythocentric line, "[t]he triangle Spinoza-Hegei-Schelling is 
thus not as unambiguous as it may appear." This means although "Spinoza 
rejoins Hegel" on issues of the "feminine assemblage" of reason and the 
conceptual truth of religion, "Spinoza is closer to Schelling" in their naive belief 
in "true anti/fetishism" due to the ignorance of "the level of form" and the 
possibility of an Event (Zizek, 2004a: 54, 74-77). 
Juxtaposing the two series, two things could be deduced. First, Zizek is well 
aware of the conditions of excessive logos or obscene superego manifested 
in contemporary Spinozism and Hegelianism. If Spinozism supplies the 
"ideology of late capitalism", reducing consumers to un-reflexive marionettes, 
then Hegelianism provides the ideology of late nationalism, reducing 
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politicians to reflexive fools (Zizek, 1993: 216-19; 2004a: 34-41, 77-80). 
Moreover, Spinoza and Hegel cease to be logocentric and turn ambiguous 
because of the intervention of Schelling. Recall that, as we pointed out above, 
Schelling's true fetishism, the coincidental opposite of Spinoza's true anti-
fetishism, has also been acknowledged, and its ideological manifestation is a 
"fetishist disavowal", arguably the critical notion of Zizek, subsisting the 
o.bscenity of extortionate rationality. In fact, a full view of the mythocentric 
series may be read from Zizek's reading of Schelling's drafts of Ages of the 
World. Here he re-serializes the trio (as Hegei-Spinoza-Schelling) to represent 
"three levels of freedom" within Schelling's meditations on the relations of 
God/choice, fate/decision and the act/will-of-nothing (Zizek, 1996: 68-70; 
1997: 34-36). As a result, it is based on the passage from Kant's logocentrism 
to Schelling's mythocentrism that Zizek could reread the history of modern 
philosophy since "true philosophy begins" from them, which is a philosophy of 
the subjective truth, a truth of the subject implicated in substance (Kant's 
Thing and Schellng's Fate) (Zizek, 2004a: 45, 75). The effect is a. restored 
continuity between modern and contemporary philosophies. And yet, this 
continuity is possible because it has posited the ultimate notion of truth as the 
passage of two incompatible perspectives or "the parallax view'' (cf. Zizek, 
2006). Now, where does this view come from? 
Third, the restored continuity of modern and contemporary philosophies, 
including the continuity of two series within modern philosophy, is finally 
revealed as a retroactive causation (in place of their actual discontinuity) 
because of the post-philosophical turn made by Hegel and Lacan. This time, 
they herald a new philosophy of the subjective truth, a truth of the embodied 
subject separated from substance because of sexual difference. Zizek's 
theoretical challenge here is to analyze the passage of sexed consciousness 
from in-itself to for-itself in a syllogism, effectively, a retroactive movement of 
difference and repetition from the subject to substance and back with a piece 
of substance within the subject, or in terms of authorship, from Hegei/Lacan to 
Kant/Schelling and back (cf. Zizek, 1993; 2004a: 61-63). From this logical 
analysis, Deleuze may then be reread as an self-unaware Hegelian who 
misunderstands Hegel since their concepts miss and yet meet each other in 
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the coupling sites of morality and ethical politics, being and knowledge, and 
becoming and event (Zizek, 2004a: 45-75). Likewise, Deleuze may also be 
reread as a self-unaware Lacanian who misunderstands Lacan in the coupling 
sites of power and sexuality, body and language, and virtual reality and 
fantasy (Zizek, 2004a: 80-101). Hence, facing the charge that Zizek himself 
misunderstands Deleuze, he would gladly admit that if so then he is a self-
unaware Deleuzian. 
In consequence, we stress the self-analytical nature of Zizek's analysis on 
behalf of him. lt is apparent that his analysis comes from the fourth discourse 
of the analyst suggested by Hegei/Lacan. But he can no longer be deemed as 
a Hegelian or Lacanian in any doctrinal sense, since the Hegei/Lacan couple 
has fallen into the content of his syllogism, thereby only functioning to point 
toward a new philosophy of the subject. Thus, his analysis lies at the fourth 
order which is identical and yet not identical to the passage (in the three 
orders) of his analysis. And yet, calling the fourth discourse Zizekian still falls 
short of the mark, as if the reproduction of analytical subjects, which is already 
happening in our knowledge society, were a sign to the politics of Truth. Far 
from it, Zizek's work is to conduct a self-analysis of the analytical subject as 
nothing but a vessel of Truth. For him, analysts are true subjects because they 
are fearless and loving subjects constantly at odds with themselves in Truth, 
not because they are know-all prophets ahead of their times. As a result, the 
things Zizek deduces from Hegei/Lacan do not come from their all-embracing 
thought systems, but from the social-historical gaps reflected in their 
theoretical inconsistency, things which they know not they have done. 
In this sense, Zizek (2004a: 102) summarizes the "three phases in the 
relationship of Lacan toward the tension between Kant and Hegel" combined 
with their political imaginations. 26 The first totalitarian phase follows the 
26 One should note that Zizek's interpretation of Lacan is heavily indebted to Jacques-Aiain 
Miller. In fact, there are six "paradigms of jouissance" in Lacan's teachings. They evolve from 
the jouissance of imagination, signification, and impossibility to norm, discourse and non-
rapport, each of which takes a standpoint with regard to whether and how a psychoanalytic 
subject comes into play with the Other (Miller, 2000a}. The overall development leads to "the 
experience of the real," in which the speaking subject receives jouissance from the 
breakdown of the symbolic order in its dual senses of signification and embodiment. For later 
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Symbolic law supported by "the universai-Hegelian self-mediation". The 
second democratic phase pursues the Real desire posited by "the Kantian 
notion of the transcendental Thing". The third post-democratic phase passes 
to the Fictional drive through Schelling's vanishing mediation but finally 
because of Lacan's "additional twist, [as] he transposes the gap that 
separates all signifying traces from the Otherness into the immanence itself, 
as its inherent cut." As a whole, :Z:izek shows history after modern philosophy 
is much more complex than a quantitative-qualitative transition from Kant to 
Hegel as doctrinal Hegelians conceive it. His ideology critiques of 
contemporary cultural politics further demonstrate the far-reaching impact of a 
logical, as opposed to pre/phenomenological, retracing of the historical 
movement of ideas on post/Marxist philosophy and politics. 
Fourth, after the non-linear history of modern philosophy is reconfigured, 
:Z:izek can then analyze empirical phenomena by operating on four orders of 
social-psychological coordination simultaneously, which, we suggest, sums up 
his post-psychoanalytic-Marxist philosophy. The zero degree of coordination 
refers to the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real coordinates in their 
projective non"relation in a "flat" juxtaposition, thereby posing the question of 
a scientific explanation of the Imaginary (individual egos in a world society). 
On the first degree (RIS), :Z:izek conducts a causal-logical analysis of the 
couple of the Symbolic and the Real from the Fictional view. For, "[m]uch 
more difficult than to denounce/unmask (what appears to us) reality as fiction 
is to recognize in 'real' reality the part of fiction" (:Z:izek, 2004a: 171 ). On the 
second degree (RIS x RIS with 6 possibilities), :Z:izek conducts a variable-
perceptual analysis of the subset in the Real (consisting of objects, mathemes 
and the Thing) as opposed to the subset in the non-Real (consisting of 
images, symbols and Language) from the view of the subset in the Fictional 
(:Z:izek, 2004a: 1 03). The subset in the Fictional produces a minimal difference 
within the subset in the Real, which is manifested in the passage ''from 
subjectivation to subjective destitution". Subjectivization refers to the 
Lacan, the subject's "lack-of-being" is closer to Sartre's notion of "lack-in-being" than Levi-
Strauss' notion of structure. In other words, the subject is split from within, transcending its 
ego-consciousness in "the nihilation of classical subjectivity'' (Miller, 2000b). 
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matheme of desire (in Lacanese: subject-Other, "desire is the desire of the 
Other"), whilst subjective destitution refers to the matheme of drive (in 
Lacanese: $-a, the subject is nothing but a hole in "the object-cause of 
desire"). Accordingly, the minimal difference regards a "loop of enjoyment" 
based on sexual difference, that is, a loop between a masculine subject 
enjoying the Thing in the guise of the object and a feminine subject enjoying 
the object in place of the Thing (Lizek, 1993: 165-99; 1996: 92-98). Here it is 
crucial not to understand, like most critics do, .Lizek's notion of sexual 
difference in terms of bi/sexual dualism or dialectics, as if the question at 
stake were a moral crisis of masculinity or femininity, including their 
· discontents, since his conception is derived from Lacan's "formula of 
sexuation" (cf . .Lizek, 1993: 45-80)?7 Rather, .Lizek's problematic concerns, 
we suggest, the minimal difference between masculine renunciation and 
feminine renunciation in response to the question of sexuality as such. 28 
Therefore, on the third degree (which is the fourth order), .Lizek conducts an 
ideological-conceptual analysis of two incompatible actualizations of love, one 
from desire and the other from drive (Lizek, 1997: 76-87). One might say that 
the sociological subject ended in law and love is complemented with a 
27 This is inherent in Lacan's comic view of love as a missed encounter. A missed encounter 
of love occurs when one gives something which she doesn't have to the other who doesn't 
want it (Zizek, 2004b; cf. Baudrillard, 1990b[1983]: 134). In this sense, the two parties 
involved are not lovers to each other as individual human beings, but lovers with regard to the 
third element, an elusive something circulating in "the scene of two," as Badiou would say. 
The superfluous and yet indispensable something is schematized as objet petit a in Lacan's 
formula of sexuation (Lacan, 1998[1972-73]: 78ft). On the first approach, this something 
stands in for something else. 1t refers ambiguously to the names of the father and the mother, 
the phallus and the thing, or the cause of desire and the consequence of drive. On the second 
approach, this something stands out as nothing. lt formalizes the inexpressive void of the real 
at the momentary failure of representation. 
28 Theoretically, the difference stems from Lacan's reversal of Freud's psychoanalysis of love 
to "the other side of psychoanalysis" in his later teachings from seminar XI to XX, given 
between 1964 and 1973 (Miller, 2003). In Freudian psychoanalysis, love refers to the 
transference of sexuality. Transference love posits that one's serial objects of love stand for 
sexual displacement of the lack of love from his/her parent(s). In this sense, love is an 
ideology, a mirror reflection to sexuality within the causal chain of automatism and 
conditioning, or contingency and determination (Miller, 1994: 7-11). However, Lacan turns 
love into a labyrinth in which the dissymmetrical positions of love (i.e. loving and being loved) 
are expressions of sexual difference (i.e. castration and the phallus) and similitude (i.e. 
castrated and castrating). This rneans "the love life of the woman" appears if "she constitutes 
a man as a phallus, all the while secretly castrating him" (Miller, 1994: 12). Therefore, love is 
not determined by vulgar materialism (i.e. the repression of sexuality and its discontents) but 
is over-determined by a threefold psychic economy of the drive, desire and demand (Miller, 
1994: 13). In sum, Freud explains love away by his science and technology of sexuality, 
whereas Lacan reconsiders love as a matter of subjective faith and superstition (Miller, 2004 ). 
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psychological subject caused by desire and drive. If so, what matters in his 
social-psychological analysis is not an essentialist question of choice between 
the four states of the subject in the causal link, but an existential question of 
reconfiguring these subjective preconditions of actualization, shifting between 
their fundamental passageways. Simply put, the two passages, from Real 
desire to Virtual love on the one hand and from Fictional drive to True love on 
the other, symbolize two Orders of love via the necessary expression of two 
Forms of law. 
But what do the above four things we learn from Zizek have anything to do 
with Durkheim? Intellectual kinships (from Kant to Deleuze) aside, 
Durkheimians should have noticed the corresponding points of relevance. Are 
they not basic Durkheimian questions in the making process of sociology, 
which are questions of causality (in a sense-organism), history (in a mythical 
logic), truth (in a sexed subject) and society (in an order of love)? We 
formalize these four points since they make up a hole, an inherent limit 
between Durkheim's philosophy and sociology often obscured by 
Durkheimians' over-contextualization. 
6.2 Durkheim's social philosophy 
Durkheim's proposal of a loving organism of society exceeded the modernist 
philosophy of law and love before him. As a matter of fact, the 
phenomenological-historical reading of German idealism from Kant to Hegel 
was the overbearing philosophical system from which Weber and Simmer 
spun off their forms of sociology. Even Marx wasn't immune from the German 
ideology when he praised Hegel against Comte. Having shown that Comte 
was not less "great", as Marx (in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 42: 292) claimed, 
than Hegel, we maintain that Durkheim learned his social philosophy from 
Comte. 
Due to the wane of theoretical sociology in general and functionalist sociology 
in particular, the aforementioned reflexive condition has probably 
predominated over sociology instead of society in the past few decades. 
Within Durkheimian studies, in particular, the philosophical reading of 
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Durkheim receives a wider interest than the sociological reading. Precisely, 
this philosophical-sociological method is popular outside of American 
sociology where the Parsonian frame of social analysis has never lost ground 
(Alexander & Smith, 2005: 1-31; cf. Alexander, 1978; 1988; Gamic, 1987; 
1996). Most of these philosophical interpretations dismiss the Comtean 
tradition of Durkheim, placing him back to German idealism and its kinship, 
including materialism, realism and hyperrealism. 
First, Durkheim could be read as a Kantian and/or a French Kantian by 
identifying idealism in the moral action of persons. By the instruction of Emile 
Boutroux, Durkheim's sociological project "from is to ought" shares with Kant 
the general concerns of developing a spirit of laws from the moral science, an 
organic self from the division of labour, a kingdom of ends from the republic of 
persons, and ethics of duty, good and autonomy from the religious cult of man 
(cf. Miller, 1996). If not a Kantian, Durkheim is at least a French Kantian for 
his debts to Renouvier's neo-criticism are profound. Charles Renouvier's 
political republicanism and scientific liberalism, it is argued, had an indelible 
influence on Durkheim's beliefs in collective conscience and causal freedom 
(Stedman Jones, 2001: 87, 153). However, it's more accurate to argue that 
Durkheim's "Kantianism" had swerved from transcendentalism in crucial 
epistemological aspects since the reception of Kantian philosophy in France 
was channelled by eclectic spiritualism from Victor Cousin to Paul Janet (cf. 
Schmaus, 2004). In sum, these mutually-conflicting Kantian interpretations 
are symptomatic of a basic fact that Durkheim does not have a Kantian 
project to be carried out from is to ought (or, from meta/physics to morals), but 
rather, as we see below, a post-Kantian problematic to be worked through 
from the knowledge of being to an ethic of existence in a religious political 
sense. 
Second, Durkheim could be read as a Hegelian and/or a French Hegelian by 
recognizing idealism in the ethical life of individuals. Durkheim shares with 
Hegel various universal themes, including objective reason, history, law, 
morality and politics, etc. (Knapp, 1985: 5; 1986: 596) Agreeing with Hegel's 
concern for ethical life, in particular, his idea of organic solidarity reconciles 
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the dual logic of individual and society, body and mind, in a normatively 
bounded and yet historically open flow of becoming (Gangas, 2007): If not a 
Hegelian, Durkheim is at least a French Hegelian for his close friendship with 
Octave Hamelin (Strenski, 1989). Some question the link biographically and 
intellectually, but the intellectual points of contrast, such as reason versus 
reality, morality versus society, truth versus history, etc., reduce Durkheim to 
an anti-Cartesian empiricist, siding with the "evil genius" (Nemedi in Nemedi 
et al., 1995: 111). Hence, it remains plausible to read Durkheim and Hamelin 
together in a philosophical tradition of representationalism culminating at the 
end of the 19th century (Mestrovic, 1988: 47-48). In fact, Durkheim has passed 
the classical dualism of empiricism and idealism, criticizing instead the 
"radical empiricism" of pragmatism by Hamelin's "radical idealism" (Durkheim, 
1983: 34-35; however, see Nffl edi, 1995: 123-24, n. 8). 
Third, Durkheim could be read as a Marxian, post-Marxian and/or anti-
Marxian through a difficult crossover from idealism to political materialism. 
Coinciding with Marx, Durkheim has a radical socialist vision behind his 
political economic critique of the statist law and forced labour as an order of 
fatalism as well as anomie (cf. Pearce, 1989). Moreover, Durkheim leaves a 
lasting reminder to Marxism on the question of creating a "socialist morality" 
by disciplining, or rather self-controlling, the "passions and desires" of "human 
subjectivity and effectiveness, even for the revolutionary" (Pearce: 1989: 198, 
205). The post/Marxist appreciation of the potentials of Durkheim's thought is 
echoed in the Hegelian assessment: "what a Hegelian argument would look 
like immediately after Marx can be found in Marx's ethical sociology." 
(Gangas, 2007: 333, n. 12) In consequence, Durkheim's "collective 
subjectivism" produces a social ontology of the body and soul on the one 
hand and social epistemology of truth and ideology on the other. His sociology 
amounts to a position of "contradiction, ambiguity and aporia," shifting 
between pre-structuralism (social being) and post-structuralism (social 
knowledge) as a condition, and structuralism (social order) and critical 
structuralism (social change) as a result (cf. Lehmann, 1995). 
Fourth, Durkheim could be read along with Mauss' symbolist anthropology, 
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radicalizing idealism into social realism between words and things. On the one 
hand, if a homological structure could be transposed on Saussure's linguistic 
order (of la langue), Durkheim-Mauss' social order (of primitive classification), 
and Mauss' symbolic order (of the gift), then Durkheim's notion of the social 
fact might be conceived as social discourses, the "sacred effect of language" 
(Gane, 1992: 61-84). Believing an order of words on top of things reveals a 
Christian approach to realism (based on grace), according to which social 
realities, from complex and violent to tacit and charitable characters, are 
predicated on a holistic human being (cf. Melior, 2004). On the other hand, if 
heterogeneous cultures could be collected from the comparative religious 
studies of Sylvain Levi, Mauss' "second uncle" and Durkheim's "alter ego", 
then the Durkheimian notion of religion might be perceived as material, spatial 
and temporal existences, the "embodied sacred things" (Strenski, 1997: 116-
48). Obeying a state of things at the bottom of words betrays a Judaic 
approach to realism (based on legalism), according to which social realities 
are "structured" in a metamorphic web of societies composed by singular 
objects. Contrary to appearance, however, the cultural successors to this 
legalist realism are not to be found in the seriousness of Cartesian reason and 
Kantian thing-in-itself, but in the festiveness of Rabelaisian playground of 
things and Wundtian "/' ecole des chases" greatly admired by Durkheim (Aiun 
Jones, 1999: 58-68, 172-231). 
Fifth, Durkheim could be read along with Bergson's vitalist philosophy, 
inverting idealism into psychological hyperrealism between selves and the 
other. lt is argued that the works of Durkheim and Bergson are twin modern 
sources of postmodernism in anticipating the writings of Deleuze, Foucualt, 
Baudrillard and Derrida. Both generations of theorists transfer their anxiety 
about the contested situation of the intellectual to the thinking of (the 
disappearance of) the sacred in society (Riley, 2002). First, Durkheim and 
Bergson are reconciled because of Durkheim's compromised idea of "the left 
or impure sacred" developed alongside the anthropological studies of Mauss, 
Hubert and Hertz. Then, the modern sacred and the postmodern sacred are 
correlated through "the transference of these essentially Durkheimian ideas of 
the sacred to some of the students of Mauss during the 1930s, most 
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particularly to Bataille, Caillois and Leiris and other members of le College de 
Sociologie and other groups of the literary and artistic avant-guard of the 
interwar years" (Riley, 2002: 251, 258). However, before the conceptual 
confusions between religion, magic and mysticism are clarified theoretically 
and empirical!~, this plausible lineage should be regarded as an institutional-
ideological transference rather than intellectual-philosophical confluence. At 
bottom, Durkheim's symbolist thought belongs to "a variant on the religious 
reformist trends of his time", which is neither "a species of avant-guard 
thinking mirrored in the radical artistic and literary movements such as the 
symbolist movement", nor "an anticipation of the religi~us social radicalism of 
self-appointed successors of Durkheim such as le College de Sociologie" 
(Strenksi, 1997: 153). 
Virtually all interpretations above distance Comte from Durkheim's social 
philosophy. On the first approach, they appear quite fair to point out the 
mythmaker Parsons whilst refuting the myth of a positivist Durkheim. But early 
Parsons' (1937) reading of Durkheim as a positivist turned idealist is not a 
mistake; his mistake lies in not being positivist enough with regard to his 
analytic realism. He fails to acknowledge that Durkheim's positivism is neither 
confined to his early work nor confined to Comte's early work. As for 
commentators in the shadow of German idealism, they simply risk throwing 
the baby out of the bathwater, missing a real Comtean legacy purified by 
Durkheim. On the second approach, they are truly unfair to Parsons since he 
consistently seeks to apply or translate Durkheim's theory, or any other theory, 
to an analysis of modern society. Without respecting his sociological method 
of reading, one cannot appreciate later Parsons' "evolutionary" reinterpretation 
of Durkheim's Elementary Forms in the human condition rather than social 
system (Parsons, 1937: 640-96; 1973: 156-80). 
Acknowledging Bellah's classic essay on Durkheim, later Parsons had 
outlined his evolutionary theory of general human action by 1970, jointly 
guiding the value orientation of American sociology to study modern society 
as a cybernetic system of moral individualism and civic religion (Bellah, 1959; 
Parsons, 1970). At this stage, one might recall the real myth of Parsons 
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behind the whole demythologization of the positivist Durkheim. We are 
referring to Dennis Wrong's 1961 sloppy criticism of Parsons for presenting an 
'over-socialized image of man'. We suggest a source of confusion lies in an 
inadequate differential understanding of American sociology represented by 
Parsons and Bellah. In fact, Bellah (1959: 451-52) confuses Durkheim's 
'genetic method' for a 'historical method', albeit his loose idea of history has 
excluded historicism. In this context, Durkheim's proposal of 'comparative 
sociology' is intended to provide a methodological precondition of 
anthropology rather than history. It is a structural method in place of Comte's 
historical method insofar as genetic comparisons can be generalized from 
'several societies of the same species' to 'several distinct social species' 
(Durkheim, 1982[1895]: 156-58). This explains why Durkheim argues against 
the materialist concept of history, insisting on religion as the base of economy, 
and also why he argues against the empiricist concept of history, describing 
causal relationships as universal laws 'regardless of time and place' 
(Durkheim, 1982[1897]: 173; 1982[1908]: 215). In sum, while Bellah is pulled 
by a pre/Comtean-Durkheimian method of historical evolution, Parsons is 
pushed to a posUComtean-Durkheimian method of genetic evolution 
(ironically through his affirmative reading of Bellah's essay).29 
For Parsons (1973: 167-71), Durkheim's study of religion explores, besides 
cognitive and normative symbolizations, the "expressive" component of 
human action "as a generalized medium of interchange anchored primarily in 
social system but specifically mediating primary interchanges with both 
personality and cultural systems". This affective category is expressed in the 
contexts of sense (of appetite), faith (in a community of effervescence) and 
ritual (by symbols of blood and eating). Moreover, Durkheim's study of religion 
is not just social-cultural but rather scientific, since it proves that religion is a 
"general system of action" constitutive of the code within behaviour 
organisms, a science comparable to contemporary genetic biology 
unforeseen by evolutionary biology in Durkheim's time (Parsons, 1973: 160-
29 More ironically, Bellah-Durkheim's evolutionary thesis of moral individualism is inherited by 
the contemporary arch anti-Parsonian, Giddens, whose interpretation of Durkheim favours the 
lectures of morality, education and politics in Durkheim's Bordeaux years (Giddens, 1978: 16-
19, 49-50, 63-64, 80-82). 
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66). In sum, Parsons (1973: 161-62) eventually seizes the perverse core in 
Comte-Durkheim's positivism (that is fetishism) at the revelation that free will 
lies in the genes. Foreign to post-idealist rationality (excluding the path from 
Fichte to Schelling),' the conundrum of legalism and voluntarism does not find 
its solution in the external bound of legalism, but in an internal limit of 
voluntarism itself.30 
All post/idealist interpretations of Durkheim, albeit contextually or reflexively 
reasonable in their own right, cannot invalidate Parsons' self-evident thesis 
that Durkheim's notion of conscience collective completes the evolution of 
French subjectivism from Descartes through Rousseau to Comte (Parsons, 
1968: 313-14). This suggests that a quasi-essentialist dimension survives in 
Durkheim's social philosophy between Descartes and Kant. Indeed, it could 
be found in Spinoza's eternal conception (sub specie aetemitatis) if one 
'examine[s] the doctrine of categories and the problem of totality in the works 
of Aristotle, Bacon, Spinoza, Kant and Renouvier.' (Neilsen, 1999: 19, 33) In 
the long run, '[d]espite Durkheim's attachment to Aristotle, Renouvier and 
others, the most systematic comparison is with the work of Spinoza.' (Neilsen, 
1999: 242) Representing 'political liberalism of their respective eras,' 
'Durkheim and Spinoza forge monistically oriented philosophies within the 
contexts of civilizational encounter, philosophies which retain their dual 
commitments to both tradition and modernity.' (Neilsen, 1999: 242-43) If such 
is the case, then Schelling's Spinozist idealism follows closely behind (cf. 
Durkheim, 2004: 33, 38). 
Disturbed by "pure" philosophical comparisons, philosophical-sociologists 
might still wonder about the immediate context of Durkheim's social 
philosophy. By 1851, a scientific model of French philosophy had been 
30 This is where Mestrovic (1988) errs in placing Durkheim in the legacy of Schopenhauer, 
since essentialist voluntarism falls in complicity with constructive legalism. In fact, Durkheim 
does not accept a bleak world of representation dictated by wanton will. At the level of the will, 
he rejects Schopenhauer's theoretical claim, "pleasure is simply the absence of pain", on 
three accounts: there is a) a non-violent need of pleasure, b) a continuous act of pleasure, 
and c) a needless cause of pleasure (Durkheim, 2004: 61). At the representational level, he 
refutes "empirical monism" in addition to "idealistic monism", which regards man as "the 
creator of his own suffering" (Durkheim, 1960b: 330-31). 
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established by Main de Biran's psychology and Comte's biology as they 
betrayed from Cousin's eclectic circle and Saint-Simon's socialist circle, 
respectively. Since then, the model was elaborated by the subsequent 
philosophical generation, culminating in Bergson's psychological philosophy 
and Durkheim's social philosophy. 31 French Kantians and Hegelians were 
subjected to this general trend rather than subjugating it when they imported 
German ideas (cf. Gunn, 1922). For Durkheim, therefore, the object of 
philosophy is individual consciousness, psychological states of time-space, 
whereas the object of sociology is collective representation, social facts as 
things. Both philosophy and sociology are regarded as a science, since each 
study rests on a set of facts no less factual than positive sciences. Simply put, 
they open up two extra orders of "objectivity'' (Durkheim, 197 4: 1-34; 1982: 
50-59; 2004: 33-35). In light of this, Durkheim's social philosophy could be 
regarded as the weakest link between psychology which he opposes and 
sociology which he supports. 
More systematic than his philosophical essays on representations, judgments 
and human nature, the elementary forms of Durkheim's social philosophy can 
be generalized from his Sens lectures delivered in 1883-84 and pragmatism 
lectures delivered in 1913-14 (Durkheim, 1983; 2004). Meanwhile, these texts 
"should be understood in the context of his religious politics," considering that 
a constant battle of secular rationalities of the state and the church was fought 
within Durkheim's academic community (Gross, 1997: 142, italics mine).32 1n 
the light of texts and contexts, it turns evident that during his entire career 
devoted to a science of sociology, Durkheim never stopped thinking over 
31 Durkheim's students, biographers and commentators cannot give us any consistent picture 
about the exact philosophical relation between Bergson and Durkeim. Both men had similar 
racial, religious, family and educational backgrounds, allowing one to conduct a comparative 
psycho- or cultural analysis (cf. Greenberg, 1976; Strenski, 1997). Larger contextual 
examinations even show that their intellectual projects and impacts entwine in a more 
complex manner than both men were willing to admit at the time (cf. Lalande, 1925; Bougl? in 
Durkheim, 1974; Peyre, 1960: 14; Lukes, 1973: 52, 495, 505; Pearce, 1997: 24-26; Gross, 
1997; Riley, 2002). 
32 In addition to phylogenetic and ontogenetic contexts of analysis which we have seen in the 
previous footnote, a sociogenetic analysis prefer to draw a sharp contrast between Bergson 
and Durkheim in the context of institutional facts sui generis, including clusters, personalities, 
colleges and faculties (cf. Clark, 1973; Greenberg, 1981; Weisz, 1983; Grogin, 1988). These 
analysts are Durkheimians who "love" Durkheim too much (arguably the most) to 
acknowledge Durkheim's religious politics in his original texts (let alone Bergson's). 
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again and again some perennial dualities in theology and philosophy, such as 
God and world, body and soul, consciousness and perception, truth and 
reality, reality and thought, thought and action, etc. Accordingly, if his 
statement of human nature is said to finalize "a modulated dualism set within 
an implicit monism" (Neilsen, 1999: 223), then one must add that his social 
philosophy reinstates a modulated monism set within an implicit duality. For, 
the material, spatial and temporal causalities of fate and freedom, law and 
will, representation and consciousness, or science and conscience in 
Durkheim's social philosophy can no longer be determined by logocentrism or 
mythocentrism alone. After all, it is in the spirit of Comte's narrative logic that 
Durkheim advances a mythical logic of history, a genetic evolution of history 
caused by the sense-event: "consciousness is therefore not a function with 
the role of directing the movements of the body, but the organism knowing 
itself, and solely by virtue of the fact that organism knows itself, we can say 
that something new occurs" (Durkheim, 1982: 82-83). 
6.3 Durkheim's sociology 
Durkheim's sociology is qualified for the crown of science because it traverses 
a passage of truth from logocentrism to mythocentrism and back. 
Differentiated from his social philosophy, the sociological figures which carry 
this passage of truth ask the question of education. Against post/idealist 
understandings, we shall argue that Durkheim does not support education by 
morals and/or opinions, but education by a truth subtracted from them. One is 
educated by the truth of love rather like heroes and heroines in Goethe's 
Buildungsroman. Moreover, Durkheim does not conceive love as an effect of 
human values and/or discourses, but love as a sense-event organized 
materially, spatially and temporally. Durkheim never promises us a sociology 
of love, not even a comparative-cultural one (as Weber does), but love in 
Durkheim's sociology can be scientifically symbolized through three degrees 
of causality. First, a temporal causality is expressed in the mediated, 
generational relation between children and adults. Second, a spatial causality 
is situated in the immediate, mimetic relation between nature and society. 
Third, a material causality is embedded in the de/mediated, ritualistic relation 
between women and men. At every degree, a question of the social organism 
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recurs in different perspectives from a neuter body through sexual organs to 
the de/sexed bodily fluid, blood. The question is not supposed to be 
interpreted contextually as an "analogy" of any empirical society in modernity 
from a critical or ambivalent standpoint, but is to be read textually as a literal 
truth in the structure of a fiction. In short, Durkheim symbolizes society in an 
organism of love by a mythical logic. 
Before entering the three degrees of causality of love in education, we should 
understand Durkheim's general theory of education in his Sorbonne.lectures 
delivered in 1902-03. He lays out a moral theory with relevant educational 
practices, explicating how a child can be socialized by imparting a feeling of 
duty in the mind, the good in the heart, and autonomy in the will. In theory, he 
outlines three elements of morality, including the spirit of discipline by rules, 
attachment to social groups, and self-determination of the self (Durkheim, 
1961: part 1). In practice, he canvases three aspects of education, which 
consist of reasoning against corporeal punishment and rewards, developing 
altruism in the school environment and cultivating judgment by discrimination 
between scientific and non-scientific knowledge (Durkheim, 1961: part 11). We 
focus on his moral theory. 
On the one hand, Durkheim rejects the liberai-Marxist idea of discipline based 
on control, that is, discipline understood as "a violation of a man's natural 
constitution" by "impeding his unrestricted development". On the contrary, a 
limitless self is "a sign of disease", a "view of the infinite" bound to go from 
aspiration to anguish like "Goethe's Fausf'. His reason is a "reserve of vital 
energy" applies "for all forms of human conduct and, even more generally, for 
all kinds of biological behaviour," including survival ("amount of nourishment"), 
activity (walking and repose), "general sentiments" ("love of animals, even 
love of others") and "intellectual life" ("quantity of knowledge") (Durkheim, 
1961: 38-40). Nevertheless, discipline could be checked by "criticism or 
reflection, the agents par excellence of all change", since "conformity must not 
be pushed to the point where it completely captures intelligence" (Durkheim, 
1961: 52). As such, revolutionary heroes like Christ and Socrates are not anti-
disciplinary rebels, for "we must take care not to confuse two very different 
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feelings: the need to substitute a new regulation for an old one; and the 
impatience with all rules, the abhorrence of all discipline" (Durkheim, 1961: 
53). In result, a distinction between normality and pathology is transversal to 
all conditions since all discipline "regularizes" its means and "constrains" its 
goals (Durkheim, 1961: 47). 
On the other hand, Durkheim refutes the liberai-Marxist idea of attachment 
based on self-interest, since self-interest does not equal to self-worth: "if each 
individual taken separately has no moral worth, the sum total of individuals 
can scarcely have more. The sum of zeros is, and can only be, equal to zero." 
Accordingly, interest of the self and sacrifice to the other are both sides of the 
same coin, since "the practice of philanthropy is a virtue for some. Morality on 
the other hand, must by definition be common and accessible to all. Thus, one 
can scarcely see in sacrifice or in the devotion of person to person the kind of 
act we call moral" (Durkheim, 1961: 58-59). In result, "above and beyond me 
as a conscious being, above and beyond those sentient beings who are other 
individual human beings, there is nothing else save that sentient being that is 
society. By this I mean anything that is a human group, the family as well as 
the nation, and humanity" (Durkheim 1961: 59). 
These groups are called "permanent and organized crowds" in a 
physiological-psychological sense, insofar as "[!]he organism itself is 
something other than a sum of its cells, so is society a psychic being that has 
its own particular way of thought, feeling, and action .. ." (Durkheim, 1961: 62, 
65). Yet there is a "quite unintelligible" question about "renunciation of the self' 
(Durkheim, 1961: 66). Durkheim (1961: 67) wishes to explain "why we must 
regard society as desirable in and of itself and not only to the extent that it is 
useful to the individual." His general reply refutes "the hoary habits of thinking" 
social-individual dualism as "a deceptive appearance". Examples of suicide, 
language and religion are discussed to explicate the interpenetration of 
society and individuals in production of an actual person who "is not only a 
being who disciplines himself' but "also a system of ideas, of feelings, of 
habits and tendencies, a consciousness that has a content" (Durkheim, 1961: 
67-73). 
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His specific reply begins from the social fact of familism, nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism. On the one hand, these groups can never replace one 
another since "each has its function", and yet they can be stratified in 
"different phases of our social and moral evolution, stages that prepare for, 
and build upon, one another" (Durkheim, 1961: 74). On the other hand, the 
political society has a primacy over the other groups, and yet nationalism is 
"the limiting case" which "most closely approximates the society of mankind", 
if and only if "the inflated and jealous state knows no rules other than those 
directed toward its own interest" (Durkheim, 1961: 81). Here Durkheim over-
identifies "the internal improvement of society" with "the general interest of 
humanity" according to a "centrifugal" rule of morality, capable of ruling "the 
state [to] commit itself as its main goal not to expanding, in a material sense, 
to the detriment of its neighbours" (Durkheim, 1961: 77). Given the case, his 
normative typology of nations, which distinguishes the "scientific, artistic, and 
pacific" from the "aggressive, military", obscures some realistic conflicts 
between national morality and its interest in an international division of labour. 
But Durkheim is no idealist since he is fully aware of the problem revolved 
around the distinct bodies of human groups in the making of a world society. 
The nation-state is given primacy over humanity because "there is no 
constituted society ... a social organism" in mankind, whereas "the state is 
actually the most highly organized form of human organization in existence" 
(Durkheim, 1961: 76). One might argue that Durkheim's evolutionary image of 
society is torn between the present body of nation-states and the future spirit 
of humanity, whilst assuming the familial past. Nonetheless, his moral spirit of 
humanity is determined by the social body more !han historical time because 
the fundamental rule of his argument posits that a body once born (family and 
nation-state) doesn't truly die, and a body yet to be born (humanity) doesn't 
have a real life. 
In sum, discipline and attachment are two moral aspects in society, whose 
· authority doesn't come from extra/ordinary individuals, but from "superhuman 
beings" embodied in the collective conscience of beliefs and sentiments. One 
can observe these beings by the "organization of society", since even when 
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the "silent functioning of the internal organs" may "escape us", "the effects get 
through to us" (Durkhiem, 1961: 86-93). Therefore, virtues of duty and good 
turn into "a pair of abstractions" since "they altogether lack that which is 
needed to touch the heart and mind - above all, the minds and hearts of 
children." These "fuzzy concepts" are insubstantial "moving forces of conduct" 
composed of "emotional language", which "must be put in contact with the 
concrete and living realities" (Durkheim 1961: 94). Durkheim (1961: 98) does 
not confound the ideas of duty and good for "a single unity", but regards them 
as "the one or the other view of society", so that "we act out of respect for duty 
or through a desire of the good." Irrespective of conceptual integration, they 
"are still different things", designating two types of people (Durkheim, 1961: 
99). One is the Kantian man characterized "by self-control and a tendency to 
withdraw", whereas the other is "the loving hearts, the ardent and generous 
souls ... these passionate men" characterized "by a love of spending 
themselves, by an outward expansiveness ... by active and creative energy" 
(Durkheim, 1961: 1 00). Furthermore, the two types of moral individuals can be 
generalized into collective sentiments. Durkheim (1961: 101) argues that in 
times of stasis and integration, "such as that of Louis XIV or that of Augustus", 
"the preference for rule and order is naturally preponderant". By contrast, "in 
times of flux and change," "the spirit of sacrifice and devotion" becomes the 
salient morality. As a whole, discipline and attachment form the duality of law 
and desire, not love, since the rule of duty and good will are pushed and 
pulled by the Other. They are not sufficient to make up a social being in love: 
the third element is required, self-determination of the will. 
The introduction of the third "element sui generis of morality" is far from an 
anthropomorphosis of the Other into the Self. Durkheim never goes so far as 
to count on ethical individuals as the basis of a society of lifestyles, for it 
would be a nominal rather than a real society. In fact, he proposes "only a 
provisional approximation of moral reality" by giving "some feeling for this 
richness and complexity." "Morality is a preeminently human thing" which 
"embraces apparent contradictions" to appear idealistic and realistic at once 
(Durkheim, 1961: 122-26). He feels the urgency to "develop a spirif' matching 
with "the establishment of appropriate institutions", social bodies prompted by 
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"(n]ew ideas of justice and solidarity" (Durkhiem, 1961: 1 02-03). Precisely, he 
asks how the body and the spirit could be related to resolve the duality of law 
and desire, finally knowing the social being of morality rationally and 
scientifically. 
Durkheim's rational morality seeks to be scientific in later Comte's sense of a 
subjective synthesis of theology and metaphysics within positivism. On the 
first approach, he translates Judaic-Christian theology positively by identifying 
the "religious symbolism" of God, save God's essence, with the collective 
society, society understood as an object of both being and becoming, 
exteriority and interiority. This moral argument of society, as we call it, echoes 
his moral argument of the existence of God (Durkheim, 1961: 1 03-07; 2004: 
302-08). In explicit terms, "[a]ll that we needed was to substitute for the 
conception of a supernatural being the empirical idea of a directly observable 
being, which is society- provided that we do not view society as an arithmetic 
sum of individuals, but as a new personality distinct from individual 
personalities" (Durkheim, 1961: 104). As a result of his positive theology, "(a] 
society remains, in some measure, the same throughout all the course of its 
existence. Throughout the changing conditions to which it is subject, there is a 
basic character that is always the same" (Durkheim, 1961: 1 06). 
On the second approach, Durkheim (1961: 1 08) translates Kant's 
metaphysical morals positively by embodying the "double necessity" of 
constraint and autonomy in the dualism of human nature. With this explicit 
move back to Descartes and Pascal, he puts forward a scientific argument of 
morality, claiming to "resolve" the "contradiction between the good and the 
obligatory, between the individual and group" by "the dualism of our nature: 
autonomy is the product of reasoned will, heteronomy is the product of the 
senses" (Durkheim, 1961: 109-111; cf. 1960b). Suggesting a positive dualism 
of human nature as an answer to the abstract duality of society, he brings the 
philosophical question of the will's autonomy down to a sociological question 
of "effective autonomy", "progressive autonomy", or "enlightened allegiance" 
(voluntary conformity) (Durkheim, 1961: 114-15). In a metaphysical world with 
nobody involved, Kant can safely argue "the will is autonomous", to which 
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Durkheim questions "by themselves, moral laws are not necessarily 
imperative" (Durkheim, 1961: 109, 113). But if we live in a human society with 
bodies of groups and individuals, then "science is the wellspring of our 
autonomy", "thought is the liberator of will", and "we must have knowledge, as 
clear and complete an awareness as possible of the reasons of our conduct" 
(Durkheim, 1961: 116, 119-20). 
On the third approach, Durkheim's "science of morality'' is neither a rationalist 
science (boasting "man's reason as the legislator"), nor a humanist morality 
(imagining "morality is a personal artifact"), but a moral science consisted of 
"a system of symbolic representations" to "adequately express" nature and 
society, "just like the mathematician can determine the relationships between 
magnitudes through a simple mental calculation and without having to 
observe the actual relationships of such magnitudes they obtain outside of 
him" (Durkheim, 1961: 114-15, 119). By the symbiosis of natural objects with 
subjects on the pole of science, and social beings with things on the pole of 
humanity, the third element of morality turns out to be more than just 
achieving autonomy, but rather acquiring "intelligence". In an implicit move to 
Spinoza, morality can be enriched from "a function of the act", intentional or 
not, to a function of knowledge, achieving a deeper awareness "into the 
nature of things - the symbolic explanation of the rule itself, its causes and 
reasons for being" (Durkheim, 1961: 120). In sum, moral education leads one 
to a revelation of some total "knowledge of nature", "an ideal limit that we 
approach asymptomatically" (Durkheim, 1961: 116). As if to preempt 
Bergson's creative evolution with revelatory evolution, however paradoxical it 
might sound, Durkheim holds a human society can will against its free but 
blind will through a production of the self in order to love only intelligible 
laws/desires of the Other. 
Now one could read Durkheim's remaining discussions of the three aspects of 
education as a tutor's manual advising practical issues deduced from his 
moral theory. Specifically, children learn to know and love his morality after 
they are initiated to a set of proper relations between pupils and their tutors, 
pupils and other pupils, and pupils and kinds of knowledge under instruction. 
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However, it is far from a functional enforcement of a theory of socialization by 
teachers who are agents of socialization. Between theory and practice, in fact, 
there is a chapter considering basic observations of children's behaviours and 
temperaments before advices to the above practical circumstances are 
given.33 
Durkheim (1979: 149-53) defines childhood as a period of growth, in which a 
child expresses his/her physical, mental and moral fragility as well as 
potentials. At once weak and strong, a child is equivalent to a capricious 
"force for change" in a "constant process of renewal", and yet the "free 
movement and unhindered development" remains "the victim of 
circumstances". Accordingly, capricious change includes rather than excludes 
constancy. This means the political instability of a child induces him to appear 
"a sort of anarchist, ignorant of all rules, restraints and consequences", and 
"also a little traditionalist, even a stick-in-the-mud." By contrast, only an 
individual who has "self-control, the power to contain, regulate and overcome 
oneself' is considered to undergo a "veritable metamorphosis". Lacking a 
veritable order to make a change, a child's love-fear complex for novelty and 
change is destined to a movement of repetition, "a force of action" with 
"nothing to counterbalance if'. "For this reason, it is very easy to make the 
child acquire habits" (Durkheim, 1979: 153-54). In result, a child's "formation 
of character and will" requires "a taste of regularity" which "is not yet respect 
for rule and duty", but "manic routine" or "mechanic order". Paradoxically, 
"nature does in fact place in our hands the means necessary for transcending 
it" (Durkheim, 1979: 154). 
Furthermore, Durkheim reads Rousseau's Emile to the purpose. In fact, 
Durkheim's approach to education is closer to Rousseau than Kant whose 
philosophy is said to agree more with Spencer's on the primacy of self-interest 
" The detour to discover some facts about children's nature protects his scientific application 
from the ideological concerns of his time. Due to further complications caused by this detour, 
we will not go on to provide a systematic analysis. Nonetheless, one can see the apparent 
problem of education here regards a mediated relation between children and adults, 
expressing a temporal causality of love. In this regard, a more concise account could be 
drawn from his notes on "childhood" published in 1911, and lecture outlines entitled 
"Rousseau on educational theory" published posthumously in 1919. 
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(Durkheim, 1979: 179). Discarding the German lens of Rousseau who 
idealizes either romantic nature (anti-Kantian) or enlightened culture 
(Kantian), Durkheim rightly applies Rousseau's theory of savage education in 
human civilization to his theory of moral education. We could divide 
Durkheim's outlines of Rousseau's educational theory in three parts. 
First, education has a "positive value", which isn't based on socialization in a 
critical or reflexive sense, such as class reproduction, state control, and value 
indoctrination, but on socialization in a paradoxical sense of denaturing and 
naturalization, or simply a social simulation of nature. Inasmuch as "the 
essential elements of man" can be ultimately found in "the nature of things", 
there is "nothing to study" but to "look for the child in the child" (Durkheim, 
1979: 164-70). 
Second, education has a "negative morality", which is "to educate man by 
things" where "the sentiment of absolute necessity stems from". Man's 
"superfluous powers" can be curbed when he is "surrounded by things", so 
that he personally experiences "the feeling of necessity" and "the feeling of 
resistance". The natural learning with "no restriction of movement" is 
analogous to natural healing with "no doctor" (Durkheim, 1979: 171-73, 176). 
The "action of things" "pre-forms" "a positive effect" distinguished from the 
commands of others' opinion and will (Durkheim, 1979: 183, 185). On the one 
hand, "opinion does not express things as they are. lt denatures them. lt is an 
artificial thing" (Durkheim, 1979: 175). On the other hand, "human will must be 
disregarded" because it "superimposes on the real world a world of fiction and 
imagination" (Durkheim, 1979: 183). In sum, finite things "act from necessity, 
impersonality", stopping· us from doing otherwise and making us obey 
"inflexible laws" with "no choice" (Durkheim, 1979: 177-78). The injunction of 
things says "let the curb be the force, not authority" (Durkheim, 1979: 178). 
Rejecting the commands of obstinate opinion and arbitrary will, man knows 
"true freedom" by "doing what one can" in "the feeling of the impossible" 
(Durkheim, 1979: 173-174). 
Third, education has a "negative relation", which requires no obedience, no 
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punishment, no lessons, and no action of the child involving the tutor, for the 
tutor always remains aloof (Durkheim 1979: 177). Tutor and pupil are not 
involved in a contiguously interpersonal relationship of authority, but rather a 
natural-social relation intermitted by the action of things. Yet, this is not to say 
there is no personal master or action; rather, there is "no direct action. But not 
all action is forbidden. Tutor is the master of things; is behind them ... the tutor 
must speak as things." In short, a pupil "must live surrounded by things", not 
by people (Durkheim, 1979: 179, 181). To sum up, Durkheim's moral theory 
practices "negative education", which seeks to produce a "positive value" of 
nature in society by developing a "negative morality" of "beings limited by 
things", "invincible and legitimate things", in a "negative relation" of "no fusion" 
between human beings (Durkheim, 1979: 186-94). 
However, a temporal causality of love expressed in the mediated, 
generational relation between children and adults assumes that society 
reproduces itself in a neuter body independent from natural history. As such, 
the first degree of causality begs the question about the social organization of 
time by the natural force of things. In the pervious analysis, we have seen that 
his repetitive effort is to present a valid proof of this force, only manifested 
differently in his scientific theory of law and symbolic theory of religion. We 
stressed that the notion of force in his theory of religion posits a speculative 
non/identity of natural religion and moral society. But we haven't studied the 
relation of nature and society directly from the scientific view of law. Thus, it is 
worth consulting Durkheim's Latin thesis on Montesquieu finished in 1893, the 
same year as his main doctoral thesis The Division of Labour in Society, and 
his Bordeaux lectures on Rousseau delivered before 1901 and first appeared 
posthumously in 1918. Here post/idealistic interpretations interested in 
speculating Durkheim's political position from his academic- and religious-
political contexts ironically fall back on a pre- or anti-Durkheimian ground, for 
they tend to dis/miss the scientific lessons Durkheim draw from Montesquieu's 
and Rousseau's explicitly political writings. 
By and large, Durkheim seeks to reduce an original model of social science 
mainly from Montesquieu's Spirit of Law and Rousseau's Social Contract. He 
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argues carefully the potentials and limitations of their ideas, developing, 
above all, a scientific re-conception of "law" and "nature" to subsist a 
typological study of. societies as real things. From Montesquieu's case, 
Durkheim explores the conditions (of social things, types, laws, and 
descriptions), fields (of laws and ethics), societal classification (by sovereign 
powers) and methods (of deduction, experiment, comparison, induction and 
history) a social science is supposed to have. In Rousseau's case, the state of 
nature and origin of societies, the body politic and general sovereignty, and 
finally general and particular laws are further examined. According to 
Durkheim's oblique logocentric series from Descartes to Comte, Montesquieu 
and Rousseau are two key figures of transition in the making of a true social 
science, insofar as they swerve from the circular deadlock of utilitarian 
interests and humanist values in Hobbes' and Kant's political philosophy. 
For Durkheim, Montesquieu surmounts the twin traditions in the philosophy of 
natural laws based on "deliberate will of human beings" and "general notion of 
man". Montesquieu "declares not only the general laws, but also the whole 
system of laws, past and present, to be 'natural'. However, he derives the 
laws from the 'nature' not of man but of the social organism" (Durkheim, 
1960c: 20-21). Specifically, "he does not separate law from morality, trade, 
religion, etc ... Widely as they may differ, all these phenomena express the life 
of a given society. They are elements or organs of the social organism" 
(Durkheim, 1960c: 56). Nonetheless, he has problems justifying a division of 
law and ethics on the one hand and a mixture of law and rule (given by a 
lawgiver) on the other. These problems suggest Montesquieu still 
compromises with the traditional views due to his failure to extend the field of 
natural laws to "the whole of social existence" (Durkheim, 1960c: 22-23, 48-
49). Since "he also applies the word laws to relations between ideas rather 
than between things", Montesquieu lacks Comte's progressive method of 
history (Durkheim, 1960c: 59, 63). 
In a concrete analysis, Montesquieu commits a confusion of double standards 
in his classification of societies which are republic (city-states of antiquity and 
the Middle Ages), monarchy (modern European nations) and despotism 
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(Oriental empires). After rejecting Aristotle's criterion of classification based on 
number of rulers, Montesquieu's criterion still wavers between "the number, 
arrangement, and cohesion of their component parts" and "the nature of the 
sovereign authority", or "forms of government" (Durkheim, 1960c: 26, 32-33). 
Against the latter criterion, Durkheim gives an extended analysis of these 
societies based on the former. In terms of social sentiment, a republic is 
based on virtue; monarchy on honor (or self-love); despotism on fear. In terms 
of social structure, a republic is based on the unity of an undifferentiated body; 
monarchy on the division of labour in which "the classes - or, to use a 
contemporary term, the organs - of the social body limit not only to the 
authority of the prince but each other as well"; despotism on "the aspect of a 
monster, in which only the head is alive, having absorbed all the energies of 
the organism". In terms of social power, a republic is based on individual 
equality with no "antagonistic parties", monarchy asks for collective "political 
freedom", and despotism is sustained by people being "equal in the sate of 
servitude" except the ruler (Durkheim, 1960c: 27-32). Yet, it's crucial to note 
that Durkheim refuses to endorse any form of society, let alone any form of 
government in this typology. In fact, this is exactly his point of criticism, insofar 
as Montesquieu biases against despotism, unable to respect that "each type 
has its own perfect form." Besides, he explicitly warns us not to mistake 
Montesquieu's republican socie.ty for "present-day France" (Durkheim, 1960c: 
25, 62). Thus it is more apt to say that Durkheim's theory of society 
assimilates the symbolic force of his contemporary society without conforming 
to any secular powers of that society. Meanwhile, this means Montesquieu's 
scientific re-conception of law is not sufficient to observe societal types. 
Durkheim has also to re-conceive the relation between nature and society by 
recourse to Rousseau's miraculous account. 
For Durkheim (1960c: 73), Rousseau's state of nature "definitely continued to 
reject Hobbes' pessimism about the presocietal man." On the other side, 
Rousseau's sovereign power also surpasses Kant's moral law by making itself 
no exception from limits: when the sovereign power infringes upon the rights 
of the citizens, it must be committed "by individuals who have taken its place 
and usurped its authority. Hence there is no obligation to obey (compare with 
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Kant)" (Durkheim, 1960c: 115). In result, "society is nothing if not a single 
definite body distinct from its parts", an organicist view superior to Spencer's 
"superficial relationships" of self-interest in a vague connection with sympathy 
(Durkheim, 1960c: 83-84). However, Durkheim has to maintain Rousseau's 
dual principles of individualist reflection and socialist compassion without 
falling into self-contradictions committed by Rousseau (Durkheim, 1960c: 73, 
85). Hence he questions "if, as assumed by Rousseau, Montesquieu, and 
nearly all thinkers up to Comte (and even Spencer relapses in to the 
traditional confusion), nature ends with the individual, then everything that 
goes beyond the individual is bound to be artificial." (Durkheim, 1960c: 66) 
Through defending Rousseau against Rousseau, Durkheim intends to prove 
that nature ends with the social. 
Durkheim (1960c: 137) proposes a logical re-description against the common 
historical interpretation of Rousseau, while concluding that "just as he fails to 
explain how social life, even in its imperfect historical forms, could come into 
being, he has great difficulty in showing how it can possibly cast off its 
imperfections and establish itself on a logical basis." In fact, his logical reading 
of Rousseau's account of the origin of societies from the state of nature bears 
a striking resemblance to Schelling's account of the genesis of time from 
eternity. "lt is as though, in metaphysics, after assuming the subject to be self-
sufficient, we should attempt to deduce the object from it" (Durkheim, 1960c: 
80). "Rousseau's solution is fraught with contradictions. But this is far from 
specious" (Durkheim, 1960c: 80). "One reason for not imputing to Rousseau 
the radical pessimism that has been attributed to him is the germ of social 
existence is inherent in the state of nature" (Durkheim, 1960c: 90). 
Deconstructing Rousseau's text closely, Durkheim (1960c: 67) argues "the 
state of nature should be taken not as historical truths but as hypothetical, 
conditional speculations." Natural man's "desires are satisfied. He cannot 
covert what he does not have ... At that state of his development, he was not 
unsocial but asocial. .. he is happy': (Durkheim, 1960c: 73-74). "Men come to 
need each other more and more and become increasingly interdependent. 
Thus they emerge naturally from the state of nature ... Thus, in order for 
190 
society to arise, external circumstances must increase man's needs and 
consequently modify his nature" (Durkheim, 1960c: 81). "Something must 
have upset the existing balance, or if it was never really stable, certain factors 
must have marred it from the very beginning" (Durkheim, 1960c: 75). "[A] first 
association must have unleashed their passions, broadened their intelligence, 
in short, upset the original balance" (Durkheim, 1960c: 79). "Once the balance 
is upset, it cannot be restored. One disorder follows from another. Once the 
natural limit is crossed, there is no turning back. Passions beget passions and 
stimulate the intelligence, which offers them new objectives that rouse them to 
a fever pitch" (Durkheim, 1960c: 80-81). "Rousseau certainly prefers the state 
of nature to the civil state he sees about him ... But there is no ground for 
supposing that he regarded this state of perfection as the only possible state 
of perfection" (Durkheim, 1960c: 89). "But then, if there is some way of 
correcting these imperfections or making them impossible, the grandeur alone 
will remain, and perhaps this new perfection will be superior to that of the 
original state" (Durkheim, 1960c: 91 ). 
Yet, Durkheim's question is more complex and original than providing a logical 
basis of history for Rousseau, which is, after all, already there in Rousseau's 
subtexts. The bite of his criticism comes in the second part of the conclusion: 
"[s]o unstable is its foundation in the nature of things that it cannot but appear 
to us as a tottering structure whose delicate balance can be established and 
maintained only by an almost miraculous conjunction of circumstances" 
(Durkheim, 1960c: 137 -38). Bluntly put, the properly Durkheimian question of 
"the nature of things" frames his analysis of Rousseau's views on politics and 
laws. 
On the first approach, Rousseau specifies the body politic and sovereign force 
in accordance with the law of nature. "This new life must therefore be 
organized without doing violence to the law of nature" (Durkheim, 1960c: 93). 
"Thus nature and society cannot be reconciled by outward juxtaposition. 
Nature must be recast...The state of nature must be transformed and, at the 
same time, maintained ... they must assume a new form without ceasing to be" 
(Durkheim, 1960c: 93). "Thus they would depend, not upon each other, but 
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upon a force which by its impersonality would be identical, mutatis mutandis, 
with the force of nature" (Durkheim, 1960c: 94). "But natural is here 
synonymous with rationaf' (Durkheim, 1960c: 95). In this context, Durkheim 
rejects Grotius' doctrine of "the right of the stronger" and Janet's doctrine of 
the "exchange of the personality of others", reaffirming that a "society is an 
organized body", since "the moral order ... must be introduced. However, it 
requires a foundation in some being ... the social body" (Durkheim, 1960c: 97, 
99, 1 03). Furthermore, Rousseau's notion of sovereignty is regarded as a 
"new type of personality" or "simply the collective force ... in the service of the 
general will" (Durkheim, 1960c: 105, 11 0). In the authorship of Rousseau, 
Durkheim summarizes four characters of sovereignty, which are inalienable, 
indivisible, supreme, and restricted. The former two characters describe the 
sovereign power as a "collective being [sic] sui generis" and "a homogeneous 
force" that is "not organic", effectively, a "vitalist and substantialist conception 
of life and society" comparable to "a living body ... animated by a single 
indivisible soul" (Durkheim, 1960c: 11 0-12). The latter two characters describe 
the sovereign power as having "no check" but "tak[ing] cognizance only of the 
body of the nation ... an agreement...between the body and its parts, in short 
between the body and itself' (Durkheim, 1960c: 112-15). 
On the second approach, Rousseau specifies the positions of general 
lawmakers and specific law governors in his political society. Rousseau's 
lawmaker, in a view more scientific than Montesquieu's lawgiver, has no 
power. "He can have no effective force for implementing his idea, for if he had, 
he would replace the sovereign power ... He can only propose. The people 
decide ... [Yet] how can he win obedience ... ln all likelihood, he will not be 
understood ... in actual history legislators have been able to get around these 
difficulties by taking on a religious character'' (Durkheim, 1960c: 118-19). "By 
some happy, unpredictable accident, a lawmaker must emerge to guide the 
people ... such individuals are few and far between, and when they do appear, 
it is as if by miracle." Here Rousseau inevitably falls back on "historical 
pessimism. Though not necessarily contrary to nature, society does not arise 
from it naturally" (Durkheim, 1960c: 121). Furthermore, Rousseau's law 
governors, in a view more scientific than Montesquieu's classification, 
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"depend on the size of the society ... Each kind of government may, of course, 
be best for a particular mode of existence." This is so even when Rousseau 
personally prefers aristocratic democracy in a society where "bonds between 
individuals should be reduced to a minimum" (Durkheim, 1960c: 124-27). And 
yet, Rousseau's "entire theory of government is based on a 
contradiction ... Either, without any change in the general conditions of the 
state, the government becomes more concentrated and so acquires a power 
that is not in keeping with the size of the society, or else the government as a 
body usurps the sovereign power or the executives as individuals usurp the 
power that they should exercise only as a body" (Durkheim, 1960c: 128-29). 
In conclusion, Durkheim stops to wonder if Rousseau is wrong to eliminate 
"the illogical and antisocial separation between spiritual and temporal power", 
inventing instead a "state religion ... reduced to the few principles needed to 
strength the authority of the ethical power'' (Durkheim, 1960c: 133-34). 
This is not to say that Durkheim wishes to repeat "the illogical and antisocial 
separation" of two powers, at least not naively. Rather, he pushes the properly 
Comtean plan for the reconstruction of society to its logical extreme. 
Durkheim's "natural religious politics", as we call it, should be understood in a 
strict sense of his symbolic science. This is shown in his renunciation of 
formulating any messianic religious politics which is destined to be assimilated 
by another temporal power. Moreover, his critical analysis of Rousseau's 
views on politics and laws has a reflexive significance for his theory of society 
set in a division of labour. For Durkheim, a society is not just a body of vital 
forces, but rather a living organism based on a sexual division, the division of 
all divisions. Rather than imagining a Simmelian female culture, Durkheim 
fully admits sexual difference embedded in a society. This is why he develops 
"the method of determining this function", specialization, from a philosophical 
discussion of friendship, marital relationship and sexual evolution, which is a 
philosophy of dissimilarity, not "feelings of empathy that spring from similarity" 
or "general[ly]love [that] presumes a certain harmony of thought and feeling" 
(Durkheim, 1984: 17, 22). From the outset, Durkheim's notion of solidarity has 
ruled out the "union" or "fusion" of "two representations" or "images". Instead, 
"in the case of division of labour, they remain outside each other and are 
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linked only because they are distinct. The feelings that arise cannot therefore 
be the same in both cases, nor can the social relationships that derive from 
them" (Durkheim, 1984: 22-23). Here one would fall back on commonsense in 
the guise of Kant's spirit by remarking that "love is not love if it cannot cope 
with our hurts and disputes" (Miller, 1996: 1 04). In fact, foreshowing an 
intermediary form of society in the notion of "sexual totemism," Durkheim 
conceives sexual antagonism as a real symbol of love suspended within the 
social organism to augment individual diversity (cf. Durkheim, 2001: 124-25). 
Nevertheless, a spatial causality of love expressed in the immediate, memetic 
relation between nature and society assumes that society produces itself in a 
sexed organism independent from primitive kinship. As such, the second 
degree of causality begs the question about the formal organization of space 
by the real force of objects. For, a natural-social space cannot be conceived 
as a form awaiting organization before some cryptogenic objects are placed in 
it. At this stage, Durkheim's logocentrism meets mythocentrism. We are 
referring to his studies of incest and suicide, both of which were published in 
1897, the same year of his essay 'Concerning the definition of religious 
phenomena', and two years after the putative "transition" from science to 
religion usually inferred from his "revelation" by the work of Robertson Smith 
self-reported in a letter dated 1907 (Durkheim in Pickering, 1984: 61). We 
have refuted the epistemological break imputed to him, arguing instead that 
his studies of law and religion are integral to his symbolic notion of science, a 
science framed by a unique sociological series of logocentrism. Nonetheless, 
Durkheim needed to provide a methodological ground for the symbolic view c 
itself, that is, a "reversed" mythocentric method of anthropology established in 
1897 to supplement his logocentric method of sociology formulated in 1895.34 
This means a mythical core of Durkheim's logical science could be released 
from his narratives of incest and suicide. In short, we hold that the two works, 
one of anthropology and the other of sociology presented to their best, 
34 Durkheim's question of method between 1895 and 1897 has been shown clearly by Gane's 
research. In fact, Gane problematizes Durkheim's question on several levels, including a) a 
textual complexity in the sociological method, b) a contextual reversal between the 
sociological method and the theory of suicide, and c) a broken link between a social modeling 
and an individual "scenography of suicide" in the theory of suicide (Gane, 1988: 1994; 2000a; 
2005). 
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disclose the internal limit and horizon of Durkheim's thought. 
Durkheim reveals the nature and origins of the incest taboo by a method of 
anthropology. The method states "in order to understand a practice or an 
institution, a judicial or moral rule, it is necessary to trace it as nearly as 
possible to its origin" on the following ground: "although the manner in which 
they must develop is not fatally predetermined by the properties which 
characterize them at their birth, these properties do not cease to have a 
profound influence on the entire course of their history" (Durkheim, 1963: 13). 
Defined as such, his method is firstly not an anthropological method 
commonly understood in terms of "structure" versus history. Nor is it, 
secondly, an archaeological method normally conceived as digging out hard 
evidences on the "original" site of a certain history. Rather, Durkheim's method 
of anthropology is closer to the genealogical method in Nietzsche's sense of 
the term. 35 Precisely, it is the counterpart of his genetic method of evolution at 
the basis of comparative sociology to go beyond Comte's historical method 
(Durkheim, 1982: 156-58). 
Durkheim (1963: 15-16) starts from an observation of the law of exogamy 
widely practiced by aboriginal clans, a clan defined as "a domestic 
society .. .founded exclusively on the community of the totem, and not on a 
definite bond of consanguinity." For example, "among the tribes of Victoria, the 
slightest suggestion of love-play among the people of the same clan was the 
object of repressive measures" (Durkheim, 1963: 18). Hence he concludes 
"exogamy is the binding force of the clan" (Durkheim, 1963: 25). Moreover, 
exogamy is the "very form that the incest prohibition appeared for the first time 
in history ... For all repression of incest presupposes familial relations 
35 The structural relativism in anthropology (i.e. respect foreign cultures) could adopt a surface 
observation or a "deep description", but the anthropological method is an offspring of 
phenomenology in the final a.nalysis. The primitive absolutism in archaeology could hunt a 
lived fact (e.g. a bone, a tissue), an artifact (e.g. a clay, a mural) or a natural fact (e.g. a 
meteor, a fault), and yet the archaeological method is a derivative of empirical positivism. In 
contrast, Durkheim's method of anthropology works on the logic of proof to trace the descent 
of an origin, a birth in history (Nietzsche). This method is re-appropriated in many ways from a 
genetic mutation of the body (Bergson, Deleuze), through a discursive history of the present 
(Foucault, Derrida), to a meta-political art of disappearance (Baudrillard, Badiou). 
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recognized and organized by society" (Durkheim, 1963: 27). "However", he 
adds quickly, "we cannot rest content with those. exclusively dialectic 
considerations" (Durkheim, 1963: 28). 
Tracing the social "origins" of incest, Durkheim (1963: 54, 68) refutes three 
hypotheses: a) the hypothesis of violence due to "specific peculiarities of 
lower societies, b) the hypothesis of heredity due to "constitutional 
peculiarities of human nature in general", and c) the hypothesis of instinct due 
to "a horror of blood". The first hypothesis, supported by Mclennan, Lubbock 
and Spencer, explains the taboo by factors such as infanticide, collective 
marriage, war and pillage (Durkheim, 1963: 54-56). For Durkheim (1963: 57, 
59), these exterior factors make an "unfortunate confusion between the tribe 
and the clan" because clans "in the majority of Australian and even Indian 
tribes ... were born of two primitive roots by way of spontaneous generation. 
They were therefore not due to a sudden introduction of foreign and already 
differentiated elements." Morgan provides the second hypothesis, explaining 
the taboo by the harmful diseases a consanguineous marriage would cause to 
the individual organism. However, this is a derivative reason not only because 
"the aristocrats, the elite, cannot be formed in any other manner'' but also 
because "there is a striking disproportion between the real inconvenience of 
consanguinity and the terrible sanctions imposed without exception on all 
those who transgress the law of exogamy" (Durkheim, 1963: 64-65). Finally 
refuting the hypothesis of instinct, Durkheim (1963: 68) argues "blood, it has 
often been said, has a horror of blood. But such an explanation is a refusal of 
explanation." 
Nevertheless, he totally accepts the horror of blood as an objective social 
phenomenon, which is the most subjective type of ideology, a pure 
commonsense compared to the hypotheses of violence and heredity, only to 
re-cognize it by a social scientific explanation, the hypothesis of rituals. 
"Since", Durkheim (1963: 69) reasons "the totem is a god and totemism a cult, 
is it not rather in the religious beliefs of lower societies that one must go to 
look for the cause of exogamy?" His initial explanation says the horror of 
blood expresses the term called taboo in "a collection of ritualistic prohibitions 
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which have their objective to avert the dangerous effects of a magical 
contagion by preventing all contact between a thing or a category of things." 
One is forbidden to "touch" it, for "the nature of things is capable of diffusing 
and extending to the infinite by way of contagion." To accommodate 
something which "comes from the divine," "[a]ll that is needed is some chosen 
receptacle to contain such energy", an "object", a "container" strong enough to 
resist being "destroyed by its contents" (Durkheim, 1963: 70-71 ). This "feeling 
of horror" which causes a mutual avoidance of the sacred and the profane 
"demonstrates how deepseated is the separation of the two sexes ... Does this 
hostility", he asks rhetorically, "not symbolize the type of antagonism that 
exists between the two sexes" (Durkheim, 1963: 71-72, 78)? 
Explicating sexual prohibitions by ritualistic prohibitions, furthermore, 
Durkheim adduces the anthropological studies of James Frazer and Ernes! 
Crawley precedent to Robertson Smith. We should note in passing that 
Robertson Smith is a primary reference in support of Freud's thesis developed 
from Totem and Taboo to Moses and Monotheism, so that he could found a 
psychoanalysis of sacrifice (i.e. the in/famous "historical truth" of the Oedipus 
myth in an act of killing one's father) in a further reversed form to Durkheim's 
sociology of sacrifice evolved from Incest to The Elementary Forms (cf. Preus, 
1987: 187-90). For Durkheim (1963: 85, italics mine), the origins of exogamy 
are revealed in the following scientified myth, "blood is taboo in a general way. 
lt taboos all that enters into contact with it. lt repulses any contact and creates 
a vacuum ... Thus the woman, in a rather chronic manner, is the theater of 
these bloody demonstrations." On the first approach (as a result of his reading 
of Frazer and Crawley), blood is a de-mediated, material cause of the restraint 
and concealment of sexual organs, for "the veil is often a means of 
intercepting a magical action" (Durkheim, 1963: 85-86). On the second 
approach (as a result of his reading of Robertson Smith), blood is a mediating, 
quasi-cause of the communal body in which "a single flesh", "a single blood" 
and "a single soul" share their "consubstantiality" in the "mythical being" of a 
"blood-covenant" (Durkheim, 1963: 88). lt is the quasi-cause for two reasons. 
First, "the magical properties attributed to the blood ... come from" the "totemic 
being", a being who is "an individual" separated conceptually from the literal 
197 
totemic substance, "the animal or the vegetable species", but still "contain[s] 
within itself, in power, the species and the entire clan." In result, if the blood is 
empowered by an individual being, then the "sympathetic magic" of the 
savage, a superstitious belief that fragments or severed body parts live on 
without an organism, can be explained (not explained away) by a totemic 
religion of the body (Durkheim 1963: 86-87). Second, it is through the blood 
that "the totemic being [sic] immanent to the clan [sic] is incarnate in each 
individual." In result, "there is god in each individual organism" (Durkheim, 
1963: 89). 
In his synthetic view, Durkheim (1963: 92) comes around to "guard against 
literally accepting the popular explanations" as they condemn the woman as 
"a seat of impurity" by relating her menstrual blood "to evil powers rather than 
protective divinities." However, it is also incorrect to say that Durkheim guards 
for the sacred woman for her purity. Rather, he fully understands that women 
in the popular imagination can be interpreted as "either a dangerous magician 
or a born priestess" (Durkheim, 1963: 92). These two irreconcilable views 
together express "the extreme ambiguity" in "the notion of the divine" 
(Durkheim, 1963: 96). Hence, his precise scientific point is that "it is not so 
much as a deliberated being that the woman is taboo, but because she is the 
source of a magical action" (Durkheim, 1963: 93). Given the case, it is na"ive 
to fall back on the first, temporal causality of love: one could argue in a 
constructivist criticism that Durkheim "identifies" with patriarchal men who 
subject women to a contradictory object of hate, hate of and hate by women, 
given that they are excluded as strangers in a social reality virtually perceived 
as nee-liberalism (Lehmann, 1994). it is not even satisfying to stay at the 
second, spatial causality of love: one could also argue in a deconstructive 
ambivalence that Durkheim "projects" women as a borderline object of fear, 
fear of and fear for women, given that they are alienated as sacred insiders 
and profane outsiders in a social reality formally conceived as some other 
scene within nee-liberalism (Tiryakian, 1981; Gane, 1992: 85-132; 1993: 21-
58). For him, "[t]he fact is that fear is an integral part of respect", and 
"whatever difference there was with regard to the consciousness of these two 
emotions, disgust and veneration, they translated themselves into the same 
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external signs" (Durkheim, 1963: 95). Durkheim harbours neither hate nor fear 
to go down to the material causality of love. He accepts those ambiguous 
popular feelings, hate and fear of blood as a mythical symbol, in order to 
transform them into a social feeling of respect. 
But what exactly is the "social nature" of incest? In fact, Durkheim has cleared 
the ground to answer the question in part H of Incest, which means before the 
real cause of the taboo in the blood is tracked down. There he makes sure a 
clan society is irreducible to a temporal-spatial social system represented by 
Cunow's "ethnography of the system of classes", according to which "each 
class would be a group of individuals of approximately the same age" 
(Durkheim, 1963: 28-32). Cunow's theory presupposes a society has a 
"double organization" rested on a unity of totemic groups and "the common 
habitat", which is a confusion of "totemic associations" with "territorial 
associations" (Durkheim, 1963: 25). This is confusing because, once the 
custom of women leaving home to live with their husbands is taken into 
consideration, "a weakening of the strictly totemic group takes place. For 
portions of various clans, which are thus reunited in a single place, live one 
life together and as a result form a society of a new type" (Durkheim, 1963: 
42). Eventually, the system theory runs into a logical contradiction: "the duality 
of the totemic group and of the territorial group disappears, whether the two 
become one, or whether the former ceases to exist. it was this duality that 
produced the alternating combination to which the system of classes 
corresponds" (Durkheim, 1963: 43-44). Durkheim (1963: 40) clarifies that a 
totem is not "only a word, a verbal sign; it is the symbol of an entire ensemble 
of traditions, of beliefs, of religions and other practices. But when the different 
parts of the same clan no longer live one life together, the totem no longer has 
its original significance, although it retains its prestige for a long time because 
of habit." Introducing his genetic view of evolution by habit, Durkheim (1963: 
45-46, 97-98) escapes Bachofen and Morgan's matriarchal view of society 
without giving in to the system theory which is eventually a patriarchal view of 
society. For him, "what tends to reverse the principle of uterine lineage is the 
law of exogamy combined with custom according to which the woman must 
live on the locale of her husband, for it is these two rules that determine that 
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the child is immediately placed far from his mother's clan" (Durkheim, 1963: 
48, italics mine). As such, Durkheim (1963: 49) rejects Cunow's thesis holding 
"the Kurnai are more primitive than the other Australian tribes." Far from the 
elementary form, the Kurnai's "fusion of clans" is closer to his/our 
contemporary society since it is "made up of groups whose members look 
upon themselves as related, but who do not have a common insignia. 
Furthermore, no where are the instances of prohibition of so multiplied ... Far 
from the incest horror among them being at a minimum, it is nowhere so fully 
developed; one can even say that it reaches a point of abnormal 
development" (Durkheim, 1963: 53). 
In view of this, the social nature of incest symbolizes two sentiments of love, 
one situated in the "domestic", sexual order of society whilst the other in the 
"conjugal", sexed order of society (Durkheim, 1963: 1 06). In kinship relations, 
"love is not simply a spontaneous movement of personal sensitivity; it is, in 
part, a duty ... This is why the home has always had, today and in former 
times, a religious character'' (Durkheim, 1963: 100-01 ). "Elsewhere, there are 
sexual relations ... [T]he society that they form depends exclusively, at least in 
principle, on their voluntary affinity ... Love in this instance, can exist only on 
condition that it is spontaneous" (Durkheim, 1963: 101). The problem is 
"marriage seeks in vain to be the most moral form of sexual society" because 
"as long as they are not yet legally and morally linked, they are in the same 
situation as lovers" (Durkheim, 1963: 1 02). The duality of "the good and the 
pleasant, duty and passion, [and] sacred and profane" in the sexual order of 
society is so radical that "a man cannot make a wife of his sister without her 
ceasing to be his sister. This is what makes us disapprove so strongly of 
incest" (Durkheim, 1963: 1 03). Given "the opinion of mankind", "there must 
have been some cause, foreign to their structural attributes, that determined 
this manner of seeing things" (Durkheim, 1963: 105, italics mine). Why? The 
foreign cause "must have existed first" not because incest is impossible, but, 
on the contrary, because incest is a/ways possible: "the sexes should 
differentiate themselves and form some sort of two societies within one 
society; for nothing, either in the constitution of one or the other, would make 
such a separation necessary" (Durkheim, 1963: 108, 114, italics mine). 
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In conclusion, Durkheim (1963: 108, 114-15)stresses repeatedly that just as 
"the prejudices relating to blood" tell us "there is nothing in the properties of 
blood necessarily predestined it to acquire this religious character'', nothing 
but a real, quasi-cause, so the conjugal, sexed order of society foreign to the 
domestic, sexual order of society is not to be seen as "a progressive 
realization of certain fundamental ideas". Passing the necessity of "human 
dialectic", the sexual order must "have been imposed" by the sexed order as a 
"powerful force," a force authorized by the "obligatory nature" of truth 
(Durkheim, 1963: 108, 115; 1983: 98). 
No doubt, the eternal antithesis between passion and duty would 
have always found a means of demonstrating itself; but it would 
have taken on another form. It is not in the heart of sexual life that 
passion would have established, so to speak, its centre of action. 
Passion and love between the sexes would not have become 
synonymous (Durkheim, 1963: 112). 
6.4 Durkheim contra Bergson 
In view of the foregoing discussions, we may now explore the internal limit 
and horizon of Durkheim's sociology. We have seen his theory of society is 
revolved around dual orders, namely a domestic order and a conjugal order. 
Adopting these conventional terms, however, Durkheim leaves a wrong 
impression to careless readers that a clan defined as a domestic society 
refers to the domestic order. Even as his clan society is rightly understood as 
the conjugal order, one runs into a further risk of regarding him as an 
ideologue of the patriarchal family. In fact, the latter case has been 
established by critical constructivists and ambivalent deconstructionists alike. 
Their case is based on ample textual evidences found in Durkheim's defense 
of the indissolubility of marriage for the benefit of men, as he declared his 
practical stands in an essay 'Divorce by mutual consent' published nearly a . 
decade after his statistic-sociological analysis of "conjugal anomie" in On 
Suicide (Durkheim, 1978[1906); 2006[1897): 284-305, 422-31; cf. Tiryakian, 
1988: 1030-32; Gane, 1993: 117-19; Lehmann, 1994: 64-81). 
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These interpretations put Durkheim's thought into a gender frame of mind, 
which is, we suggest, the ideology of our contemporary world. Gendered 
readings miss their target of criticism and reflection .for having confused 
Durkheim's idea of (sexual) passion with sex on the one hand and (familial) 
duty with love on the other. According to his usage, "domestic society" and 
"conjugal order" are purely contradictions in terms for defining and describing 
a clan. We might even say that his clan conception of society aims at an 
unremitting deconstruction of the family, as if Durkheim is working out how 
Comte's altruistic love could evolve from familial types of affection, which are, 
to recall, veneration, attachment and sympathetic love in the filial, sibling and 
conjugal relations. This is why he takes great pains to develop the genetic 
method of anthropology from sociology in Incest, arguing for the original 
survival of totemism at the end of the evolutionary chain against patriarchal 
and matriarchal models of society (represented by Cunow and Morgan). In 
other words, he traces the ex/istence of an original cause in the elementary 
form of society, de-territorialized and de-historicized society, via a passage 
from the symbolic thing of totem in the clan, through the real object of blood in 
the incest prohibition, to the original truth of love between the sexes. This 
passage presents a moral proof of love, like his moral proof of God, not a 
mere evidence of it. In sum, the incest taboo proves that conjugal love is but 
is not just a mythical coupling of affinity by attraction and repulsion: love has 
also been preformed by a scientific order, an order sui generis, in society. 
To clarify Durkheim's semantic obscurity, we have renamed his dual orders of 
society in terms of a sexual order and a sexed order. The sexual order is 
based on a phenomenological duality of sexuality/family (or, passion/duty), 
whereas the sexed order on a logical duality of sex/love. Marriage is an 
institutional site linking and breaking the dual orders, but these two emotional-
conceptual couples do not represent social phenomena in the same breath. 
As a result, there is an insoluble sexual difference built in his sociological 
analysis. 
Durkheim presents a clear picture of the sexual order, which may be found in 
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his theoretical refutation of the hypothesis of infinite pleasure and suffering 
{based on his anti-utilitarian view of happiness and progress) and anomic 
division of labour in The Division of Labour, in his statistical analysis of familial 
egoism and economic anomie in On Suicide, and in his practical 'Discussion 
on sex education,' where he points a way out of the impasses of moral-
religious mystification and scientific-political demystification of sexual matters 
imparted to children (Durkheim, 1979[1911]: 140-47; 1984: 179-99, 291-309; 
2006: 179-217, 262-84). In this regard, Durkheim argues consistently for a 
moral-scientific integration and regulation of myths created by the popular 
imagination. This is why, we recall, Durkheim (1961: 38ff, 66ff) expounds the 
duality of discipline and attachment in Mora/ Education by correlating an 
ethical lesson of "reserve of vital energy" learnt from Goethe's Faust with a 
social fact of "renunciation of the self' embedded in the structure of world 
politics. At this stage, we understand that his idea of education advocates an 
ethic of masculine renunciation. On the first approach, his sexual ethic has 
advanced to a neuter standpoint akin to Weber's neo-classicist reading of 
Goethe. On the second approach, his sexual ethic remains in a masculine 
standpoint shared by all non/Marxist sociologists we have discussed so far, 
regardless of their nuanced images of Goethe from the perspectives of neo-
classicism, neo-romanticism and neo-Enlightenment. On the third approach, 
beyond any secular political arithmetic (of conservatism, liberalism and 
radicalism), his sexual ethic eludes the masculine standpoint again for a 
foreign cause. 
For Durkheim, the cause for masculine renunciation comes from elsewhere. 
From the vantage point of the sexed order, the sexual order will unleash a 
masculine force of sex-love once bereft of moral-scientific discipline. This is 
the force of mysticism, a contemporary doctrine of which may be found in 
Bergson's late work The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. First, Bergson 
over-identities morality with religion in a single instinctive force of Life, from 
which intelligence and intuition evolve as the two sources of power (of 
pressure and aspiration) to distinguish between closed and open moralities, 
static and dynamic religions, and mechanic and mystical societies of love 
(Bergson, 1935[1932]: 97-101, 266-68). In this sense, the speculative 
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non/identity of society and religion is dissolved in a biological metaphysic of 
life, according to which society is religion and vice versa. Second, taboo and 
totem are the functional products of static religion in dual perspectives, 
individual organism and human species (Bergson, 1935: 120-34). 36 By 
contrast, Bergson's dynamic religion adopts the third perspective, the view of 
vital impetus.37 Third, a mystical society of love is correlated to open morality 
and dynamic religion. Morally, mystic "sensibility" as a "faculty or power of the 
soul" is masculine since "woman is as intelligent as man, but [sic] she is less 
capable of emotion" (Bergson, 1935: 44). Religiously, mysticism may be 
traced back to Greek and Indian philosophies, but "the complete mysticism is 
that of the great Christian mystics" (Bergson, 1935: 227). Socially, "[t]he 
mystic love of humanity is a very different thing" from the natural kinds of 
loving one's family and country (Bergson, 1935: 234). 
Strictly speaking, Durkheim's critique of mysticism targets at William James 
rather than Bergson in his lectures on pragmatism. This is why he defines 
pragmatism in "the Anglo-Saxon milieu", and carefully distinguishes James' 
self-identification with Bergson's criticism of "classic rationalism" from the non-
identity of "the positive conclusions at which the two men arrive" (Durkheim, 
1983: 5-7, 32). Setting the French academic politics aside, Durkheim has 
acknowledged the similar spirit between his sociology and Bergson's 
philosophy in their common invocation to a vital force. Nonetheless, he 
pledges loyalty to a unique lineage of life philosophy, in which he associates 
without confusion Nietzsche's doctrine of truth "beneath appearances and 
fiction" and German romanticist "sense of complexity, richness and variety" 
with Comte's sociological feeling "which would be richer, more complex and 
less formalistic" and yet rationalistic "in the highest degree" (Durkheim, 1983: 
2-5). Thus it is more correct to say that Durkheim's sociological question, 
distinguished from a psychological one, is less concerned with the 
36 From the view of individual organism, "religion is a defensive reaction of nature against the 
dissolvent power of intelligence": this is taboo. From the view of human species, "religion is a 
defensive reaction of nature against the representation, by intelligence, of the inevitability of 
death": this is totemism (Bergson, 1935: 122, 131). 
37 From the vital impulse arise new religious representations which are "defensive reactions of 
nature against the representation. by the intelligence, of a depressing margin of the 
unexpected between the initiative taken and the effect desired" (Bergson, 1935: 140). 
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intensification of psychic force than with the organization of social life. 
In light of this, a horizon limited in the conceptual relation of life-time and free 
will could be drawn by contrasting Bergson's psychological philosophy with 
Durkheim's social philosophy. On the one hand, a single life-time has a 
supreme value for Bergson, whereas Durkheim appreciates better the 
meaning of deaths in life, lapses of time. Solving Zeno's paradox, Bergson 
vivifies a mechanical series of actions into a mystical act of duration. Hence, 
he often discusses the case of the relation of vision to the eye or the relation 
of the hand to the iron filings that limit its motion, recovering mysterious acts in 
the flow of everyday life (Bergson, 1911[1907]: 87-97; 1935: 207). However, 
cutting mystical "contact" with the Bergsonian body of functions, Durkheim's 
organicism, as we understand it, expresses something foreign to structuralism 
and functionalism alike. For Durkheim (1983: 95, 97), "continuity and 
communication exists in the mind, as they do in things," and yet "the need for 
distinction and separation [sic] lies in things themselves." In this sense, if "a 
state of anomie is impossible wherever organs solidly linked to one another 
are [sic] in sufficiently lengthy contact", it doesn't mean live contact with 
persons, but quasi-live contact with persons through things in a society of 
specialization (cf. Durkheim, 1984: 304-08). 
On the other hand, Bergson gives an unconditional plea for free will, whereas 
Durkheim appreciates better the role of fate imposed on the will to make it 
free. Note that this is far from an epistemological or deontological 
disagreement, but rather an ontological difference. Bergson's philosophy of 
creative evolution begins from reclaiming the notion of reality by evolutionary 
means and ends in rejecting the notion of noting as fictitious (Bergson, 1911: 
ix-xv, 272-97; 1935: 260-62). But Durkheim's sociology accepts the fictitious 
nothing in social reality. Passing metaphysics, Durkheim's sexed order of 
society realizes that the ontological difference is a difference between the 
sexes. This is the lesson of feminine sex-love in On Suicide. Durkheim's 
problem is not that he cannot account for the question of women, but rather 
that he cannot miss to account for them as nothing. He could have easily 
adopted a straight chauvinist, neuter or feminist position to explain the 
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extremely private act of suicide, for all these positions are subjectivist. But 
excluding the sexed order, it wouldn't be a sociological analysis of suicide in 
the first place. So he knowingly presupposes and yet suspends the question 
of the other sex throughout the thesis, isolating the conjugal element from the 
other factors at every stage of the analysis. After all the non-social factors (i.e. 
psychic illness, racial heredity, cosmic season and imitating media) are 
rejected and all the social factors (i.e. religion and science, family and politics, 
military and economy) are explained, a quasi-social type of "conjugal anomie" 
(analyzed from the statistical correlation between marriage and suicide) is 
finally distilled, demanding a reply. 
On the first approach, it is true that Durkheim (2006: 298-99) argues marriage 
life is to be favoured for the benefit of men, literally for the sake of protecting 
masculine sexuality from running wild. On the second approach, it is also true 
that he asks women to "make the sacrifice," which may sound anti-feminist to 
contemporary readers, but is nonetheless an honest female viewpoint 
(Durkheim, 2006: 305). On the third approach, in his description, women's 
paradoxical relation to men is strikingly homologous to nature's relation to 
society, as we have seen in Durkheim's lectures on Rousseau. "The woman is 
a more instinctive creature than the man, she has only to follow her instincts 
to find peace and quiet." Hence, marriage is "not necessary" and "a strict 
obligation" for women because they are "already limited by nature" (Durkheim, 
2006: 301). As a result, "their interests are opposed, one needing constraints 
and the other freedom" (Durkheim, 2006: 303). On the fourth approach, 
sexual antagonism amounts to be the last straw which could make or break 
his solution of the social problem of suicide by means of professional groups. 
He suggests to "make marriage more indissoluble" on the one hand, and 
allow both sexes to "be equally socialized but in different ways" on the other 
(Durkheim, 2006: 429-31 ). 
In view of this, we might ask if Durkheim is forbidden to take a fatal leap from 
feminine sacrifice to feminine renunciation. His organism of love is neither 
asexual nor sexed but de/sexed in that women sacrifice their natural freedom 
to make a real object of desire for the constitution of society. Conversely 
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speaking, he knows a society is not yet free with men's discipline, but only 
free with women's sacrifice. Meanwhile, he also knows that the woman is a 
quasi-cause of society since the woman is nothing, who wants nothing but 
pure freedom without a form. So he needs to contain women's "magical 
action" as much as he needs to constrain men's mystic feeling. As a result, for 
Durkheim, a free society is grounded in the fate of the sexes.38 What he could 
have sacrificed is the very ground of fate for the woman to decide if she might 
renounce her magical action freely to help create a new form of society. 
From the social science of Comte and Marx to non/Marxist sociologies, we 
have travelled a full circle back to Goethe's ethic of renunciation. In part I, we 
argued that Goethe's art of love-life anticipated the social science of Comte 
and Marx in the sense that his ethic of renunciation stood ahead of the 
cultural-historical imaginations of classicism, the Enlightenment and 
romanticism. In part 11, we visited classical sociologists from Weber and 
Durkheim to Simmel and Marxists only to find that their renditions of Goethe's 
ethic relapsed to neo-classicism, nee-romanticism and nee-Enlightenment. 
Then, we reconsidered Durkheim's sociology to discover a sexual difference 
of renunciation in his theory of society, society as a de/sexed organism of 
love. From the de/sexed standpoint, we recognize Durkheim as the true heir 
of Comte, for he traces the education of love back to its original source in 
Goethe's art. 
" In this sense, the fatalistic type of suicide, consisted of the cases of slaves, "young" married 
men and "childless" married women, is a particular by-product of conjugal anomie, not anomie 
as such (Durkheim, 2006: 305). 
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Part Ill 
The Romantic Enlightenment of Sociology 
Chapter 7 Reflexive Discourses of Love 
Pre-1980 para-sociological approach to the question of love often criticized 
the social phenomenon of intimacy in modernity. One critical voice comes 
. from liberal Marxism. Classical examples include Hannah Arendt's 
philosophical portrait, in The Human Condition, of the birth of "the social" in 
sustaining a labouring society (1958: 38-39), and Richard Sennett's historical 
account, in The Fall of Public Man, of the cult of narcissistic "personality", the 
"ideology and tyranny of intimacy", in a "destructive gemeinshaff' (1977[1974]: 
219ff, 333-40). Both pieces of work have a strong utopian sentiment, 
admonishing one against the breaking of democratic politics from the ideals of 
Greco-Roman cultures (for Arendt) and the Enlightenment (for Sennett). 39 
Accordingly, this line of research spatializes social morality by the 
contradictory trends of egoism and altruism, ascribing the culprit of 
"privatization" to the rise of intimacy. 
39 Arendt's political and ethical philosophy, which spans from her Marxist analysis of 
totalitarianism to her Kantian analysis of the mindless evil and the willing mind may be read 
as a life-long commitment to the question of Augustinian love, the subject of her doctoral 
thesis produced in 1929. The textual and contextual importance of this theological exercise to 
Arendt's later philosophy in particular and existential philosophy of her time in general has 
been carefully analyzed by her two posthumous editors, Scott and Stark, who reconstruct a 
coherent text from Arendt's three versions of manuscript revisions between 1958-65 (Arendt, 
1996: vii-xvii, 115-211 ). In Arendt's analysis, Augustine's theology of love is to be read in the 
context of Greek philosophy from Plato to Plotinus. Hence she argues that love in Augustine 
concerns the constitution of an ethical-political community or earthly city (civitas tetrena) of 
neighbourly or brotherly love. it is characterized by a collective faith of fellowship (societas) 
not "in Christ [which] is secondary", but in a "new companionship of fate", which is originated 
in the common danger or menace of death, sustained by the imitation, as opposed to 
generation, of mutual love ( diligere invicem), and completed by the transformation of grace to 
the choice and obligations of a "community-in-sinfulness" (Arendt, 1996: part Ill). In practice, 
Christ's redemption of the whole world (mundas) instead of mere individuals is made possible 
by the subjective recollection of a past order and measure of love (dilectionis ordo et 
mensura) via a libidinal economy of the future. According to Arendt's Augustinian economy of 
the subject, an anti-dialectic of time (moving in backwards) and desire/craving (appetitus, 
moving in forwards) corners one to clear a spacing of thinking and willing '"between past and 
future" (nunc stans), thereby converting the very course, along with the object, of one's love to 
soar in upwards from the love of worldly beings (cupidita) to a love of God the eternal Being, 
translated as neighbourly love (charita) (Arendt, 1996: part I & 11). 
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The other voice of criticizing private morality comes from social psychology 
and neo-Marxist psychoanalysis. Both genres of study object to the 
domination of superego over the rational ego and/or the passionate id. Two 
influential studies of social psychology are David Riesman's The Lonely 
Crowd (1977[1950]) and Christopher Lasch's The Culture of Narcissism 
(1991 [1979]). lt is self-defeating to engage in the polemic over the general 
nature of the American character (i.e. whether it is other-directed or 
narcissistic), given the risk of an infinite relativism of the sociology of 
knowledge (cf. Lasch, 1991: 64-66). Rather, opposing conceptions together 
compose a pair of mirror images of society: while Riesman reports a society of 
moral interaction, Lasch adds a psychological dimension to it40• Examined 
closely, the two pieces of work share the same analytical method as both 
examine the impact of culture upon personality, the same empirical thesis as 
both argue the socialization of authority through surrogate agencies, and the 
. same theoretical view as both imply the end of moral altruism41 • 
For Marxist-Freudians, in addition, Herbert Marcuse's Eros and Civilization 
(1969[1955]) and Eric Fromm's The Art of Loving (1957) explore how the 
human subject suppressed by industrial capitalism can regain autonomy by 
40 Specifically, it is worth noting a distinction between the methods of cultural history and 
social psychology. Social psychology, due to its logic of internalization, has set one foot in the 
reflexive school. This leads to nuanced conceptions of narcissism between Sennett and 
Lasch. Lasch borrows Sennett's notion of narcissism, but overturns his thesis of privatization. 
After admitting Sennett's diagnosis of narcissistic psychology as self-hate instead of self-love, 
Lasch adds a reflexive twist, arguing that narcissism reveals the problem lies in the private 
realm itself rather than privatization of the public sphere (Sennett, 1977: 333-36; Lasch, 1991: 
27-30). In his words, "the cult of intimacy originates not in the assertion of personality but in its 
collapse ... our society, far from fostering private life at the expense of public life, has made 
deep relationships, love affairs and marriages increasingly difficult to achieve" (Lasch, 1991: 
30). 
41 Nevertheless, compared to Riesman, Lasch (1991: 243-49) has a sharper critical edge in 
developing a psycho-generic theory of "the minimal self". The notion of "primary narcissism" 
allows him to guard against secondary narcissism, opting instead for a self-delimiting ego 
capable of recognizing alter egos. Riesman (1977: xxvii-xxxix), on the other hand, takes pains 
to refute the confusion of the notion of other-direction with that of conformity or impression 
management. In fact, he fully recognizes the positive nature of other-direction, which is 
described as "a greater resonance with others ... in a wider interpersonal circle", a character 
heralding the coming of the "plastic man". lt is easy to assess, according to the sociology of 
knowledge, that this relative difference is a result of the intellectual politics of their times (early 
50s versus late 70s). Nonetheless, we maintain that both accounts, as empirical 
generalizations, capture the same urban mass society, in which every self has become 
acutely aware of his/her social environs in his/her own eyes. 
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unleashing the force of eras and practicing the art of love. In short, this line of 
research is forever dissatisfied with the social-economic order since it is 
predisposed to personalize love in an active against the passive mode of 
human relations (i.e. loving is superior to being loved). 
The logical link connecting a critical with a reflexive approach to love, or 
probably to every subject of social study, might be reduced to this formula: 
criticism to problematization is reflexivity to deproblematization. From the 
critical perspective, the ascent of intimacy, often characterized as a 
phenomenon of privatization, alienation and mystification, signifies a 
conservative reaction to the historical reason of the Enlightenment, a 
regression of modernity to the dark times. From a reflexive standpoint, by 
contrast, it is the utopian reason itself that harbours a moral bias to the course 
of modernity. Henceforth, objections to privatization, alienation and 
mystification can be regarded inversely as projections of a privatized 
historicity, an alienated theory and a mystified politics. Compared to the critical 
approach, that is, a reflexive approach is happy to start from a clean 
conscience, claiming that there is nothing privatized, mystified and alienated 
in modern intimacy. They agree that the genesis and evolution of the private 
life had been coeval with modernity from the 171h to the 19th century. In 
consequence, "late-modern" intimacy since the late 20th century signifies a 
subjective understanding of modernity, which is correlated to a blanket 
transvaluation of the word "privacy". Given as such, the metaphysical 
Enlightenment of love in public cedes its discursive power to the sociological 
Enlightenment of intimacy in private. 
Post-1980 accounts of intimacy by the reflexive sociological approach began 
with Niklas Luhmann's Love as Passion (1986[1982]), and was then variously 
revised by Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim's The Normal Chaos of 
Love (1995[1990]), Anthony Giddens' The Transformation of Intimacy (1992) 
and Zygmunt Bauman's Liquid Love (2003). Commonly inspired by 
Luhmann's logic of the autopoietic systems, they admit that the symbiosis of 
intimacy and modernity stands for a modern code of love to make possible 
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reflexive communications between individual persons. The reflexive coding of 
love thus Jays stress on cognitive and/or moral aspects of intimacy at the price 
of over-representing its expressive aspect under a shade of emotionality, from 
sexuality, eroticism to affection. In consequence, inside the code, all 
discourses of love are allowed, appearing plausible, but, outside the code, 
nothing is. 
lt is fruitless to compare between these similar discourses in anticipation of a 
whole reality and meaning of love to appear. We have surpassed the 
challenges of positivism and hermeneutics in the question at stake. But this is 
not to say totality doesn't exist. Far from it, with the reflexive turn, we are 
given a totality of reality and meaning within a discourse of love: we have a 
multiplicity of totalities. Here, readers are deprived of all critical standpoints or 
"prejudices" to assess particular statements, since each discourse of love has 
become an integral part of each theoretical project. In result, the condition of 
knowledge turns into a mirror reflection of the condition of love described by 
these discourses. If this is the case, is sociology writing love or is love writing 
sociology? We will not answer this meta-theoretical question until the following 
chapter. 
For now, the sense of vertigo takes us back to the Baroque scene, making us 
wonder whether the real and further true nature of love in contemporary 
society has been captured by sociological reflexivity at all. One might even 
argue that, after the metaphysical Enlightenment, a sociological enlightenment 
is caught in what Augustine once described as "the kingdom of darkness". 
However, one should note that the present "kingdom" is only semantically 
continuous with the medieval world, but structurally differentiated from it. After 
all, the current "darkness" is no longer a result of ignorance and superstition, 
but of reason and knowledge. Indeed, if one can see nothing in complete 
darkness, then one is also blind in full light. Accordingly, if critical knowledge is 
relatively blinded by disfiguring truth (for, a critic is biased), then reflexive 
knowledge is absolutely blind to sign on a death certificate of truth. On 
account of this, a sketch of these four reflexive accounts of love, however 
untruthful to the "original", is necessary. Our textual examination shall lead us 
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to acknowledge the impasse of the reflexive approach, while we trace a 
mystic cult of cynicism behind the "romantic enlightenment" of sociology.42 
The journey begins from the moral hostage in Bauman's case and political 
womanhood in Giddens' to cultural spirituality in Beck's and scientific ecstasy 
in Luhmann's. 
7.1 Bauman 
For Bauman, "liquid love" refers to the "connection" or "network" of "virtual 
relation-seekers" in "liquid modernity". Befitting to this subject matter, groups 
of short essays are collaged like a cognitive mapping of human relationships 
from micro to macro societies, as the fluid idea of love ties individuals loosely 
to their social environs, from families, neighbours and nations to the whole 
humanity (Bauman, 2003a). Bauman's idea of love in liquid modernity is a 
result of an incompatibility between his modernist-liberalist ethic and 
postmodernist-communitarian morality. On the one hand, the power ethic of 
modernity prefers order-building, which further leads to ethical ambivalence 
for a monad. The ambivalence of love can be found factually in privatized and 
socialized surrogates of love, such as the experts and money (Bauman, 1991: 
201-08). On the other hand, the moral politics of postmodernity favours the 
aporetic "moral party of two", which is finally rooted in moral uncertainty for a 
couple. Thus, the uncertainty of love can be found counterfactually in 
individual strategies of escape such as fixing (possessive love) and flowing 
(noncommittal love), with flowing on the wax side (Bauman: 1993: 82-109). 
But what really happens is that flowing being the last im/possible stand to a 
postmodern morality of commitment is often moralized into the commitment of 
religious fundamentalism. This means an actual paradox of the ethical 
ambivalence of moral uncertainty itself is obscured by Bauman's call for a 
postmodern morality (after Levinas and L0gstrup). As a result, Bauman (2001: 
171) is cornered to the pragmatic claim that "love needs a reason", but a 
reason "as an instrument, not as an excuse, justification or hide-out." 
42 lindholm (1998) concludes "the future of love" as the end of romanticism by mis/reading 
Giddens along with Weber. Any facile post-romanticist sociology of love unwittingly assumes 
an innocent view of the Enlightenment, missing all together the reflexive turn of sociology. We 
repeat our point made in chapter 1 that romanticism is the perverse core of the 
Enlightenment. Hence, the second enlightenment of sociology is in fact a romantic 
enlightenment. 
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So there is no consistent theory of love in Bauman's writings, not even in 
Liquid Love. Precisely so, however, his life work can be read as an endless 
work of love. Since understanding modernity in terms of Holocaust's 
"rationality of evil", Bauman abstains from any epistemology of truth to 
envisage a morality of ambivalence. An ambivalent morality is expected to 
cast an impossible look at the opposing terms of difference (modernity) and 
indifference (postmodernity) at once. So the image of knots is his typical 
. analogy: "Gordian knots are notorious for the impossibility for untying them. 
Gordian knots can be only cur (Bauman, 2002b: 299). Because the dialectical 
method has ceded to inconsistency, social criticism traditionally conceived (as 
rigorous science and politics) should then be suspended by a moral emphasis 
on sociological enlightenment (Nijff, 1998; Bauman, 2000b). Bauman's notion 
of morality is deeply seated in the life situation of a person. He confesses "it's 
very difficult: not to live in ambivalent conditions, but to live in ambivalent 
conditions and being aware that they are ambivalent. That's awfully difficult. 
But I fear that is the only answer I can give" (Bauman in Welzer, 2002: 1 08). 
However, we shall see how Bauman's moral ambivalence profits from private 
life situations to reach a utopia of strangerhood as the fate of humanity, 
thereby recognizing love only in the hostage. 
In hierarchical societies, the stranger referred to a distinct (under-)privileged 
group, constituting a sociological form as Simmel (1971: 143-49) describes it. 
In differentiated societies, a certain "decomposition of the Other'' occurs when 
strangers turn "either invisible or omnipresenr (Stichweh, 1997: 9). However, 
it does not mean that the Other is definitively dead in modernity, but that 
strangers, as personages of the Other, are politically constructed and mass 
media represented (Bauman, 1995; Beck, 1996; Rundall, 2004). In short, the 
political construction of strangers thus marks their social disappearance43• 
The disappearance of strangers means an indifference to its sociological form, 
since "individualization and categorization of the Other become 
43 The problem concerns whether the stranger remains a useful analytic tool, and in relation to 
this, whether moral ambivalence should be included as a part of social criticism, or 
distinguished as a reflexive method of its own right. See debates between Tabonni (1995), 
Stichweh (1997), Diken (1998), and Marotta (2000; 2002). 
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interdependent", which "makes room for more flexible schemata for 
distinguishing" (Stichweh, 1997: 10). Meticulous distinguishing is evidenced in 
what Bauman calls "the privatization of ambivalence", designating a violence 
of discrimination in liquid modernity when "private morality" guards itself from 
harm in an "immoral world" (Bauman, 2001a: 175-219). Private morality has 
many faces, ranging from communitarian and fundamentalist enthusiasm to 
interpersonal affections (sexuality, love and friendship) (Bauman, 2001 b; 
2003a). But it is a morality of collective privation. 
Bauman holds the axial trajectory of modernity dashes toward time-space 
liquidation, by which social strangers are all excluded by way of inclusion in 
physical proximity, meeting without talking, living for the moment in emic 
places (e.g. monumental squares), phagic places (e.g. department stores), 
empty places (e.g. hotel rooms) and non-places (e.g. deserted areas, blank 
spots in mental maps) (Bauman, 2000a: 91-129). Liquid modernity is situated 
in an efficient individualized society, where everyone is provided with quick 
services, small products, light food and carefree encounters (Bauman, 
2000b). The global alliance of liquidization and individualization encourages 
"universal strangerhood" like "conceptual Jews" (Ciarke, 2002). 44 "The 
stranger sits on the barricade, he is neither here nor there, he belongs neither 
inside nor outside": this is the so-called "new anti-Semitism" (Bauman in 
Bielefeld, 2002: 116). 
Being a Polish Jew living in Russia, Poland, and England, Bauman does view 
the homeless world from the eyes of a stranger (Smith, 1998). He is 
concerned with how the noble culture of immortality has abandoned historical 
actions, perverting itself into a post-historical savagery of the undead: 
"[e]ternity, · unless it is served up for instant experience, does not 
matter ... lnfinity has been reduced to a series of 'here and nows'; immortality, 
to endless recycling of births and deaths" (Bauman, 1992; 2001a: 250). In 
44 Clarke (2002) suggests how psychoanalysis (via Melania Klein) can enhance the 
explanatory force of sociology of the stranger, particula~y in relation to the notion of 
conceptual Jews. In this regard, see also Kristeva (1991) for a historical psychoanalysis of 
xenophobia and nationalism, and Diken (1998) for attempting an integration of Kristeva and 
Bauman into an ambivalent social theory. 
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such an unlivable situation, moderation can only be regained through 
extremity since extreme thought counterbalances extreme reality. This is to 
say, since modernity has built a liquid paradise on earth, it can only be 
challenged by "ethereal, intangible, individualized utopias in life and death" 
(Morawski, 1998: 35-38; Tester, 2002: 61; Jacobsen, 2004: 68, 83). 45 1n short, 
Bauman's utopia receives a fateful turn to u-topia, a non-place of the Other 
forever elusive to me. This is how the demise of modern politics, in its 
breakdown of the territory/nation/state alliance, implies a deliverance of civil 
societies to a "post-Trinitarian fate of humanity" (Bauman, 2002b). 
In short, the condition of modernity has grown ripe enough for people to 
pursue intimacy with universal strangerhood as the fate of humanity. This fate 
is conceived simultaneously as a historical fact of the past and a moral thing 
to come. Bauman's utopian formula is more concretely expressed in his near 
aphorisms of love and identity. With regard to love, we read, "[y]ou would hold 
onto the partner of your choice and to the clan that has been chosen for you 
by fate"; "choice, unlike the fate of kinship, is a two-way street" (Bauman, 
2003a: 26, 29). And yet, the very nature of love is "giving hostages to fate" 
(Bauman, 2003b: 6; 2004: 63); likewise, "[n]o one says making people into 
your partner-in-fate is easy; but there is no other way but to try, and try, and 
try again" (Bauman, 2003a: 25). With regard to identity, we read again, "'[t]o 
identify yourself with .. .' means to give hostage to an unknown fate which one 
cannot influence, let alone control" (Bauman, 2004: 30). And yet, "'[i]dentity' is 
a simultaneous struggle against dissolution and fragmentation; an intention to 
devour and at the same time a stout refusal to be eaten" (Bauman, 2004: 77). 
Due to these all-too-human contradictions, Bauman could depict modernity in 
terms of a moral ambivalence between fate and choice only from his u-topian 
standpoint. 
45 What we call the "fateful" concept of utopia is suggested by the three commentators in the 
reference. This fateful discourse is originated in revisionist Marxism distinguished from 
Leninism. This central European line of humanism stems from the Warsaw school (e.g. 
Leszek Kolakowski) and the Budapest school (e.g. Agnes Helier) by reading Anionic Gramsci 
and Gyogy Lukacs. For its history, see Michal Kopecek's 'Socialist democracy or revolutionary 
consciousness? The prospects and limits of "revised" Marxism in central Europe in the 1950s 
and 1960s' at http://users.ox.ac.ukl-oaces/conference/oapers!Michal Kopecek.o<ff. accessed 
on 20 January 2005. 
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Nevertheless, in a time of "rampant individualization", giving hostage to fate is 
giving hostage to uncertainty. Bauman conceives the hostage situation in a 
sense of sublime urgency beyond the secular crisis of biography in "fateful 
moments" (cf. Giddens, 1991: 110-13). As such, Bauman assumes the 
possibility of moral recollection and intervention in a hostage situation. lt 
functions like a test of moral aptitude to see if the situation could be resolved 
by either the victim's revolt or the kidnapper's conscience. Therefore, Bauman 
has ruled out state mechanisms of the police and related outside agencies to 
terminate the situation by force. Moreover, he has also precluded a social 
psychology of the Stockholm syndrome (when victim falls for the kidnapper) in 
an actual hostage crisis, an immanent but objective reversal of the situation to 
entangle matters to the worse (cf. Baudrillard, 1990b[1983]; Bauman, 1988). 
Finally, a hopeful future is rested on moral actions, the last solid stand in our 
liquid life: "in these conditions [ie. individualized modernity], like it or not, act 
we will, bearing the consequences of our actions or our failure to act" 
(Bauman, 2002a: xix). This suggests Bauman's postmodern morality of 
ambivalence must have colluded with the modern ethic of voluntarism. 
7.2 Giddens 
For Giddens, love preordained by an impersonal fate has been replaced by 
interpersonal intimacy which structures and is structured by nee-liberal 
democracy. lt is the idea of romantic love which not only undermines the 
values of patriarchal family, especially raising women's social status, but also 
enhances each individual's ability to conduct reflexive conversations 
(Giddens, 1992: eh. 3). Just as romantic love of the 19th century untied the 
knot of family from generational reproduction from outside of the kinship, so 
technological advancement of the 20th century, such as contraception and in 
vitro fertilization, achieves the "socialization of reproduction", releasing the 
pleasure of sexuality further from biological procreation within the family 
(Giddens, 1992: eh. 4). However, romantic love remains tied to the sexual 
division of labour. Therefore, Giddens (1992: eh. 7) looks into social 
psychology for the direct impacts of the relation between the sexes upon 
sexuality. Adopting the object relations school of psychoanalysis, Giddens 
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argues that intimate relations are psychologically determined by the parent-
child relation, a psychology socially strengthened by maternal love, alongside 
romantic love, in the 19th century. In light of this, although men and women 
might display differential interests in sex and love, they share the same social 
psychological constitution in the pursuit of maternal love. With this paradigm, 
Giddens seeks to explain the late-modern obsession with sexuality in a post-
Freudian view. Criticizing Foucault for entrapping himself in the 19th century, 
Giddens explains genital sexuality through the role of woman/mother in our 
society of sexual pluralism (Giddens, 1992: eh. 2). Combining the idea of 
romantic love with the maternal culture and reproductive technologies, as a 
result, sexual power is freed from the family institution, emerging as an 
independent force to propel interpersonal intimacy toward a future of plastic 
sexuality, confluent love and pure relationships. Finally by the projection of 
utopian realism, intimacy is hoped to facilitate nee-liberal democracy since it 
allows people to learn autonomy and contract, negotiate right and obligation, 
and develop respect and trust (Giddens, 1992: eh. 10).46 
Giddens (in Bryant and Jary, 2001: 234-37) himself admits that his theoretical 
transition around 1990 owes to the "differenf' research of intimacy as a result 
of his personal therapy experience lasting three and a half years to 
"disentangle some threads of my emotional life". This means his social theory 
which ends in the thesis of the "democratization of personal life" is only a step 
away from his Third Way political theory. Given as such, the case of intimacy 
is a crucial empirical study to understand to what extent Giddens' theory of 
late-modernity is a logical extension of his structuration theory (cf. Giddens, 
1984; 1990). 
The whole thesis of intimacy revolves around the intermeshing of the public 
and private spheres on the one hand and utopia and reality on the other. Its 
general point assumes the possibility of a female culture in the transformation 
46 lt is na'li(Jl to criticize Giddens for dismissing the downsides of intimacy for empirical and/or 
historical reasons (cf. Jamieson, 1998; Tester, 1995: 116-22). For, he does distinguish sexual 
from intimate relations conceptually through the discussion of obsession and codependence. 
He also seeks to resolve the problem of the "cult of the penis" with Klein's post-Freudian 
theory of maternal love (Giddens, 1992: eh. 5-8). 
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of social life, since, as extended analyses of romantic and maternal love 
unambiguously show, the vitalization of sexual power in society mostly relies 
on female agents. But female culture is liable to become a male 
representation of womanhood. This is why, we recall, Simmel puzzles over the 
impossibility of a female culture due to the tragic clash between a male form 
of significance and a female content of beauty. This is also why accounts of 
women's place in a post/modern culture often run into a theoretical problem of 
mediation or linkage, insofar as they begin from the premise of the public 
sphere idealized by the historical imagination of Greco-Roman antiquity 
and/or the German Enlightenment (cf. Habermas, 1992; Bauman, 1987). By 
contrast, Giddens' late-modernism immediately represents a female culture by 
the case of intimacy. The culture of intimacy could be represented in an 
immediate structure, or a duality of structure, because the "knowledgeability" 
of intimacy characterized by sexualized love and purified relationships is 
mainly a product of practical consciousness and the unconscious, not 
theoretical consciousness. Love is no longer a thought for him. Perhaps this is 
why he can publicly disavow the thematization of culture from his structuration 
theory when saying, "I don't recognize any specific cultural turn in social 
theory" (Giddens in Bryant and Jary, 2001: 248). 
If one regards female culture as an empirical case of the structuration 
process, then the culture of romantic and maternal love might be conceived 
as the duality of structure, structure defined by rules and resources, medium 
and outcome, constraint and enablement of (female) agency which is power 
(Giddens, 1984: eh. 4, 17 4). Conversely, agency refers to the reproductive 
practices, structuring in a structured society at every instance. Moreover, 
structuration is sustained by a pseudo-deconstructive notion of agency, 
insofar as agency "instanciates" structural principles like virtual traces in social 
institutions. The notion of agency is pseudo-deconstructive since it follows a 
politics of social change by means of interpersonal demonstration under risk 
control, by definition free from danger. Giddens' secret politics of risk, long 
before he agrees with Beck and others, may be inferred from his sociology of 
suicide threats and attempts in counter to Durkheim's sociology of completed 
suicides. His sociological theory of the suicidal act, as we might call it, began · 
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in the early 1960s with recourses to views and data from anthropology, social 
psychology and psychoanalysis, and finally ended by 1971 (Giddens, 1964; 
1965a; 1965b; 1965c; 1971: 36-51, 97-120; 1977: 297-332). By 1980, the 
suicidal act was conceptualized as a mediator between agency and power, as 
long as there was an "intimate tie between agency and suicide. Self-
destruction is a (virtually) always open option, the ultimate refusal that finally 
and absolutely cancels the oppressive power of others; hence suicidal acts 
themselves can be understood as concerned with the exercise of power" 
(Giddens, 1979: 149). After 1980, the mediator of suicide, as a sociological 
theme, vanished from Giddens' major publications, especially in his statement 
of structuration, in which agency, power, time-space and structure seem to 
evenly make up a recursive constitution of society.47 But Giddens' theory of 
late modernity marks a return of his early repressed thought, for the pseudo-
deconstructive, reflexive power of agency is finally "suicidal agency" as we 
call it.48 Suicidal agency ambivalently displays the authenticity of its "acr in 
late-modernity. As a symptom,· it is expressed in the search for intimacy when 
reflexive couples cope with eo-dependence in the vicious cycle of addictive 
letting-go and . compulsive tightening-up (Giddens, 1992: 49-11 0). As a 
therapy, it is manifested in the pursuit of self-identity when reflexive agents 
play with contingencies of their "fateful moments", striving to. maintain and 
reverse adverse circumstances (Giddens, 1990: 1 09-43; cf. Thompson et al., 
2002). 
In short, structuration of a female culture by romantic and maternal love could 
be reconsidered as female agents adopting the male cunning of reason 
reflexively in the suicidal act. Due to her political strategy of suicide, female 
47 This is where Archer (1982; 1995: 82-87) criticizes Giddens' notion of duality for making the 
ontological error of "central conflation", unable to elaborate the interplay of agency and 
structure on the one hand and culture and structure on the other. She couldn't understand 
why the duality of structure and agency does not conform to a symmetrically layered form of 
realism. But Giddens is partly to blame for her misreading since the "intimate tie between 
~ency and suicide" is hidden from his structuration theory. 
This is where Schilling (1993: 200-02) and Layder (1994: 138-42) criticize Giddens for 
making a surreptitious shift of perspective from recursive structure/agency to reflexive 
system/practice. They couldn't understand the logical consistency from the constitution of 
society to the deconstnuction of society. But what happens is not a transition between two 
methods or theories, but a reemergence of their vanishing mediator, suicidal agency, 
adumbrated in Giddens' early work. 
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agency is content to achieve gender equality on the male's term. In structural 
terms, the wax of the female power is dependent upon the wane of patriarchal 
structures, aiming to gain more access to rules and resources in a neo-liberal 
democracy. In this sense, the very form of male culture is kept intact, only its 
inherent sexual antagonism is intensified. This suggests that Giddens' late-
modern politics of intimacy expressed in sexualized love and purified 
relationships must have posited the cultural representation of womanhood, 
forcing a mis/representation of the unrepresentable. 
7.3 Beck 
For Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995), the "normal chaos of love" captures 
best a society of individuals structurally differentiated from the society of 
families. They are not asserting absurdly the disappearance of the family; 
rather, they assess the cultural consequences in the changing structure of the 
family. Social structural change in the private realm produces an 
individualized culture of love "more impossible and more important". Specific 
descriptions and quasi-general explanations of empirical data are Janus-faced 
with no logical conclusion.49 Although the argument mainly revolves around 
the conundrum between freedom and love, an actual intervening factor lies in 
gender equality. This means the individualized culture of love is a direct 
outcome of the empowerment of women, which could further deliver the 
society as a whole in shaking the "feudal foundation of industrial society", 
namely the residual sexual division of labour within industrial capitalism. The 
rise of women's social status is aided by institutional factors, such as 
education, economy and technology, amongst others (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim, 1995: eh. 1). As such, gender inequality appears the determining 
structure to be subverted in the social-historical contradiction of modernity. 
Consequently, three proximal close relations, within couples, between 
mothers and children and among individuals, receive far-reaching impacts. 
New social problems come into view, turning around to destabilize the modern 
49 As a thesis, specific arguments are repetitive and inconclusive to the brink of incoherence. 
An ironic reason is that this is a work of collaboration by the married couple writing about the 
nonmal chaos of love. 
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family structure. They include changing relationships, serial divor~e. men's 
forced freedom, attention to children, personal security and crisis, and so on 
(Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: eh. 2-5). As a result, ethical paradoxes 
diversify from action, authenticity to truth. In other words,"love is a chaotic 
interpersonal experience unclassifiable by rigid political, social and/or 
philosophical concepts. This is why love could be defined variously as 
"revolution for two", "communism within capitalism", "democracy for two", 
"dogmatism for two", "act of confession" against "a heartless society", "pop 
song romance" derived from novels reading of the previous century ... At last, a 
quasi-definition of love turns out to have a religious nature: love is a "religion 
without churches and without priests", a privatized "secular religion", in which 
lovers themselves are "subjective law-givers" who are eager to "become 
themselves" (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: eh. 6). The religious culture of 
love hence expresses what individualization is about in Beck's theory of 
reflexive modernization. 
Beck's theory of reflexive modernization evolves via two lines of research. He 
works on the thesis of risk society by himself, while coauthoring with his wife 
Beck-Gernsheim on the thesis of institutional individualization. The thesis of 
risk society has expanded its explanatory scope from the (inter-)national 
society to world society (Beck, 1992; 1999). The thesis of individualization has 
grown from a structural analysis to a cultural politics of individualism (Beck & 
Beck-Gernsheim, 1995; 2001). Politically speaking, taking on environmental 
and feminist issues does have an advantage of de-territorializing political 
economic approaches, such as globalization theory and international politics, 
advancing to a kind of manifesto of cosmopolitan culture (Beck, 2000). 
Philosophically, Beck's radical cosmopolitanism can be read as deriving from 
a long tradition of human rights originated in Kant's criticism of Hobbes. To 
avoid being entangled by his ideological polemics, it's better to trace 
cosmopolitanism back to its religious nature by taking a detoured look at his 
evolving logic of risk. 
Beck's original theory of risk society argues a modest case rooted in the 
German interpretive sociology (from Weber to Habermas): the politicization of 
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science. He refutes scientific accounts of nature, such as "immiseration of 
civilization" and "the end of latency", arguing instead that the capitalist society 
has been caught by a knowledge economy in the sense that knowledge 
determines being in a self-referential "ecological communication" (Beck, 1992: 
51ft, cf. Luhmann, 1989). Therefore, scientific rationality only ends in a risk 
consciousness of "second-hand non-experience" such as statistic probability, 
promoting a catastrophic society (Beck, 1992: 71 ff). In counter to this, 
scientific rationality has to be politicized by bring in social rationalities, such as 
actual concerns in the local communities. At the level of international society, 
one can still recognize certain social roots, such as collective interests, in 
Beck's politics of risk. However, the paradigm of risk gradually breaks away 
from reflexive modernization to a higher vantage point of world society. Beck 
lately differentiates his conception of reflexivity from Giddens' structural and 
Lash's cultural versions. He argues that reflexivity should be conceived as an 
open attitude to the future courses of things based on reflexive unawareness 
instead of reflective knowledge (Beck, 1999: 109-32; cf. Beck, Giddens and 
Lash, 1994). To be fair, this move can be anticipated from his mistrust in 
scientific discourses from the outset. Nevertheless, the problem is that 
unawareness assumes the world to be knowable, infinitely (Beck, 1999: 
122ft). Given the assumption, what is the nature of this rationality involved in 
formulating a reflexive unawareness to risk? Whose rationality does it belong 
to? How do these unobservable, virtual risks cross the social threshold from 
the knowable unknown to the communicable? These questions can no longer 
be explained by classical sociology since a rationality of unawareness is 
foreign to the social production of knowledge (by experts, politicians, 
journalists, etc.) in the first place. They can only be known by esoteric means 
in an individualized world society. In this sense, Beck's world risk society is no 
longer satisfied with a political integration of science and society as in risk 
society, put pursues a gnostic experience of the world. 
In light of this, one understands better why the analogy of privatized religion to 
individualized love finds no point of reference to any classical sociology of 
religion we have discussed. lt is applicable to neither Durkheim's ritualism nor 
Weber's asceticism, and most definitely not Marxist atheism. lt seems 
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comparable to the Calvinist faith, but only to a certain extent, since this faith 
no longer results in an institutional certitude as Weber's account of 
bureaucratization has shown. Rather, the "Calvinist" faith of love refers to an 
uninhibited display of psychological uncertainty, describing the normal chaos 
of knowledge and action in an individualized society (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 1995: 174-75). But the interpretive problem is, we recall, the 
same psychological uncertainty in the Calvinist faith has been pointed out by 
Sennett (1977: 333-40} as an anxiety of self-denial, responsible for the 
ideology of narcissism and the tyranny of intimacy. This suggests Beck's 
·individualized culture of love pines for neither sacred nor secular religion, but 
rather supra-rational spirituality, which is, at bottom, an ultra-passionate spirit 
of science akin to Weber's account of love in Hinduism. 
7.4 Luhmann 
For Luhmann, love breeds its own improbability as a generalized symbolic 
medium. From the social semantic of novels, he outlines an evolution of the 
codes of love, passing from the medieval courtly love through passionate love 
in the late 17th century to romantic love in the early 19th century. Note that 
historical data here are. subjected to an evolutionary frame. So these codes 
can be differentiated from one another because of parallel evolutions of form, 
proof, morality and anthropology (Luhmann, 1986: 41-47). 50 And yet 
historically, it was passionate love which unfolded a social differentiation of 
emotion in the 1 ih century. Passion synthesizes rationality and sexuality in a 
passive manner, thereby encouraging moral ambiguity about the tension 
between love and friendship. Its social consequence leads to a "relaxation of 
the overall social morality", enhancing one's "capacity of being a person" 
(Luhmann, 1986: 46-47). 
In an empirical context, passionate love gives birth to personal freedom 
because of a moral independence of extramarital affairs from family relations. 
50 By form, the three codes correspond to idealization, paradoxicalization and 
functionalization. By proof, they correspond to knowledge of the object, subjective 
imagination, and symbolic questioning of facts. By morality, they correspond to the 
problematization of "the vulgar" in extramarital affairs, of sexuality as a matter of balancing 
rationality and sensuality, and of love itself. By anthropology, they correspond to rationality 
over passion, passion over rationality, and codification over incommunicability. 
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In these affairs, potential lovers experience mounting pressures to take an 
action against the odds of mutual uncertainty about the loved one's true 
intensions. But this apparent deadlock creates a "double contingency". This 
condition of im/possibility does not occur until a woman gains the ability to 
choose freely her object of love. The historical evidence could be found in the 
French literature of the 17th century when "precious" courtesans moved away 
from the medieval mannerism of a lady's "unattainability", learning to play the 
game of ambiguity with their suitors. The paradox is that "rhetoric of excess" 
fosters an "experience of instability" to subsist a rational "art of seduction". As 
a result, passionate love transgresses social conventions and logical 
demonstrations (luhmann, 1986: eh. 6).51 
Passionate love gave rise to a series of differences in the 18th century. The 
primary difference separates plaisir from amour. 52 Pleasure stands for a 
subjective experience of reality inaccessible to others, whereas love refers to 
the social play around secondary differences regarding truth and falsity of the 
information perceived during interactions. Then, the controversy over passion 
and reason (e.g. "does s/he love me or not?") turns into a problem of the 
social systems (Luhmann, 1986: eh. 8-9). From the perspective of the primary 
difference, however, the 18th century remained a transitional phase in 
modernity. Modernity proper refers more specifically to the process of 
individualization initiated by romantic love in the 19th century (luhmann, 1986: 
eh. 1 0). Nevertheless, the 181h century signified a transitional discovery of 
"incommunicability" induced by radical differentiations between and within 
primary and secondary differences. Passionate love is not a code equipped 
enough to shape individuality since individuality requires a simpler codification 
than incommunicability. Thus, sincerity emerges as a new code to stand in for 
51 I! is important to note that, except for the subjective feeling of excess which got an 
evolutionary advantage, passionate love bounded in a rational art of seduction did adapt to 
conventional morality in the late 17'" century. That is why, parallel to passionate love, the half-
rationality of friendship between passion and marriage could replace the rigid morality of 
gallantry. Comparatively, friendship in the early 18"' century then turned into a regression 
toward the medieval morality of gallanlry (Luhmann, 1986: eh. 7). Hence Luhmann's account 
of friendship stands in a sharp contrast to Haberrnas' account of the public sphere. 
52 Conceptually, the primary difference is, in Bateson's words, "the difference that makes a 
difference". In the current context, it refers to the distinction between visible and invisible 
modes of communication, that is, the differentiation of human beings as an individual body 
and mind from social systems. 
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incommunicability. Since passionate love prefers emotion to rational 
judgment, making pleasure, the question of happiness, the only criterion of 
reality, sincerity, the question of truthfulness, is added to overcome the 
incommunicable passion. As a consequence, modern intimacy regards the 
systemization of individuality, consisting of romantic love, unconscious 
incorporation of sexuality, socialization of the reproductive function of the 
family, amongst other factors. Luhmann (1986: 127-128) insists that the 
romantic love complex is a historically relative code, codifying the 
im/possibility of communication by way of self-organization. Since each 
individual's bodily and psychic experiences has become opaque like black 
boxes, romantic love functions as a transparent code for people to 
communicate through secondary differences along the signifying chain. Far 
from a linear evolution toward either personality or anonymity, the self-
referential evolution of love bears a witness to the differentiation between 
personal and impersonal systems, including their mutual mis/references 
(Luhmann, 1986: 12-17, 170-71). 
Luhmann's Love as Passion published in 1982 might be read as a transitional 
case study before the presentation of his systems theory in 1984 which 
provided a platform for his observations of different subsystems, including the 
environment, economy, science, politics, social movements, mass media, etc. 
Meanwhile, this work might also be read as a natural outcome of Luhmann's 
early writings on religion and morality which applied his (less systemic) theory 
of differentiation in the 1970s. Structurally speaking, love takes over the social 
functions of religion and morality, opening an evolutionary course of modernity 
based on the logic of the social systems. Semantically, systems theory itself 
originates in a theory of love. In Luhmann's theory of love, moral ambiguity is 
cultivated in the interpersonal realm. The codification of intimacy from courtly 
to romantic love is initiated by the middle code of passion in an evolutionary 
sense, since a passion for pleasure creates the primary difference in a subject 
experiencing an inner excess. 
A systemic consequence of excess is interpenetration. Luhmann's concept of 
interpenetration has an important role to play in the systems theory. 
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Interpenetration refers to a mutual construction of complexity between two 
systems. In fact, there are two separated modes of interpenetration: 
"intersystem interpenetration" operates between a social and a human 
system, whilst "interhuman interpenetration" operates between two human 
systems. 53 In interhuman interpenetration, complexity emerges when both 
human systems (think they) have gained an access to each other's 
experiences and actions. Actions and experiences are conceived in a 
concatenation of events, which are "ways of relating" or "connectivity" without 
assuming any meta/physical existence and change of elements (Luhmann, 
1995a: 215). Accordingly, communication means an "interpenetration of 
complexity" since an inter-human systemic relation is equivalent to an inter-
environmental relation. But interpenetration does not apply to the visual image 
of a partial overlapping of two circles since the complexity of another human 
system can often penetrate deep into the center of a human system, 
fundamentally changing its operation (Luhmann, 1995a: 217-19). Therefore, 
interpenetration presupposes autopoiesis. Autopoiesis refers to an operative 
closure of a system, while it opens up to the complexity of the environment. 
By means of interpenetration, autopoiesis and complexity, two boundary-
opening systems are constructed at once like two virtual identities. In this 
sense, interhuman interpenetration describes the formal process of 
communication in modern intimacy. 
Second, interhuman interpenetration is evolved from intersystem 
interpenetration (Luhmann, 1995a: 210-12, 223-24). The two modes of 
interpenetration share the same operating mechanisms, but the intersystem 
mode is operated between personal and impersonal systems, namely human 
beings and social institutions. Luhmann's modernity means primarily a 
differentiation of human systems from the social systems, or when human 
systems gradually become an environment to the social systems. He fully 
acknowledges that the human body/mind subsystems have been penetrated 
53 The tenn "human" is chosen carefully to bypass the humanist notion of personality. 11 refers 
to "the social identification of a complex of expectations directed toward an individual human 
being" (Luhmann, 1995a: 210). In addition, a human system is different from a social system 
in that the fanner is composed of subsystems of the body/mind, commonly known as human 
beings. 
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by the social systems via politics, economy and sexuality into a "symbiotic 
mechanism". Nevertheless, Luhmann insists that this intersystem 
"integration", or "colonization" in Habermas' term, is not possible without 
having posited the opacity of human body and mind. In this sense, it is more 
na"ive than critical to say that the "binary schematization" of modern love (e.g. 
either/or) has assimilated to the semiotic strategy of intersystem 
interpenetration. Rather, the opacity ~f human body and mind is the 
immediate condition of possibility for interhuman interpenetration independent 
from the mediated condition of intersystem interpenetration. 
Finally, the two modes of interpenetration are distinguished by emotion. 
Human systems cannot operate without emotions, but social systems can. 
Emotion in this context has transcended the mind-body dualism since human 
body and language can be penetrated by the social systems (Luhmann, 
1995a: 228). For example, social subsystems such as mass media and 
medical welfare have penetrated the interhuman means of verbal 
conversation and bodily care. In sum, although both modes of interpenetration 
presume incommunicability, and both penetrate language and the body by 
means of binary schematization and symbiotic mechanisms, interhuman 
interpenetration has an extra emotional capacity. 54 Therefore, the evolutionary 
contribution of intimacy is reconfirmed. Passionate pleasure, the excessive 
experience of the human systems, is the precondition of interhuman 
interpenetration and intersystem interpenetration, the emotional motor of 
modernity. 
Too intimate and yet too strange, passion is ultimately opaque to the solitary 
thinking subject, not to mention inter-subjective speaking subjects. This is why 
Luhmann objects to classical humanism. But such an overwhelming pleasure 
54 Luhmann (1995: 229-251) gives several examples to explicate how interpenetration 
overcomes incommunicability by means of binary schematization and symbiotic mechanisms 
of language and the body. Binary schematization always adopts a moral interpretation of 
norms to produce a moral crisis. One can counteract such crises by socialization, such as 
moral education. Cases of symbiotic mechanisms can be found in the two modes of 
interpenetration. On the one hand, symbiosis occurs in the intersystem government of the 
body by the state, market and sexuality. On the other hand, symbiosis involves in the 
interhuman development of the bodily potentials in the name of "youth", including dance, 
music, play and sport. 
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reveals a collective experience of ecstasy in the mystic cult. What lovers enjoy 
in love is not the transcendent, impersonal God, but a personal god, or rather 
two personal gods, which are at one with each by means of the other. This 
suggests that Luhmann's scientific codification of love is the flipside of a 
mystical experience of ecstasy. 
From Bauman's postmodern morality to Luhmann's modern science, we might 
conclude that the reflexive appoach has alchemized a scientific morality of 
love. This reflexive morality rationalizes love as a sign coded in the system of 
communication. In the virtual name of love, individual selves are bound to 
experience personal enjoyment through the physical proximity of others. 
Sustained by a collective fantasy, the reflexive rationality celebrates a cynic 
morality of public masturbation (since a cynic can only enjoy himself through 
the gaze of the other), which is neither private nor public intercourses, and yet 
nor private masturbation. 
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Chapter 8 Autopoietic Societies of Love 
In the previous chapter, we serialized four reflexive accounts of love from 
Bauman to Luhmann, only to find a scientific morality supported by a mystic 
cult of cynicism. But setting Bauman and Luhmann aside, one could at least 
speak for Giddens and Beck that they do propose a radical cultural politics 
which has reformed the force of criticism through reflexivity. Nevertheless, this 
defense denies that the fundamental principle of reflexivity concerns the de-
problematization of critical problems. Specifically, cultural politics (the 
personal is the politicized) is not a simple subversion of economic politics (the 
personal is the privatized). Rather, a reflexive subversion is a ceaseless 
operation of inclusive exclusion. In this sense, reflexive rationality stands for 
the simulation of critical reason, a pseudo-criticism. 
Such a sociological pseudo-criticism appears more unsettling in actual social 
settings. If "the most dangerous characteristic" of modernity is "the 
disappearance of taboos", its prevailing outcome is moral neutralization 
(Kolakowski, 1990: 12). In a world of moral neutralization, everyone is judging 
and being judged. But if all social values could be subjected to mindless and 
lawless questioning by a reflexive spin, then what we have is a society of 
secrets and scandals, accusations and counter-accusations, a melodramatic 
society much more sinister than the society of the spectacle. Not even nee-
tribalism can be immune from the social logic of witchcraft and sorcery 
practiced in tribalism. With a certain evil intelligence superior to the sociology 
of reflexivity, the contemporary reflexive society has been living in a real 
nightmare, whilst reflexive sociologists rest content with a utopian realism. 
So to the subjective question of the author in the writing of love and sociology 
(is sociology writing love, or is love writing sociology?), we can respond by 
objectifying love as a mirror between sociology and society. We hold that only 
by fully submitting oneself to the excessive love of reflexivity in current 
sociology and society could one encounter the limit of its validity. Following 
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the methodological rule, in this chapter, we posit a structural homology 
between current sociology and society, and then proceed to explicate it in a 
historical-institutional situation with recourse to Foucault's study of bio-politics. 
We will argue Foucault rightly points out that late/modern governmentality 
targets sexualized individuals, not couples in love. Henceforth, an 
in/communicative irony in the reflexive discourses of love reverts back to a 
paradox performed by the solitary thinking subject. But before our contextual 
exposition begins, a closer look at the irony of communication in Luhmann's 
social systems would be helpful. 
8.1 Luhmann's irony 
In the section on Luhmann of the previous chapter, we concluded his science 
endorses a morality of public masturbation on the pretext that his theory of 
love reveals nothing but a collective experience of ecstasy. No longer able to 
imagine each others' subjective experiences, lovers end up communicating 
the incommunicable by codes. Furthermore, if Luhmann's coding theory of 
love does play a crucial role in the development of his systems theory, as we 
have suggested, then his social systems must operate at a reflexive level of 
communication beyond human imagination. Now, without losing ourselves in 
more elaborate operations of the subsystems, such as economy and mass 
media, we can reestablish Luhmann's theoretical making of social systems 
from his basic concepts of society, communication, rationality and religion. 
Derived from his early rejection of nee-empiricism, Luhmann's systems theory 
practices an epistemology "between semi-determinism and methodological 
decisionism." Admitting the objectivity of value judgments, his sociology of 
"functional equivalences" captures selective meanings through the reduction 
of complexity (Zolo, 1986). By this method, his theory of society claims to 
reunite divided objects of analysis, action and system, in two sociologies. He 
finds that functional, critical and empirical sociologies all commit the paradox 
of relating a surface case to an underlying cause. The emergence of a 
paradox is tied to the demise of an objective observer. But the loss of a two-
valued, objective subject may be overcome in his theory by re-describing 
modern society as a self-describing, self-observing and finally self-referential 
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system. In effect, nothing lies behind a case. Meanwhile, everything could be 
raised to a "cause" according to the rule of a multi-valued distinction, positing 
that the second observer can see what the first observer fails to see 
(Luhmann, 1994; 1995b). Historically, the coming of a systems society 
signified the passing of a political society (societas civilis) since the French 
Revolution. lt marked a crisis of "societal" legitimacy, participation and 
representation. In response, legal despotism was created but failed as a 
political tool of reunification since parliamentary representation ended up 
representing particular interests bereft of the whole. As a result, the 
representation of society operates within a systems society of functional 
differentiation as opposed to stratified hierarchy (Luhmann, 1987). Arriving at 
a formal and unified concept, Luhmann (1991) then insists society could no 
longer be understood as human beings or territories to suggest a self-
referential subject. Quite the contrary, it should be treated as "a self-
describing obje~t·, "an operatively closed autopoietic system". By his 
definition, a systems society is re/produced via communication, operating 
recursive distinctions between information, utterance and mis/understanding. 
Human relationship is an environment to social systems. "Society is the 
comprehensive system of all communications." (Luhmann, 1991: 73) In other 
words, society refers to an insubstantial dimension of communicative 
operations, organizing people and things across time-space. 
From very early on, Luhmann (1982) had appreciated the unity of Parsons' 
action-system theory from an advanced view of self-reference and complexity. 
Self-reference, also known as "reentry of indication", is "a structural feature of 
objective systems", by which time-space paradoxes can be resolved to build a 
functional hierarchy and regain a unity of difference. Complexity, on the other 
hand, is the cause and consequence of rationality toward selectivity and 
order, by which an analytical theory and action can wed with value-orientation. 
In effect, Parsons' early concept of action as an actor's situational relation to 
the object (i.e. the unit act) is transcended, and his late concept of action as a 
limited emergence of the system (i.e. AGIL-grid) is radicalized. Meanwhile, 
Parsons' concepts of interpenetration and media of interchange, "the kernel of 
his theory", are developed to describe the "consequences of differentiation". 
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Examined closely, however, Luhmann went through a theoretical transition 
from the vantage point of action to that of communication around 1980 
(Stichweh, 2000). Up until the late 1970s, he had affirmed action as the 
elemental form of society, rejecting the thesis of two sociologies. In 1979, he 
started to consider action in time as an event. By 1984, communication took 
the place of action as the ground of Luhmann's sociological/social systems. 
Relevant intellectual contexts include studies done in the late 1940-60s, such 
as information and communication theories, pragmatics and analytic 
philosophy, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Relevant 
theoretical problems involve the distinctions between psychological and social 
systems, experience and action, observation and operation, and finally 
autopoiesis and communication. On the new basis of communication, the 
explanatory scope of sociology thus expands from industrial society to 
information society on the one hand, and from human society to world society 
on the other. In general terms, communication is an operation of endless 
distinctions (between information, utterance and mis/understanding) by a risky 
preference. Hence, objective values are always implied but never realized. 
Denied any access to thought, communication is a property of social systems 
independent from the psychological system, so "only communication 
communicates". Nonetheless, communication might be upset by 
consciousness when scripts of contiguous words and images are perceived 
as "inverted system-reference" (Luhmann, 2002: 155-68). This means "the 
mind has the privileged position of being able to disturb, stimulate and irritate 
communication. The mind cannot instruct communication, because 
communication instructs itself." In sum, two different systems, the human mind 
and non-human communication, interpenetrate autopoietically without 
identification (luhmann, 2002: 176-77, 182-84). Between the "structural 
coupling" of public language and private language, or social order and 
individual freedom, communication produces a differential form of rationality 
(Luhmann, 1991: 74-79). 
Placing luhmann's society of communication systems back in Western 
historical culture, one can then appreciate his challenge to the Old European 
rationality, as he often calls it. The Old European rationality supposed the 
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continuity of thought and being, as well as action and nature. The 
.disappearance of a universal observer began from the late Middle Ages 
(skeptical nominalism) through the Enlightenment (critical rationalism) to 
Hegelianism (dialectic idealism). Since then, the West has been living in the 
epistemological consequences of paradox and distinction. The appearance of 
global communication contributed by the invention of printing, the discovery of 
America, the establishment of modern disciplines, and the cultivation of the 
critical public (via novels reading) sets a new historical scene for the Western 
experience. In this context, Luhmann rejects any reactionary rationality 
comparable to Far Eastern mysticism, such as Zen Buddhism, since they still 
believe one could reach at the level of an "unobservable observer" by 
cultivating oneself to become an extramundane, transcendental, immediate 
and pluralistic subject. By contrast, Luhmann, while admitting the loss of the 
classical subject, takes a step back to stand by an "observable observer" in a 
second-order observation. As such, paradox and distinction can be reunified 
in the "distinction of distinction" drawn from Spencer-Brown's form of reentry, 
promising the differentiation of-functional systems (Luhmann, 1998a: 22-42). 
In an empirical sense, Luhmann's modernity features individualized 
technologies without alienation, self-describing economies without reification, 
and contingent futures redrawn from the unmarked space of the present as a 
"border value" (Luhmann, 1998a: 1-21). He would encourage a contingent 
morality, advising us to take the risk of decision by endless trials against the 
ecological views of opaque fate and transparent knowledge (Luhmann, 1998a: 
70ff; 1 08ff). Thus, Luhmann is not a romanticistin the conventional sense of 
opposing to the Enlightenment. By challenging the Old Europe, he regards 
himself as a New European rationalist, we argue, based on a mystical re-
description of Christianity. 
The secret of Luhmann's theory is disclosed in an elective affinity between 
religion and social systems (Luhmann, 1998a: 43; 1998b: 68-69).55 Given that 
55 One cannot afford to miss the fact that religion has a privileged place in Luhmann's 
theoretical edifice from the beginning to the end. We are referring to his very early work on 
The Function of Religion (1977[1972]) and other essays (1988b), and his very last writings 
published posthumously as The Religion of Society (2004(2002]). Known as a contemporary 
grand theorist in Gelman scholarship, Lumann's systems theory has a striking resemblance 
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he has modernized the Old European rationality to a second-order 
observation whilst rejecting Eastern mysticism as a reactionary rationality not 
unlike the Old Europe, we might wonder if there is any religious significance 
left for a modern observer. In the first approach, because religion and social 
systems both seek to "de-paradoxize" life, "it seems as if the concept of God 
has only provided a dress rehearsal for society, with the unexpected side 
effect of semantically preparing society's entry into the modern world" 
(Luhmann, 1998a: 55, 1998b: 183-224). However, "the theological prototype 
of the observer of the system in the system is the Devil!" (Luhmann, 1991: 69) 
If the very moral distinction of good and evil sustains evil, then by playing the 
tragic role of observing the universal observer God, the Devil shows himself to 
be a fundamental monotheist (that is, monogamist), the keenest lover (that is, 
of God) (Lumann, 1998b: 235-37). In this de-paradoxical viewpoint, 
sociologists, anthropologists and even theologians are irreconcilable with lay 
believers since they are doomed to a sinful life of knowledge with no innocent 
sense of belief (Luhmann, 1998b: 66, 243). On the other hand, even laymen's 
beliefs in hell, ghosts and witches as an integral part of a theodicy of fate to 
explain human sufferings are considered to have dwindled in the 
modernization of religion (Luhmann, 1998b: 64, 199). Thus, the overall 
religious sentiment in a modern society turns closer to the mystical faith of 
Nicholaus Cusanus, for whom God exists in an Other side of distinction, as 
well as of distinction and in-distinction (Luhmann, 1998b: 238). As such, the 
paradox of God and the Devil is reunited in a form of reentry by drawing a 
further distinction. The mystic unity with God ends up in an ecstasy of 
universal differences. While insisting that even caprice has a determinative 
structure underneath it, Luhmann states "God's command is a form of 
freedom" favourable to relativism, whereas the fear of relativism is Devil's 
moral trickery (Luhmann, 1988b: 245). In result, a modern observer of the 
system within the system turns out to be a mystic virtuoso speaking a 
scientific dialect. 
to Hegel's philosophical theology. Therefore, we are not interested in rehearsing Luhmann's 
concrete analysis of religion only to parrot his formulaic position that religion is one of many 
other social subsystems. Rather, by a contrary procedure, we deduce the theoretical logic of 
social systems from his religious writings. 
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Identifying the second-order observer with a scientific-mystic virtuoso explains 
why Luhmann's social semantics prefers differentiated social structures since 
they produce only "legitimate" knowledge from "stable and repeatable" 
communication. At bottom, systems theory recognizes only regularized social 
semantics after it "seriously exorcises" other inter-systemic, semi-meaningful 
discourses in popular cultures (Staheli, 1997). In this sense, the eo-evolution 
of cultural semantics and structural differentiation marks a nonconsensual 
consensus between a religious dogmatic and a social evolutionist, as the 
in/communication between theology and sociology reconciles with the liberal 
modern world (cf. Luhmann, 1988b: 71-182). In effect, Luhmann's Religion of 
Society reaffirms every modernist thesis one is already familiar with, such as 
differentiation and secularization, except that it is written in a coded language 
like a minute of communications by social systems themselves (Luhmann, 
2004). 
Luhmann's making of his systems theory from the remaking of the concepts of 
society, communication, rationality and religion looks immaculate. In the 
beginning, things appeared how they had been full of paradoxes beneath 
certainty. There was no history. But a new rationality based on objectified 
judgments of value came to resolve these paradoxes with formalization, 
differentiation and functionalization. Hence, these paradoxes have not been 
worked through, but rather diverted by drawing a meaningful distinction. 
Decomposing into insignificant differences, things become how they will be 
full of contingencies beyond paradox. The future will not happen. To 
communicate in the unity of differences (not opposites), social systems 
practice a technological mysticism. Due to the indifferent mystery of being, 
distinctions are obligatory even though they merely trans/forms life paradoxes 
into a virtual evolution of society. The evolved differences do not lead the 
world to get a glimpse of heaven or hell, but constantly reenter the world to 
trim and enrich it, unmarking it as a non-place beyond recognition and 
remarking it as an event beyond imagination. For Luhmann, communication of 
social systems is an allegory of love since paradoxical passion has turned into 
a distinctive code insensitive to subjective thought (e.g. "Mate, do you have a 
girlfriend or not?"; "Honey, do you love me or not?"). Yet, an ironic 
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consequence of such love is that social communication eventually goes on 
without lovers' personalities involved (e.g. "Listen, they are together ... "; "Look, 
we are an item!"). Hence, we may conclude the irony of social systems by 
asking- has human communication ever begun? 
8.2 From Parsons to Foucault 
We have deliberated upon Luhmann's irony of social systems, the scientific 
horizon of all reflexive discourses of love. Now we turn around to examine the 
institutional condition of these discourses via the historical contextualization of 
modern sociology. We expect that few Western intellectuals would contest the 
thesis that humanity has been reaping the bittersweet fruit of modernity from 
1789 through 1968 up to now. However, the epochal view glosses over a 
difficult rite of passage in the 1970s when social systems grew mature from an 
antagonistic to an adaptable state of discontentment. If modern society in the 
postwar period might be . described by material and symbolic excesses, 
late/modern sociology represented its surplus values as it wavered between 
criticism and analysis. In result, we should examine the modernization of 
sociology itself from a vocation to a profession. 
The impetus of late/modern sociology since 1970 was derived from a 
supposed incommensurability between the bourgeois revolution of 1789 and 
the student movement of 1968. The social-historical logic of change, albeit 
remaining collective, appeared to have altered its mode of organization. 
Within sociology, we could discern two phases of intellectual shift. 56 At the first 
phase, late/modern sociology was disenchanted with the crisis consciousness 
of European classical sociologists between 1880 and 1920, whose morality 
entwined individuals and society in a tragic fate. At the second phase, 
56 We restrict our genealogy to the confines of modern sociology. But the paradigm shift was 
not enclosed to sociology. On a larger background of modern philosophy, arguably, there 
were already four cognitive revolutions taking effects around the 1960s. The early 2010 century 
went through an intellectual change of climate from Husserl's and Heidegger's 
phenomenology since the 1920-30s, through Sartre's and de Beauvoir's existentialism since 
the 1940-50s, to Levi-Strauss' and Piaget's structuralism since the 1950-60s (above all 
anticipated by de Saussure and Mauss besides other literary and artistic movements). 
Meanwhile, revolutionary developments from the cognitive sciences included a) analytic 
philosophy of everyday language by Wittgenstein ahd Austin; b) phenomenology of everyday 
life by Schutz and Luckman; c) cognitive psychology by Simon and Bateson; d) second-order 
system theory by Maturana and Varela. 
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late/modern sociology was dissatisfied with the naTve consciousness of 
American Parsonians and liberal Marxists between 1920 and 1960, whose 
morality promoted individual· action and collective praxis. In the process, the 
boundary between social analysis and social criticism turned increasingly 
blurred. Particularly since Lockwood's (1976[1964]) thesis of two integrations 
(system/ parts versus social/ people), a late/modern theory of society was 
elaborated, in which Parsons' and Marx's spirits roamed. 57 In place of 
classical dualism, a late/modern theory of structure and agency was expected 
to open the unknown future by revaluing creative individuals' practices in 
everyday life. 
In this sense, the Parsonian "tradition" became irreplaceable for its transitional 
character. Parsons (1937; 1970) established an analytical framework of action 
and system to analyze modern society, a paradigm unrivalled by other conflict 
theorists (e.g. Coser, Rex and Darendorf). Theoretical reconfigurations settled 
down by the late 1980s. On the one hand, Munch, Luhmann and Alexander 
insisted on radicalizing Parsons' sociology in functional and systemic terms 
(Munch, 1981; 1982; Luhmann, 1982; Alexander, 1984; Alexander and 
Colomy, 1985; Mouzelis, 1999). Mainly due to abstractive theoretical 
language, the reception of post-Parsonian systems theories remains limited. 
On the other Habermas, Mouzelis, Giddens and Archer formulated the 
sociology of structure and agency against their bete noire Parsons. 
Meanwhile, since Parsons' theoretical position had been counterbalanced by 
Lockwood's introduction of a Marxist standpoint, the question of structure and 
agency developed into a variety of theses, including Habermas' first-degree 
perspectivism (1987), Mouzelis' second-degree perspectivism (1974; 1997), 
Giddens' duality (1993[1976]: 169; 1979: 49-95), and Archer's dualism (1982; 
1996b). The methodological debates occurred within as well as between a 
new social epistemology (Habermas vs. Mouzelis) and a new social ontology 
(Giddens vs. Archer). 
57 The subtle assimilation of criticism within analysis in Lockwood's account provokes the 
problematic of structure/agency in late/modem sociology. Therefore, his analysis is not to be 
confused with similar theses, such as two sociologies or two Parsons (Dawe, 1973; Menzies, 
1976). 
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But a Parsonian form of analysis (characterized by the unit act, pattern 
variables of value orientation, generalized symbolic media of interchange, and 
the AGIL-schema) was explicitly targeted and implicitly preserved by the 
sociology of structure and agency, as if it was a middle ranged theory of 
society in bridging the ·disjointed levels of action and system (Habermas, 
1981; Giddens, 1984; Mouzelis, 1995; Archer, 1995). Accordingly, we have a 
theory of communicative action, a theory of power hierarchy, a theory of 
structuration, and a theory of morphogenesis. Collectively, these discourses of 
structure and agency have completed a Marxian translation of Parsons' 
paradigm, ending up neither Parsonian nor Marxian, but more neo-Weberian, 
or philosophically neo-Kantian. Given the current common interest in multiple 
degrees of perspective and types of agency, we wouldn't be too surprised at 
witnessing a critical Marxist converting to a reflexive Weberian. 58 The only 
question is whether this conversion stands for a "relapse" of will-to-power in 
asserting social revolution, or an "advance" of will-to-love in supporting the 
evolution of social systems. 
From this theoretical constellation, three observations can be made. First, a 
cognitive map of late/modernity has been drawn up by a differentiated model 
of society composed of concepts like system, structure, agency and 
inter/action. In the model, one expects a radicalization of antagonism between 
autopoetic system and interactive action as soon as the rules of structure and 
agency are set up in between. With these rules at hand, one averts the 
danger of falling back on Parson's theoretical edifice. But the price to be paid 
is that these rules are supposed to explicate specific mechanisms of system 
and inter/action in an empirical setting. In consequence, a social theory of 
structure/agency accedes to that of system/action. We have seen in the 
previous chapter that the development of Giddens' writings is a vivid example 
\ 
of this irony. In short, as soon as structuration theory is applied to an 
institutional analysis of late-modernity, "abstract system" runs away from the 
58 A representative case of such a conversion can be found in later Lockwood's work 
Solidarity and Schism. As a leading British sociologist of the conflict school, Lockwood (1992) 
inverts Parsons' question of order into a questioning. His thesis manages to integrate 
Durkheimian and Marxian sociologies (social anomie and economic contradiction) from a 
Weberian frame of analysis (cultural rationalization versus fatalism) (cf. Mouzelis, 1993: 578; 
Turner, 1995: 167). 
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reflexive control of agency. Sooner or later, the controversy over the relative 
autonomy of system and (inter-)action returns, which has occurred in post-
Parsonian functional and systems theories. 59 
Second, one possible response to the above controversy is to develop a 
layered theory of agency. The explanatory scope of agency causation is then 
enlarged to include means only loosely linked to social institutions, means 
borrowed from natural and human sciences (e.g. biology, psychology, history 
philosophy, etc). Again, we have seen that Giddens' writings from the very 
outset are fraught with psychological and philosophical meditations. These 
elements take actual effects in his later analysis of self-identity and intimacy 
as notions like ontological security, biographical zoning, anxiety, trust and risk 
build up a vague concept of agency. After all, once the duality of structure has 
been accepted, there is little reason to reject the duality of agency based on 
autopoietic subjectivities homologous to Luhmann's autopoietic social 
systems. In consequence, reflexive sociology of structure and agency turns 
into a general theory of agency sui generic reminiscent of later Parsons' 
general system of action, which has also occurred since the 1990s.60 
Third, abandoning the vocation of evolution as well as revolution, late/modern 
sociology finds its professional task in bettering people's welfare in everyday 
life. The independence of the life-world is recognized as a late/modern 
condition, irrespective of Habermas' critique of colonization (Habermas, 1987: 
156ff). Beyond criticism, late/modern sociology has accomplished a reflexive 
adaptation to the maintenance of everyday practices. No wonder Giddens 
endorses an unbroken chain of theory and "practice" qua application. His 
59 The case could be found in several rounds of debate caused by Goffman's notion of 
"interaction order" (Goffman, 1983; Rawls, 1987; 1988; 1989; Fuchs, 1988; 1989; Levine, 
1989; Mouzelis, 1992). In the process, relevant ideas of Simmel, Parsons and Luhmann are 
drawn into the debate. The central point of contention lies in whether face-to-face interaction 
has an order sui generis distinguished from social systems in modernity. Doubtlessly, they are 
dealing with a case of "the end of society". 
60 Challenging new projects of a general theory of agency include pragmatism (Joas, 1996), 
critical realism (Archer, 1996a; 2000), ethnomethodology (Barnes, 1985; 1992; 2000, 2001 ), 
network relationalism (Emirbayer, 1994; 1997; 1998), philosophy of life (Campbell, 1996; 
1999; 2006), psychoanalysis and psychology (Layder, 1994; 1997; Elliott, 2003; 2005; Adams, 
2003; 2004), and sociology of the body and emotion (Shilling, 1993; 1997; 1999; 2001; 
Williams, 2001; Scheff, 2000). 
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sociology promises a user-friendly toolkit, joining in the service industry of 
knowledge. I! is a matter of fact that late/modern sociology is no longer 
sustainable without feeding empirical analyses and predictions useful to the 
interests of the life-world prior to the system. Indeed, the sign value of a social 
scientific research is now determined by its empirical relevance and policy 
implications. More service than practice, professional sociology survives in the 
modern world through the revitalization of everyday life. 
Given as such, we are tempted to argue that late/modern sociology "reflects" 
an economic society since the 17th century when scientific revolution prepared 
the material condition for the emergence of private life. The bourgeois right to 
privacy is "the social" in Arendt's (1958) sense, a domain of household 
consumption accumulating to the common wealth of a nation. The birth of the 
social sustains her tragic view of privatization since the public virtue of 
excellence (an~te) in leading a life of thinking and action (vita contemplative 
and vita activa) has lost to a thoughtless process of labour. However, this 
economic negativism cannot account for an affluent society. 
We are also tempted to argue that modern sociology "projects" a political 
society from the 18th century onwards. The medieval way of life was a "natural 
artifice". The question of "how is society possible" only started to make sense 
in the era of "critique and crisis" (Tester, 1992: 6; Koselleck, 1988). In result, 
the transition from Tradition (asymmetrical reciprocity based on divine 
providence) to the Enlightenment (symmetrical reciprocity based on society) 
marks an imaginative construction of society in response to the crisis of 
religious life (Tester, 1992: 15ff). An imagined society has been operating by 
the authority of love since the 19th century. Paternalism creates an "authority 
of false love" (e.g. employers), while autonomy expresses an "authority 
without love" (e.g. experts) (Sennett, 1993: eh. 2-3).61 Both illegitimate forms 
provoke psychological negation, thereby standing for the "fear of authority" 
61 Sennett (1993: 52-54) lays out an evolutionary typology of authority: patriarchy, 
patrimonialism and paternalism. Ancient patriarchy originated in oeconomy or family economy 
distributes property and power according to kinship. Medieval patrimonialism derived from 
manorial societies keeps a contractual relationship with the seigneurs. Modern paternalism 
results from the separation of work from the family during industrialization. In paternalism, 
employers present themselves as patriarchs, "fathers" in a symbolic sense of the contract. 
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(Sennett, 1993: 28-41 ). But if one follows Hegel's dialectic of recognition, 
authority could be transformed since it is after all the work of imagination 
(Sennett, 1993: eh. 1, 4). Neither a thing nor an illusion, authority might be 
reshaped by applying a private ethic of discussion to the public domain in a 
metaphoric way (Sennett, 1993: 190-97). The political imagination of society 
echoes the sociological thesis of detraditionalization defined as "the 
internalization of authority" (Heelas, 1996: 2). As a matter of "relative degree", 
detraditionalization prefers radical individualization to the coexistence with 
tradition (Heelas, 1996: 3-11). However, this political positivism cannot explain 
a mass society. 
An affluent mass society, especially in the West, is a comfortable and learned 
society, a society of material and symbolic excesses. The crisis of the welfare 
state, the ideology of a decentralized government, the popularization of higher 
education, global network capitalism, visualized consumption, and virtualized 
technology all contribute to the multiplication and excrescence of social reality. 
Surviving by the surplus values of society, late/modern sociology has become 
an integral part of the social condition it tries to represent. In this symbiosis, 
there is no longer any need for a "great refusal" as Marcuse once believed; 
meanwhile, Beck's vision of a reflexive "new beginning" seems even less 
likely. On the contrary, a compromise with and a flight from paradoxes of life 
might describe better the adult character of reflexive sociology: structuration 
and differentiation are their proper professional names. 
We argue that the eo-evolution of late/modern sociology and everyday life 
"embodies" the social, dissolving the split of private economy and public 
politics. In a response to the crisis of families in the post-1848 France, a 
hybrid system of "flotation" prefigured the invention of the social (Deleuze in 
Donzelot, 1980: xvi). Preoccupied with "social problems" ranging from 
delinquency through sexual disorder to personal hygiene, the social was 
made up of a complex alliance of "tutelary" agencies, such as judicial courts, 
social work, psychiatry, pedagogy and medicine. lt functioned as if there were 
a real life/time of the social in need of maintenance by these organs, 
preventing the social body from growing old and ill. Death, moreover, became 
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an omnipresent object of anxiety for the social. Rift by "antinomies inherent in 
the political foundation of the sovereignty of all", which are justice and 
freedom above all, the Third Republic invented the social as a political 
strategy of diversion. The social heralded the arrival of modern welfare states 
(Etat- providence) to overcome at once traditionalism and liberalism at the 
turn of the 20th century. Political responsibility ceded to the ideology of "social 
progress". The socialization of risk was programmed by the "homogeneous 
language of statistics" to secure the "organic solidarity" of (social) right 
(Donzelot, 1992). Surpassing the metaphysics of political sovereignty, social 
solidarity created a "consensus society" to promote the social and the 
individual, security and freedom at the same time (Donzelot, 1991: 17 4 ). 
According to this historical narrative, the subsequent crisis of providential 
states after the 1960s can no longer be seen as a sign of the revival of 
liberalism or communism in any neo-forms. Rather, the crisis of welfare states 
marks the failure of politics and the success of the social as the state and 
society drift further apart to make "the simultaneous enlargement freedom and 
security'' the only way to social democracy. This "middle way" sums up the 
ideological debate between nee-liberalism and neo-social democracy, since 
both agree that a society must progress through dynamic social bonds instead 
of static social structures. Therefore, the cry over the crisis of the social 
signifies "the crisis in the growth of the social, since the debate is only about 
alternative modalities of the social bond, not about that opposition between 
differing ideals of the social order which the social-democratic strategy had 
undertaken to exorcise" (Donzelot, 1991: 177-78). Constructing love as a 
malleable social bond in everyday life, late/modern sociology has un/wittingly 
identified itself with the consummative agent of the social. 
8.3 Foucault's paradox 
For Foucault, the · social exercise of bio-politics is an exercise of 
governmentality. He provides us with a short history of governmentality. From 
Machiavelli's advices to the prince to Rousseau's invention of sovereignty, a 
process toward the "governmentalization of the state" occurred between the 
16th and the 18th century. The historical transition started from the medieval 
state of justice, though the state of management around the 15th and the 161h 
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centuries, to the state of government after the 16th century. Based on the 
protocol of security, the modern state exercises its governing power by 
collecting pieces of knowledge about its population and territory (Foucault, 
1991[1978]: 87-104). Moreover, the changing rationale of governmentality is 
not only expressed in social ideas, but also in imaginary narratives, common 
practices and disciplinary discourses (Foucault, 1988[1981]: 154-60). In 
practice, governmentality refers to political techniques of surveillance applied 
to individuals, which induces "the police" (polizet). Policing is different from the 
Christian and princely surveillance traditions due to the deployment of raison 
d' etat. In other words, the state looks for an immanent source of objectivity 
apart from God and the prince by recourse to political knowledge. Policing 
technologies result in several historical effects, such as consolidating 
empirical power, historicizing inter-state competition, and marginalizing 
individuals (Foucault, 1988: 146-52). The overall impact leads ·to 
individualization and totalization at once, insofar as the individual is given a 
value of the particular and the universal at the same time in the statistical pool 
of population (Foucault, 1988: 162). In short, govern mentality is formed by an 
alliance of the police technologies and empirical rationality. 
Furthermore, the subject of bio-political governmentality refers to sexualized 
individuals, not couples in love. In this sense, the incommunicative irony in the 
reflexive discourses of love is paradoxically confirmed in the guise of a solitary 
thinking subject. This is why Foucault stresses that adolescent masturbation 
was a key social problem in the 191h century (Foucault, 1980[1976]: 104, 120-
21). His essay 'Sexuality and solitude' SU!llS up further the Western history of 
subjectivity (cf. also Foucault, 1985[1982]; 1986). In the essay, Foucault 
(1997[1981]: 175-83) argues that modern sexuality deploys "technologies of 
the self quite distinct from Habermas' tripartite interests of knowledge, 
production, communication and domination. The Christian technique of 
confession should be valued in itself with regards to truth and sexuality. 
Genealogically, asceticism was not an invention of medieval Christianity, but 
could be dated further back to Stoicism in late antiquity. Nonetheless, the 
transition of sexual problematic from penetration to masturbation didn't gain 
an institutional form only since Christianity to help develop a dimension of 
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subjectivity from relation to non-relation, action to thinking, or intimacy to 
solitude. This could be exemplified by the contrast between a pagan text and 
a Christian one in the Roman imperial period: Artemidorus' The Interpretation 
of Dreams and Augustine's City of God. In Artemidorus' text, sexual dreams 
were often expressed via the scene of penetration (as an act). Sexual 
positions in these dreams had no Freudian implications of a family romance, 
but were related to the male dreamer's social position (cf. also Foucault, 
1986: 4-36). By contrast, Augustine's depiction of the sexual act emphasized 
emotional and bodily spasm, clearly a masturbating individual out of self-
control. Adam was supposed to have sex only for procreation in Heaven. In 
view of this, Adam's self-concealment with a fig leaf before God signified less 
a response of psychological shame than biological punishment, namely 
involuntary erection. As Eve was punished for her labour, so Adam was 
punished for his sexuality. Since Augustine, confession means a confession of 
the libido: a subject's will to truth amounts to a will to sexuality. To deal with 
the problem of masturbation, a subjective truth must be constructed by 
sexualized thinking. 
In order to master sexuality, one has to purify thought by a constant self-
analysis. Besides Augustine, a parallel example can be found in the ethic of 
"chastity" established by Cassian's analysis of "cardinal vices" in 415 AD. 
Fornication had a key place in the causal chain of vices. First, fornication and 
greed composed vices of the flesh, which were the first two causes of 
degeneration. Second, distinguished from greed, fornication was also the last 
of eight vices, the consequence of pride. Thus, a vicious circle was completed 
by connecting the spirit (pride) back to the flesh (fornication). Lastly, different 
from greed again, fornication was a biological need which requires complete 
eradication. Therefore, for an ascetic, the most severe battle occurred inside 
the self (Foucault, 1985: 14-17). Moreover, Cassian broadened the sense of 
fornication by adding two notions, immunditia and libido. The former referred 
to uncleanness when sexuality occurs without sexual contacts (e.g. 
caressing). The latter was even more subjective, describing how sexuality 
emerges from thoughts in the mind (Foucault, 1985: 17). Expanding the 
semantics of a word as such, Cassian could then separate fornication from 
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adultery which was an institutional violation, opening up a subjective domain 
of sexuality without sexual acts and relations, immunditia and libido, as the 
ultimate battle for chastity (Foucault, 1985: 18-19). In practice, there was even 
a technical design to help ascetics sleep without having sexual dreams. This 
technology of the self produced a separation of the will from thought 
(Foucault, 1985: 20-21 ). In short, the ascetic technique is a vigilant mental 
self-analysis to eliminate pollution and achieve virginity. The historical 
consequence of asceticism is less relevant to sexual restriction, and more to 
the expansion of a subjective reality in thought. For Foucault, subjectivation 
means opening up the immanent plane of thought to play with knowledge and 
truth. A thinking subject is an invention of ethical practices in Near Eastern 
monasteries and subsequently institutionalized in the moral actions of 
Western Christian churches (Foucault, 1985: 23-25).62 
Christian confession is radically different from the Buddhist meditation in this 
respect. On the one hand, meditation has no subjective truth since subjectivity 
is the fundamental illusion - all we have is now. On the other hand, the 
counterfactual consequence of confession ends up reproducing a 
symptomatic subjectivity instead of clearing away evil demons, as expected 
by the psychoanalytic talking cure (Foucault, 1997: 178). The automation of 
thinking makes history possible in a reflexive movement uncontrollable by 
human imagination. This is why ethics should be conceived as "a genealogy 
of problems, which is not to say that all things are bad, but that all things are 
dangerous" (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 231). 
Following Nietzsche, Foucault's genealogy of ethics reconstructs problematic 
62 Here the social-historical background is related to '"the cult of the saints" in late antiquity, 
marking a tortuous passage to Christianization. The social craze in worshiping saints should 
be neither degraded as a matter of popular religion nor upgraded as an elite one, but rather 
signifies a collective turn to solitary deliberation (Brown, 1981 ). Situating "the problem of 
Christianization"' in late antiquity, Brown (1995) argues that holy men such as Augustine 
acquired their social authority by fulfilling the function of pragmatic faCilitation more than 
consecrated protection, insofar as they were often required to deal with pagan practices 
similar to sorcerers. We may infer, in contemporary settings, the "religious" cult of the saints 
and idols is still a common practice in Southern European and Southern American societies, 
which is homologous to the cult of the gurus and fetishes in Far Eastern societies. The 
"cultural" cult of the saints re-embodied in media celebrities and pop idols, we might add, can 
also be found in nee-liberal capitalist societies and/or metropolis around the world. 
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values by a socio-historical analysis of descent (Herkunft) and emergence 
(Entstehung) without origin (Ursprung) (Foucault, 1977: 139-64). Indeed, 
ethical problematization defines the methodological bearing of his history of 
sexuality: "far from being the still incomplete and blurred image of an Idea that 
eternally retains our answers in some upper region, the problem lies in the 
idea itself, or rather, the Idea exists only in the form of a problem: a distinctive 
plurality whose obscurity is nevertheless insistent and in which the question 
ceaselessly stirs. What is the answer of the questio11? The problem. How is 
the problem resolved? By displacing the question." (Foucault, 1977: 185) 
Similarly, Foucault's genealogical method might also be described as "the 
ways in which human beings understand themselves and act upon 
themselves and others do not fit into such a linear narrative, nor do they 
emerge as a consequence of 'more fundamental' changes elsewhere-in the 
conditions of production, in family forms, in 'culture'. Subjectivity has its own 
history, and it is a history that is more heterogeneous, more practical and 
more technical than these accounts suggest." (Rose, 1996: 295) Summing up 
later Foucault's method, Deleuze (1988: 101, 104) argues "a dimension of 
subjectivity [is] derived from power and knowledge without being dependent 
on ·them" because "recuperated by power-relations and relations of 
knowledge, the relation to oneself is continually reborn, elsewhere and 
otherwise." All in all, we arrive at a reflexive definition of the Enlightenment 
from Foucault's genealogy of sexuality, thinking and history. As themes in 
Foucault's life work develop from the rational confinement of madness, 
through the epistemic discipline of crime and illness, to the bio-political 
government of subjectivity, Kant's idea of criticism, generated in a self-
educational process to individual maturation via knowledge and freedom, 
degenerates into a conceptual "exit" and historical "way out" (Foucault, 1997: 
305). In other words, Foucault's "project" of modernity is always interrupted by 
discursive narratives more or less than modernity: modernity has been 
deprogrammed by the circulation of fantasies around the ideology of the 
Enlightenment without ever touching its sublime object. 
In light of this, Foucault's final recourse to a Greco-Roman ethic of the body 
might be read as a response to the metamorphosis of the Self in 
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late/modernity (Foucault, 1986; 1992[1985]). Historically speaking, there was 
a change of ethos from the Greek act of an1J.~ to the Roman "pathologization" 
of subjects (Foucault, 1986: 54-58, 141-42). Foucault indicates a problematic 
domain at the kernel of the Greek ethic of self-mastery besides the mutual 
limitation of the private house and the public agora. The inherent limit of the 
Greek ethic was situated in an ambivalent school/playground of eroticism 
where the "subject" and "object" of pleasure battled most fiercely in the case 
of "antinomy of the boy", that is, when a man in the same-sex relationship 
wavered between a struggle of his activity and a respect for his boy's honor 
due to the boy's potential right to citizenship. There was no such ethical 
ambivalence between reciprocity and asymmetry in the case of two boys, 
where an inter-objective struggle for activity reigned supreme since both were 
not yet free subjects (Foucault, 1992: 193-225). Foucault exercises the 
deconstruction of Greek dual spheres unreservedly, which is shown in his 
recognition of the case of erotic relationships between two adult men, and yet 
subsequent exclusion of the outer limiting case from "the domain of active and 
intense problematization" (Foucault, 1992: 194-95). The educational problem 
of the boy was supposed to be solved by Plato's ontological distinction of love 
and eros in the example of Socrates. In Plato's narrative, Socrates reversed 
the condition of the erotic chase (that is, making boys chase him) by turning 
his eyes away from the embodied knowledge toward the disembodied truth 
and ultimately ending the erotic play (so that all chase after the truth) 
(Foucault, 1992: 229-46). But Socrates-Plato's beautiful idea of love didn't 
take roots according to Foucault's history of subjectivity. What followed 
effectively was a birth of the Stoic subject in the Roman Empire. 
Foucault (1986: 81-86) argues that the Roman's "care of the self shouldn't be 
explained away as an individual withdrawal to the hearth and soul, as if it was 
a structural effect of the victory of the Empire over the city-state. Instead, 
multiple social networks of the self and others were produced. First, local 
relations of the po/is were not destroyed, but appropriated by the Empire in a 
network of social space. Second, ethical reflection did not die away with 
aristocratic citizens, but changed its form of expression due to an emergence 
of managerial, service aristocracy. This intermediary class, consisted of 
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councilmen and knights, was caught in a contradictory social position between 
the governing princes and the governed civilians. In short, power relations in 
the Roman Empire became more complex than in the Greek city-state. Third, 
in parallel to the new "political game," "matrimonial association" turned 
paradoxical. On the one hand, the economic function of marriage was taken 
over by the Empire, turning marriage into a public institution. On the other 
hand, the marriage relation was tightened up between reciprocal couples 
(Foucault, 1986: 77-80). As a result, relativized political activities had to enter 
in complex relations with the moral agent on the one hand and personal 
destiny on the other (Foucault, 1986: 87-94). But, there has never been a 
critical form of the subject, let alone any phenomenological inter-subjectivity. 
Quite the contrary, during the Roman imperial period, the subject was "born" 
in a docile state, a pathological state of mind which required constant 
solicitude by the technologies of the self. This is carefully suggested by 
Foucault's choice of chapter titles from Dietetics, Economics and Erotics in 
The Use of Pleasure to The Body, The Wife and Boys in The Care of the Self. 
His implicit statement is that the heroic domains of the act were succeeded by 
the bio-technological relations between subjects, exactly precarious 
subjectivity from the very outset of its history. 
In Foucault's history of subjectivity, the biological question of sex prevalent in 
the 19th century has been deconstructed to a semiotic question of sexuality, 
allowing late/modern men to re/construct ad libitum a sexual-cultural politics of 
lifestyles in counter to bio-politics. This is how he actually liberates Freud's 
repressive hypothesis in the guise of criticism (Foucault, 1980: 15-49).63 As a 
logical consequence, the question of the second sex, women, is relegated to 
the historical background. For him, the moral question of women was only a 
superficial and transitory one in the Middle Ages since the underlying question 
"We are tempted to argue that Foucault took serious notes of Baudrillard's (1987[1977]) 
criticism of his productivism in the first volume of The History of Sexuality from the standpoint 
of seduction, and so tried to break through the ideological impasse in The Use of Pleasure 
and The Care of the Self. We can see how the bio-political approach was pushed to the limit 
in the thematic parallels between Foucault's analysis of Greek eroticism and Roman 
asceticism and Baudrillard's analysis of seduction and fatal strategies (Baudrillard, 
1990a[1979]; 1990b[1983]). In fact, Deleuze's (1988) interpretation of Foucaull's concept of 
subjectivity by the "fold" of "the force of the outside" presupposes also his last twist after the 
first volume of The History of Sexuality. 
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from the late antiquity to modern times has always been an ethical question of 
the body. This is why he reposes the question of chastity divested of female 
morality (Foucault, 1985). Moreover, the ethic of the body was derived from 
the genetic code of the boy in the erotic domain of the antiquity. By taking the 
primordial question of the boy into accounts, we are not simply arguing that 
his theory of society adopts a libertarian ethic of sexuality in place of sex. This 
kind of criticism deserves to be retorted by Foucaultians as regressing to a 
heterosexual ideology in a chauvinist as well as feminist sense. Rather, we 
are analyzing in a scientific sense that Foucault's theory of society posits an 
erotic education subsisted by a generational body of knowledge instead of a 
sexed organism of love. Given the case, we could come back to the crude 
fact, an original problem subtly displaced by Foucault's semiotic formalism. 
Foucault (1992: 200) argues that a Greek citizen's ethical conflict between 
reciprocity and asymmetry was really caused by his boy's "juvenile body" 
juxtaposed with "signs and guarantees of a developing virility." So the boy's 
body should be perceived as a sign of "feminine ambiguity" distinguished from 
"feminine beauty." But hasn't his distinction presumed that the object of desire 
was originally caused by a simulation of feminine beauty, a quasi-feminine 
body? Reduced to this genetic evolutionary sense, Foucault's erotic politics of 
the body turns out to be in the shadow of what Durkheim (1960c: 138) has 
said about Rousseau's body politic, that is "a tottering structure established 
and maintained only by an almost miraculous conjunction of circumstances." 
While eroticizing the ethic of self-mastery, Foucault (1990: 7) refuses to be a 
Hellenist like Nietzsche. The Roman Empire inherited the "strengthening of 
austerity themes" from classical Greece, while Latin Christianization further 
gave the ethical model "a legal framework and an institutional support" 
(Foucault, 1986: 235). Methodologically, Foucault plays out the paradox of 
Christianity and the Enlightenment in Western modernity by recourse to 
Eastern Stoicism. But far from looking for a route of flight from the fantasy of 
the Enlightenment, Foucault traverses the fantasy back in the Christian 
matrix, looking for a minimal difference in the repetitive movement from the 
Stoic ethic, the suppressed Christian antecedent, to Christian morality. 
Theoretically, Foucault plays out the paradox of sex and love by recourse to 
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the history of sexuality or subjectivity. Thinking through the late/modern irony 
of intimacy and solitude, or communication and ecstasy in Baudrillard's terms 
(1988[1987]), Foucault brings to light a performative paradox between speech 
and thought, which is the paradox of masculinity (from a boy to man). 
Foucault's erotic education tells us that a social discourse is produced by a 
sexual body instead of rational language, a case to which a sociological 
discourse is of no exception. Given so, one can learn to tell the easy word of 
love from love itself, no matter how heavy the burden of proof may be. But 
shaking off the burden for the service of bio-politics, late/modern sociology 
has ended in social reality, confusing sexuality with love. Politically, as a 
result, the paradox between the sexes is too antagonistic to be reflexive. No 
post/Rousseauan body politic is able to govern both sexes in/differently as it 
governs individuals, for a society of sexed organism eludes every strategy of 
difference and indifference. This means even Foucault's sexual history of truth 
is immersed in the gay scene of transgression too much to bear the drab 
thought of a sexed politics of truth - once again (cf. Miller, 1993; Halperin, 
1995). 
8.4 Love after life 
Late/modern sociology in Europe has grown from a critical to a reflexive state 
of mind. This is the mind of an individual subject who says "I am not the ego", 
given that the duality of modernity formulated in a subject's critique of its own 
rationalization has produced new social movements in a reflexive world 
without society (Touraine, 1989; 1995; 1998). Meanwhile, we cannot avoid the 
performance of the late/modern sociological self in everyday life, insofar as it 
has sacrificed modern sociology in America through a difficult rite of passage. 
After all, it was Parsons' sociology which first overturned classical holism by 
discovering the value of individualism. Europeans might argue that a 
contemporary individual has overcome Parsons' actor of faith in order and 
conflict, control and struggle, becoming an agent of risk for an uncertain 
future. Still, they have buried a modern sociological tradition of love in America 
suggested by later Sorokin's research project of "creative altruism" in the 
1950s and later Parsons' thesis of "expressive revolution" in the 1970s. 
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(Sorokin, 1950; 2002(1954); Parsons, 1978[197 4)). 64 By an act of passage, 
that tradition is forgotten in the dustbin of history. Since reflexive discourses of 
love present themselves in a fresh portfolio, let us take it at face value. 
Reflexive discourses of love acknowledge individualization as the primary 
condition of late/modernity. Luhmann's science observes individualization as a 
structural factor in the social systems; Beck and Giddens aim further to 
politicize its cultural potentials. However, since Bauman thinks from a moral 
standpoint of individuation, expecting a u-topian future of humanity, he is 
acutely ambivalent toward any cosmopolitan or life politics of individualization 
(Bauman, 2001a; 2002a; 2002b; Beck, 2000; Giddens, 1991: 209ft). 65 
Nonetheless, we have shown how Luhmann's reflexive science has opened 
an ironic horizon, purging the last residue of humanism in a reflexive morality. 
In sum, the individual and the human person are in conflict with each other 
within the reflexive paradigm of love. 
In fact, conceptual and cultural configurations of the person and the individual 
have never been very close in history. The person turns on the idea of a mask 
64 Pitrim Sorokin (1889-1968), the founding chair of the sociology department at Harvard, was 
an opponent of Talcott Parsons' individualist sociology. Imprisoned by the Czarist regime and 
sent to exile by the Bolshevik regime, Sorokin was a Menshevik, as he continuously sought to 
draw a balance between socialism and individualism in the social-cultural contexts of Russia 
and America. Early Sorokin's work Social and Cultural Dynamics (4 vols. 1937-41) analyzed 
cultural mentalities of society cycling between ideational, sensate and idealistic types, a thesis 
summarized later in The Crisis of Our Age (1957). Directing his Research Center of Creative 
Altruism since 1943, later Sorokin published a series of empirical studies on altruistic love in 
the 1950s, in which the Christian-Catholic legacy of saints and neighbours were analyzed 
statistically, sociologically and psychologically to look for an idealistic-socialist answer to the 
crisis of our age, materialistic individualism. Presenting elaborate scientific and spiritual 
techniques to achieve altruistic love, these pioneering studies could beat any New Age self-
help books we read today. By contrast, later Parsons' writings on religion and expressive 
revolution in the 1970s pushed the social diagnosis further to a realistic-individualist model of 
human action extended from Protestant love. Specifically, Parsons connects the Protestant 
idea of affection in tenns of "gold" and "money" to a Christian order of "extended ecumenism" 
and "church" by recourse to his generalized view of the system, human system. Theoretically, 
an inner social-cultural tension between Catholicism and Protestantism shows that this 
American sociology of love and religion follows the Comtean-Durkheimian nexus in the 
shadow of a Kantian-Weberian nexus (cf. Turner, 2005). 
65 Meanwhile, Bauman's social analysis relies heavily on a post/Kantian view of morality (in 
the authorship of Levinas), targeting at a postmodern "deconstruction" of any post/Marxist 
politics. An unreserved sociological exercise of Levinas' philosophy could be found in 
Bauman's study of death and culture (Bauman, 1992). As a matter of fact, since the wane of 
Hegel's phenomenological dialectics (of civil society and the state), the Kantian turn of 
neo/Marxism had taken place a long time ago in Habennas' analysis of human knowledge 
based on different types of interest. 
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split from things, whereas the individual focuses on the idea of indivisibility as 
a thing itself (e.g. an atom) (Williams, 1983: 163, 232). On the one hand, the 
person originates in the Latin word persona. In the Indian tribes from North-
Western Americans to Australians, the person was a rigid function of a role or 
part in the clan or family (Mauss, 1979: 63-74). Although the person as a ritual 
mask had existed in Hindu and Chinese civilizations since the final two 
centuries B.C. (Brahmanism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism), later 
Oriental interpretations of the mask generally held a radical view of !-
construction as an illusion. In consequence, personal interactions based on 
faces and names contributed to the dissolution of the person in collective 
social structures (Mauss, 1979: 75-77). By contrast, a fully-fledged concept of 
the person is a long historical product of the Roman law (Le. the right of a 
personae), Stoic morality (Le. the conscience of a character), Christian 
metaphysics (Le. the substance of man or soul as such), sectarian politics and 
post/empiricist psychologies (Le. consciousnesses of the self) (Mauss, 1979: 
78-89). Closely related the notion of character, in sum, personality designates 
"the quality of being a person" in contradistinction to a thing. In conceptual 
history, the modern meaning of the person is the outcome of a semantic 
change from an outward sign to an internalized possession between the 141h 
and the early 19th century (Williams, 1983: 233-35). 
On the other hand, the individual in the sense of indivisibility can be dated 
back to medieval theology of the Trinity, physics of the 17th century, and 
empiricist logics and biology of the 18th century. In a classical sense, the 
individual was part of the group it belonged to. lt was not until modern 
economics, politics and biology of the late 18th century that the individual 
acquired an independence from group reference (Williams, 1983: 162-63). 
Furthermore, individuality has a longer conceptual history than individualism. 
From the Renaissance to Reformation, individuality represented a revolt of 
Protestantism and the Enlightenment against feudalism, whereas 
individualism was an ideological product of liberalism based on political-
economic structures of the 19th century (Williams, 1983: 164-65). In 
conceptual terms, the classical individual valued a harmony between freedom 
and equality. Individual rights were measured by "man in general" and "nature" 
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as a whole. This "individualism of equality" lasted until the late 181h century, 
culminating in the cosmopolitan idea of human rights demanded by French 
revolutionaries. By contrast, "individualism of inequality" was marked by a 
tension between freedom and equality in the post-Revolutionary period. 
Severed from natural laws, the individual became a construction of culture 
and history. In historical terms, the quantitative "singleness" of an individual 
calculated by the political economists in England and France ceded to a belief 
in the qualitative "uniqueness" of an individual by the German romanticists. 
Generally, the question of distinction in the Renaissance was replaced by the 
question of competition in the Enlightenment, and then ended up with the 
question of specialization in Romanticism (Simmel, 1971: 217-25, 269-76). In 
result, the modern individual enjoys full sovereignty as an indivisible thing. 
But there remains the confusion of the person with the individual. Bauman's 
individuated humanism remains incompatible with Luhmann's individualized 
antihumanism. However, the problem is displaced to another level between 
humanism and anti-humanism. After the polemic against French anti-
humanism (dubbed as "/a pensee 68" by Alan Renaut and Luc Ferry), Renaut 
(1997) argues further that the problem with anti-humanism is its dangerous 
assessment of modernity, which celebrates "independent" individuals at the 
price of "autonomous" human beings. The latter (humanist) tradition is derived 
from Descartes' philosophy of subjectivity, going through Kant's criticism and 
arriving at the postmodern question of "immanent transcendence" asked by 
phenomenology from Husserl to Levinas. The former (individualist) tradition 
originates in Leibniz's philosophy of monadology, going through Berkeley's 
empiricism and culminating in a tragic view of the subject from Hegel, 
Nietzsche to Heidegger. In this context, Renaut reviews Heidegger's and 
Dumont's "readings of modernity" from the opposing perspectives of the 
subject and the individual, arguing that modernity should not be reduced to a 
monadological worldview. 
From an anti-individualistic standpoint of humanism, Renaut (1997: 203) is 
opposed to "the individualistic forms of antihumanism" in the post-68 social 
thoughts. Frankly, it is only plausible to argue that French antihumanism 
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identifies with individualism, since after the human form is overcome, it would 
be hard to maintain an idea of the sovereign individual. In fact, the contrary 
appears to be the case in French social thoughts, considering that we are 
often challenged intellectually by their neologism as they try to alienate an 
indivisible being with a ghostly existence, such as supplementary traces, 
ryzomatic lines, and viral simulacra. We might venture to say that French 
antihuman ism is post-individualistic. 
Nevertheless, Renaut's distinction of the human from the individual remains a 
fruitful analysis to us for two reasons. On the one hand, Renaut's analysis, in 
a style more rigorous than Bauman's essays, provides us with a critical view 
to lay bare Beck's and Giddens' illogical and antisocial project of a second 
modernity, insofar as they advocate a cultural politics of humanity on the basis 
of an individualized society. On the other hand, if Alexander Nehamas (in 
Renaut, 1997: xviii) is right to conclude that Renaut's liberal humanism 
represents a regression to traditionalism, then Bauman's utopian future of 
humanity is in fact a recollection of the past. We must fully admit the present 
irreality of humanity. Accordingly, reflexive modernity proposes a counterfeit 
humanism on the premise of sovereign individuals: human rights are 
individual rights, privileged individual rights. Thus Renaut barks at the wrong 
tree. The spirit of humanity is caught in a state of bankruptcy due to an 
idolatry revival of humanism, not because of antihuman ism. 
The historical logic from social science to sociology is very much like a 
mythical encounter of Oedipus with Sphinx. Since Comte's suture of Humanity 
to Fate, the riddle in Rousseau's Social Contract has been answered: "man is 
forced to be free." The forced freedom of humanity is the only dream of a 
modern social life whether one follows the logic from Comte to 
· Durkheimianism or from Marx to Marxism. However, in the myth, as the riddle 
of man is solved by Oedipus, Sphinx plunges itself into the abyss, mortified 
but not dead. Similarly, after modernity, a deeper enigma lies beneath the fatal 
ground. Once the dream has become a reality, who cares about the forced 
condition of freedom, except freedom itself? Except fate, is there any other 
condition(s) of freedom on which humanity can rest itself? Or is there norie? If 
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there is only abyss, is it still human freedom? In short, what is life like after the 
forced freedom of humanity? 
We have seen how late/modern sociology devotes itself to the daily care of 
the self, enjoining individuals to carry out biographical projects by evaluating 
and managing risks inherent in the social systems. Due to the assimilation of 
sociological knowledge to social being, life after the forced freedom of 
humanity has become a nomadic life of individuals who are willing to submit 
themselves to the social body. They intensify and appropriate its vital force for 
inter/personal concerns, leaving unintended consequences to further reflexive 
control. Simply put, a late/modern individual voluntarily serves the body 
social's will to risk in exchange for his/her will to live in a state of security. 
Thus managing the risky business of life, has s/he not purchased an 
insurance policy? 
Giddens (1999) promotes the policy forcefully to the general public. He argues 
that soon after the manufactured risk takes over the external risk, bringing an 
end to traditional and natural societies of "fate," a second-degree observation 
of "new riskiness to risk" should be brought to consciousness in our runaway 
world. His pseudo-deconstructive move from fate to risk follows three 
interrelated steps. The first is a commonsense view from the present. The 
"great power" of fate (mouria), "the bringer of doom and death [sic] more 
ancient than the oldest gods," is considered as "preordained determinism" in 
opposition to "openness of future events." Meanwhile, the "moral" aspect of 
fate called "destiny'' is dismissed for its "cosmic meaning," irrespective of its 
sociological implication about collective responsibility (Giddens, 1991: 109-
10). The second is an anthropomorphic view of history. The Greek god of fate 
is succeeded by the Roman goddess of fortuna. Moreover, a Christianized 
form of fortuna is secularized in the Machiavellianism of society. Although 
Christian "Divine Providence" bears a resemblance to Greek fate, the overall 
historical rationality has plunged into the project of modernity (Giddens, 1991: 
110-111). The third is an individualist view by the self. Fortuna secularized in a 
political rationality is eventually personalized in "fateful moments," crowning 
every individual a Machiavellian prince in his/her kingdom of the self 
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(Giddens, 1991: 111-13). 
Has the late/modern world/view replaced fate with risk with success? Or, has 
it not mistaken security for risk which had been synonymous with fate? 
Moreover, has the risk-ridden society/sociology not been caught in a trap of 
fatal strategy? In a post-Marxist view, Baudrillard (2001 [1999]: 49-50) 
captures with lucidity the twist and turn of a reflexive state of mind: "the 
chosen forms of modification of the will and derivation of desire are merely 
parodies of fate. A fatal strategy, then, but a derisory one. In the absence of 
transcendent powers watching over us, and in the perpetual effort to produce 
proof of our existence, we are forced to become 'fatal' to ourselves ... AII risk-
situations, which were once man's natural lot, are today re-created artificially 
in a form of nostalgia for extremes, survival and death. A technical simulation , 
of pain and sacrifice ... the individual reinvents for himself a form of trompe-1' 
oei/ destiny as the technical hallucination unfolds-a form of artificial danger 
through which each person defies himself to exist. Like those ascetics and 
anchorites of old who subjected themselves to all kinds of ordeals in the hope 
that God would respond to their bodily torments." 
In psychoanalytic terms, the fact that risk-seeking and security-binding 
individuals affirm everything but fate betrays their defensive psychology in the 
face of plethoric social realities (cf. Groarke, 2002: 574, n.7). Theorists of risk 
society "leave intact the subject's fundamental mode of subjectivity: their 
subject remains the modem subject, able to reason and reflect freely, to 
decide on and select his/her set of norms and so on" (Zizek, 1999: 342). 
Moreover, "[t]he answer of psychoanalysis to the risk society topos of the 
global reflexivization of our lives is not that there is none the less some 
prereflexive substance called the Unconscious which resists reflexive 
mediation; the answer is to emphasize another mode of reflexivity that is 
neglected by theorists of risk society, the reflexivity at the very core of the 
Freudian subject" (Zizek, 1999: 345). In a post-psychoanalytic view, Zizek 
(1999: 345-46) adduces "numerou~ variations on this reflexivity in 
psychoanalysis": first, reflexive hysteria exhibits "the desire of non-
satisfaction"; second, obsessional neurosis displays "the desire for regulation" 
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in a "'masochistic' reflexive turn"; third, psychoanalysis itself is perverted by 
the "global reflexivization of interpretation" to end up with "the impotence of 
interpretation," since "the analyst's interpretation loses its performative 
'symbolic efficiency' and leaves the symptom intact in its idiotic jouissance." 
In this sense, a political "theory" of the third-way (including radical democracy) 
is an ideology since it theorizes nothing but merely reflects and incites the 
popular feeling that "there is no society." We are far from saying that social 
feelings are ideologies because, however much infused with the popular 
imagination of myths and magic, they stand for a natural state of affairs in 
need of respect in the first instance. Rather, our point is that a "sociological" 
theory gives itself up to the ideological apparatus when it falls for 
commonsense feelings and makes a professional gain by packaging and 
promoting them in a cultural field of distinction. This position, often obscured 
and stigmatized by the current pseudo-sociology, characterizes Durkheim's 
sociology as a "positive science" since it insists on the intellectual's 
nonidentity with social feelings in the final analysis. In a similar but reversed 
vein, Zizek (2000: 62-63) poses a "na"ive" question to those reflexive 
intellectuals, as if grumbling on behalf of the over-identified masses when 
their lives do not work out as expected: "is not the true message of the notion 
of the Third Way therefore simply that there is no second way, no actual 
alternative to global capitalism, so that, in a kind of mocking pseudo-Hegelian 
negation of negation, this much-praised Third Way' brings us back to the first 
and only way-the Third Way is simply global capitalism with a human face, 
that is, an attempt to minimize the human costs of the global capitalist 
machinery, whose functioning is left undisturbed." Indeed, do we not often 
hear similar "irresponsible" complaints made by the same people acting as 
reflexive individuals in their daily lives? And yet, who has fled from 
responsibility, the party of representation or the over-represented, the caring 
ideologue or the spoiled individual? 
If classical sociology was responsive to a national society of the late 19th 
century, then late/modern sociology is adaptive to a world society of the late 
20th century, a world of global capitalism, neoliberal democracy and 
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multiculturalism. The process of sociological adaptation might be summed up 
in a series of disillusionment. From the communitarian dream up to 1945, 
through the revolutionary hope up to 1968, to the communist promise up to 
1989, late/modern sociology come to accept the rule of the survival of the 
fittest by giving service to the only social agendas in town, which are world 
risk economy, human right politics and cosmopolitan culture. In this context, 
the reflexive discourses of love make a romanticist overdraft of the 
Enlightenment reason by enjoining us to enjoy sexuality in the name of love. 
As such, they stand for the cunning ideology of bio-politics. Un/fortunately, if 
only 9/11 had not upset the autopoetic system of late/modern 
society/sociology, we would not have bore witness again to the inhuman fate 
of love. If Badiou is right to say that the sexed truth of humanity can be seized 
only by inhumanity, then Comte's women are released from the object of 
Humanity subdued by Fate, turning into fatal subjects splitting the object from 
within. 
When social systems have been producing the code of love, one's appeal to 
sensual love in everyday life cannot create anything new, for the human body 
has become part of the problem in the problem of language. As Barthes 
(1990[1977]: 231) has shown, after lovers' discourse, body and image, an 
"oblique truth" of love might be redeemed from Kao Tsu's response to a 
monk's question: "'All things are said to be reducible to the One; but to what is 
the One reducible?' And Kao Tsu replied: When I was in the Ching district, I 
had a robe made for myself which weighed seven kin."' In Barthes' Zen-like 
logic, the virtual oneness of love is deconstructed to the discursive multiplicity 
of everyday life. But why not challenge the real multiplicity of love itself by the 
actual duality of love? When we encounter an object of true love, isn't the 
hyper/real appearance of everyday life fictionalized once again, so much so 
that love is re-experienced as an earth-shattering thought of the two split up 
from the one? 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have genealogized the concept of love in a discontinuous 
history of sociological thought which traverses from social science through 
classical sociology to reflexive sociology. Before conducting our genealogical 
research, a methodological view was carefully formulated from the theoretical 
views of Deleuze, Baudrillard, Badiou and Zizek. Accordingly, we adopted an 
evental method to subtract a subject of love who endeavors to name the truth 
of a void situation without passing through the figure of the master or 
sovereignty. This method philosophised love as an arch truth-event which 
occurs to a real life situation. In the situation, an axiomatic subject of love 
could only seize the disappearance of its evental being in the world by 
capturing a singular moment of separation from the beloved other/Other. In 
short, this approach has admitted that love in the world no longer has, if not 
never has had, an uncontested totality or harmonious nature. Therefore, an 
ideal social ontology of love, understood in a real sense, is and is able to be 
revolutionized eternally through an axiomatic reposing of its presupposition, 
the subjective truth-event of love. 
Based on this subtractive ontology, we suggest that our genealogical research 
has achieved the three aims stated in the introduction. For the first aim, we 
hope we have demonstrated that the concept of true love is a hidden agenda 
evolving within social science and classical sociology. Then, we achieved the 
goal of discriminating true love from love's simulacra reflected in reflexive 
sociological discourses. On this first level of content, we drew upon Goethe's 
model of fate to read the conceptual implications of love in sociological 
thought. The fate of love was problematized as a failed historical act in 
Comte's religion of Humanity and in Marx's politics of Communism. The fate 
of love was then problematized as formalized sexual freedom in Durkheim's 
inclusion of magical action within religious reality, in Weber's attribution of 
passion to rationality, and in Simmel's splitting of adventure and seduction. 
The fate of love was finally problematized as social risk by varying reflexive 
sociologies of modernity (Luhmann), postmodernity (Bauman), late-modernity 
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(Giddens, Beck) and non-modernity (Foucault). We suggested that they 
confused love with sexuality and mixed life politics with bio-politics since 
reflexive agency was reproduced by the code of communicative rationality, 
and so a society of reflexive practice promoted only pseudo-activity. 
Defending love's truth against its reflexive ideology, we thus delineated an 
orthodox series of sociology passing from Comte through Durkheim to 
Parsons, a series which recognized the belief of fetishism in building a social 
order (i.e. social production) prior to its maintenance (i.e. social reproduction). 
Understood in an evental sense, the recognition of a pre-ontological cause of 
society would imply that an order of true love must be generated in a life 
situation of fetishization. If this situation makes subjective fetishism an 
undecidable exception of the positive social order, then a reversible procedure 
of thought between Comtean religious sociology and Marxian political anti-
sociology might be established. However, the dream of a new order of love 
based on a possible alliance of the two social scientific cannons was 
suspended as soon as we found a calling of fraternity believed by a group of 
heterodox non/Marxist sociologists consisting of Weber, Simmel and 
Goethean Marxists. We suggested that, once settling for a fraternal morality, 
the truth-event of love was ontologized, if not further positivized, in a familial 
body of the State, Nation and/or Society. 
For the second aim, we hope we have reconfigured the conceptual event of 
love from the rigid analytic sites of philosophy and sociology diagrammed in 
the introduction. The reconfiguration can be shown in the following diagram: 
260 
Goethe's Art 
Zizekl Deleuze 
Ethic of Renunciation 
Philosophy-Marxism 
(Economy) 
Comtean 
Religion Time and Sex, or Death and Woman 
Marxian 
Politics 
Psychoanalysis-Sociology 
(Culture) 
"Social" 
Science 
Badiou/ Baudrillard 
We assumed that sociology sets its fundamental task to think life socially, a 
task involving a fresh look at the social and life from an evental horizon of true 
love. Accordingly, we argued that Goethe's art and life science induced the 
conception of a social science of love. Then, we examined the logical 
consistency of science and religion in Comte's thought before indicating 
briefly a parallel couple of science and politics in Marx's thought, only to 
realize that their failed historical acts implied the im/possibility of a religious 
politics of love. Furthermore, apart from an introductory note, we suspended a 
systematic analysis of Deleuze-Zizek's take on a religion of love and 
Baudrillard-Badiou's stance of a science of politics. Instead, we asked how 
classical non/Marxist sociologists turned to theorize culture and economy 
directly, thereby creating an ontologized (e.g. Weber's spirit of capitalism) or 
positivized (e.g. Durkheim's spirit of society) concept of love. Against the 
official perception of sociology, we interposed Badiou's philosophy of love 
after Comte and Marx and Rose-Zizek's philosophy of love before Durkheim 
in order to argue a genealogical proximity between sociology and anti-
sociological philosophy. We found that they shared a complex picture of the 
history of philosophy irreducible to the rationalistic view of modernity, a view 
which acknowledged only the maximalization of action and reality through 
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objective processes of secularization and humanization. As a result, they 
converged, with varying degrees of awareness, on the question of how the 
body-event can become a quasi-cause of the subjective order of love in the 
world. 
On this second level of form, we argued that Comte and Marx, insofar as they 
inherited Goethe's art, followed Goethe's ethic of renunciation to organize a 
social life of love. Since we read the theoretical logic of social science 
eventally, renunciation in this original context might be brought forward to a 
vital renunciation of Life and a feminine renunciation of Woman. This was why 
our progressive presentation of Goethe was foreign to the circulation of 
cultural-historical schemata of classicism, the enlightenment and romanticism 
in the Goethe scholarship. On the other hand, we found these stock images of 
Goethe recurring in a heterodox series of non/Marxist sociology. I! would have 
been possible to examine the mis/recognitions of Goethe's ethic within 
German-Russian sociology, spanning from Weber's ascetic action and 
Simmel's seduced adventure to Lukacs' praxis of fate, Bakhtin's 
predetermined chronotope and Benjamin's star of hope. However, our critical 
reading privileged Weber to the others, since this historical sociologist 
reduced Goethe's ethic of renunciation in the subtlest manner to a forced 
choice of action versus contemplation. I! was this seemingly uncontestable 
presupposition which led to subsequent philosophical-theological meditations 
on fate and hope. Against the cultural-historical moralization of renunciation in 
classical sociology, we have understood Goethe's ethic originally as a social 
science of love. That is to say, an experience of renunciation conceived as the 
end of time and sex occurs at a point of subjective destitution, thereby 
preserving a restricted action of thinking on an evental plane immanent but 
irreducible to the objective world of empirical action and theoretical 
contemplation. Contrary to intuitive expectations, we found Durkheim's 
sociology, after the social science of Comte and Marx, preserved the evental 
logic of Goethe's ethic outside the German-Russian scene through a close 
reading of his sociology. Specifically, we explored Durkheim's conceptions of 
duty and respect in his sociology of law and morality on the one hand and his 
sociology of religion and magic on the other to uncover a subversive force 
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kept hidden in his organicist theory of society. We suggested that Durkheim's 
society presupposed Goethe's renunciation as we understood it, since it could 
be constructed only by an analytic breakdown of the limits of life-time and sex-
body. In this strict genealogical sense, we maintained that Goethe's ethic of 
renunciation could have been reconsidered as a universal experience of love 
driving the historical reason of social science and sociology. 
The foregoing summation has explained why we proposed to reintroduce 
Goethe's legacy into the sociological tradition. We venture to say that his ethic 
of renunciation invites us to think again the nature of an act of true love in the 
world. In the introduction, we argued that love being a truth-event can only 
dis/appear in the world by way of separation. Now, placing the notion of 
separation in our research context of Goethe's ethic of renunciation, we stand 
sharply oppo·sed to the very idea of sociality which constitutes the sacred 
heart of sociological mentality as such. From an evental view of love, we are 
apathetic about any moral revival of sociology, including cultural sociology in 
general and sociology of personal relationships in particular. These emotional 
intellectual reactions to cognitive rationalism held by structural sociology in 
general and sociology of impersonal organizations in particular say more 
about the moral panic of sociological theory than of social reality when both 
are disoriented by the dissolution of the spirit of modernity. At bottom, 
idealizing a particular type of sociality, which might span from the couple, the 
family, friendly communities and virtual networks to the neighbourhood, 
political alliances, commercial relations and cosmic humanity, never questions 
the conventional form of proximity or togetherness, since these sociological 
"types" of sociality are content with mirroring practices of the world. 
Henceforth, the key point in our separatist concept of love is that, instead of 
chasing after yet another ideal type, one can always subtract from existing 
positive types of sociality to formalize a disappeaiing trace of true love in the 
real gap between the ideal and reality. Rendered quantatively, all "scales" of 
human relationship, insofar as they can be reduced to the idea of social bond, 
are supposed to be intimate in the last instance. Conversely speaking, 
intimate socialities can never be morally distinguished from estranged 
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socialities, not just because authentic privacy socially colludes with 
pretentious publicity, but also because the sociological idea of sociality itself is 
meant to be based on the intimate in the first place. 
By contrast, true love does not care for intimacy, but situates itself in a quasi-
religious extimacy (figured by Lacan's objet petit a, the object cause of 
desire), a target of analysis which Zizek would claim. Upon eventualizing itself 
in the world, true love subtracts a formal point of separation from positive 
types of sociality to produce a quasi-scientific politics of unbinding (figured by 
Althusser's subjectivity without subject beyond ideology and science), an aim 
of analysis which Badiou might agree. Defined as such, true love in this thesis 
conceptualizes a theoretical knot of love and politics deduced from a 
corresponding methodological knot of religion and science. 
Nonetheless, with regard to keeping the truth procedure or process of 
analysis, that is, never giving up one's analytical desire, we cannot forget 
Baudrillard. If we adopt his symbolic view of art, then true love can 
problematize the logical paradox of gift exchange in society through a 
disjunctive synthesis of relation and non-relation. There are three anti-
dialectical instances of paradox in the social exchange of gifts. The first 
instance reveals the ontological plenitude of social relations through the 
contingency of exchange, considering that people give and receive gifts as a 
voluntary, free choice. These people practice a subjective construction of true 
love in the world, because the actual web of gifts and counter-gifts stands as a 
positive proof of loving relationships in society. For them, there is a world of 
true love. The second instance reveals the ontological destitution of social 
relations through the necessity of exchange, given that people receive and 
give gifts as a detenmined, forced choice. These people practice a subjective 
destruction of true love in the world, since the virtual web of gifts and counter-
gifts stands in for a negative sign of loving relationships in society. For them, 
there is no world of true love. The third instance reveals the ontological 
axiomatization of social relations through the impossibility of exchange, 
supposing that people give and receive gifts as an undecidable choice of fate. 
These people practice a subjective subtraction of true love from the world, for 
264 
the real web of gifts and counter-gifts stands for an unnamable signifier of 
loving-and-hating relationships in society. For them, there is no world of true 
love, but true love does occur to the world through an act of renunciation. 
At this point, renunciation makes a subjective appearance not by a rejection of 
the gift exhange, but rather by an annulment of the social-relational function of 
the gift through exchange. In the first instance, true love is manifested by the 
selfs gift exchange with the other, constantly keeping contact with the other 
albeit in a subjective distance from taking part in changing the other's plight in 
a situation. Thus enjoying oneself through (the desire of) the other, as if to 
keep them on a leash by the code of togetherness, this world of true love 
produces nothing but the loving falsity of the world. In the last instance, 
however, true love is expressed through an axiomatic subject's courage to let 
go of the beloved other in the name of truth. During the truth process, the 
subject must pay the full price in each and every bound of gift exchange. And 
yet/so, the subject can stand truly within the other's life difficulties with 
patience until the disjunctive couple have delivered themselves into a new 
situation, where both are able to leave each other with no anxiety to prove 
their subjectively positive social relation with any objective gift, except for an 
eternal trace of memory impressed by their common fidelity to true love. 
For the third aim, we hope we have shed some new light on other ideological 
discourses of love which were not included or discussed sufficiently in this 
thesis. After applying an evental method to rethink a new world order of love, 
we have attained the third level of name with the master-signifier. By 
refraining from invoking and yet not sacrificing the sovereign name of the 
Other, we have learned that the production of a universal subject rests on 
nothing but the seductive efficacy of a name, insofar as this name can be 
recollected by thinking again the arch event of truth called love. 
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